
00024440

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 18 July, 2018

SOME OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE

OF

# GEORGE CANNING

VOL. I.

yy d-67

PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE
LONDON

# SOME OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE

OF

# GEORGE CANNING

EDITED, WITH NOTES, BY

EDWARD J. STAPLETON

4231

IN TWO VOLUMES

24440 ac

VOL. I.

LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
AND NEW YORK: 15 EAST 16th STREET
1887

*All rights reserved*

923.242
ean/ean/som
24440

00024440

# CONTENTS

OF

# THE FIRST VOLUME.


## 1821.

| DATE | | | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Introductory Note by Editor . . . . | | *Canning's Political Position* | 1 |
| June 21 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Holding off from Office* . . | 24 |
| „ 23 | Do. | Do. | *Do.* *Do.* . | 25 |

## 1822.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan. 12 | Mr. Canning to Mr. Huskisson . . . | *Offer of India* . . . . . | 28 |
| April 7 | Mr. Canning to M. de Chateaubriand. | *Acceptance of India* . . . | 39 |
| | Editor's Note . . . . . | *Appointment to Foreign Office* . . . . . | 43 |
| Sept. 30 | Mr. Canning to M. de Chateaubriand . | *Do.* *Do.* . | 46 |
| Nov. 15 | Memorandum for Cabinet. . . . . | *Spanish Affairs* . . . . . | 48 |
| Dec. 9 | Mr. Canning to Sir William A'Court . | *Do.* *Do.* . | 64 |
| „ 17 | Do. Do. | *Introduction of Sir P. Roche* | 67 |

## 1823.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Editor's Note . . . . . | *French Invasion of Spain* . | 69 |
| Feb. 4 | Mr. Canning to Sir Charles Stuart . . | *Canning's Remonstrance with Monsieur* . . . . . | 70 |
| „ 1 | Mr. Canning to Monsieur of France . | *Remonstrance against Invasion of Spain* . . . . . | 71 |
| „ 10 | Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Canning . . | *Interview with Monsieur* . . | 76 |
| „ 17 | Do. Do. | *Further Interview with Monsieur* . . . . . | 80 |
| „ 15 | Monsieur to Mr. Canning . . . . . | *Answer to Remonstrance* . . | 81 |
| | Editor's Note . . . . . | *French Invasion of Spain* . | 84 |
| | Memorandum by Mr. Canning . . . | *French Invasion of Spain— Policy of Great Britain* . | 85 |

| DATE | | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|---|
| June 24 | Memorandum for Cabinet by Mr. Huskisson | *House of Lords and Liberal Legislation* | 88 |
| „ 28 | Mr. Canning to Sir William A'Court | *Difficulties owing to Interregnum in Spain* | 92 |
| Sept. 18 | Do. Do. | *Do. Do.* | 93 |
| Nov. 20 | Mr. Canning to the Lord Chancellor | *As to Answering Official Letter from Pope* | 94 |
| | Memorandum from Lord Eldon | *Do. Do.* | 95 |
| Dec. 8 | Foreign Office Memorandum | *Precedents for Recognition of Revolted Colonies* | 95 |
| | Extracts of Despatches from Sir William A'Court to Mr. Canning | *French Advance into Spain* | 97–108 |
| Sept. 4 | Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Canning | *Difficulties between France and Spain* | 105 |


CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.


| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb. 7 | Thomas Hiden to Mr. Canning | *Cato Street Plot Informer* | 108 |
| „ 27 | Do. Do. | *Do. Do.* | 109 |
| | Editor's Note | *Slavery and Sugar Duties* | 109 |
| „ 18 | Mr. James Stephen to Mr. Canning | *Do. Do.* | 111 |
| „ 20 | Mr. Canning to Mr. Stephen | *Do. Do.* | 112 |
| March 16 | Mr. Stephen to Mr. Canning | *Do. Do.* | 112 |
| „ 16 | Do. Do. | *Do. Do.* | 113 |
| | Colonel de Lacy Evans [Editor's Note] | *Proposed Seizure of Cuba* | 116 |
| May 2 | Mr. James Stephen to Mr. Canning | *Pamphlet on West Indian Slavery* | 118 |
| | Mr. Joseph Hoskins [Editor's Note] | *The Conduct of Duels* | 119 |
| „ 6 | Memorandum by Mr. Daniel Stuart | *'Courier' Newspaper and its Politics* | 121 |
| „ 18 | Dr. Keate to Mr. Canning | *Eton Montem: Invitation to Dinner* | 123 |
| „ 19 | Mr. Canning to Dr. Keate | *Invitation declined* | 124 |
| Oct. 26 | Mr. Canning to Mr. Zachary Macaulay | *The African Institution* | 124 |
| „ 31 | Mr. Zachary Macaulay to Mr. Canning | *Withdrawal of Canning from List of Governors* | 125 |
| Dec. 20 | Mr. Vulliamy to Mr. Canning | *Watches and Presents to Diplomatists* | 126 |
| „ 22 | Mr. Canning to Mr. Vulliamy | *Do. Do.* | 129 |
| „ 13 | Mr. Canning to Mr. Giffard | *Mr. David Robinson and the 'Quarterly'* | 129 |
| „ 13 | Mr. Giffard to Mr. Canning | *Do. Do.* | 129 |
| „ 23 | Mr. Thomas Mulock to Mr. Canning | *Mr. North and his Oratory* | 131 |
| „ 25 | Mr. Canning to Mr. Mulock | *Do. Do.* | 132 |

## 1824.


| DATE | | | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jan. 9 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *West Indian Slavery* | 134 |
| „ 19 | Do | Do. | *King's Speech* | 134 |
| „ 19 | Do. | Do. | *Vacant Deanery of Christ Church* | 135 |
| Feb. 13 | Do. | Do. | *As to Despatch relative to Spanish Colonies* | 136 |
| „ 26 | Do. | Do. | *Irish Education Commission* | 137 |
| | Editor's Note | | *Spanish American Colonies* | 137 |
| Jan. 26 | M. de Chateaubriand to M. de Polignac | | *Recognition of Independence of Spanish American Colonies* | 138 |
| Feb. 21 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Mourning for King of Sardinia* | 145 |
| „ 21 | Earl of Liverpool to Mr. Canning | | *Do.* *Do.* | 145 |
| March 7 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Lord Eldon's Procrastination* | 145 |
| „ 3 | Do. | Do. | *Lord Mayor's Banquet* | 147 |
| „ 24 | Do. | Do. | *Do.* *Do.* | 148 |
| July 7 | Do. | Do. | *Vacancy in Irish Representative Peers* | 149 |
| „ 29 | Do. | Do. | *Supposed Evacuation of the Principalities* | 150 |
| „ 30 | Do. | Do. | *Talk with new Spanish Prime Minister* | 150 |
| Aug. 8 | Do. | Do. | *French Troops in Spain* | 152 |
| | Editor's Note | | *Misconduct of Spanish Government; Lord Granville's appointment to Paris* | 152 |
| „ 17 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Conferences as to Brazil; Diplomatic Changes* | 153 |
| | Editor's Note | | *Spanish Colonies; Diplomatic Arrangements* | 156 |
| Sept. 11 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Visit to Ireland* | 159 |
| „ 11 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Do.* *Do.* | 160 |
| „ 18 | Do. | Do. | *Rumour of Death of King of France; Reception in Ireland* | 161 |
| „ 24 | Do. | Do. | *Mission of Condolence to France* | 164 |
| Oct. 10 | Do. | Do. | *The King and Sir Charles Stuart* | 168 |

| DATE | | | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct. 12 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *The King and Sir Charles Stuart* | 171 |
| „ 12 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Do.* *Do.* | 173 |
| „ 14 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Do.* *Do.* | 174 |
| „ 14 | Do. | Do. | *Sir C. Stuart and Governorship of Madras* | 174 |
| „ 17 | Do. | Do. | *North-West Coast of America; Conferences on Greece; British Embassy at Lisbon* | 177 |
| „ 25 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Mission of Condolence* | 180 |
| „ 27 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Sir C. Bagot; Sir C. Stuart; Canning's claims to disposal of Diplomatic Patronage* | 182 |
| Nov. 5 | Do. | Do. | *Greek Question* | 188 |
| „ 11 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville. | | *Diplomatic Business at Paris* | 190 |
| „ 13 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Spanish Colonies; Portugal and Brazil* | 192 |
| | Editor's Note | | *Portugal and Brazil* | 193 |
| „ 13 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *France and Portugal* | 195 |
| „ 16 | Do. | Do. | *Greek Appeal for Help* | 197 |
| „ 16 | Do. | Do. | *Spanish Colonies and Supply of Armament* | 198 |
| „ 18 | Do. | Do. | *Sir C. Stuart and his Destination* | 200 |
| „ 20 | Do. | Do. | *Do.* *Do.* | 201 |
| „ 21 | Do. | Do. | *Russia and Greece; Lord Granville's Reception at Paris* | 203 |
| „ 23 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Views of King of France; Lord Granville's Reception at Paris* | 205 |
| „ 25 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Occupation of Spanish Fortresses by France* | 209 |
| „ 26 | Do. | Do. | *Situation as regards Spain* | 209 |
| „ 27 | Do. | Do. | *Do.* *Do.* | 210 |
| Dec. 8 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville. | | *France and Greek Affairs* | 211 |
| „ 11 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *As to Lord Liverpool's Memorandum on Spanish Colonies* | 212 |
| „ 14 | Do. | Do. | *Do.* *Do., and Opinions of Members of Cabinet* | 213 |
| „ 20 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Withdrawal of French Troops from Spain* | 214 |

| DATE | | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dec. 27 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool | | *Lord Westmoreland and Subserra; Views of Chateaubriand* . . . . . 217 |
| „ 31 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | . | *Lord Granville's Indolence; Spanish America* . . . 217 |


CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.


| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan. 9 | Mr. Lewis Goldsmith [Editor's Note] | | *Revival of Order of Knights of Malta* . . . . . 219 |
| Feb. 12 | Captain Charles Napier [Editor's Note] | | *Steam between London and Mayence* . . . . . 219 |
| April 3 | Anonymous . . . . . | | *French Warlike Preparations* . . . . . 220 |
| Aug. 5 | Mr. Hutchinson . . . . . | | *Borough of Callington* . . 221 |
| „ 26 | Mr. Hyde Villiers . . . . . | | *England and Greek War of Independence* . . . . . 222 |
| Sept. 8 | Mr. William Giffard . . . . . | | *Retirement from Editing 'Quarterly'* . . . . . 224 |
| Oct. 4 | Mr. Zachary Macaulay . . . . . | | *West Indian Slavery* . . . 227 |
| „ 8 | Do. Do. . . . . | | *Do. Do.* . 227 |
| „ 5 | Mr. Canning to Mr. Zachary Macaulay | | *Do. Do.* . 228 |
| Dec. 6 | Mr. R. T. Blewitt . . . . . | | *French Regicides* . . . . 229 |


1825.


| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan. 10 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | . | *Greek War* . . . . . 231 |
| „ 14 | Do. | Do. | *Russian Offer of Aid to Spain* . . . . . 232 |
| „ 17 | Do. | Do. | *Entertainment at Bristol; Russia and Greece; Hayti; Portugal* . . . . . 234 |
| „ 21 | Do. | Do. | *Villèle's Private Communications* . . . . . 239 |
| „ 30 | Mr. Canning to Earl of Liverpool | . . | *The King's Speech* . . . . 240 |
| Feb. 15 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | . | *Catholic Association; Austria and Spanish Colonies; Miss Canning's Engagement* . . . . . 241 |
| | Editor's Note . . . . . | | *On topic of preceding letter* . 242 |
| „ 18 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | . | *Catholic Association Debate; Villèle's Communications* . 245 |

| DATE | | | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb. 22 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Catholic Association Debate; Composition of Despatches* | 250 |
| | Editor's Note | | *Catholic Question; Instructions to Ambassadors* | 251 |
| March 4 | Austrian Government—Opinion | | *Greek Question* | 254 |
| ,, 9 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Portugal and Brazil* | 255 |
| ,, 11 | Do. | Do. | *Prince Metternich* | 257 |
| ,, 25 | Do. | Do. | *Recognition of Spanish Colonies* | 260 |
| April 1 | Do. | Do. | *Prince Metternich: Title of Emperor* | 261 |
| ,, 19 | Do. | Do. | *Catholic Question: Voting in Lords* | 263 |
| ,, 19 | Do. | Do. | *France, and St. Domingo, Cuba, and Cadiz* | 265 |
| | Editor's Note | | *French Proceedings at Hayti* | 266 |
| ,, 26 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool | | *Panama Canal* | 268 |
| May 18 | Do. | Do. | *The Cabinet and the Catholic Question* | 269 |
| ,, 27 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *The Catholic Question in Parliament* | 270 |
| June 3 | Do. | Do. | *The Catholic Question and a Dissolution* | 271 |
| ,, 6 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool | | *American States and Panama Canal* | 273 |
| ,, 7 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Duke of Cumberland; France and Oyster Fisheries* | 274 |
| ,, 21 | Do. | Do. | *France, and St. Domingo and Cuba* | 275 |
| ,, 28 | Do. | Do. | *Business at End of Session* | 278 |
| July 8 | Do. | Do. | *France, and St. Domingo and Cuba* | 279 |
| ,, 12 | Do. | Do. | *Do. Do.* | 281 |
| Aug. 6 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool | | *Interview with United States Minister* | 283 |
| ,, 13 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Prince Metternich; Prussia and the Independence of Spanish America; Mexican Treaty* | 284 |
| ,, 21 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool | | *Amusement at the Lakes; the Duke of Wellington* | 287 |
| Sept. 5 | Do. | Do. | *Catholic Question and a Dissolution* | 289 |
| | Editor's Notes | | *Do. Do.* | 291 |

| DATE | | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sept. 12 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool | | *Catholic Question, and the Corn Laws and a Dissolution* . . . . . 293 |
| „ 18 | Do. | Do. | *Earl of Mount-Cashell and Irish Representative Peerage* . . . . . 296 |
| Oct. 13 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Foreign Office Work: Remonstrance for Indolence* . . 297 |
| „ 13 | Mr. Canning to Mr. Huskisson . . . | | *Badly drawn Order in Council* . . . . . 300 |
| „ 14 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Missing Papers; and Irish Representative Peerage* . 301 |
| „ 17 | Mr. Huskisson to Mr. Canning . . . | | *Conversation with King Charles X. of France* . . 303 |
| „ 19 | Mr. Canning to the King . . . . . | | *The Catholic Question* . . 307 |
| „ 21 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Reception of Ministers of recognised Spanish Colonies* 308 |
| „ 21 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Do. Do. George IV.'s Behaviour* . . 309 |
| „ 23 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Lord Wellesley's Behaviour; State of Office Business* . 312 |
| „ 25 | Memorandum by Mr. Canning . . . | | *Interview with Count Lieven* . . . . . 313 |
| „ 25 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Lord Wellesley's Behaviour*. 316 |
| „ 25 | Do. | Do. | *Russian Overtures of Confidence; Prince Metternich* . . . . . 317 |
| „ 31 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Arrival of Intelligence* . . 318 |
| Nov. 5 | Do. | Do. | *Major Gurwood* . . . . . 320 |
| | Mr. Canning to Sir George Cockburn (Memorandum) | | *British Naval Force in Mediterranean* . . . . 321 |
| „ 13 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *George IV.'s Overtures of Confidence in Canning*. . 322 |
| | Editor's Note . . . . . | | *Portugal and Brazil* . . . 323 |
| „ 14 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville | | *Accidental Publication of a Despatch offensive to French Government* . . 327 |
| „ 17 | Do. | Do. | *The 'Gabrielle'; Sir Sydney Smith* . . . . . 330 |
| „ 18 | Do. | Do. | *Major Gurwood* . . . . . 331 |
| „ 18 | Do. | Do. | *Duel by a Member of Staff of Embassy at Paris* . . . 332 |
| „ 27 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool. | | *Draft Despatches for Stuart at Rio Janeiro* . . . . 333 |
| „ 27 | Do. | Do. | *Lord Wellesley's Behaviour*. 335 |

| DATE | | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nov. 27 | Mr. Canning to the Earl of Liverpool . | *Irish Representative Peerage* | 336 |
| Dec. 6 | Do. Do. | *Lord William Bentinck. Irish Representative Peerage* . . . . . | 337 |
| „ 8 | Do. Do. | *Do. Do.* | 339 |
| „ 9 | Mr. Canning to the King . . . . . | *Sir Charles Stuart's Behaviour* . . . . . | 341 |
| „ 9 | The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Canning | *Russia and Turkey* . . . | 346 |
| „ 26 | Mr. Canning to Viscount Granville . . | *Lord Strangford: Mistake at St. Petersburg* . . . . | 347 |

CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb. 3 | Mr. John Gale Jones [Editor's Note] . | *Chartist Agitators* . . . . | 349 |
| | Mr. Cobbett . . . . . | *Advertisement of Book* . . | 350 |
| „ 12 | Anonymous ('H. T.') . . . . . | *Catholic Question and treating with Rome* . . . . | 351 |
| | T. Hipkins and Robert B. Pitman [Editor's Note] | *Panama Canal Scheme* . . | 353 |
| | Mr. George Angelo . . . . . | *As to his Poetry* . . . . | 354 |
| April 13 | Mr. Canning to the Ladies of Llangollen | *Introduces his Daughter, Lady Clanricarde* . . . | 355 |
| „ 18 | Ladies of Llangollen to Mr. Canning . | *Welcome the Proposal* . . | 355 |
| „ 24 | Do. Do. | *Express delight at having seen Lady Clanricarde* . | 356 |
| „ 25 | The Rev. J. S. Sawbridge . . . . . | *The true Doctrine of the Sacrament and Mr. Canning's Speech* . . . . . | 357 |
| June 3 | Mr. Canning to Rev. J. S. Sawbridge . | *Explains his meaning* . . . | 359 |
| May 1 | Sir Richard Clayton . . . . . | *Extract of French newspaper applauding Mr. Canning* . | 360 |
| „ 11 | Mr. Canning to Dr. Phillpotts . . | *The Athanasian Creed* . . | 363 |
| June 2 | Mr. John Vernon . . . . . | *A model Slave Estate* . . . | 363 |
| „ 9 | Mr. Canning to Mr. John Vernon [Editor's Note] | . . . . . | 365 |
| | M—— J—— . . . . . | *Scheme for Suppression of Vice* . . . . . | 365 |
| „ 20 | 'Amicus' (Anon.) . . . . . | *Russian Politics* . . . . | 366 |
| „ 24 | The Marchioness of —— . . . . . | *Wants a place for her Son's Doctor* . . . . . | 368 |
| „ 26 | Mr. Canning to Lady D. . . . . | *Declines to comply with request* . . . . . | 369 |
| | Lady D. to Mr. Canning . . . . . | *Explains further the case, and complains of misconstruction* . . . . . | 369 |

| DATE | | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|---|
| June 29 | Mr. Canning to Lady D. | *Points out there was no misconstruction* | 369 |
| July 11 | The Rev. J. S. Sawbridge | *As to Transubstantiation.* | 371 |
| „ 12 | Mr. Canning to the Hon. Butler Clarke | *Declines to Sign a Petition on Irish Affairs* | 372 |
| „ 19 | Mr. R. Kinsman | *The Borough of Callington: offer of Seat* | 374 |
| Aug. 13 | Mr. Canning to Mr. Kinsman | *Offer of Seat declined* | 375 |
| July 22 | Anon. ('An English Gentleman') | *Letters in Foreign Office Bags* | 375 |
| „ 26 | Mr. Canning to Mrs. Bolton | *Visit to the Lakes* | 376 |
| | Anonymous | *New High Tory Newspaper* | 377 |
| Sept. 26 | The Rev. A. Burnaby | *Determination to obtain a Preferment in the Church.* | 378 |
| | Mr. Jones [Editor's Note] | *Poetry on Sir J. Hippisley* | 379 |
| Oct. 22 | John Shaw | *Protest against War* | 380 |
| „ 25 | Mr. S. Kent | *For intercession with Portuguese Government on behalf of a Friend* | 382 |
| „ 29 | Mr. Canning to Mr. S. Kent | *Explains impossibility of interference* | 386 |
| „ 15 | Count de B——o | *Wants Money* | 387 |
| Nov. 21 | Mr. W. Wordsworth | *A Canvass in the matter of his Son's Candidateship for a Fellowship at Merton College, Oxford* | 391 |
| „ 26 | Mr. Canning to Mr. W. Wordsworth | *Expresses willingness to help* | 392 |
| „ 30 | Mr. W. Wordsworth | *Application withdrawn* | 393 |

SOME

# OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE

OF

# GEORGE CANNING.

## 1820–22.

THE story of the life of George Canning, one of the most illustrious statesmen of the first quarter of the present century, has never yet been fully told. 1820

The collection of letters and other papers belonging to Canning, here edited and published for the first time, will be found, it is believed, a contribution of considerable value to the existing stock of knowledge of his career, particularly of the latter and more important incidents of his life. But it must be admitted that they are far from completing the whole record of the eventful history; in truth, they only serve to supplement in part two works published at various dates by the late Mr. Augustus Stapleton, dealing with the same subject.

The first of these works, entitled 'The Political Life of George Canning,' published in 1831, furnishes the reader with a most useful summary and defence of Canning's foreign and domestic policy from 1822 to 1827. The author was fully qualified for his task, as he wrote when fresh from a period of confidential and friendly relations with the subject of his memoir. He brought into the work large quantities of extracts from Canning's private political papers, of which the contents had been entrusted to him by Canning's representatives with a view to vindicate the political memory of the deceased statesman from the aspersions of partisan enemies after his death. Both politicians and historians have found this work a mine of useful information; though, owing to the avowed purpose for which it was written, it perhaps appears to the reader of a later generation somewhat too much of a pamphlet in structure, and deficient in the

1820 dates and landmarks which might help the less well-informed reader of after time to grasp a consecutive idea of the events to which it refers:- besides, its scope is limited to foreign affairs, and to the three or four leading questions of domestic policy in which Canning took an active part.

The second work on George Canning, by the same author, was published in 1859, and entitled 'George Canning and his Times.' At this later date Mr. Stapleton found himself free to use many private letters and confidential memoranda, which had either come into his possession at the time of Canning's death, or had been subsequently given to him for the purpose of publication; he could therefore now show much more of Canning as a man, and could bring into view events of the earlier part of Canning's life. The volume, no doubt, failed to furnish all the information that might be desired; but, with no pretence to exhaust the subject, it sketched out from original documents a trustworthy outline of the whole of his career.

The only fault, if fault it be, is that the biographer, naturally an ardent admirer of Canning's political judgment, still devoted himself greatly, though not to the extent of the first work, to expounding and justifying the utterances of that judgment.

The reader, therefore, finds himself rather too much in the atmosphere of debatable politics.

Both the foregoing works, then, appear to have been written 'with a purpose,' and a purpose of a largely polemical nature; the material not conducive to such purpose the author laid aside as inappropriate and unserviceable.

But when dissociated from the idea of a particular purpose, the balance of material then discarded appeared to be not altogether uninteresting. It has therefore been gathered together, arranged in chronological order, and explained, when possible, by a running commentary.

---

One or two problems present themselves on the threshold, which seem to require some little discussion and speculation to assist the reader to a judgment in the absence of more decisive information; and they are here treated as much as possible in a manner free from partisan or provocative intention.

These problems will now be discussed. The first that presents itself is to account satisfactorily for Canning's absence from office during the period from December 1820 to September 1822.

It will help to explain the solution to be presently offered if the following synopsis of the state of public affairs, and of Canning's political relations from 1814 to 1822, be borne in mind.

In the autumn of 1814, Canning accepted the Lisbon Embassy. 1820
In the spring of 1816, having returned to England, he entered the Ministry as President of the Board of Control, an office equivalent in most respects to that of Secretary of State for India in the present time.

In the autumn of 1816, the prolonged war being now terminated, the artificial state of trade begotten thereby likewise came to an end, and a painful reaction set in. A bad harvest supervened, followed by symptoms of widespread disaffection throughout the country; marked, in particular, by a vast but abortive insurrectionary meeting which took place in Spa Fields, London.

In 1817 the disturbed state of the country continued unabated, or rather, aggravated; discontent and scarcity prevailed, and four Acts of Parliament for suppressing sedition were passed; the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended, in the first instance to the end of the session, and then during the recess.

In 1818 an increase in the supply of food temporarily alleviated the distress of the people, popular discontent abated, and the stringency of the repressive measures was relaxed.

In 1819 a return of scarcity again afflicted the nation; more popular violence broke out, and again a large meeting directed against existing institutions took place, this time at Manchester. The crisis rose to such a height that in November Parliament was called together to pass what were known as 'the Six Acts,' for more effectually suppressing revolutionary conspiracies and violence.

Altogether, during these four years the nation appeared to be greatly suffering in material respects, and deeply discontented in matters political; while the Government, under the guidance of Lords Castlereagh and Sidmouth, limited its efforts to maintaining order and suppressing outbreaks of violence, and apparently never thought of setting itself to devise adequate means of mitigating or abating the grievances complained of by the people.

As to foreign affairs, in 1815, while Canning was absent from England and from power, the treaties of Vienna had been concluded, under the auspices of Lord Castlereagh, upon terms singularly regardless of the rights and liberties of various countries and peoples on the Continent: the formation of the Holy Alliance as a European Police naturally followed, to enforce the unpopular obligations of the Vienna treaties; in consequence, by the time of the year 1819 a spirit of bitter disaffection to the then existing forms of government, never altogether absent from the European populations, had spread and intensified to a dangerous degree on the Continent.

The German nations had been grievously disappointed of their promised 'free constitution,' and found themselves under the rod of

1820 iron despotism ; both the Italian and the Spanish peninsulas groaned under Governments forced upon them, and in France a formidable proportion of the population undisguisedly hated and abused the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty.

Finally, England, in participating in the treaties of Vienna, appeared to lend her countenance to the reign of tyranny on the Continent, and, without winning the respect of the Governments, lost all touch with the peoples of Europe. Such was the critical state of affairs at home and abroad at the end of 1819.

In the course of 1820 three revolutionary explosions occurred in the south of Europe—in Spain, Portugal, and Naples respectively.

The utility of the Holy Alliance now became manifest, and the despotic monarchs began to arrange conferences, and to take counsel how best to employ their good understanding and organised confederation in suppressing with the least possible delay these dangerous and infectious movements of the people.

In January of the same year George III. had died, and George IV. became king ; on June 7 following, Caroline, the separated and disgraced wife of George IV., now become Queen Consort, entered London amidst great popular excitement, to lay claim to her regal position ; on the 25th of the same month Canning warned George IV. that he could not join in action against the Queen. Early in August Canning went abroad to avoid becoming mixed up in the proceedings against the Queen ; on August 17 the trial commenced ; on November 10 the Government carried the Bill of Pains and Penalties on the second reading by a majority of only nine in the House of Lords ; on the next day they withdrew the Bill ; on December 11 Canning resigned office.

In June 1821 Lord Liverpool found himself in a position to offer either the Admiralty or the Home Office to Canning, but the King resisted ; and Canning wrote the first letter of the present series to hold back Lord Liverpool from pressing him on the King.

Lord Liverpool again brought the question of Canning's return to office before the King after the King came back from Ireland in August 1821 ; the King would not listen, and departed for Hanover without settling the matter.

Shortly afterwards there took place negociations for Canning's appointment to the Governor-Generalship of India, which appears to have originated with the King with a view to escape Lord Liverpool's continual importunities, and to get Canning out of the way. The King's object was now less difficult, inasmuch as the Government had been strengthened by the accession of the Grenville party to their official ranks, and of the Marquis Wellesley and Mr. Plunket to

the Irish Administration, which had diminished Lord Liverpool's political necessities, and reduced the urgency of his demands for help. 1820

At the beginning of April 1822, Canning accepted India, and spent the ensuing summer in making preparations for departure; on August 12 Lord Londonderry died; on September 12 Canning received the seals of the Foreign Office.

It has been said that the first problem to be met with in these papers is to account satisfactorily for Canning's absence from office from December 1820 to September 1822.

That this is a genuine problem appears in the difficulty of recognising the adequacy of the reasons publicly assigned for this voluntary eclipse. Canning had had no kind of scruple in serving with the same colleagues from 1816 to 1820. The Cabinet continued to be made up of his personal and political friends. A very particular friend, Lord Liverpool, remained at its head. During these four troublous years he had supported his colleagues in their measures to preserve order and to suppress sedition, and had co-operated with them in their opposition to reform of Parliament. He had entered into friendly relations with Lord Castlereagh, which had extended even to collaboration in Foreign Office work. Lord Castlereagh, in a letter expressing regret at Canning's retirement, dated December 19, 1820, and published in 'Life and Times,' p. 319, cordially thanked Canning 'for the uniform attention with which you have followed 'up, and the kindness with which you have assisted me in the business 'of the department for the conduct of which I am more immediately 'responsible.'

Mr. Stapleton, in the 'Political Life,' vol. i. pp. 299-302, points out the various circumstances which make it probable that one of the most important State papers issued from the Foreign Office in May 1820, about a month before Canning ceased to attend the Cabinet, owed its composition to Canning's pen adopted by Lord Castlereagh. With India to supervise, with this degree of influence at the Foreign Office conceded by his colleagues, and with an apparent general harmony of domestic policy, it seems hard to say exactly why Canning found it impossible for him to continue in the confidential counsels of his friends in the time of the summer of 1820.

This is not quite the same question as why George IV. so persistently opposed Canning's succession to Lord Castlereagh in August 1822. The one now under consideration depends upon Canning and his political views of the state of the nation in 1820. The later question depends upon George IV., and the opinion his Majesty had formed of Canning, and of Canning's political conduct just before. Each has its difficulties, only they are not the same on the two occasions.

1820 There can be no question, as appears from the papers published in 'Life and Times,' that Canning ostensibly retired on the ground that, having been once a confidential adviser of Queen Caroline, he could not honestly exercise the functions of confidential adviser to Queen Caroline's husband and prosecutor.

It may be admitted that this furnishes a good enough excuse for temporary retirement pending the Queen's trial; but it fails to account for a persistent withdrawal after the trial was over.

On the question of the temporary retirement, it appears from the memorandum dated January 25, 1820, published at p. 290 of 'Life and Times,' that George IV. took Canning's offer to retire and declared intention at least to stand aloof in very good part, and in fact complimented his Minister on his manly and straightforward conduct, and eventually desired him to remain in office on his own terms.

This concession to Canning did not necessarily create any serious difficulty at the time, as all the autumn proceedings took place in the House of Lords, so that there was no urgent need for auxiliary eloquence to assist the Government in the House of Commons.

By the time the Queen's trial was over, there is no evidence of pressure being brought to bear on Canning to retire, either on the part of the King, or on the part of his colleagues; on the contrary, from what is known the general tone seems to have been one of regret and remonstrance against it.

On December 12, 1820, Canning again submitted his resignation; his only excuse is in paragraph 5 of the letter to the King published at pp. 316–17 of 'Life and Times,' where he alleges that 'the dis-'cussions respecting the Queen which may now be expected in the 'House of Commons will be so much intermixed with the general 'business of the session, that a Minister could not absent himself 'from them without appearing virtually to abandon the Parliamen-'tary duties of his station. On the other hand, to be present as a 'Minister taking no part in the discussions must produce not only 'the most painful embarrassment to himself, but the greatest per-'plexity to his colleagues, and the utmost disadvantage to the conduct 'of your Majesty's affairs.'

Now, it is evident from the superlatives of this passage that it magnifies as much as possible the inconvenience to be apprehended from Canning's retirement, and implies that Canning considered his position in the House of Commons would forbid his continuing to hold his peace when matters respecting the Queen came on for discussion. The Parliamentary services of an ordinary Minister can be often dispensed with, and as regards particular offices, some of them rarely call upon their holders for efforts in debate; of such offices

the Board of Control, the India Office of the period, least of all demanded that its President should mingle in the daily political fray of the House of Commons: to mix up India with the Queen's trial really required an ingenuity which it was unnecessary to anticipate. Canning apparently wished to excuse himself somewhat as follows:—'Holding the views I do, if I remain in office it is desirable 'I should be silent; and yet both my own reputation as a debater 'and a statesman, and also the credit of the Government to which I 'belong, would alike suffer seriously from such reserve.' The precise weight of this argument for separation is a matter of opinion: an argument which mainly depends upon the estimate a man may place upon his own powers and importance can never be conclusive, but always liable to contradiction. 1820

Great as was Canning's position, it may be doubted whether it imposed this kind of inevitable necessity for speaking in Parliament; and perhaps Canning was not quite sincere when he insisted that it did. Moreover, the Queen's position in December by no means remained what it appeared in June. In June, in the absence of the presumptions of guilt subsequently brought into formal publicity, she could claim to be treated as innocent, and could appeal to the country for protection against the penal proceedings which threatened her; but in December, though the proceedings had failed, a heavy presumption of her guilt had been publicly established, while in points of personal peril she was perfectly safe from molestation. The exigency which previously rested on her former or present friends to aid and countenance her to the best of their ability had indefinitely diminished in force; they might acknowledge a call to shield her from aggression, but hardly to sustain her pretensions to the honours of innocence.

It is conceivable that Canning, as a former friend and adviser of the Queen, might without censure, and even with praise, have adopted in the session of 1821 a position nearly to the following effect: he could decline to join in a sense hostile to her Majesty in any discussion on her affairs in Parliament; on the other hand, if such abstinence did not involve the displeasure of the King or of the Cabinet, he might honourably insist that, as already a confidential servant of the Crown, it was not imperative on him to resign his post only to attain a liberty of action already conceded to him. He might repudiate the idea that, even if free from the trammels of office, he was bound to enter on any undertaking to avenge the wrongs of the Queen, seeing that, however badly the King had behaved, her Majesty's conduct had been proved, to say the least, to be wanting in discretion and outward decency. It is apparently a paradox, but none the

1820 less true, that to disregard the canons of morality is less dangerous to an offender than to defy the public opinion which upholds those canons: the loss of self-respect is greater in the defiance of public decency than in the original lapse from morality. Her Majesty's recklessness had released her friends from the obligation to vindicate her character.

And in adopting such a line there would have been no deception or unfairness. Canning's views on the Queen's business were well known and undisguised. Besides, the consequences of his conduct, if governed by those views, would fall upon the King and the Administration; the responsibility rested with them; if *they* did not choose to raise the objections mentioned by Canning to his continuing in office, it hardly lay with *him* to insist on them; and when his Master and colleagues alike showed themselves reluctant to lose his services, notwithstanding a warning as to his Parliamentary conduct, it must be confessed that his impracticability must have seemed captious and unreasonable, and wanting in sincerity on the point in difference. It is therefore suggested that the Queen's affairs were only an excuse, scarcely an adequate excuse, and, under the circumstances, one giving rise to conjectures that other and more powerful motives secretly influenced Canning to act as he did at this conjuncture.

If, then, the pretext put forth by Canning for his retirement in December 1820 appears inadequate, the question remains, what might be those other motives which it is surmised existed, but could not be advanced in public, and which privately operated so powerfully on Canning's political conduct?

First, then, let us state in a few words what it is permissible to infer as to Canning's political principle.

There can be no doubt he was truly 'Conservative' (to use a modern expression), and considered it his duty to defend to the last extremity a constitutional and hereditary Protestant monarchy, an Established Church, a House of Lords, and a House of Commons elected by narrow constituencies, such as had grown up during the previous century and a half; it is conceivable that in process of time Canning might have conceded a larger basis for the constituencies; but he held that on no account should the House of Commons become a 'National Assembly,' so directly reflecting the changing moods of the body of the nation that no other power could stand before it. This Conservative creed, honestly and fervently held and maintained, kept Canning in the Tory camp, and separated him from the Whig-Radical element in politics, which aimed at subverting the then existing balance of the constitution.

In other respects Canning's views seem to have been what are

now called 'Liberal:' he advocated Catholic Emancipation as far as Ireland was concerned; he advocated measures tending to free trade in commerce, and co-operated with friends like Huskisson, who worked steadily in that direction. He must have regarded with anxious and compassionate feelings the distress and discontent which had recently evoked such alarming symptoms in the working classes of Great Britain. Above all (as he was able subsequently to prove in action), he sympathised with the oppressed nations of Europe, and profoundly resented the action of the vast military confederacy which crushed the liberties and overwhelmed the struggling peoples on the Continent. 1820

Now, what was his position? He could not but feel conscious that his abilities and experience qualified him for the places of highest authority in the Government, and that his liberal principles peculiarly fitted him to deal with the problems which threatened to become more dangerous to the body politic every day; but he was powerless, he could do nothing. Lord Castlereagh possessed and was publicly credited with the possession of the direction of the policy of the Cabinet, and Canning could hardly even protest against, he certainly could not overrule, the resolutions of Lords Liverpool and Castlereagh, confirmed by the Chancellor and the Duke of Wellington.

And in the winter of 1820 the dangers of the situation waxed greater and greater. Disaffection in Ireland was chronic, and might be set on one side as incurable, and for the moment it did not obtrude itself with any unusual significance, though Canning had what he believed would be a remedy for that too; but in Great Britain disaffection in the manufacturing towns, disaffection in the metropolis, dangerous disaffection amongst the troops, promised shortly, if not abated, to grow to revolutionary heights, certainly to upset the Ministry, not impossibly to overthrow the monarchy. The reader may learn from Canning's letters to Lord Liverpool and to Huskisson, printed in 'Life and Times,' chap. xviii., how imminent Canning considered the peril in which the monarchy stood during the storm raised about the Queen's trial.

While on the Continent the Holy Alliance, under the guidance of Metternich, took counsel how to bring under their supremacy the lesser powers of Europe, and how to extinguish by violence the feeble efforts at freedom which had blazed up in the independent countries of Spain and Portugal and Italy. These proceedings, and the insufficiency of the Government to cope with them, must have caused great anxiety to a sensitive statesman like Canning, who felt confident of his own capacity for guiding the State, but who was powerless to rectify errors in policy.

1820 Castlereagh might consult him, but Castlereagh was master, and the policy of Castlereagh and of the Government harmonised on every side with the repressive principles of the despots of the Continent.

How sympathetic with Metternich and the absolutist monarchies on the Continent Lord Castlereagh really was, and how Lord Castlereagh discounted in private the value of any protests against their arbitrary policy he might be obliged to make in public, by laying the responsibility of such protests on the urgencies of Parliamentary government, may be seen in several of the private political letters published in vol. xii. of the 'Castlereagh Correspondence.'

For instance, writing to Lord Stewart on February 13, 1820, p. 213, Lord Castlereagh uses language which would have been utterly abhorrent to Canning :—

'This of course puts an end to the pleasure I should have had in 'officially talking over in this country with Prince Metternich all our 'future plans for settling and keeping the world at peace. . . . I 'should have proposed to myself the utmost possible advantage from 'endeavouring to explain to him (Prince Metternich) on the spot the 'many peculiarities, which in this country must be attended to, in the 'management of certain points of foreign politics. I am satisfied 'that in a few days of personal interview we should so thoroughly have 'understood each other, that our correspondence for some time at 'least would be nothing more than a detail of events.'

So we find that Lord Castlereagh proposed to join Metternich in 'future plans for settling the world ;' that he referred disdainfully to the British Parliamentary system as 'the many peculiarities,' and that he was confident that he and Metternich would have 'thoroughly 'understood each other.'

Metternich, in reply, on March 7 following (p. 219), confidently calls on Lord Castlereagh to provide for '*l'uniformité la plus entière* '*de la marche de nos représentans à Paris* :' he winds up by invoking Lord Castlereagh's sympathy with his '*principes.*'

This secret concord with the views of the Continental Powers, being well known to the Ministers of those Powers, effectually neutralised the effect of the public manifestoes occasionally put forth to satisfy Parliament and Canning.

Besides all this, Lord Castlereagh's domestic policy in Ireland and in England attracted the uncompromising hatred of all lovers of freedom in both countries, and, as has been observed, might be expected in no long period of time to raise hostility to a degree which would imperil at least the Administration, if not the throne itself.

To remain in office was for Canning to sanction that policy, foreign and domestic.

The aim and object of Canning's withdrawal, therefore, simply was to avoid any longer sharing the dangerous responsibility of the Government, and serving with, or rather under, Lord Castlereagh; and rather than continue so to do, he resolved, at any risk short of personally denouncing the Government, to escape from office. But how to escape from office? 1820

The only legitimate road by which he could hope to attain to the reality of power, and eventually to occupy the authoritative position of Lord Castlereagh, lay in the permanence of his alliance with the Tory party.

To retire on the ground, publicly alleged, that he totally disapproved of the policy of the Government with which he had been so long co-operating, might, it seemed probable, destroy the Administration; but whether it did so or not, it would assuredly draw down upon the destroyer the bitterest resentment of the leaders and great majority of the Tory party. For the Government in 1820 was in a tottering condition, and looked as if it might fall at any moment; and the shock of the secession of a statesman of Canning's eminence, publicly justified on political grounds, would in all probability have brought it to the ground.

Whether, after such a catastrophe, any prospect would have remained to him of eventually reconciling the Tory party to his lead, it is hard to say.

Yet, except by some such hazardous appeal to public opinion, it appeared impossible to dislodge Lord Castlereagh from power: Canning had, under similar circumstances eleven years before, tried the effect of private remonstrances with the head of the Government, with the result that he had to fight Lord Castlereagh, and had to submit to exclusion from office for years. He could hardly fight another duel with Lord Castlereagh; and he had every reason to anticipate that another such effort to expel his rival might again react disastrously on himself; besides, his own good heart and honourable feelings would tend to restrain him from openly assailing a statesman who personally had been behaving towards him with kindness and confidence.

Any aggressive protest against the Government promised to make Canning politically impotent for the rest of his life.

Thus, for the sake alike of political ambition and of personal credit, it was of the highest importance that, if he withdrew, he should withdraw without disclosing his real motives, and thereby reflecting blame on the Government.

With regard to the means of defence in his power if called to account for deserting the Government, it seems certain that any forebodings of evil he may have entertained must have been derived

1820 — from a knowledge of Lord Castlereagh's wrong-headed policy as developed in Foreign Office papers confidentially imparted to him, and therefore unavailable for public use. Canning could not justify in public a condemnation of a policy of the secret working of which he had become cognizant in confidence. His special knowledge might guide, but could not be used to defend his conduct.

The Queen's business offered itself as a plausible, and in many respects not insincere, excuse; and it is suggested that Canning seized the opportunity to escape from his dilemma, and that it served his purpose, though, of course, it did not take away the necessity of concealing the existence of the political apprehensions and disgust which really prompted him to the step.

Accepting, therefore, this as a reasonable solution of the first problem, we find ourselves some way towards a solution of the second problem; and the second problem is to account for the active animosity displayed by the King against Canning when the Ministers advised that he should be invited to return to office.

And here we arrive at a position which affords a retrospective confirmation of the foregoing theory. The theory accounts, it is submitted, for Canning's withdrawal from office in December 1820; it remains to be explained why Canning continued out of office until September 1822.

The King's hostility constituted no doubt a large factor amongst the causes of this exile; and as people at the time, and the great mass of authorities since, connected that hostility with Canning's exclusion from office, as cause and effect, it will be needful presently to examine the alleged nature and precise importance of the hostility.

Before so doing it is necessary to scrutinise Canning's position under the theory assumed above, and see whether his conduct, pending his absence from office, confirms or destroys the hypothesis.

It must be premised that the King's hostility, however great, cannot be treated as if it were an insuperable obstacle; it could, no doubt, be overcome, as it was eventually overcome, by a threat of Lord Liverpool to resign and break up the Ministry unless the King withdrew his opposition; and the question with Canning and Lord Liverpool was not *how* to break down the King's resistance, but whether the exigency had arisen *when* this resistance was to be broken down.

Now, if Canning retired only on account of the Queen, then, when the Queen faded out of politics and shortly afterwards died, in the course of the summer of 1821, the obstacle being removed, and no interest of State surviving to keep the quarrel alive, his return

to office, or, at least, symptoms of readiness to return to office, might reasonably be looked for. 1820

If, on the other hand, Canning retired, as suggested, from unexpressed motives of political disapproval of the policy of the Government, one would expect to find that the removal of the Queen made no difference in his attitude, and that he would be seen remaining out of office just so long as Lord Castlereagh continued to direct the policy of the Government.

While Lord Castlereagh lived Canning might indeed return to office, but he could not possibly return to power; and it was in sheer despair of return to power that Canning resigned himself to a splendid exile in India.

All this happened accordingly: Canning did not return to office until, at the death of Lord Castlereagh, he also returned to power.

In the meanwhile, the members and supporters of the Government, whether they secretly knew of Canning's disapprobation or not, and whether they, in return, approved or disapproved of Canning's political views, could easily concur in the efforts made by Canning's admirers in the Cabinet, by Lord Liverpool particularly, to bring him back; for they felt pretty well assured that, so long as Lord Castlereagh remained in office, Canning's return to office could only strengthen the authority of the Government, but could not impair the predominance of their favourite political opinions. There was, therefore, no lack of pressure brought to bear on Canning to constrain him to re-enter the sheepfold; and as the excuse about the Queen's business daily diminished in force, he lay under the necessity of producing a fresh and plausible reason for his continued separation from the Government, in the teeth of the well-known anxiety of his late colleagues for his return, and notwithstanding the disappearance of the obstacle at first assigned.

Circumstances favoured him, for George IV. let it be known that he had conceived a strong resentment against Canning, and had resolved rigorously to exclude him from his service. This relieved Canning from all further trouble on the score of excuse; he had only to plead the King's hostility, and his dutiful respect for the King's feelings, to silence all cavil at his persistent avoidance of office.

The cause of the King's resentment will be discussed presently; the service it was to Canning can be pointed out at once: his only fear was lest he should be unable to prevent a pressure being brought to bear, which the King might find it impossible to resist; he therefore declared himself anxiously desirous to avoid all appearance of obtruding himself on an unwilling monarch, and he maintained this

1820 attitude of self-abnegation, until the time came when Lord Castlereagh's death cleared the way for an advance to substantive power, and then the King's aversion was no longer to be allowed to prevail; the necessary pressure was brought to bear which compelled his Majesty to surrender the position and to recall Canning to his service.

The value of the excuse first assigned by Canning for his retirement from the councils of the King's responsible advisers has been discussed. The value of the excuse subsequently assigned for the prolongation of his retirement does not require discussion in the same way. As far as it went, George IV.'s hostility to Canning was a genuine fact, and created a real though not insuperable obstacle to his return to office; but the problem now to be examined is to account for the King's animosity, to indicate the precise points in Canning's conduct which provoked it.

If Canning was actuated by the secret political motives already attributed to him, it is most likely that some evidence of the knowledge of these important motives, and of the effect of such knowledge on his mind, will be traceable in the conduct and feelings of the king; not openly and on the surface, but incidentally and under restraint. For a revelation of Canning's private feelings of condemnation towards the policy of the Government could only work incalculable mischief to the Ministry; and as the King sympathised with and approved that policy, the King, though from motives different from those of Canning, must have felt himself constrained to guard the secret; and hence the present difficulty in investigating the King's feelings only by inference, and by an indirect process of reasoning.

The secret has been well kept, for the King's animosity against Canning has been generally but not invariably connected with the Queen, and the failure of the proceedings for a divorce.

Before discussing the reasons assigned by particular contemporaries, the more obvious reasons for the dislike under this head, as they appear conspicuous in history, may be pointed out.

It appears from his published letters that Canning, in common with most sensible and honourable men at the time, held the opinion that the King's behaviour in previous years in neglecting his wife, and condemning her publicly for immoral conduct while allowing himself unrestrained liberty in the same respects, disqualified his Majesty from all right to a divorce, and from all just claim to assert his grievances against the Queen.

The total effect of this public opinion in the end caused the failure of the proceedings for a divorce, and thereby inflicted a great

personal disappointment on the King. His brothers had recently married in some haste, with a view to provide an heir or heirs to the kingdom; while he alone, the eldest and the King, found himself shut out by his unfortunate matrimonial relations from all hope of being the father of his successor: he had lost his daughter and his daughter's newly-born infant; his only chance lay in a divorce and liberty to marry again, and the chance was now destroyed. 1821 —

No wonder if he entertained feelings of great animosity against all the prominent men who might be thought to have contributed to his discomfiture; and it cannot be denied that Canning's attitude of resolute neutrality during the proceedings really contributed, in some considerable degree, to bring about the failure of the Bill of Pains and Penalties, and was fairly obnoxious to the King's anger.

But assuming the King's anger against Canning on this score, it must not be forgotten that the separation of the two did not originate with the angry Sovereign, but with the offending Minister, which appears a somewhat inconsistent conclusion of the quarrel.

Again, still assuming the same cause for the King's displeasure, one might calculate on its lasting as long as its cause, but hardly longer; one might expect that the royal wrath would considerably cool down when by the Queen's death the King recovered his liberty to marry again, and nevertheless did not choose to profit by the occasion. The consciousness of a practical surrender of the ground of his old grievance might naturally have greatly abated his desire to make a display of rancour against Lord Liverpool and Canning, which could only attract attention to his own inconsistency and questionable private relations.

On the whole, it does not appear necessary to attribute too much of the King's anger to the failure of the proceedings for a divorce.

Passing on, then, to another suspected ground of offence, it has been hinted that the King found a grievance in the relations which had existed in past times between his wife and his servant. In a letter to the Duke of Wellington of September 5, 1821 (after the Queen's death), the King insists that the matter of Canning's return to office involved a point of 'his own private honour,' words which suggest an idea that the relations between Canning and the Queen in times past had been of a kind to give ground of complaint to the King.

Further, in a letter of Canning to Lord Liverpool of June 21, 1821, printed below, a great anxiety is shown to abstain from forcing himself on the King, which, unless otherwise accounted for, gives an impression of special delicacy of feeling on the subject, and might be thought to confirm the surmise.

1820 — But, in the first place, it is difficult to suppose that George IV., under all the circumstances, could really entertain a genuine feeling of resentment against any one for sharing or conniving at his wife's misconduct; the King had too keen a sense of the ridiculous to pretend to be really sensitive on a grievance at which, considering his own character, all the world would laugh. He might for some special purpose feign such resentment; but for the present argument it is sufficient to conclude that the words 'his own private honour' either referred to some other grievance against Canning, or, if intended to refer to a grievance about the Queen, were used to disguise his real cause of quarrel.

In the next place, whatever those relations were, there exists at any rate a description of them presented by Canning to the King in person, at the critical moment when it was necessary to make the Queen a pretext for his retirement from office: what Canning said on the occasion is found in a memorandum he made of the interview, which took place in June 1820. It is printed in 'Life and Times,' p. 290. In the third paragraph it states that (leaving out the substituted names, 'Marcus,' 'Dirce,' &c., which, it may be said by the way, occurring in a letter of Canning's, could, under the circumstances, hardly deceive the dullest clerk in a foreign post office *cabinet noir*)—

'Mr. Canning then adverted to his former habits of intimacy 'with Queen Caroline, and to the confidence she had reposed in him 'on many occasions, by unreserved communications on the subject of 'her own affairs, and stated that it was impossible for him to take 'any part in criminatory proceedings against a person towards whom 'he stood in so confidential a relation. As a mediator between the 'Queen and the King, he had exerted, and would still exert if the 'occasion permitted it, his best endeavours; but he could not become 'the Queen's accuser.'

In the seventh paragraph of the same memorandum it is stated that the King signified his cordial approval of Canning's conduct up to that date.

Now, it is known that George IV. had always kept himself well informed of all his wife's proceedings, whether abroad or at home; it can hardly be supposed that he was unaware of the real nature of Canning's relations with the Queen, whether defensible or indefensible. Canning, on the other hand, knew far too much of the secrets of the time to imagine that the King could be ignorant of the facts of the case.

It therefore appears incontrovertible that the construction Canning desired to place on his intimacy with the Queen may be found

in this memorandum, and that, whatever were the realities of the position, the King accepted the construction without gainsaying it; and, though it was open to him to protest and reproach, he chose to treat Canning with cordiality and approbation. 1820

After that, the King could scarcely affect to develop a solicitude for his 'private honour,' on the ground of suspicions of the existence of objectionable relations between the Queen and Canning.

Therefore, whether such suspicions are well or ill founded, there can be no great error in presuming that they did not form any essential part of those feelings which prompted the King's subsequent dislike of Canning.

The authority of Mr. Stapleton in 'Life and Times' (p. 323) refers the King's animosity to his resentment against anything that contributed to the failure of the Divorce Bill in Parliament; but the votes of Canning's friends in the House of Lords helped materially to bring about the result. And, as Canning's influence was supposed to guide their votes, he indicates that the King felt greatly aggrieved against Canning. The King had permitted him to hold aloof, and he expected that Canning would consider himself bound to be at least neutral after such a gracious concession; and yet the King believed Canning had influenced the division in the Upper House so as to reduce the Government to a majority, the narrowness of which caused Lord Liverpool to withdraw the Bill.

The stress of this ground of quarrel does not lie in the mere defeat of the King's wishes, but in his assumed sense of unfair usage after the friendly release he had granted to Canning to stand aside during the struggle over the divorce.

On such authority, and on the probabilities of the case, it must be at once admitted that the King not only professed to be, but really felt, indignant with Canning on the above ground.

The variance presumably arose on the question of what was meant by neutrality, Canning limiting the obligation to his public life, the King expecting that it should include both public and private expressions of opinion.

In chap. xviii. of 'Life and Times' there are three letters, two to Huskisson and one to Lord Liverpool, fully discussing the Queen's affairs. It is not too much to suppose that sentiments much to the same effect were privately imparted to others of Canning's friends, including members of the House of Lords; Canning, not unreasonably, held that he might have resigned office and publicly lent his powerful aid to the Queen's cause, and that in not so doing, but in remaining in office, in holding his tongue and retiring abroad,

1820 — he fully discharged his obligation of neutrality without feeling bound to regulate his private correspondence by the King's wishes.

But, on the other hand, the knowledge of Canning's views as disclosed in his private letters may have influenced, and most probably did influence, the votes of his admirers in the House of Lords; and this, naturally enough, roused the anger of the King, and led him to denounce Canning privately as intriguing and treacherous in his conduct.

The question now becomes nearly identical with that first discussed in the course of these observations. In the former argument the merely public elements of the question were considered, the known failure of the proceedings for a divorce, the known effect of Canning's neutrality. In the present argument the position is qualified by the further knowledge that Canning had specially obtained the royal permission to remain neutral, which negatives the idea of the royal displeasure on that head; and that, beyond the effect of the notoriety of his neutral attitude, Canning was credited with having indirectly or privately influenced a certain number of the peers, so as to stop the Bill.

Now, it may be allowed that in this respect the King had a real grievance, but, it is contended, not such a grievance as would last for nearly two years after the occasion had passed. George IV. was essentially a man of the world, in no way high-principled, but none the less endued with considerable instinctive sagacity of great service in his political career, which perhaps chiefly failed him on the occasion of his unfortunate conflict with the Queen. He could not be ignorant, after the danger had passed, that he had nearly wrecked the monarchy on the question of the divorce. And he could not but be conscious, after the Queen's death, that the question was really a matter of indifference to him, and that his interest in it had vanished. A sensible man under such circumstances would have no wish to perpetuate the memory of his folly by keeping alive the inconvenient resentments and grievances he had manufactured at the instigation of the moment.

It is therefore concluded that, granted the King's displeasure at Canning's influence on the vote of the House of Lords, yet that displeasure was not the same displeasure as that which the King openly professed before Canning accepted the Foreign Office, and secretly cherished almost to the end of his Minister's life.

For there was something behind Canning's withdrawal at this time. There was a solemn silent warning of the dangers of the period, and a tacit rebuke of the policy of the Government and of the infatuation of the King; this left an abiding sting, and the King could hardly ever forgive it.

He could never divest himself of the recollection of the formi- 181
dable perils through which his reign had passed, of the alarming —
disturbance of popular feeling, of the disaffection in the army, which had imperilled all that he really cared for—the power and stability of the monarchy. And his anger at Canning's silent disapprobation must have been intensified in proportion as, surrendering his grievance about the Queen, he succeeded in imagining Canning's retirement and temporary abstention from politics to be something in the nature of treasonable desertion.

Neglecting all reasoning on the other side, he could easily depict to himself the situation as follows: here was the Government of the country labouring amidst great difficulties, and there stood Canning, the foremost statesman of the time, holding aloof, giving no help, but, by his averted attitude, encouraging the disaffected and increasing the trouble. How could such conduct be sufficiently condemned?

The provocation of the vote of Canning's friends in the House of Lords was transient and evanescent; the irritation of Canning's silent disapproval was continuous and ever new.

The clearer his perception that the circle of Canning's condemnation included more than the business of the Queen's trial, and extended to the very principles of the Government as carried on by Lord Castlereagh, the hotter must have been the King's wrath and the more helpless he must have felt.

Lord Castlereagh's principles were naturally congenial to George IV.; but had the King hated them ever so much, it was no more in his power to rid the Government of Lord Castlereagh than it was in Canning's power to effect the change; but the King could not really desire a change; and in the published correspondence between the King and the Duke of Wellington there can be traced the profound distrust felt by the King towards Canning's policy. It is true that latterly, when Canning had restored the honour and credit of the nation, the King fairly and honourably reconciled himself to his brilliant Minister; but even then, when it came to appointing him to be Prime Minister, George IV. hesitated and procrastinated in a way which marked that his distrust of Canning was smothered but not extinguished.

The King of course knew he could have Canning back on the conditions of the expulsion of Lord Castlereagh and of the reversal of Lord Castlereagh's policy; but to such conditions he had determined never voluntarily to submit. Nevertheless, if Canning, for his part, did not find it necessary to justify his proceedings by a public denunciation of Lord Castlereagh, it was only common prudence on the part of the King to abstain from challenging Canning's conduct,

1820 which might drag before the public an indictment against the Ministry which Canning had so far judged it prudent to abstain from preferring. His Majesty therefore simply fell back, with great sincerity, on an allegation of general dislike of Canning; to account for which he followed his servant's lead, and fanned the burnt-out embers of the quarrel over the Queen's trial.

Therefore during the years 1821 and 1822 the King was sincere in his desire to keep Canning altogether out of his service, because he knew how deeply, though secretly, Canning disapproved of the policy of Lord Castlereagh. At the same time he kept his knowledge to himself, because he had no wish to force Canning to appeal to the public on the question.

On the other hand, Canning was sincere in his wish to return to office, but he had clearly made up his mind it could only be as Prime Minister or leader of the House of Commons, as the successor of either Lord Castlereagh or Lord Liverpool; otherwise he desired to remain unconnected with the Ministry; and while he remained out of office, it was essential to the present safety and future prospects of his political position to keep in reserve the disapproval of Lord Castlereagh's policy which actuated him in his secession.

Both the King and Canning had reasons of their own for agreeing to treat this quarrel as only a quarrel on a private point, but the latter found considerable difficulty in making enough of the alleged private quarrel to prevent his being forced on the King by his struggling friends in office; and the first of the letters to Lord Liverpool here published expresses an excessive anxiety to respect the King's prejudice against him.

But the insincere element in this line of conduct, though apparently unavoidable, was not without its Nemesis.

The predicament of having to assign an inadequate public motive for holding aloof from his friends, while his unavowed motive lay in utter condemnation of their policy in general and of Lord Castlereagh in particular, cast an unsatisfactory shadow on his position; and it is in this predicament that may be found the reason of the charges of treachery and intrigue so frequently cast at him during the remainder of his career by his various enemies, but most perseveringly of all by Lord Castlereagh's family and friends.

It may be asked why, in a merely political point of view, Canning might not have continued to hold the unobtrusive, and, in general matters, irresponsible position of Minister for India, without its affecting the fulness of his independence, whenever the time should come in the natural order of things for him to take up Lord Castlereagh's 'inheritance.'

In the first place, Lord Castlereagh was only a year older than himself, so that it would have been absurd and presumptuous for him to calculate on any such succession by mere lapse of time. 1820

Secondly, whatever may have been Canning's faults, there was an impatience of co-operating with men unequal to the situation which might be called ambition, and desire of power, but certainly influenced his political conduct at various times in a way so unpromising for his prospects that impartial people might call it patriotism without exposing themselves to ridicule.

He had not hesitated on a previous occasion to hazard a quarrel with Lord Castlereagh at a most critical moment, and the quarrel could have been easily foreseen to promise to cost him dear; and it did.

He did not hesitate to declare his opposition to the King's wishes on the occasion of the Queen's trial; and in those days the influence of the Crown in antagonism to a statesman might be counted fatal. Yet, on the other hand, he abstained from seeking revenge and stumping the country as a demagogue. If it be said he was biding his time, it may be answered that, as far as matters then appeared, his only chance seemed to lie through the path of the agitator and demagogue. Lord Castlereagh's age, and the revivification of the Ministry, removed 'his time' into a perfectly uncertain and remote future, yet he did not yield to the obvious temptation.

If then he could, apparently, anticipate no profit by his withdrawal, it may be asked, did he in fact gain anything? And the answer must be that, though the harvest was reaped by an accident, Lord Londonderry's death, yet the corn was grown during his temporary isolation; all the liberal thinkers in England (the Whig party, as a party, are not here meant), all the 'patriots' of Ireland, all the 'Liberals' or 'Jacobins' (as Wellington and the high Tories called them) of Europe, marked him at once as a man who declined to share the responsibility of Lord Castlereagh's anti-Liberal policy, who was not afraid to offer the silent protest of withdrawal from office to confirm his unuttered objections to that policy, and who might be expected, if admitted to power, to lose no opportunity of reversing and annulling the retrograde methods of his predecessor; and all such waited for him accordingly.

The intrigues of the Lievens on behalf of Russia, the unbounded hatred of Metternich (to be found on record in the Prince's Autobiography recently published), the inexpressible jealousy and dislike of the Tory members of the Cabinet, all prove that as the Liberals of the world recognised in him a champion, so the anti-Liberals saw in him a foe.

1820 Thus, though the revolution passed under the ascendency of a Tory Prime Minister, the change from Lord Londonderry to Canning was in very truth a change of 'government' of a most real kind; and the curious political situation which practically made an administration of high Tories mere ciphers in a total change of principles of administration did not appease the bitter but natural animosities engendered by the change.

There remains to be noticed one remarkable and important fact with regard to Canning's advent to power in 1822, which requires explanation. It is recorded that the Duke of Wellington used his best influence with the King to induce his Majesty to forgive Canning, and cancel his resentments against him. Yet Wellington was regarded on all hands as the enemy of 'the revolution,' as the champion of Conservative and monarchical principles, if the question came to be fought out again, whether in England or on the Continent. But those who have read the duke's political correspondence after the conclusion of the war, and have followed the details of his political career so long as he exercised any influence on passing events, will recognise that he was guided in his political conduct by two leading motives. The first in respect of domestic policy, conspicuous in all that he did, was the supremacy of the obligation that 'the King's government must be carried on;' before this all political opinions and exigencies were bound to give way, including the opinion of the King himself. The story of Catholic Emancipation in 1828-29 amply illustrates this truth. The second in respect of foreign policy, not conspicuous but still always discoverable in all his counsels, was that the power of Russia should be watched with unremitting jealousy, distrusted, and as far as possible held in check.

Napoleon had sounded the same note of warning, and on the collapse of the gigantic power of France, Russia suddenly appeared to dilate to unexpected proportions, and to menace the independence of the monarchies of Europe, and Wellington was far too able and experienced a man to fail to appreciate this change in the military balance of power on the Continent.

In applying these principles to the political crisis in the autumn of 1822, it must be remembered that Lord Castlereagh was a statesman of great ability, large experience, and considerable prestige, whose place it was uncommonly difficult to fill.

The irony of the Duke of Wellington when he said that a Foreign Secretary must be able to talk French, that Canning could talk French and nobody else could, so he must be Foreign Secretary, implies the hopelessness of finding a competent successor of Lord Castlereagh except in Canning. Wellington was not yet prepared to sink his

military position in that of a civilian statesman: besides, the Government wanted strength in the House of Commons; and Canning, though Liberal in many of his political views, still preserved his active dislike of reform of Parliament, and still benefited by the credit of his discipleship with Pitt, and his subsequent service with the Tory party; and above all—and we now come to the advantages reaped by his self-suppression—by his abstention from hostilities against the Ministry, since he withdrew from their counsels. Though the old Tory placeholders well understood that they were letting in an influence antagonistic to their ideas in many respects, yet they found themselves powerless to exclude it. 1820 —

Wellington, with the confidence of a strong man, saw the necessity of securing Canning's services, believed that he and the rest of the Cabinet could manage to 'keep him in order,' and therefore did not shrink from advocating, and that effectually, with the King the appointment of the Liberal statesman to the Foreign Office.

But the action of Wellington was also influenced by apprehensions of the power of Russia at the particular conjuncture of 1822, and by anxiety that no man of less than first-rate ability should preside at the Foreign Office to cope with it.

Wellington dreaded a war with Russia; he understood, as few others did, the enormous military superiority of Russia, the extreme military weakness of England, and the exhausted condition of the other great Continental Powers. He perceived the dangerous semi-lunacy of the Czar, and was aware of the Russian projects for advancing powerful armies into various parts of Europe, under the pretext of suppressing the revolutions in Spain and Italy. Congresses were about to be held by the military despots of the Continent to consider the best means of quelling the disturbances. At such a crisis in foreign affairs it was absolutely of the first importance that Lord Londonderry's successor should be a man of established reputation and ability; and no other man but Canning answered the description. The duke therefore, with his usual single-minded desire to promote the best interests of his country, laid aside as insignificant the matters in which he and Canning were at variance, and did his best to remove from Canning's path the obstacles in the way of his reaching the Foreign Office.

It will be noticed that the operation of these motives with the duke could not, and did not, prevent his subsequently watching Canning's proceedings with the utmost vigilance and jealousy; and in proportion as circumstances changed, as Peel proved his great capacity in the House of Commons, and released the duke's mind from anxiety at home, and as the Continental crisis died away, and the

1821 dangers abroad diminished in imminence, so Wellington gave freer scope to his dislike of Canning and Canning's Liberal opinions, and eventually found them no longer bearable; and on the occasion of the ministerial crisis of 1827 he could not help betraying his real sentiments.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Gloucester Lodge: June 21, 1821.

My dear Liverpool,—The circumstances under which we have met since my return to England have naturally precluded political discussion between us. At our first interview I listened to what you had to communicate to me, without offering any observations upon it. And last Saturday nothing would have induced me to utter a word upon such a subject, even if I had been then as much aware as I am now of the King's indisposition to your proposed arrangement.

But that indisposition is now the talk of all the town; I cannot pretend ignorance of it: and I am, therefore, desirous of putting you in possession of my feelings upon it, before you shall have committed yourself either with the King, or with your colleagues.

I entreat you not to press me upon the King.

I entreat you not to let any consideration for me endanger the stability of the Administration, and least of all your own situation in it.

I release you entirely and unequivocally (if that be necessary) from any obligation, express or implied, which you might imagine yourself to have contracted by the overtures which you have made to me.

I am not surprised at the King's objection, nor do I think it unreasonable, if it arises from the only cause to which I can attribute it.

If I have myself felt (as you know I have) for the last twelve months, or more, the impossibility of my succeeding to the office of Home Secretary of State,

so long as the recollections, and perhaps some of the practical difficulties, belonging to the conflict with the Queen should be still alive, I have no right to be surprised if the same considerations should appear to the King to extend farther, and to make even an occasional intercourse such as would arise out of the other situation,[1] which you had been kind enough to find the means of tendering to my acceptance, highly unpleasing to his Majesty. 1821

I do not complain of such a decision on his Majesty's part.

Whatever may be the motives of the King's indisposition to the arrangement, I have not the presumption to question them; but I would rather remain out of his Majesty's service indefinitely than re-enter against his wishes.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Gloucester Lodge: June 23, 1821.

My dear Liverpool,—My letter of yesterday (the 21st) is, I trust, sufficient to justify you to yourself in yielding to the wishes of the King, and to account to your colleagues for your doing so.

But in order to reconcile you to the acting upon that latter the more readily, it may be fit I should let you see a difficulty which would arise in the arrangement such as you opened it to me in our first conference after my return, which I did not then bring under your consideration both because it was not a season for discussion, and because I wished to ascertain more precisely than I had then any opportunity of doing, its existence and its degree.

The scope of the arrangement, as now in contemplation, I need not tell you falls short of what I had

[1] Admiralty.

1821 been led to expect from former communications; not certainly in respect to myself, since you have exactly consulted, in what regards me, my own opinions and inclinations.

But the particular point to which I wish to call your attention, as well with a view to the public interest as to my credit (and I think I may add your own), is the way in which Huskisson would be passed over.

If I knew nothing more of Huskisson's value to the Government than what I have learnt and witnessed since my return home, I should think that his long struggle in the Agricultural Committee, and his masterly fight for the agricultural horse tax, entitled him to peculiar consideration at this moment.

But it is unnecessary to remind you how small a part these constitute of his long-established claims upon the gratitude of the Government.

He has never, as you know, aspired to Cabinet office, but his present office has long been so distasteful to him, that he has often and often been on the point of asking your consent to his withdrawal from it.

And he certainly has long flattered himself that an opportunity of arrangement would not be suffered to go by without placing him in that sort of situation (below the highest, but above the ordinary rank of office) to which a man of his long services and general ability may without presumption aspire, and the India Board (out of the Cabinet) is precisely that sort of situation.

He was, however, perfectly ready to postpone his claims to that situation to those of two other persons, of Peel if it should be wanted for procuring his accession to the Cabinet, or of Robinson (who has already got before him), persons on their road to higher things, and not likely, therefore, to be eternally in his way.

But for a third person, a stranger, one whom Hus-

kisson left the other night voting, with all his connec- 1821
tions, against an unpopular tax of half a million, which Huskisson had been exposing himself to general obloquy and to the resentment of its constituents in defending, braving, too, the whole brunt of the battle in that defence, for one who is likely to occupy the post if he obtains it for the remainder of his political life, Huskisson is not prepared to waive his pretensions; and I should not do fairly by you if I were not to tell you that such an appointment would, I am now confident, drive Huskisson from you, nor by him if I were not to add that he would feel it yet more strongly as an unkindness than as an injustice.

You see then, my dear Liverpool, that if you were to succeed in conquering the King's indisposition to the arrangement, so far as relates to myself, we should yet have difficulties to encounter.

I need not ask you whether it be possible that I should come into the Government at one door, while Huskisson was going out at the other.

Is it not better that I should be out, through the King's objection on my own account, than through dissatisfaction at your arrangement on Huskisson's? and would not the withdrawal of my name from the arrangement enable you, by some new casting of it, to do justice to Huskisson at the same time you would gratify the King?

Ever, my dear Liverpool, most sincerely yours,

G. C.

P.S.—Huskisson does not know of my writing to you about him.

1822

## OFFER OF GOVERNOR-GENERALSHIP OF INDIA.

MR. CANNING TO MR. HUSKISSON.

(Private.) January 12, 1822.

My dear Huskisson,—Although you dispense with my answer to the questions which you put to me in your letter of the 6th inst., on being relieved from the apprehension of any public discussion upon the subject of them, I think it right, nevertheless, to notice a few points upon which you were manifestly astray in your examination.

1. It cannot be true that 'all the reasons against immediate acceptance were in full force before the steps taken by the King'—because one reason, the main one, and the only one assigned by me, or to be assigned for me, for declining 'immediate acceptance,' is the non-existence of a vacancy; which was only discovered by the King's inquiry of Doyle. Up to that period Doyle had affirmed that he had a resignation in his pocket, and whatever degree of credit might attach to this affirmation, I had no means of controverting it.

I had, indeed, the fullest confidence, and so had Liverpool, the night before the King saw Doyle (you remember the period; it was when I saw you in Whitehall Place on my first coming up to town in November), when we parted the next morning, L. and I each in the same persuasion (mine, of course, strengthened by his), that D. had no resignation to produce; that he would say so, and that the arrangement of June would consequently be resumed.

[The first arrangement of June was the appointment of Canning to the Home Office on the retirement of Lord Sidmouth; the next was Lord Melville transferred from the Admiralty to the Home Office, and Canning going to the Admiralty. Both of these came to nought: the last, on Peel taking the Home Office, from which he was too con-

siderable a man to be removed, must have depended on an ejectment of Lord Melville, and an assignment to Canning of the Admiralty : the 'resumption' of the arrangement of June probably started from this initial point, a promotion for Huskisson following on afterwards.] 1822

2. The attempt to raise a 'constructive resignation' into one *de facto* was so far from being contemplated by us, that I am quite sure if the idea had occurred to either of us, in either of our first two interviews, we should have concurred in scouting it altogether.

3. I knew nothing of any intention to offer an Embassy to Lord H. [Marquis of Hastings, Governor-General of India], and never heard of it till after the discussions as to the validity of the 'constructive resignation' were begun : I should have protested against it at any time, as changing the entire character of my succession to Lord H.

Indeed, it would not be very consistent to lay this charge to my account, at the same time that it has been argued with me that I might conscientiously and with all delicacy accept the succession to Lord H., since he was brought home purely for his own interest, not for mine. If so, what have I to do with the means of bringing him home ?

If you ask me what I believe would happen to Lord H. if he came home, I will tell you. I believed that the vacancy in the Household, to be made by Lord Cholmondeley's forced-on accepted resignation (for it was known that Lord Cholmondeley tendered his resignation before the journey to Ireland, and had been desired to hold on), was designed for Lord H. And I believed this because letters from Calcutta to several members of the Court of Directors concurred in reporting Lord H. to have received an invitation from the King to return home ; because Bloomfield had himself spoken to me some weeks before, of somebody

1822 whom he wished to see Lord H. before he came away; and then, upon perceiving the slip that he had made, endeavoured to retract or explain it; because the same person had spoken to Liverpool, during the negotiations of June, of Lord H.'s return as a thing to be wished, as affording a solution of difficulties; because Lord Melville had spoken to Mr. Reid in August or early in September of Lord H.'s return as an event certain to take place; because Lord H., in his mad letter to me of February, had announced his return as being to take place, 'but not in the manner which I might expect'—that is, not by his throwing up in a huff (of which other manner the King's invitation afforded a solution); and lastly, because contemporaneously with the reports from Calcutta, which I have put at the head of these 'becauses,' came letters from Lord H. to the chairman expressing his desire to return, and his expectation of receiving by the next ship the nomination of his successor.

If Embassy has been substituted for Household, it may have been so in consequence of more recent advices from Lord H. notifying his inability to live in England on any terms—or his preference for the Continent—or it may have been for the sake of the Duke of Dorset; but I am perfectly confident it was not for mine.

4. The King was 'set in motion,' unluckily but inevitably, in consequence of the above-mentioned letters from Lord H. to the chairman, dated in May and June, and received in September, which were, as I have said, accompanied by reports of his recall by the King. No shadow of doubt rested on the chairman's mind, nor, I confess, on mine, that Lord H. was on the point of coming home, and that a successor must be provided instantly.

The chairman, however, had upon his mind (how impressed there, I know not) a pertinacious belief that

'the King had a successor in view. The person supposed, or rather persons, for there were two of them, would not in his (Reid's) opinion suit the Court of Directors; and he was anxious, properly enough, that the fact of the King's wish should be ascertained, in order that an intimation of the probability of its not being adopted might be made known to the King privately, before he had committed himself by a public and positive suggestion. He (R.) was confirmed in this belief (however created) by a note which he had received from Bloomfield some short time before, in which, à propos to some very trifling matter, B. expressed his reliance (or the King's, I forget which, but the King's was plainly implied) upon R.'s readiness to do everything in his power to carry into effect the wishes 'of that house.' 1822

I could not help sharing R.'s belief that the King had a nomination in view, balancing his declared proscription of me against Bloomfield's wish for 'solution.' I did not, however, feel quite so confidently as R. the assurance that the Court would not concur in it. But I was only the more anxious that the King's wishes should be ascertained before my name was brought forward to be placed, perhaps, in conflict with his Majesty's nomination.

At this time—it was about the middle of September—the King was in Hanover; L. [Liverpool] at Walmer; I, unluckily, for a few days in town. To me, therefore, R. [Reid] communicated the extracts of Lord H.'s letters of May and June, and of the contemporaneous reports from Calcutta, and the draft of the answer which he had prepared (and I believe sent) to Lord H. expressing his (Reid's) 'satisfaction' at his Majesty's gracious 'recall of Lord H. to his presence, and promising to prepare a successor to him as soon as communication could have been had with the King,' or to that effect; and he

1823 begged me to transmit these papers to Lord L. I did so.

The next day I left town; and it was not till late in the next week (owing to some blunder in directing his letter to me) that I received from R. a minute of his conference with Doyle, who called upon him a few days after I left town—as R. took for granted, to present Lord H.'s instrument of resignation, but, as it turned out, to deny the fact of Lord H.'s intending to resign; at the same time admitting that he (D.) had, and for some months had, Lord H.'s resignation in his pocket.

This minute I, of course, forwarded to Lord L. What he did with it I know not; I wished him to see D. upon it himself; thinking, as I did, that he had been in habits of communication with D. In this, however, I was mistaken, and L. gave me his reasons for not wishing to begin a communication with him then. These reasons satisfied me at the time, but I now regret bitterly, and so does he, that he acted upon them.

Had he seen D., the object of that interview would have been limited to the obtaining precise information as to the fact of the existence of an instrument of resignation. Unluckily, such inquiry was deferred till there was also a desire to create as well as to ascertain. But L. was so far from being a party to that desire, that he described to me (at our meeting which I have before referred to, in November) the purpose of the King's interview with D. as being solely to leave *à quoi s'en tenir* amidst the contradictory accounts of Lord H.'s wishes and intentions. That it was turned to another purpose was neither L.'s fault nor mine.

I believe I have pretty well disposed of all your questions (relating to myself) except the last, which is a sort of summary of the whole, and which, though not put interrogatively in your letter, is in substance this: 'Will

it not be, or is it not, said that I had agreed to go to India, and when everything was settled, declined it?' 1822

No. I had agreed to go to India (not to quarrel with that expression) upon terms which have not yet been made good; and I declined because they could not be so. Of those terms, the principal was an unquestionable vacancy by voluntary resignation of Lord H. I deny the existence of such a vacancy. The King asserts it. The Court of Directors are appealed to as umpires, and decide for me. How then can it be said that 'everything was settled'? The first element of settlement was wanting.

It may be true that the King has done his part to create, and that the Court of Directors would willingly have done theirs in lending themselves to the creating a vacancy. But such a vacancy, so far from being the condition of my consent, has been all along the ground of my objection.

As to the existence of a resignation, I presume nobody now mentions it. If there be one, why has it never been shown to me? If a man says, 'I have a cheque upon Drummonds in my possession for Mr. ——, but I am not to present it except under such and such circumstances,' he may say true. But if, when the circumstances occur, he has no cheque to produce, but only an inference from those circumstances that ought, in his opinion, to be as good as a cheque, Messrs. Drummond, I apprehend, would say 'No cheque,' just as confidently as I say 'No resignation.'

It may be true—grant, for argument's sake, that it is so—that even if there were a complete and perfect resignation to be produced at this moment, there are other circumstances which would make me wish to decline availing myself of it. But what business has anybody with that?

1822 It does not follow that they would make me decline it. The difficulty might be great and the struggle arduous, but I might, if obliged to decide now, decide against my wishes. But the case for decision is not before me. The K. has no vacancy to offer. The Court of Directors could make one, but so made, it would be a vacancy indeed, but precisely such a one as I have said I would not accept. I have, therefore, declined nothing; for there has been nothing to decline, nothing but what, it was perfectly known, I must decline, if I did not depart from my foregone declarations.

I admit that if there had been in Doyle's hands, or in any one else's, an instrument of resignation, formal, and not *motivé*, there would have been a pretence for calling upon me to decide, aye or no, as to the acceptance, just as (to use my previous illustration) Drummonds would pay a cheque in due form, without inquiry as to the circumstances which produced it. But, even so, I should have thought myself dealt with most disingenuously if that instrument had been transmitted to be used conditionally, and was used absolutely, under circumstances not in the contemplation of the signer.

But, happily, here is no such difficulty. There is no instrument. If there be, why not produce it?

There are, at most, letters which show that Lord H. will be easily reconciled to a recall. But a recall is not a resignation; and I have other letters which show that a recall, however produced and however palatable, will very probably be attributed to a conspiracy; and I therefore reject all softenings, and stick to my plain text—a resignation.

A resignation may come hereafter, and then unquestionably I must decide. But why am I to anticipate an event after all not so sure, perhaps, or at least not so near as is assumed?

I have seen within these few days an extract (or abstract) of a letter from Lady Hastings, dated August 9, which indicates anything but an intention of coming home; which says nothing of health, and is evidently written in high spirits: and (observe) Doyle has reported to the Board of Control a letter from Lord Hastings of August 7, which places his desire to return on the score of Lady H.'s health. 1821

But granted a resignation may come, and I must then decide. But why am I to give a prospective positive answer to a distant hypothetical proposition? To bind myself and thereby fetter my own intermediate conduct, while nobody else is bound—nay, they would rather be thereby set more free and more at their ease towards me? Are circumstances nothing to me, while they are so much to others? In the course of ten months, the probable interview before the arrival of the 'Tees' can have operated, how many things may happen! a new war—a new ministry—a new reign—a hundred unforeseen modifications of domestic calls or convenience. Why am I to take upon myself an obligation independent of all such and other possibilities—in order simply that other people may play their game with more elbow-room by setting me down as disposed of?

Had the King been able to produce a resignation now, I must either have accepted or declined. When the Court of Directors receive a resignation which they see fit to act upon, they will, if they also think fit to propose to me, have a right to expect then that I shall accept or decline without hesitation. Nay, I will add that if either Crown or Court have now anybody to propose for the situation, who may not be so scrupulous about the nature of the vacancy, I have not the smallest pretension to stand in his way.

But what I cannot admit is either that any one has a

1822 right to complain of me for declining now, when the case on which alone I would at any time accept has not occurred; or that they would have a right to complain if, upon grounds of quite a different sort, public or private, stated or not stated, I should decline hereafter, when a real resignation may arrive.

For what is the prospect of the expression 'I had agreed to go to India'? Surely not that it is a bargain which I am bound to fulfil. If I offer a man 100 gs. for a horse, and then after paying the purchase-money leave the horse in his stable, do I break a bargain? or is there any ground of complaint against me? If I were then to go about complaining that he kept the horse from me, I should be unjust; but so long as I held my tongue, surely no one else has a right to be dissatisfied.

I was willing to accept the succession to Lord H. (on terms before mentioned), or rather to accept the sanction of the Crown to that succession already mine, without any thanks to the Crown, as the solution of the difficulty respecting my return to office.

Well, and has not the solution been accepted? Have not the arrangements been settled without me? And have I made, or do make, any complaint that they are so? But India is ready for me, and I do not take it. First, I say, it is not ready; and till it is ready I need say nothing more. But how if, when ready, I do not take it? What then? Who has any right to complain of that? Who suffers from the omission but myself? They with whom the supposed agreement was entered into have already reaped their benefit from it; and if I chose to forego mine, how am I answerable to them for doing so?

If, indeed, a return to office had been pressed upon me by the Government and by the King (as in 1812), on public grounds and for public purposes—if I had then

accepted India as an escape from solicitation, and afterwards refused to go there—though my presence was required in that department—there would be some plausible ground of blame against me. But in the present case the circumstances are entirely different. Office at home has not been offered me. The Government was willing to offer it, but the King not; and I voluntarily and of my own motion relieve both King and Government from the chance of a disagreement upon that point by expressing my willingness to accept India. 1827

Well, this point is accomplished without or before my absolute acceptance. What signifies it to them whether it be before or without, so that the point is accomplished, with respect to which alone they were interested in my acceptance?

It was never any point with me that their arrangements and my acceptance of India should be simultaneous; nor was it any part of our supposed agreement. But it was a point with me that there should be a previous, voluntary, and admitted resignation, which there is not now; and it was another point, quite plainly indicated by me, though not perhaps to the K. [King] (which I cannot help), that the source of my appointment should be understood to be, as it was in fact, the E. I. Co. [East India Company], not the Crown; and that had been nearly taken from me. I do not complain of this, because there may not have been any design in it; but I am glad of a delay which incidentally affords a chance of that point being placed in its true light again, whenever the E. I. Co. come to act upon a real vacancy.

So much, and more than enough, as to myself.

As to L. [Lord Liverpool], I really know not how to answer your question. I am not apprised exactly when the overture to P. [Peel] was made. I presume, not

1822 before I had declined the vacancy from Doyle. Yet, if after, there is something extraordinary in it. My belief, however, is that in this, as in other instances, L.'s real wishes and good intentions have been overborne; that he has occasionally deceived himself as to what he could carry; and that he has preferred on such occasions remaining under misconstruction himself, to exculpating himself by explanations which would throw the blame on others.

It is now time to close this tremendously long letter, and I must do so, therefore, without adverting to other matters in yours, which, as you say indeed, may be as well reserved for conversation.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

ENDORSEMENT ON LETTER.

W^k [Welbeck]: Jan. 12, 1822.
(Received 15th.)

I do not keep any copy of this, and I do not send it through B. [Lord George Bentinck], because it must lose a day; but I should be glad if you would let him have it at your leisure, for the purpose of taking a copy. I may like hereafter to refresh my own memory with a retrospect to my feelings at this time.

[This letter illustrates the strength of the dislike entertained by the King against Canning, and the efforts made by his Majesty to relieve himself of the pressure brought to bear on him to readmit Canning to his counsels. For this purpose there was no office outside the Cabinet of sufficient dignity and importance except the Governor-Generalship of India which could be offered to Canning, so that he could not avoid accepting the honour and responsibility tendered to him. The King, therefore, took measures to bring Lord Hastings home and create a vacancy; the matter was managed accordingly. Only the King's hurry outstripped the course of events, and Canning was called upon to accept the office before there was a vacancy.

Canning, on the other hand, felt no ardour to leave England, to terminate his brilliant parliamentary career, and to renounce for the

future all possibilities of the Premiership and Foreign Office; he 1822
therefore took matters very coolly, and soon detecting that the King's —
offer was premature until Lord Hastings' resignation had actually been received, he declined to commit himself as to accepting the appointment, and took great pains to vindicate himself from any imaginable charge of intriguing against Lord Hastings.

In fact, the circumstances under which the Governor-Generalship was prematurely pressed upon Canning suggest the idea of a trap, by which it was hoped to contrive a somewhat discreditable exit for him from the home stage, to his future detriment if ever he returned; and he rather deals with it in that sense. Perhaps George IV. was not altogether above some such little meanness where he hated anybody. We here come to Canning's apology to M. de Chateaubriand for subsequently accepting the Governor-Generalship of India.]

MR. CANNING TO M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

London, 7 April, 1822.

Je ne voulais pas écrire sans vous éclaircir sur les bruits de ma destination au gouvernement des Indes. Je n'avais rien de positive à vous dire jusqu'au jour même que votre lettre m'est parvenue, celui de ma nomination actuelle; et depuis ce tems j'ai été tellement accablé d'affaires que ce n'est qu'aujourd'hui (dimanche de Pâques) que j'ai pu m'en débarrasser pour causer avec vous à loisir.

Vous m'avez exposé votre position, et vous me demandez l'exposition de la mienne.

Me voici, donc, mon ami, Gouverneur Général des Indes. Vous n'aimez pas cette destination, mais vous avouez qu'on ne pourrait en juger confidemment sans en sçavoir les pourquois. C'est en effet, comme vous le dites, un exil—honorable, il est vrai, et d'autant plus qu'il est volontaire.

'Mais la Chambre des Communes!' 'Mais le Ministère!' 'Mais l'Europe en général!' 'Mais l'Angleterre peut être dans des difficultés qui demandent, pour y tenir tête, tout ce qu'elle a de moyens parlementaires et ministériels!'

1822 Tout cela peut être bien vrai. Et je n'ai d'autre réponse à y offrir que le Roi.

Il a bien voulu s'opposer à outrance à ma rentrée dans le Ministère au mois de Juin. Aurait-il cédé dans le mois de Novembre ? Votre ami des Pyrénées vous a dit que oui. Pour moi, je n'en sais rien. Mais ce que je sais très bien, c'est que si j'avais voulu risquer cette question-là, quoiqu'il est possible que j'aurais été nommé premier Lord de l'Amirauté (poste que j'avais préféré au Secrétariat d'Etat pendant la vie de la Reine), il est bien possible aussi que j'aurais été la cause de la chute du Ministère ou, au moins, de la démission de Lord Liverpool—cette alternative n'avait pas trop d'attraits. Mais il y avait une autre, encore moins agréable, celle d'être rejetté une seconde fois, le Ministère restant debout, et Lord Liverpool lui-même faisant le sacrifice que, par amitié et par générosité, il m'aurait fallu lui exiger.

Vous voyez donc que j'avais à choisir non seulement entre l'Inde et l'Amirauté, mais entre l'Inde et une tentative à faire, pour obtenir, de gré ou de force, le consentement du Roi à ma rentrée ; tentative qui sans doute aurait été faite par Lord Liverpool de bien bonne foi, mais dont le succès n'était rien moins qu'assuré. Et vous pouvez vous imaginer quelle aurait été pour moi la gêne de la position où je me serais trouvé dans la Chambre des Communes en cas du non-succès : brouillé avec le Roi, quoique toujours bien avec le Ministère, et ne pouvant prendre aucun parti (excepté celui d'un dévouement un peu humiliant) sans m'exposer à l'accusation d'agir pour vengeance ou par désespoir.

La nomination aux Indes me tirait de cet embarras. Je ne la devais point au Roi, mais à la compagnie des Indes, qui très longtems auparavant (même au mois de Mars ou d'Avril 1821) m'avait sondé sur ma disposition d'accepter cette nomination, et en avait parlé en confi-

dence à Lord Liverpool comme le choix qui leur convien- 1822
drait le mieux. Vous ne saviez pas, peut être, que ce choix est par droit et par loi l'affaire des Directeurs de la Compagnie, pas de la Couronne. Par exemple, Lord Lauderdale était proposé, il y a quinze ans, par le Ministère de Fox et de Grenville, et soutenu par toute l'autorité du Gouvernement, et a été hautement rejetté par les Directeurs. Le choix des Directeurs, il est vrai, n'est pas conclusif sans l'approbation formelle du Roi. Mais cette approbation ne sçaurait être refusé par caprice ou par haine individuelle; et mes cinq années d'administration comme Président du Board du Control me guarantissaient contre toute autre objection.

Si vous me demandez, 'Pourquoi donc refusez cette nomination au mois de Novembre?' en voiçi la raison: l'absence d'une Résignation positive et constatée de la part du Marquis de Hastings.

Le M. de H. est l'ami du Roi, pas des miens. Le Roi était prêt, et désirait même précipiter sa retraite pour précipiter ma nomination, et peut-être mon départ. Mais moi je ne voulais pas que le Roi eut l'air de me faire le sacrifice de son ami. En un mot, je ne voulais pas qu'il parut pour plus dans cette affaire qu'il ne fut à la vérité.

Cinq mois se sont écoulés, pendant lesquels le Parlement s'est rassemblé, et j'y ai pris ma place comme l'année passée.

Dans cet intervalle se sont multipliés assurances de la part de Lord Liverpool de sa détermination inaltérable de se démettre de sa charge. Les Directeurs se sont adressés à moi de nouveau. Je me suis rendu à leurs instances. Enfin ils m'ont nommé à l'unanimité; chose, dont il n'y a qu'un exemple, celui de Marquis de Cornwallis en 1805.

Quant au Parlement, vous voyez qu'avant que je

1822 quitte ma place, je veux faire un dernier effort sur la question que j'ai tant à cœur. Je n'ose pas prédire un succès complet; mais je n'en désespère pas même dans la Chambre des Pairs; dans celle des Communes, je ne doute nullement que je ne l'emporte.

Mais voilà bien assez de moi. Si c'est trop, c'est à vous-même que vous devez vous en prendre.

[This is sufficiently good French to justify the Duke of Wellington's reason for preferring Canning to Peel for the Foreign Office, that Canning could talk French and Peel could not.

To the numerous motives already analysed for influencing Canning's conduct, we find another in the expression of his jealousy lest the King should reap more credit for his appointment to the Indies than he deserved. 'Je ne voulais pas qu'il parût pour plus dans 'cette affaire qu'il ne fut à la vérité.'

By this, according to the views already propounded, it should be understood that Canning did not attribute the King's desire to send him to the Indies to any wish to promote Canning, or to benefit the Indian Empire, but that the motive was purely selfish and artful; selfish in his wish to rid himself of Canning, artful in the design to discredit that statesman if he ventured to decline such a magnificent exile.

There is a remarkable statement in this letter which must not be passed over, as translated:

'Although it is possible that I might have been appointed First 'Lord of the Admiralty (which I should have preferred to the ap-'pointment of Home Secretary), it is very likely that I might have 'been the cause of the upset of the Ministry, or at least of the dis-'missal of Lord Liverpool—not an over-attractive alternative.'

Now it may fairly be asked, why should Canning's acceptance of office have upset the Ministry, or at least have caused the dismissal of Lord Liverpool?

To this the only satisfactory answer can be found in the theory elaborated before: the cause of disturbance could not have been in the King, because, *ex hypothesi*, he would have sanctioned Canning's appointment; nor in Lord Liverpool, because he proposed it; nor in Lord Castlereagh and the Tory Ministers, because they then wielded the power of government and were naturally satisfied therewith. It can, therefore, only be found in Canning himself; and the observation implies that, if brought back by the authority of the Prime Minister,

with the consent of his colleagues and the sanction of the King, Canning meant to hold his hand no longer. He had hitherto felt restrained alike from private and public opposition to Lord Castlereagh's policy; but if brought back, under such circumstances, he would feel liberated from restraint in the Cabinet; and the opening up of an active and persistent counteraction to Lord Castlereagh's supremacy in the counsels of the Government could only end in its dissolution; or, at least, if not in that, at any rate in the expulsion of his friend and ally Lord Liverpool, of course accompanied by himself. 1822

The personality of Huskisson in the above letter to Lord Liverpool represented the Liberal element of Canning's political principles, and in declining to desert Huskisson he declined to surrender his Liberal principles.]

APPOINTMENT TO FOREIGN OFFICE, SEPTEMBER 12, 1822.

[Canning being now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and leader of the House of Commons, it will be useful to describe in general terms the political situation abroad.

Political revolutions of government had taken place in Spain, Portugal, and Naples in the course of the year 1820. In October of that year a Congress of the Great Powers was held at Troppau, from which both France and England were excluded as consultative members. They were allowed representatives to take notes of the transactions of the meeting for the information of their respective Governments, but no more. The three Great Powers in congress agreed to extinguish, first of all, the popular outbreak at Naples, as being the most easily dealt with; and having settled on this, to meet by adjournment at Laybach in December 1820, where they met, and where the runaway King of Naples met them.

The Congress at Laybach prolonged its consultations until May 13, 1821, by which time the Austrian forces had completely suppressed the Neapolitan outbreak, and restored the King of Naples to his unconstitutional and absolute royalty.

In the summer of 1821 the Czar arranged to move 100,000 men to the south of Europe, to support the military operations for the suppression of the various revolutions.

The invasion of the Spanish peninsula was a much more formidable undertaking, and the main responsibility of the expedition would necessarily fall on France; and as the French domestic concerns at that moment appeared in a highly precarious state, besides apprehensions of the jealousy of England which hampered the

1822 freedom of their movements, it came to pass that the French had only managed to get through the preliminary steps of an aggression on Spain by the end of 1822, by which date the Great Powers, in order to lend impetus to France and to support the enterprise, arranged to meet in congress first at Vienna, and then by adjournment at Verona, down in the plains of Italy, whence the Czar could easily mark out, as a temptation for his troops, a road to the Pyrenees. Indeed, his military energy and power menaced the liberties of France as France, of Europe as Europe, quite as much as they menaced the Jacobins of France and revolutionists of Europe.

The impending congress would, therefore, contain within itself highly antagonistic elements; and though all might unite in the wish for the annihilation of 'the revolution' wherever and whenever it might break out, each member experienced feelings of the greatest mutual anxiety and jealousy when the question had to be decided as to which Power should profit by the extinguished 'revolution.'

No doubt Metternich would, in the main, guide the conclusions of the meeting; and Metternich, notwithstanding his jealousy of Russia, would represent the whole animus of anti-revolution. Lord Londonderry, there can be no doubt, was in singular sympathy with Metternich, notwithstanding the occasional protests against the policy of the Holy Alliance, which Lord Londonderry found himself obliged from time to time to promulgate. The delegation of Lord Londonderry to the congress was considered favourable to the objects of the Holy Alliance; his death was considered a loss, and Canning's succession a grievous calamity for the cause of absolutism.

These ideas were not incorrect. By the death of Lord Londonderry the course of British policy became changed indeed; but Canning, who conducted the progress of the change, of course desired as much as possible to disguise and soften it. His own presence at the congress was undesirable; but in choosing the Duke of Wellington, the British Government fixed on the most acceptable person to act in place of the deceased Minister.

But though outward discords were thus as far as possible obviated, the existence of an antagonistic tendency, none the less, did not fail to discover itself at the congress.

Mere want of concurrence, and an attitude of quiet protest on the part of Great Britain, alone operated disagreeably on the minds of the allies; they felt an absence of sympathy with their wishes and aspirations which was disheartening.

Though France eventually lent herself to be a tool of the

Alliance, her counsels and policy were not such as the Alliance could implicitly rely upon; the situation of the French Government with regard to the revolutionary party was too insecure for unreserved trust in its reactionary intentions. The revolutionary party found support in the still formidable adherents of the Empire, particularly in the army; and it was exactly because the Bourbons feared the army that they lent themselves to the dangerous enterprise of an invasion of Spain. 1822

M. Villèle, the French Prime Minister, guided his policy by what he considered exclusively French interests; when, therefore, it became a question whether the suppression of the Spanish revolution should be treated in the interests of the Holy Alliance as a European question, or in the interests of France as a purely French question, Villèle pronounced unmistakably for the latter view—an opinion essential to the interests of France. It therefore came to pass that M. de Montmorency, the French Foreign Minister, who attended the congress at Verona, and held the European and failed to retain the French view of the matter, mistook his personal interests and lost his office, and M. de Chateaubriand succeeded him.

M. de Chateaubriand no doubt was a Frenchman before all things, and to this characteristic he owed his promotion to office; while, on the other hand, he met with his eventual eviction from office not because he was of the revolution, but because the *Parti Prêtre* under Monsieur could not command his services for dynastic, apart from French, purposes.

People speculated at this time whether France and Russia had not come to a separate understanding and treaty with respect to the Spanish invasion; but any such treaty could only be aimed at protecting the Bourbon dynasty from domestic revolution in case of mishap with their expedition into the Peninsula; and an object of that kind could not be called either 'European' or 'French,' but only 'dynastic.' If, therefore, the treaty existed, it must needs have been kept most secret.

A volunteer correspondent, belonging professionally, as it were, to the Journalistic Corps, wrote numerous letters to Canning from Paris, where he professed to be in the way of hearing much useful information. He received small encouragement, and supplied trifling information; but his letters dwell much upon the latent disaffection in France, the unhealthy influence of Monsieur and the Catholic party, and the probabilities of a secret alliance between France and Russia, in anticipation of the Spanish expedition. His letters contain mostly general conjectures, and are not worth printing; but it is

1822 — useful to note that they dwelt on the foregoing points in the then condition of France.

Nearly six months after the preceding letter to the Vicomte de Chateaubriand, Mr. Canning found occasion to write to his friend again, this time to explain the circumstances under which he was accepting the seals of the Foreign Office; as, the previous time, he expounded his reasons for not refusing the government of India.

Here we find it stated simply that nothing but the whole of Lord Castlereagh's position (Foreign Secretary and leader of the House of Commons, practically that of Prime Minister) would satisfy Canning. As the offer of the whole of the 'heritage' reached him, he accepted.

The touch of *nolo episcopari* may be passed over without any superfluous sarcasms under the extraordinary and unexpected circumstances of the situation.]

MR. CANNING TO M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND.

(Extract.) À Gloucester Lodge: le 30 Septembre 1822.

Le jour même que vous m'écriviez, mon cher Chateaubriand, de votre retraite à ——, pour me faire vos adieux et vos vœux pour ma santé sur mon départ pour l'Inde, et pour m'exprimer vos regrets de ce que je ne restai pas içi pour occuper les places que cet affreux et déplorable catastrophe à laissé vacantes—ce jour même mon destin a tout-à-fait changé, selon vos vœux; ce jour, j'ai reçu des mains du Roi les sceaux du Département de S. d'E. pour les Affaires Etrangères. Selon vos vœux, mon ami, mais pas selon les miens. Ma décision était bien prise; et quoiqu'au commencement (il faut bien l'avouer) les motifs de cette décision étaient un peu mêlés, j'avais, depuis quatre mois, envisagé mon départ pour mon monarchie comme la chose du monde la plus agréable, non seulement pour mes intérêts, mais aussi pour mon bonheur; et quand l'événement eut lieu qui devait (comme le disait tout le monde) me retenir en Angleterre, je ne sçaurais vous dire combien la crainte de cette conséquence ajoutait aux pénibles sentimens que l'événement était calculé à inspirer.

" Je comptais néanmoins sur l'éloignement personnel 1822
du Roi, pour me conserver ma destination Asiatique ; et je partis pour Liverpool pour y prendre congé de mes Commettans, dans l'espoir que ce serait un congé pour toujours. Dans le cas même que l'éloignement du Roi serait vaincu soit par la nécessité du tems, ou par l'opinion de Lord Liverpool, j'avais encore un autre espoir. C'était que par déférence pour le Roi, ou peut-être par jalousie des autres, on m'offrirait toute autre chose plutôt que le Département des Affaires Etrangères. Et j'étais déterminé, et même j'avais dit hautement au premier moment, à ceux qui étaient dans ma confidence, que je n'accepterais que l'héritage tel qu'il était tombé. Je croyais bien que je pourrais me justifier auprès de mes Commettans, et du pays en général, du refus de toute autre proposition.

Je ne sais pas si ce qui se passait à Liverpool aidait Lord L. et le D. de W. [Duc de Wellington] (car c'était lui qui combattait avec Lord L. pour moi, et qui, en effet, remporta la victoire), mais il est assez probable que l'expression, quoique locale et partielle, d'une opinion public et populaire, a eu quelque influence sur la décision. Enfin à mon retour de Liverpool, et avant d'arriver à Londres, je rencontrai un courier envoyé pour hâter mon retour ; et je trouvai Lord L. autorisé par le Roi à me faire la seule proposition que je ne pouvais refuser (sans être accusé de manquer et au Roi et à ce que je devais à ma patrie), celle d'occuper les places vacantes tant au Cabinet qu'à la Chambre des Communes.

Me voici donc, bien contre mon gré, et pour la vie, aux galères, dont je me flattais d'avoir échapper bellement, pour n'y rentrer jamais.

Plaignez-moi, mon cher Chateaubriand ; car vraiment je suis à plaindre ; et d'autant plus que tout le monde se plaît à me croire au comble de mes vœux.

1822 Il y a une circonstance, et il n'y en a qu'une, qui me console: c'est que mes Dames sont, comme vous pouvez bien croire, bien aises d'être épargnées et le voyage et l'exil d'Angleterre; quoique à leur rendre justice elles auraient préféré tout ce qu'il y avait pour elles de désagréable dans cette expédition, à me voir accepter des conditions moins honorables.

Il faut rendre justice aussi au Roi, qui, ayant pris son parti, m'a reçu comme s'il y avait rien eu de personnel ni dans son ressentiment, ni dans sa résistance: il m'a donné toute raison d'espérer que mes services pourront lui être acceptables.

Nous voici donc, mon ami, vous et moi, encore voisins; c'est à dire encore habitans du même quartier du globe. Ce n'est pas, il est vrai, une habitation très tranquille: et je crains que de tems en tems je ne trouve des raisons suffisants pour jeter un regard de regret vers mon empire abdiquée en Asie.

[Chateaubriand was subsequently summarily dismissed from office somewhere about July 1824, for failing to support M. de Villèle's measure for the reduction of the Five per Cents, which was actually lost in the French Legislature; whether in consequence of Chateaubriand's line of conduct or not, is not stated. (P. L., vol. xxii., pp. 187–88.)]

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET.

(Circulated about November 15, 1822.)

Mr. Canning begs leave to submit to the Cabinet the following considerations, which appear to require immediate attention:—

Important as the interests may be which are now in discussion at Verona, yet, in the present state of the world, no questions relating to continental Europe can be more immediately and vitally important to Great Britain than those which relate to America.

Our commerce is exposed to daily depredations in 182
the American seas; and the accustomed awe of our maritime preponderancy is daily diminished in the eyes of all nations, by a series of outrages perpetrated, not only by pirates and marauders who bear no national character, and for whom no Government is answerable, but by the subjects of that very nation against the invasion of whose territory by the arms of the allies, as well as against their interference in its political dissensions, the Duke of Wellington is contending at Verona.

If any reliance were to be placed on a sentiment of national gratitude, it would seem incredible that Spain, after the obligations heaped upon her by this country in the late war for her liberation and independence, should not have been cautious to avoid giving just cause of offence to Great Britain, or at least to abstain from inflicting injury upon her benefactress; and it might have been expected that in any case in which such injury might have been unintentionally done to the interests of British subjects by the agents, whether civil or military, of the Spanish Government, the utmost promptitude would have been evinced by that Government to offer redress. So far, however, is this from being a true picture of the conduct of the Spanish Government, that before two years had elapsed from the restoration of Ferdinand VII. to the throne, instances occurred of vexation, fraud, and violence towards the persons of British subjects resident in Spain; and by the beginning of the year 1819 a list of grievances of these various kinds had accumulated upon the hands of our ambassadors, and remained, in spite of urgent and repeated remonstrances, unredressed, such as in times of a quieter character, when the resentment of national injustice was not checked by the fear of shaking the peace of Europe to its foundation, would not

1822 only have justified, but have called for avengement by reprisal or by war.

A despatch of Sir Henry Wellesley's of March 1819 contains an enumeration of these grievances, coupled with an avowal of the utter fruitlessness of all his endeavours to obtain acknowledgment, or reparation for them. And a list is subjoined completing the series from that time to the present, when the Governments of the Spanish West Indian islands that have not thrown off their allegiance to the mother country appear to vie with the commander of the only remaining maritime post on the continent of America still occupied by a Spanish force, in carrying on against British commerce a direct and undisguised hostility.

Not to weary the Cabinet with the specification of many instances, Mr. Canning selects the case of the 'Lord Collingwood,' British merchant ship, captured by the 'Panchita,' royal Spanish privateer, and condemned in the courts of Porto Rico; because the instrument of that condemnation brings the ground of the capture distinctly into view; and also because this particular case having already been mentioned in Parliament (while the fact of the condemnation, though asserted, was not officially known), it is one upon which his Majesty's Government will undoubtedly be called upon to show what course they have taken, and what reparation they have obtained.

And he subjoins a report received at the Admiralty of the instructions issued to Spanish ships of war by the commander of Puerto Cabello.

In consequence of this report the Admiralty have determined upon giving convoy to merchant vessels trading to the ports of the Columbian republic.

The Admiralty could do no otherwise; but however right as a question of department, can anything be

more preposterous as a question of government, than 182
the relation in which the first maritime power of the world is thus placed towards its friends, and the light in which it is exhibited to its rivals?

Convoy in time of peace! and against the attacks of a nation with which we are professedly in amity!

Our commerce with the late Spanish colonies is one which we either claim a right to carry on, or carry on knowing it to be illegitimate.

If the former, ought we to need convoy?

If the latter, ought we not either to abandon the commerce or to make it lawful?

The means of doing the latter are in our hands; nothing but the excess of our forbearance has prevented us from resorting to them; and when that forbearance is thus requited, surely it is time to reconsider a system at once so romantic and so thankless with regard to Spain, and so ruinous and so disparaging to ourselves.

It is not intended to hold out the example of the United States as recommending a decision to which their very origin must necessarily have inclined them with so strong a bias; but it can hardly be denied that the United States Government, recognising the *de facto* independence of the Spanish colonies, claiming a right to trade with them, and avenging the attempted interruption of the exercise of that right by capturing the 'Panchita' and carrying her into a harbour of the United States, pursues upon the whole a more straightforward course, and presents itself before the world in a more intelligible position, than Great Britain forbearing for the sake of Spain to acknowledge the separate existence of her colonies; trading with those colonies by their sufferance and in faith of the continued connivance of Spain; apprised of the discontinuance of that connivance by the 'Panchita's' depredations upon her

1822 commerce, and taking refuge from similar depredations, not in reprisal, but in convoy.

If, in pursuance of this contrast, the Government of the United States, not contented with punishing the capturing vessels with capture, shall insist upon taking security against the like attacks upon the commerce of its citizens in future, and shall make the military occupation of Cuba a part of that security; while we, continuing on the best possible terms with Spain, fighting her political battles in Europe, acknowledging (what none else can see) the continuance of her supremacy in America, acquiesce in the unredressed condemnation of the 'Lord Collingwood,' and venture only to warn off, or at most to repel, the royal privateers of Puerto Cabello, it may perhaps (when Parliament meets) be mooted as a question in which of these two opposite lines of policy the policy of England, such as it was in olden times, is most discernible.

That the United States have such an acquisition in view has been suggested for some time by the common rumours of the Havannah; but the accompanying extract of a letter from that place, with the paper which it encloses, appears to give to those rumours a degree of countenance and probability which entitles the supposed project to our serious reflection.

It may be questioned whether any blow, that could be struck by any foreign Power in any part of the world, would have a more sensible effect on the interests of this country, and on the reputation of its Government.

The possession by the United States of both shores of the Channel, through which our Jamaica trade must pass, would, in time of war with the United States, or indeed of a war in which the United States might be neutral, but in which we continued (as we must do) to

claim the right of search, and the Americans (as they would do) to resist it, amount to a suspension of that trade, and to a consequent total ruin of a great portion of the West Indian interests. 1822

The cure for all the evils and dangers of the present state of things in the West Indian seas is to be found, if at all, not in a perseverance in that system of forbearance and submission which we have hitherto observed towards Spain, but in a prompt and vigorous vindication of our rights by the means which Providence has placed in our power.

Fresh applications for redress at Madrid while the applications of nine years remain unanswered, while the ships of British merchants, unjustly seized, are rotting in the ports of Spain and of her colonies, and their crews in many instances languishing in her prisons, would be surely as preposterous a waste of time as it would be of national dignity.

And if dignity were nothing, we can ill afford the time. Our choice as to the more obvious of the measures to be proposed is only between taking them ourselves, or having them forced upon us by the inevitable course of events, by the growing impatience of the nation.

It is not necessary to declare war against Spain. Spain and her colonial empire are altogether separated *de facto*. She has perhaps as little direct and available power over the colonies which she nominally retains, as she has over those which have thrown off her yoke.

Let us apply, therefore, a local remedy to the local grievance, and make the ships and harbours of Cuba, Porto Rico, and Porto Cabello answerable for the injuries which have been inflicted by those ships, and the perpetrators of which have found shelter in those harbours.

1822 Mr. Canning, therefore, would humbly propose that a sufficient naval force should be despatched to the West Indies, in addition to that despatched in consequence of Lord Bathurst's letter to the Admiralty of September 7, to blockade the harbours of Porto Rico and Porto Cabello, with the following instructions to the respective commanders.

The commander of the squadron destined to Porto Rico to demand of the Governor the immediate restitution of the 'Lord Collingwood,' of its cargo, and, if forthcoming, of its crew: if the crew be missing, to require a succinct account of the manner in which they have been disposed of; and if the cargo shall have been sold or dilapidated, a distinct account of the produce of such sale, and a pecuniary indemnification for the amount of any loss in either case.

Failing satisfaction on these points, to give notice of a determination to capture or destroy every Spanish armed vessel that shall be found cruising in those seas with papers indicating Porto Rico as its port of outfit, or which from other circumstances shall appear to bear that character.

The commander of the squadron destined to Porto Cabello to announce by letter to the commander of that port, that he is sent to remonstrate against the notice which that commander has published of a blockade which he has no visible maritime means of enforcing, and against the orders issued by him for the capture of merchant ships trading with the late colonies of Spain; to declare that he has instructions not to respect that blockade; and that if in pursuance of those orders a single British merchant vessel shall be or shall have been taken in defiance of this notice, he is to capture or destroy every Spanish armed vessel which has a copy of those orders on board, or is known to

have acted under them; and that these instructions are to continue in force until the said blockade and the said orders are publicly withdrawn. 1822

The commander-in-chief in the West Indies should be instructed at the same time to make a communication to the persons exercising the powers of Government in the new independent States, of the necessity under which his Majesty finds himself placed by the continued depredations made upon the commerce of his subjects, by vessels assuming national characters to which they have no pretension; to direct instructions to be given to his commanders to visit all vessels of suspicious appearance, under whatever flag they may present themselves; to profess an entire disposition to avoid occasioning unnecessary vexation; and to request, as the best means of avoiding it, a list of the cruisers which such State may have sent to sea, in order that those cruisers may be respected by our ships of war.

It is to be remarked that though outrages have undoubtedly been committed upon British commerce by vessels under the independent flags, yet that of late years, in instances where that character has not been feigned but real, their visit of our merchantmen has been, as far as we are informed, conducted with as little inconvenience as possible, and without any wantonness of insult; and it cannot be disputed that, of the outrages to which our commerce has been exposed, an infinitely larger proportion is to be attributed not to independent privateers, not even to pirates properly so called, as having no national character, but to vessels which, though piratical in their conduct, have been in character essentially Spanish.

As to Cuba, it may be hoped that the squadron sent out under Captain Warren will have so far achieved its object as, with or without the co-operation of the

1822 Governor of the Havannah, to have cleared that island of the pirates who haunted the neighbourhood of Cape Antonio. If the assistance of the Governor has been cheerfully afforded, we have no further cause of complaint on that head: if withholden, our remonstrances must necessarily be repeated on any fresh attack by vessels proceeding from the coasts of Cuba on taking shelter in that island; and a similar course must then be adopted with that pursued towards Porto Rico.

In any case the presence of our squadron in the neighbourhood of the Havannah cannot be otherwise than desirable with a view to keep in check the Americans, who, whatever they might do in the absence of an English squadron, would hardly venture in the face of one to assume the military occupation of the island...

The instructions to be furnished to our commanders in the event of such an attempt on the part of the United States are matter for separate consideration.

The immediate object of safety to British commerce and navigation being provided for by the measures here suggested towards the Spanish authorities and towards the *de facto* States of America, there remains the great question of a more suitable arrangement of our relations with those States, with a view both to the regularity of commercial intercourse and to the settlement of the political difficulty, of which we cannot longer defer the solution.

The partiality which has unquestionably been shown by this country to Spain, in the contest between her and her colonies, has not excited any hostile feeling in the latter.

They have looked forward patiently to the time when the force of circumstances must lead to our recognition of them; and it would be difficult to conceive under what circumstances such a recognition is ever to take

place if the present crisis does not incline us to consider of it. 1822

In the first place, the very explanations to which the exercise of our just rights of self-defence must lead, recommend, if they do not absolutely require, the residence of civil agents at the principal ports of each of the States of South America.

Secondly, the merchants of the United Kingdom pray for such protection for their commerce.

The overbearing arrogance of Spain no longer acquiesces in our neutrality.

Our ships are seized and confiscated, not because they violate blockade, or have enemy's goods on board, but simply because they trade with the colonies.

The tacit compact which subsisted for years, by which Spain was to forbear from interrupting our trade in compensation for our forbearance to recognise her colonies, is now forgotten or renounced by Spain; and the old colonial system is revived in as full vigour as if she had still a practical hold over her colonies, and had a navy to enforce her pretensions.

What resource have we but to take away all pretext for the enforcement of these absurd and absolute pretensions against us, by conferring on the colonies, so far as our recognition can do it, an independent instead of a colonial character, and thus cutting short all dispute as to Spain's colonial jurisdiction?

No man will say that under such circumstances our recognition of these States can be indefinitely postponed.

The question is, therefore, one entirely of time and of degree; and no man surely will say that we should pass by an opportunity when all things conspire to render this step at once most justifiable towards Spain, most acceptable to her late colonies, and most beneficial to ourselves, in the vain hope that we may some time or

1822 other act in this matter with the concurrence of the Spanish Government. From no Government that Spain ever saw, or is ever likely to see, despotic or constitutional, monarchical or republican, is such concurrence to be expected. Nor can a moment (it is to be hoped) ever arrive when our wrongs from Spain will set us more entirely free to take that course with respect to her colonies which our own interests prescribe.

The degree of recognition must of course be proportioned to the degree of force and stability which the several States may have respectively acquired, and to the absence of struggle for ascendency on the part either of the mother country or of parties into which each State may be divided.

Neither in Buenos Ayres nor in Chili is there a vestige of Spanish force.

In Columbia the single point occupied by Spain is Porto Cabello.

Nor is there in either of these three States such a contest for power as either to endanger its independence or to disqualify it for maintaining external relations.

Peru, not entirely cleared of Spanish troops, is also torn by conflicting parties; and in Mexico, though Spain has but one inconsiderable post (the fort of Ulloa at Vera Cruz), the newly settled Government may be considered as not out of the reach of revolution.

But in Peru, and even in Mexico, there are British commercial interests, which require the superintendence of some civil agency on the part of the British Government.

In both these States, as well as in all the others, the Government of the United States has established the means of national intercourse; and France has avowedly sent to most, if not to all of them, commissions of inquiry, which may at any time be matured into resident missions.

Our conduct hitherto towards Spain has been already described in general terms. To say nothing of the mediation so frequently offered on our part and rejected by Spain, to say nothing of our voluntary engagement to forbid the purchase of arms in this country for the colonies, one single fact speaks volumes as to our own disposition towards Spain. It is this—that in the very spring (perhaps the very month) in which the list of unredressed grievances enumerated in Sir Henry Wellesley's despatch, already referred to, came under the observation of the Cabinet,[1] the Cabinet nevertheless consented to propose to Parliament the Foreign Enlistment Bill—a measure professedly impartial indeed, but one of which the especial benefit to Spain as against her colonies could not be distinguished. 1822

But such refinements must have an end.

The practical business of the world does not admit of a perpetual exchange of benefit for injury, and it is surely sufficient to acquit us of harshness or precipitance towards Spain that we do not recognise her late colonies till we are compelled to resort, in our defence against her aggressions, to measures little short of war, and in a case in which the very want of that recognition is the main justification of those aggressions.

It is no fault of ours that Spain, at the same moment that her agents are insulting our flag and preying upon our commerce in America, is involved in revolution at home.

Her condition in that respect is not a motive for hastening our measures, but neither can it be held a reason for retarding them.

We do not take her anarchy as an offence, but she

[1] Sir Henry Wellesley was about the same time directed to intimate at Madrid, if no prospect of redress should be held out, that this country must resort to reprisals.

1822 must not plead it as a privilege. It would be rash indeed to press such a plea on the part of Spain; for as the general proposition of non-interference in the revolutions of independent nations is necessarily limited by the condition that other nations are not to be directly sufferers by their disorganisation, the legitimate effect of an argument which attributed the aggressions of Spain against other nations to her own internal distractions would be, not to secure her impunity in America, but to justify interference with her in Europe.

Spain is apprised that some steps may soon be taken to vindicate the honour of our flag and the security of our commerce. An intimation of the probability of our recognising, in a more or less qualified manner, the independent States of Spanish America has already been conveyed to her through Mr. Onis. She is, therefore, prepared for the more direct communication of our purpose.

Mr. Canning will prepare a paper to this effect, which may take the form of a note or declaration, and submit it to the Cabinet by the time of the Duke of Wellington's return from Verona.

Connected with the question of the recognition of the Spanish colonies in its general character, though distinguished from it by some striking peculiarities, is that of the more recently assumed independence of Brazil.

If the question of the recognition of the Spanish colonies could admit of much longer doubt or delay on its own merits, the separation of Brazil from Portugal must hasten and (it should seem) must determine the decision of it.

So recognising Brazil as an independent Government, leaving Buenos Ayres and Columbia and Chili unacknowledged, would be, to say the least, invidious, and might be fairly considered as unjust.

But to refuse to recognise Brazil would not be, as it has hitherto been in the case of the Spanish colonies, an act merely negative. 182

For we have with Brazil established relations, regulated commercial intercourse, and agencies, if not actually political, affording channels of political correspondence.

If we mean to treat alike the colonies of Spain and Portugal, we must either extend similar establishments to Spanish America, or withdraw them from Brazil.

But we cannot withdraw our consuls from Brazil.

It is obvious that we must continue to cultivate the commercial relations established with that country.

We may have ventured to show a chivalrous generosity to Spain at the expense of possible but unascertained benefits to be derived from intercourse with the Spanish colonies; but the mercantile interest of the United Kingdom would not readily understand our taking part in the quarrel between Portugal and Brazil on the side of the mother country, which has imposed, contrary to the treaty of 1810, thirty per cent. on our woollens, against Brazil, which is contented with the fifteen per cent. stipulated by that treaty.

But have we no more direct and powerful motive for wishing to be able to recognise Brazil?

The one great question which hangs about the neck of this country is that of the slave trade.

The one great mart of legal slave trade is Brazil.

The continuance of that legal slave trade is the cover and pretext for all the slave trade that is carried on illegally and in violation of treaty as well as of law.

The result of the Duke of Wellington's negotiations at Verona on this subject has (as was anticipated) sufficiently shown how little is to be expected towards the

1822 completion of the abolition from any interference on the part of the allied Powers. The declaration of piracy perhaps was hardly to be wished, even if we had not already pirates enough upon our hands. The proposed refusal to admit Brazilian sugar into the dominions of the Emperors and the King of Prussia was met (as might be expected) with a smile; which indicated on the part of the Continental statesmen a suspicion that there might be something of self-interest in our suggestion for excluding the produce of rival colonies from competition with our own, and their surprise that we should consent to be the carriers of the produce which we would fain dissuade them from consuming.

In short, the voluntary relinquishment of the slave trade by Brazil is the single chance for its final and total abolition.

That chance is now offered to us by a combination of events, the like of which may never recur.

What that chance may be worth it is impossible confidently to pronounce, but the inclosed extract of a note received by Mr. Canning from an agent of the Prince Royal of Brazil, now in London, affords at least encouragement to try it. If good for anything, the chance is good now, at the first moment of anxiety in Brazil, while our decision is considered as vital to their cause.

If we wait till the Emperor of Austria shall have returned a favourable answer to his daughter's letters, and till France shall have offered, as she assuredly will offer, support and countenance with the continuance of the slave trade, we may come too late with our offer contingent upon its discontinuance, and we shall have missed, and missed irrecoverably, an opportunity of effecting the greatest moral good of which human society is now susceptible, of getting rid of the most perplexing

1822

discussion with which the counsels of this country are embarrassed, and finally of saving from utter ruin our own West Indian colonies. For them assuredly there is no prospect of being saved but through the general abolition of the slave trade; and the slave trade can be abolished only through Brazil.

Mr. Canning would on these grounds propose—

That he should be authorised to avail himself of the opening afforded by this communication from the Government of the Prince Royal of Brazil, with a view to a treaty to be negotiated either through our consul at Rio de Janeiro, or in this country so soon as the Brazilian agent shall receive full powers for that purpose, on the basis of an acknowledgment on our part (properly qualified with respect to the rights of the King of Portugal) of the separate and independent Government of Brazil; and of an engagement on the part of the Prince Royal of Brazil to abolish absolutely and totally (at a time to be specified) the Brazilian slave trade.

[Canning had been two months at the head of foreign affairs when he wrote the foregoing memorandum.

At this date the Government at Madrid was in the constitutional form due to the last revolution in Spain, and of which the French monarchy, at the instigation of the Holy Alliance, meditated the overthrow.

In the 'Political Life' (vol. ii., pp. 11, 12, &c.) there will be found a summary of our difficulties with Spain at this crisis. It appears that by the beginning of the year 1819 a long list of grievances and of maltreatment of British subjects in the West Indies had accumulated on the hands of the British ambassador at Madrid; and, in addition, the Spanish Governments in those parts actually carried on a direct and undisguised hostility against British commerce, the Spanish justifying themselves by alleging that they seized British ships trading with the rebellious colonies.

By an Act of 1822 the rights of free States were given to the different divisions of Spanish America under the Navigation Act,

1822 by which Great Britain practically acknowledged the flag of those countries.

Canning held there was a tacit compact between Spain and Great Britain that, if the latter abstained from assisting the rebel colonies from conquering their independence, Spain should refrain from molesting our commerce with the Americas; that, this compact being broken, Britain should no longer refrain from recognising the colonies.

As, however, a decision on this point had to be postponed until the return of the Duke of Wellington from the Congress of Verona, Canning decided on a more speedy method of obtaining redress, by applying a local remedy for a local grievance. He therefore despatched a British squadron to insist upon immediate satisfaction, and to make instant reprisals should any fresh outrages occur. This vigorous measure elicited from the Spanish (constitutional) Government a promise for all possible atonement without delay, a promise which put an end to the retaliatory policy of recognition of the colonies so long as the constitutional and independent Government of Spain continued.

Besides, in the course of November 1822 the British Minister at Madrid received an intimation that the Cortes meditated opening negotiations with the colonies on the basis of colonial independence; negotiations which were, in fact, subsequently opened and carried to a successful termination with Buenos Ayres. These Liberal measures, conjoined with consideration for the menaced position of the constitutional form of government in Spain, led to tender treatment of the Spanish misbehaviour.

However, in the December following it was announced to the Spanish Government that the British Government intended to send consuls to the several provinces of Spanish America in order to protect British commerce. These several consular officers must be supposed to have been intended to hold a position not compromising the Spanish claims of sovereignty over these provinces at this date.]

MR. CANNING TO SIR WILLIAM A'COURT.

F. O.: Dec. 9, 1822.

My dear Sir,—As my despatches of to-day only fulfil the intimations of my private letter by the last messenger, I should have nothing to add in that shape if I had not one from you to acknowledge.

I see plainly all the difficulties which we, and you

especially, have to encounter in endeavouring to clear away the arrears of grievance of so many years' standing. 1822

Those difficulties are twofold—first, as relates to what is to be done; secondly, as to how what must be left undone is to be accounted for and excused.

Had not you better (to take the last point first) prepare a despatch on the model of Sir Henry Wellesley's of 1809, classifying the various cases, and showing in which redress may be obtained, in which it is hopeless, and why; and laying fairly before the Government (your own, I mean) the probable inconvenience of pressing to a decision those for the redress of which we shall be referred by Spain to the proceeds of the Spanish frigates of 1804?

As to what is to be done, or first: let it be as much as you can get done; but what we want, and must have, either with a view to mediation with France, or with a view to mediation with the Colonies, or with a view to a suspension of directly forcible proceedings in the West Indies, is some *éclatante* reparation—the restitution of the 'Lord Collingwood' would be the best; or that, failing that, a direct and unequivocal admission that we should do ourselves right by our own means.

M. de Colomb has undertaken so confidently for a spontaneous assurance of respect for the King's person, and of a revisal (at the time prescribed by the charter) of the democratical extravagances of the constitution, that I know not how to believe that he can have undertaken it without authority. The offer was his own.

Be therefore upon your guard against any attempt of M. de San Miguel to represent it as a demand on my part.

In declining a beneficial commercial treaty as the price of our own undertaking to mediate with France

1822 I was not wholly actuated by motives of romantic disinterestedness.

I had a perfect conviction that such a concession on the part of Spain would have come accompanied with a demand for a loan, which must of course have been refused, and the refusal of which would have thrown us back into a state of alienation and ill-humour.

It does not appear that the Spanish Government is much softened in its tone; and if their recent successes have not buoyed them up with extravagant expectations, I do trust that they will seize the opening afforded to them and solicit our intervention, and mind only that they must solicit it; for if offered they would but too probably suppose that we had some sinister view in the proposal.

Do not let your first interview with M. de San Miguel after the arrival of the messenger pass without communicating to him the contents of my Portuguese despatch; for I suspect the Chargé d'Affaires of Portugal, or rather perhaps his Government essentially, and him by their orders, to be false and tricky to an unpardonable degree.

He certainly has persuaded M. de Colomb that we broke off the Spanish treaty; whereas I know positively that the Portuguese Government was alarmed at the length which it had gone, and was most anxious for an opportunity of retracting. And it was to find or make this opportunity that they invented the fable of the new Guarantee.

You will now have three messengers with you, counting Mr. Jackson. Be not slow nor sparing in intelligence.

I am, &c. &c.

GEORGE CANNING.

[The letter above given shows how Canning thought that Spanish compensatory action should be shaped, and how careful he was to guard against any appearance of bargaining with the Spanish Constitutionalists for a revision of the ultra-democratic elements in their constitution, in consideration of their attending to British complaints in the American seas. 1822

There is a decisive tone in the instructions, which proves it to have been written before the mitigating circumstances above described had begun to affect British policy.

The paragraph about Portugal refers to the necessity of assuring Spain of the absolute neutrality of Great Britain, whatever the domestic form of government of Spain or Portugal might be. The Portuguese Constitutional Government had endeavoured to obtain from Britain a guarantee of its continued existence, which Canning had entirely declined to give; moreover, the Portuguese Government took the attitude, at first, of a desire to support Spain actively in case of war with France, but naturally shrank from its full responsibilities on closer examination of the political position. In so doing, however, they attempted to throw the blame of its backsliding on an interference of Great Britain. On this point Sir W. A'Court was instructed to make clear to M. de San Miguel that such a contention was untenable.]

MR. CANNING TO SIR W. A'COURT.

Foreign Office: Dec. 17, 1822.

My dear Sir,—At the earnest desire of Sir Philip Roche, and on the recommendation of Sir H. Wellesley, I have made the former gentleman the bearer of my despatch to you this day, for the purpose of placing him at your disposal for the collection and report of military intelligence, which in the present and possible state of affairs in Spain may be a service requiring considerable exertion and an experience and knowledge of the language eminently possessed by Sir P. Roche.

You will learn from the enclosed copy of a letter which I address to Sir P. R. the conditions and limits of his employment.

In the event of peace remaining uninterrupted, there will be no occasion for your detaining him long.

1822 In the event of war, it will be highly desirable to have a more correct account of military occurrences than we can rely upon through any ordinary channels of intelligence.

He will return either through France or through the South of Spain—and by Lisbon—as you may determine. I can conceive circumstances in which the latter route might be more advisable.

But the probabilities of peace seem to preponderate.

I am, dear Sir, very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[In the above letter Mr. Canning introduces to the British ambassador at Madrid Sir Philip Roche, whose services are to be at the disposal of the Embassy, for the collection and report of military intelligence, in view of the anticipated hostilities between France and Spain.

This case exemplifies the modern practice of neutral governments despatching a military representative to accompany the army of a belligerent Power.]

## 1823

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR. CANNING AND MONSIEUR OF FRANCE, AND SIR CHARLES STUART, BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT PARIS, on the subject of the contemplated advance of a French army, with a view to the suppression of the Constitutional Form of the Monarchy in Spain; written in February 1823.

[IT appears that Canning felt keenly the false position in which Great Britain would be placed if France persevered in her enterprise, and he anxiously sought to discover some means of averting the catastrophe, and of preventing the expedition taking place. The idea came before him—whether originating with himself or with some other person—of making a personal appeal to Monsieur to use his influence to put a stop to the movement against Constitutional Spain. 1823

It is possible that the idea, though modified, originated in a suggestion which the Hon. F. Lamb (afterwards Lord Beauvale), then at Paris, offered to the Duke of Wellington, in a letter published in Wellington Correspondence, dated January 27, 1823. In the course of his observations Mr. Lamb points out that the war was 'the 'work neither of the Government nor of the nation, but of the Court 'party,' which was identical with the party of Monsieur. Mr. Lamb says, 'The only efficacious step I can contemplate is a letter from 'our king to the King of France, stating his anxious wish for peace 'and his hope that a contest would be avoided which would open the 'door to new revolutions, and place him (our King) in the unnatural 'state of being opposed to a sovereign with whom he had made 'common cause for thirty years and whose interests he always re-'garded as his own. If such a letter were brought by a man of great 'name and service, who would be in immediate relations with the King 'and with Monsieur, I think a disposition might be created in the 'war party arising from fear, and I look to no other motive as now 'adequate.'

In a further letter on January 28, 1823, Mr. Lamb observes

1823 that 'the best mode of preserving peace would be the Duke's 'arrival with a letter to the King.' 'Monsieur's language is "that 'he regrets it" [war], "but it is inevitable."'

Again, on February 28, 1823, Mr. Lamb makes the remarkable statement that the 'Duc d'Orleans had reported that the restoration 'of Monsieur's spirits was due to Ferdinand's [King of Spain] personal 'solicitations for foreign troops.'

It will be noticed, after examining Canning's letter to Monsieur, that it, curiously enough, embodied the spirit of the protest suggested by Mr. Lamb, only shaped as a ministerial and not a royal utterance.

Few appeals would carry such weight at the French Court as the 'personal solicitations' of Ferdinand for military aid, involving as they did the whole question of the common cause of princes in general and of the Bourbon princes in particular.

Canning, in his letter to Monsieur of France, justifies his own position and integrity by reference to the consistent hostility he had always maintained against Jacobinism, and explains his *démarche* by pointing out the strong feeling aroused in England by the speech of the King of France, where the principle was proclaimed that no constitution could be valid except granted by the free grace and favour of the sovereign; he recalls the recent wars of political principle in Europe, and forebodes the possibility of an extended political convulsion arising out of the French invasion of wider extent than the French government at all anticipated at the moment; he suggests a compromise in respect of the French and Spanish position, and offers British mediation.

This last touch proves that at least Lord Liverpool and the Duke of Wellington, if not one or two others of the Ministers, must have concurred to admit of Canning proffering mediation.]

MR. CANNING TO SIR CHARLES STUART.

Feb. 4, 1823.

My dear Sir,—The kindness with which H.R.H. Monsieur has been accustomed to treat me both here and in France, and some accounts which I have received of his sentiments upon the subject of the great question now pending, have induced me to take the step—perhaps useless, but I hope not mischievous—of writing to H.R.H. the letter which I enclose to you; of course there is nothing official in this transmission. But I know no other intervention through which my letter

could reach its destination that would not be obnoxious to more objection. I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will find an opportunity of delivering it into Monsieur's hands. 1823

Perhaps the best way of doing this would be to ask to see H.R.H., and before you deliver the letter to let him know that you have such a one from me to deliver, and to beg that 'if he has the smallest objection to receiving it he will say so, in which case you will return it to me.' And you will particularly make him understand that it is, in every sense of the word, a private letter; written by me individually and without communication with any other person.

You will be kind enough to let me know when you have had the goodness to execute this commission. And I earnestly enjoin you to make no mention of it, lest it should, if known, embarrass Monsieur as well as me.

It will also be very desirable that I should learn from you whether, at any time after the delivery, you have reason to believe that the fact of my having written to Monsieur, or the contents of my letter, transpire through H.R.H. himself.

I am, my dear Sir, very sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Monsieur's answer accompanies Sir Charles Stuart's despatch of February 10, which contains a report of the remarks of his Royal Highness uttered in conversation on Canning's letter.]

MR. CANNING TO MONSIEUR OF FRANCE.

London, Feb. 1, 1823.

Sir,—The goodness and condescension with which your Royal Highness was accustomed to treat me when I had the honour and the happiness some years ago to wait upon Y.R.H. occasionally in this country, and the

1823 graciousness with which Y.R.H. deigned to receive me when I had the far greater happiness of seeing Y.R.H. restored to the palace of your ancestors, have emboldened me to address myself directly to Y.R.H., and to presume upon the motives of the freedom which I take as its apology.

If in taking that freedom I should unfortunately incur Y.R.H.'s displeasure, it is on me singly and individually that it must fall. I have no partners in my presumption, nor any confidants of it. I act in it of myself. I am impelled to do so by an irresistible conviction that a great calamity is hanging over Europe; that but a few short weeks, perhaps days, are left to avert it; and that Y.R.H. is perhaps, of all men living, at once the best able to avert and—may I say without offence?—the most interested in averting it. With all the humility of the most devoted of Y.R.H.'s servants, and with all the earnestness which the most affectionate of them can feel in any matter concerning Y.R.H.'s welfare or glory, may I implore Y.R.H. to pause before the sword is drawn against Spain?

I fear that too light an estimate is made in France of the magnitude of the enterprise upon which she is entering. It is not merely a contest between France and Spain, though that contest in arms alone would be sufficient to shake the settlement of Europe; but it is the recommencement of that contest of extreme principles which has already desolated Europe for a quarter of a century; of which seven years of peace had just begun to compose the 'agitations,' but of which, if reopened now, neither we nor our sons' sons may see the conclusion.

I know it is thought in France that it will be a short war—a campaign of gallant actions and splendid results, fleshing the youth of France in glory, without

proportionate difficulty, moulding the army into one mass and one sentiment, and knitting it firmly to the throne. War or peace, no Frenchman can wish more cordially than I do that in the last-mentioned anticipation the advocates for war may be right. But as to the shortness of the war: I, Sir, am old enough to remember the commencement of war was with France in 1793. I remember hearing from Mr. Pitt, a man (Y.R.H. will agree with me) of no mean sagacity—not in his place in Parliament, where he might have spoken only to encourage confidence in others, but in the privacy of his intimate society—that he was satisfied the war would be a short one. Yet that war outlived its beginner and his successor, and the successor of that successor, and was finally brought to a close in its twenty-second year, only by a combination of circumstances little less than miraculous. 1823

The military calculations of France may be framed on sounder data than ours of 1793; but I doubt whether her moral estimates be not at least equally fallacious. I doubt whether she has taken into account the passive powers of Spain; the unconquerable endurance of the Spanish character; the sullen desperation which will grow even out of the inferiority of their means of combat, and, above all, the animating nature of that cause, which if they had it not before, I am grieved to say the speech of the King of France will have given to them. Up to the day of that speech men were divided in opinion whether France might or might not have ground of war against Spain, on some practicable offence or assignable danger. But the declaration that the ground of war is to compel the Spaniards to take their liberties from the hands of Ferdinand, with the addition (surely gratuitous) that it was from him only that they could hold them (if that be the true

1823 construction of the sentence), has produced an effect in this country such as I have witnessed, I think, but twice in my life; and it is under the impression of that effect that I took the resolution to trouble Y.R.H. with this letter.

Your Royal Highness probably recollects the tumultuous expression of feeling in the City of London which hailed the renewal of the war with Bonaparte in 1803. Your Royal Highness must have witnessed a similar ebullition of public sympathy on the first arrival in London of the Spanish Deputies in 1808. Upon these two occasions only do I recollect ever to have seen a burst of general sentiment (pardon me if I state what is distressing to your Royal Highness) so strong as that which has followed the declaration of a war upon the principle, as applicable to all mankind, that nations can only receive freedom at the hands of their king, and such a king (the world will add, however irreverently) as Ferdinand has shown himself to be!

Your Royal Highness will not suspect me (I venture to believe) of being infected with Jacobinical principles. My public life, such as it is, has been passed in combating them. But I do frankly and sincerely declare to your Royal Highness, with all the principles and prejudices of my public life full upon me, and with Mr. Burke's last works and words still the manual of my politics, that if I were called to choose between the principle laid down in the speech of H.M. the King of France, and its antagonist principle, the sovereignty of the people, I should feel myself compelled to acknowledge that the former is the more alien of the two to the British Constitution.

As Ministers—if we had bound ourselves to you by compact (to France of course, I mean, though the familiar pronoun slipped involuntarily from my pen) in

a war against Spain, in full conviction of the justice of your cause; an attempt to perform that compact after the speech of January 28 would have united against us every party as well as every faction in the State; and we should have been driven from our seats amidst the execration of Tories as well as Whigs. Our Constitution stands not indeed upon the antagonist principle, but upon the denial of that which the speech has promulgated; our practical support indeed was not in the contemplation of France; but let her judge what is the moral support to be expected from us in a contest, in the outset of which we must disavow the principle upon which she enters into it as loudly as our political opponents, and in which the nation against whom that principle has been denounced becomes by that very denunciation an object of sympathy with all classes of our people. 1823

Is France, then, to withdraw her denunciation? Is she to retreat before the sovereignty of the Spanish people? No: the safety of France and of Spain equally rests on a compromise of the conflicting principles—on an avoidance of either extreme. That compromise is matter of fact rather than of argumentation, and is the more likely to be attained in practice the less it is canvassed in theory.

The *échappatoire*—of the 'Si' in the King's speech—induces me to hope that such a compromise may not be wholly out of reach. Perhaps for that object the services of England may still be available. Let not M. de Villèle and M. de Chateaubriand (the former of whom I honour in his public character, and the latter of whom I have the happiness of knowing better in his personal qualities)—let them not suspect that we have anything to gain either by the contest or the compromise. Our differences with Spain are settled. We want no more—

1823 neither islands nor provinces, nor privileges of trade. Trade—but not exclusive privileges—all the advantages and all the islands that Spain could offer us, are nothing worth in our eyes compared with the continuance of peace. It is of that alone that we are avaricious, however little the French Ministers may believe us.

I tremble to look back upon what I have written. As the impulse under which I began to write exhausts itself in writing the fear of offence comes upon me. But I have written in the sincerity of my heart. The occasion is one which, lost, can never recur. In moments of anxious decision the smallest weight thrown in will turn the scale; and I therefore will presume to send what I have presumed to write, in the earnest hope and confidence (may I venture to say?) that Y.R.H. will pardon if you cannot approve.

I have the honour to be, with the profoundest respect and (if I might speak my feelings without offence) with the most affectionate attachment, Sir,

Your Royal Highness's devoted servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

SIR CHARLES STUART TO MR. CANNING.

Paris: February 10, 1823.

My dear Sir,—According to the directions contained in your private letter of the seventh, I called upon Madame de Gontaut at the hour his Royal Highness Monsieur usually visits his grandchildren, and I informed his Royal Highness that his former kindness had encouraged you to open your mind to him at this important crisis respecting the alarming consequences which must result from the perseverance of the French Government in their present course, in a private letter, which I was authorised to deliver, if his Royal Highness should apprehend no inconvenience from the receipt of such a communication.

His Royal Highness was pleased to express the satisfaction with which he saw this mark of your confidence as a private

friend rather than as Secretary of State; for that much as he felt attached to the King's Ministers, he takes no part in the Government, nor does he arrogate to himself any influence over their measures independently of the King's will, whose first subject he is; that he should receive your letter and avail himself of an early opportunity to show it to the King, explaining at the same time that it is not to be considered in the light of a ministerial communication. 1823

As the possibility that this letter would be placed before the King was, I presume, contemplated when you wrote it, I did not hesitate to deliver it to his Royal Highness, who read the letter with attention, discussing the different points to which, I presume, it alluded, as he went on.

He began by saying that although he had not seen the King of France's speech to the legislative bodies before it was delivered, he approved the composition and the sentiments contained in that discourse; that since he is convinced the modifications in the Spanish Constitution must be derived from the Crown, to ensure the re-establishment of tranquillity, it is absolutely necessary that the King should be restored to the full enjoyment of his liberty.

In answer to my question what his Royal Highness understood by the liberty of the King of Spain, he said that his Majesty should be allowed to proceed to the frontier to concert with the Duke d'Angoulême, the course it is expedient to pursue, in order that after his return to Madrid he may announce the changes he shall have determined to adopt; that such a proof of his liberty being once given to the world, neither France nor any other Power would have a right to complain of the Constitution, however faulty, which he might think it proper to promulgate; and that till this course had been adopted the whole system, which is avowedly founded upon the sovereignty of the people rather than the sovereignty of the King, must be considered vicious and illegal.

My observation that such a principle could not be recommended by the British Minister he admitted to be true, but said that the religious motives which had contributed to bring about the revolutions of the British Government rendered our position different from and entirely inapplicable to other countries. His

1823 Royal Highness declared his approbation of the determination of the King of Spain not to propose to the Cortes any amnesty in favour of the officers condemned for their conduct on July 7, inasmuch as it shows his reluctance to adopt any measure in concurrence with a body which he must consider to be illegitimate, and a submission to whose authority would be worse than any appearance of dictation on the part of a foreign Power. He repeated therefore that no good can be expected before the King has proved himself to be a free agent by proceeding to the frontier.

He said he was convinced all warlike preparations might have been avoided if the Duke of Wellington had been authorised to sign the protocol of the allied Ministers at Verona, because he conceived it would have induced the Spanish authorities to give way and to be cautious in committing themselves with France; that notwithstanding this consideration, the French Government will merely avail themselves of the moral support of other Powers, without calculating upon their participation in the war, for that it is a French quarrel, and has been undertaken for objects immediately French; and that they will be careful to conduct it upon that principle.

You will see by the recapitulation of what fell from his Royal Highness in this conversation that the anxiety of that prince to avoid a war has, I know not from what cause, been very greatly overrated; and that since the measures of the Government have nearly decided the question, he has returned to all the notions respecting the Spanish Constitution which have been put forward in the discourses of the War Party. I must at the same time add that his expressions respecting his Majesty's Government were extremely flattering, and his regret that so wide a difference should separate our opinions did not at all partake of the irritation which characterises the language of the persons who are generally considered to be his Royal Highness's friends. He said he saw the difficulty of the task imposed upon his Majesty's Ministers, and the firmness it required under such circumstances to resist the impulse of public opinion; that their conduct, however, upon former occasions is to him a satisfactory proof that they will not allow themselves to be borne away or submit to take any measure, or betray any

sentiment, which can anticipate the possibility of a disagreement between the two countries arising from the question at issue between France and Spain. 1823

Monsieur de Villèle has since informed me that his Royal Highness placed your letter before the King last night, who communicated it to him in confidence this morning. He added that as it is to be considered entirely a private communication he shall be careful to let it proceed no further, and cautioned me against any allusion to the subject in my conversations with the Vicomte de Chateaubriand.

I have the honour to be, my dear Sir,

Yours very faithfully,

CHARLES STUART.

[The answer of the French Government is embodied in the Memorandum forwarded with his Royal Highness's letter to Mr. Canning of February 15—a memorandum believed to have been drawn up by M. de Villèle, the French Prime Minister.

The character of Monsieur, though even then tolerably well known, was not fully revealed until he became king, when he took advantage of his position to try to give full effect to what he conceived to be the wisest policy in the interests of Legitimate Monarchy, but in which everyone else only saw fatal and suicidal folly. Though that side of Monsieur's character had not yet fully developed itself, one would think Canning might have divined the hopelessness of his appeals to such a prince, knowing that Charles's native obstinacy was backed by the genius of Chateaubriand, and, in the present case, by the political skill of De Villèle ; but it seems likely that Lamb's suggestion of sending the Duke of Wellington with a king's letter to Louis XVIII. had taken root, and that Canning felt it necessary to propose and carry out something of the same kind, as a counter-project, in which the Duke should not be allowed to appear ; but the high function of personal intercession with the ruling princes of France should devolve on Canning instead. So, in place of the Duke remonstrating with the French King, it was Canning remonstrating with Monsieur ; and it must be confessed that Canning's known political Liberalism rendered him a less acceptable mediator than Wellington would have been. However, there was no probability that any intercession would avail on either supposition ; and by his move Canning at any rate kept himself master of the situation.

Looking at the whole affair from the standpoint of present

1823 knowledge, there seems no doubt that the French Monarchy believed it could only save its existence by war, on account of the profound and dangerous discontent of large classes in the kingdom, most especially of the army. An urgent dilemma overwhelmed them, and nothing short of immediate employment for the troops would create the necessary diversion. The device succeeded, and the Monarchy prolonged its existence for seven years more.]

SIR CHARLES STUART TO MR. CANNING.

Paris: February 17, 1823.

My dear Sir,—Madame de Gontaut wrote me a note on Saturday morning, requesting me to come to her apartments in the Tuileries, where his Royal Highness Monsieur expected to see me.

In this interview his Royal Highness told me, that, although he had fully made known his sentiments on our last meeting, he thought it necessary to send a written answer to the letter which he had received from you; and he took the accompanying letter out of his pocket, enclosing a memorandum, which his Royal Highness proceeded to read, apprising me that it contained, not merely his own opinions, but those of the King's government, respecting the war with Spain.

His Royal Highness then adverted to the feeling which has been so generally manifested in England upon this question, in a tone which betrayed the pain and alarm with which he contemplated the possibility of a quarrel between the two countries; and although I pointed out to him that the expression of this feeling is entirely to be attributed to the measures detailed in his Royal Highness's letter, which, he must be aware, are quite incompatible with English ideas, he said that he relied upon the determination of his Majesty's Ministers not to allow themselves to be borne away by the torrent of public opinion; and, pressing my hand, his Royal Highness exclaimed, with great emotion, 'Soyons amis, Cinna,' and, after a profusion of warm and kind expressions, took leave of me.

As your letter had been communicated to Monsieur de Villèle, I thought it right to go immediately to that Minister and to tell him what had passed, when the language in which he adverted to the note that had been read to me by his Royal Highness

convinced me that he is not only acquainted with its contents, but that they are in all probability his own composition. 1823

I observed to him that he must excuse me if I considered this memorandum as offering no great proof of moderation, for that the principles therein laid down had never been recognised either in England or in Spain; and that he ought to recollect that the laws of the latter kingdom, which are founded upon a precisely opposite notion, had been sworn to by Philip V. and his successors.

He answered that no abstract principle is brought forward the recognition of which is indispensable to the suspension of warlike preparations, for that, among the variety of opinions which prevail, any indication, however slight, of an intention to return to principles of government not dangerous to neighbouring States will be sufficient to arrest the hostile demonstrations of France, but that if matters continue in their present state, and if the Spanish Government set the example of the most violent hostility against France, no alternative will be left but a recourse to arms.

I have, &c.

CHAS. STUART.

MONSIEUR TO MR. CANNING.

Paris: 15 février 1823.

J'ai reçu, Monsieur, votre lettre du 1er de ce mois. Je l'ai lu avec toute l'attention qu'elle mérite; et conformément à ce que j'avais annoncé à Sir Charles Stuart, j'en ai fait l'usage qui m'était prescrit par mon devoir.

La note que je joins ici me paraît répondre de la manière la plus claire et la plus satisfaisante aux réflexions qui vous avaient été suggérées par un passage du discours du Roi à l'ouverture des chambres. Je dois vous ajouter en même temps que cette note n'a aucun caractère officiel quelconque, et qu'elle est purement confidentielle, comme la lettre que vous m'avez adressée.

Je me rappelle toujours avec un véritable plaisir les conversations amicales que nous avons eues ensemble tant en Angleterre qu'en France; et s'il peut exister quelques différences d'opinions entre nous, j'ai la douce confiance qu'elles ne tarderont pas à disparaître, et que rien ne pourra altérer les sentimens d'estime

1823 et de reconnaissance qui m'attachent à votre Roi, à son gouvernement et à la nation anglaise.

Je profite avec empressement de cette occasion pour vous renouveler, Monsieur, l'expression de ma parfaite estime et de ma sincère affection.

CHARLES-PHILIPPE.

NOTE EN RÉPONSE À CETTE ASSERTION.—'Le discours du Roi contient la déclaration que le motif de la guerre est de forcer les Espagnols à recevoir leurs libertés de la main de Ferdinand.'

Le discours du Roi de France a assigné deux motifs à la guerre contre l'Espagne. 1° Le danger auquel la France est exposée par suite des discordes civiles qui tourmentent l'Espagne; et en 2d lieu, l'aveuglement avec lequel ont été repoussées les représentations faites à Madrid.

En effet, si la France est agitée dans son intérieur depuis six mois, on ne peut l'attribuer avec vérité qu'aux événemens qui sont venus rallumer dans ce pays des passions prêtes à s'éteindre, et relever les espérances des fauteurs de révolutions.

Cependant le Gouvernement de S.M.T.C. a tenté tous les moyens de conserver la paix; mais qu'est-il résulté depuis le 7 juillet des dispositions pacifiques et bienveillantes de la France à l'egard de l'Espagne, et notamment depuis les démarches officieuses de l'Angleterre? Rien autre chose que des réponses injurieuses pour les alliés de la France, et la demande à elle-même de retirer des frontières son armée d'observation.

Voilà les motifs de la guerre tels que le Roi les donne, tels qu'ils sont en effet, tels enfin qu'ils ont déterminé les conseillers de la couronne dans cette grave occurrence. Au surplus, le Roi l'a solennellement annoncé, la guerre n'aura pour but que de conserver le trône d'Espagne au petit-fils d'Henri IV, préserver ce beau royaume de sa ruine, et le réconcilier avec l'Europe. En un mot, elle ne sera entreprise que pour conquérir la paix, que l'état de l'Espagne rendrait impossible.

Contraint d'en venir à cette mesure extrême, le Roi, dans le désir qu'il aurait de la conservation de la paix, a considéré quels seraient les moyens de préserver ses peuples et son royaume des maux auxquels ils sont exposés; et il a dû placer au premier rang et présenter comme le plus propre à atteindre ce

but désirable que Ferdinand soit libre de donner à ses peuples 182
les institutions qu'ils ne peuvent tenir que de lui et qui, en
assurant leur repos, dissiperaient nos justes inquiétudes; car la
France éprouve avec raison la juste crainte de voir le trône
d'Espagne enlevé à Ferdinand VII, tant qu'elle le voit captif
dans sa capitale et sous le joug d'institutions qui lui ont été
imposées par la force.

Cette même situation et ces mêmes craintes ont armé les Espagnols contre le Gouvernement des Cortes; et il en est résulté cette conséquence, que si d'un côté le danger de la maison régnante rendait la situation de l'Espagne incompatible avec l'honneur de la couronne de la France, de l'autre l'agitation et la guerre civile compromettent la sûreté de notre pays.

Ainsi le Roi a, en même temps, exposé les motifs de la guerre et ce qui lui paraît le plus propre à l'éviter. Le moyen qu'il indique est le plus simple, le plus prompt, et surtout le plus avantageux pour l'Espagne et pour l'Europe.

Si on se livre à cet examen avec la même attention que l'a fait le Cabinet français, avec le même désir de voir cesser réellement les causes de dissension et de danger qui troublent et menacent l'Espagne, on sera forcé de reconnaître que la concession libre de la part de Ferdinand d'institutions convenables à l'état présent est la voie la plus sûre pour ramener l'ordre en Espagne et pour le conserver en France. C'est aussi le moyen le plus prompt de réconcilier l'Espagne avec les Gouvernemens de l'Europe, qui s'empresseront de donner, par le retour de leurs ambassadeurs, la seule garantie raisonnable à l'amnistie qui serait publiée par Ferdinand et aux institutions qui lui-même aurait octroyées à ses peuples.

En résumé, le Roi de France n'a d'autre motif de faire marcher ses troupes que le soin de conserver la dignité de sa couronne, l'honneur et la sûreté de la France. Il présente comme le meilleur moyen de rétablir l'ordre, et tout à la fois d'arrêter et de mettre fin aux hostilités, ce que lui-même il a fait avec succès pour la France après une longue révolution, la concession, librement accordée par le Roi, d'institutions appropriées à l'état actuel de l'Espagne.

1823 MEMORANDUM ON THE POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN in the event of a War between France and Spain.—February 1823.

[This memorandum is evidently by Canning. Though it bears no date or initials, from its tenor it is clear it must have been composed in the first three months of the year 1823, before the French army had actually entered Spain. It deals with the position of Great Britain if she took part in the war.

It should be compared with the memorandum prepared by the Duke of Wellington on the same subject, and dated February 10, 1823, published in his correspondence of that date.

The Duke laid great stress on the immediate hostility of the great Powers; the injury their united force could effect on the weaker allies of Great Britain—the Netherlands and Portugal; besides the instant annexation of Hanover by Prussia, and the powerlessness of Great Britain for all effectual military purposes.

Canning concurs in the general idea of the results of a war suggested by the Duke; only he doubts if Austria would join in a combined anti-British movement. But then he sees that if the French Government had the chance of converting the Spanish aggression into a war of revenge against Great Britain, and used it, it would materially strengthen the warlike party in France and tend to unite all parties in one common bond of hatred against Britain.

It explains the reasons which made it expedient for Great Britain to preserve neutrality during the impending struggle. That Britain should find it expedient to tolerate the occupation of Spain by the French armies, was a remarkable inversion of all that had happened in the same country not fifteen years before.

But at the present crisis, firstly, the French Power was not under the direction of Napoleon.

Secondly, the professed object of the invasion, viz. to crush Liberal institutions in Spain, was known to be uncongenial to the wishes and feelings of all Liberal Frenchmen; to a large extent the army was more than suspected of sharing this dislike; so that this great military effort of the French nation contained within itself the elements of a strong reaction.

Thirdly, the invasion, although an unauthorised interference with the internal affairs of an independent State, did not pretend to bear a character of hostility against the Spanish nation at large; and the Spaniards accepted it, and indeed a large party welcomed it, in the light of an enterprise of police, and not of conquest.

An invasion qualified by such conditions did not suggest any very

serious apprehensions as to ulterior aims if only it left Portugal and the Spanish Colonies unmolested. But at this time there was not much hope of any such moderation. 1823

The French would have liked to profit by their temporary empire over Spain, to undertake the reduction of the rebellious Spanish Colonies, and be recompensed by an acquisition of colonial territory. But Spain is a *cul de sac* and surrounded by the broad seas, over which the British flag still preserved its superiority. No way except by sea leads out of the Peninsula; short, therefore, of positive annexation, France could make little of her military predominance without the permission of England.

No doubt it must have been in some degree mortifying to Canning to be obliged, within six months of his return to the Foreign Office, to stand by, and watch, and wait, while France started on a military enterprise which at once enhanced her reputation, confirmed the predominance of the Holy Alliance and absolutism, and at the same time disparaged the cause of freedom throughout the world and outraged the rights of an independent nation.

Wellington and Canning had at a previous epoch, each in his own way, spared no pains to drive French soldiers out of Spain ; but now they were both obliged to admit that circumstances made it expedient for Great Britain to abstain from interposing to prevent a new French inroad on the Peninsula.

Reasons of policy amply justified abstention.

Financial exhaustion and attenuated military establishments made it imperative on Britain to remain neutral except under circumstances of infinitely greater exigency than then presented themselves.

Nothing can be more brief or effective than the summary in this paper of the arguments against British intervention ; and the subsequent events fully justified the wisdom of this neutrality none the less that for its immediate object the French expedition proved perfectly successful.]

MEMORANDUM.

I believe I may consider it as an undoubted fact that the war against Spain is generally unpopular and odious in France, not only amongst the commercial and quiet part of the community but likewise with the army.

If Great Britain should take part in the war, the French Government would not fail to avail themselves of this circumstance to convert the Spanish war into

1823 an English war, and thereby to render it popular with the military and a great part of the nation, who would consider that in such a war (as far as glory and honour were concerned) they have everything to retrieve and nothing to lose.

But what are we to do in such a war?

Is it to be a land war? If so, experience proves that the defence of Spain would be thrown almost exclusively on this country, and we should be involved in an expense which would be quite ruinous to us.

This would be the case if we had an army ready to take the field to resist the invasion of the French. But we have not now any such army—and it would probably require a campaign or two to form one. Let it be considered, moreover, that Spain is at present a divided nation; that we know not how to estimate the comparative strength of the Royalists and Constitutionalists; and that, even if we were prepared to encounter the French, it would not be desirable on any account to be opposed on the field to the Spanish Royalists.

If our efforts are to be confined to the sea, I do not understand how by this means the Spaniards can be materially assisted, or the French (if likely otherwise to be successful) effectually baffled.

We are next to consider that the great Continental Powers are in a degree committed to support France against Spain.

I do not think that under any circumstances the Emperor of Austria could take part directly against us; but the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia would probably resent our conduct, and we might in consequence risk Hanover, Portugal, and our connection with the Netherlands.

I could further observe that the French war against

Spain may be unsuccessful. It may be unsuccessful 182
from the character and pertinacity of the Spaniards, and
possibly, though perhaps not probably, from mutiny in
the French Army.

If it is successful in the outset, the success may be limited to the parts of the territory covered by the French armies.

The success therefore may be only partial.

France may be engaged in a long struggle, which she may ultimately be obliged to abandon.

Considering, therefore, the risks we should incur, the little good we could do, the chances of avoiding war by delay altogether, and the danger of making a war unpopular now popular in France, I think our policy should be in the first instance neutrality.

We must not conceal from ourselves, however, that France may be successful. She may set Ferdinand at liberty and restore him to a great share of power. She may take advantage of this circumstance to re-establish French influence at Madrid, and to renew, if not in terms, in effect, the family compact.

She may further attempt to carry into execution what she has already held out—the measure of putting at the command of Spain her fleets and armies, to assist the Spanish operations in South America.

It cannot be denied that, after the forward and successful part Great Britain took in the last Spanish contest, the re-establishment of the French influence at Madrid must be mortifying to us. But I think it would be better to run this risk, than run all the other risks attendant on our being engaged in the war in the first instance.

Here, however, forbearance should stop. We have the means of easily and effectually preventing any such projects on the part of Spain and France as those to

1823 which I have referred respecting South America being carried into execution.

There our naval superiority would tell.

There a maritime war would be to the purpose; and I should have no difficulty in deciding that we ought to prevent, by every means in our power, perhaps Spain from sending a single Spanish regiment to South America after the supposed termination of the war in Spain, but certainly France from affording to Spain any aid or assistance for this purpose.

There is another case which must not be overlooked. The attack upon Portugal may follow the success in Spain.

We should certainly in this case be bound in honour, if not in good faith, to defend Portugal.

This is, however, a contingency which may not occur; and if it should occur, the military defence of Portugal I consider as an object attended with much fewer difficulties than a land war in Spain, assuming always that the Portuguese are desirous of defending themselves, and ask for our asssistance.

CABINET MEMORANDUM OF MR. HUSKISSON, PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE, on the question of Government Support in Parliament of his Reciprocity of Shipping Dues Bill, June 24, 1823.

[Mr. Huskisson succeeded Mr. Robinson as President of the Board of Trade on April 5, 1823. The policy of the Board had been in the previous session of 1822 guided by Mr. Wallace, the Vice-President, who had since resigned. Mr. Wallace's policy, as did Mr. Huskisson's, inclined strongly to liberal measures.

Amongst such liberal measures promoted by Huskisson were some for the repeal of laws acting in restraint of trade, in particular for the repeal of the Spitalfields Acts. These Acts were originally intended to protect the operative weavers, and were passed in the 13th (1773), the 32nd (1792), and the 51st (1811) years of George III. The pith of these enactments lay in the powers with

which they invested the local magistrates to fix the wages of journeymen silk-weavers, and to impose other regulations supposed to be for the benefit of the trade; the practical effect had been to discourage all improvements in the manufacture and to drive the trade away from the locality. 1823

On May 9 a petition was presented to the House of Commons against these statutes. Huskisson had already obtained the sanction of a Committee of Cabinet, held on May 2, for a Bill to repeal them. The committee consisted of the Earl of Liverpool (First Lord of the Treasury), Lord Bexley (Chancellor of the Duchy), Mr. Canning (Foreign Secretary), who did not attend, Mr. Peel (Home Secretary), and Mr. Robinson (Chancellor of the Exchequer). All the members of this committee—Liverpool, Peel, Robinson, and Bexley—represented Liberal views in commercial policy.

Accordingly, from this committee Huskisson obtained sanction to have two Bills which he had in hand treated as Government measures. The second Bill was one to enable the sovereign, by Order in Council, to establish uniformity of shipping dues in British ports, whether in respect of a British or a foreign ship, whenever a treaty of reciprocity on the point should have been concluded with a foreign Power.

But before the writing of this memorandum, the repeal of the Spitalfields Acts had become wrecked in the Lords.

A strong agitation had arisen amongst the weavers, and a petition with numerous signatures had been presented against the repeal. Huskisson remained firm; and the third reading had been carried by 53 votes to 40 in the House of Commons.

But when the Bill reached the House of Lords, the weavers mobbed the House, and induced their lordships to refer the Bill to a committee. The committee reported in its favour; nevertheless, though Lords Liverpool and Bexley loyally supported the Bill, Lords Eldon and Harrowby, and no doubt the rest of the high Tory party, prevailed to preserve the power of the magistrates to fix wages. A Bill to repeal the Spitalfields Act omitting to repeal their most harmful provision was worthless, and on its return to the House of Commons Huskisson dropped the measure for the session.

It may now be understood why Huskisson expressed himself with so much resentment at the insubordinate action of some of the highest members of the Cabinet on a Government measure; and why, as he anticipated some such treatment over again in respect of his second Liberal measure for the equalisation of shipping dues, he desired to assure himself on the point before going further.

The memorandum was circulated in the Cabinet, and bears the

1823 endorsements of Mr. Robinson (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Earl of Liverpool (First Lord of the Treasury), Earl Bathurst (Secretary of State for War and the Colonies), Earl of Westmoreland (Lord Privy Seal), and Lord Melville (First Lord of the Admiralty), mostly in favour of the measure, but grudgingly so on the part of Lords Bathurst, Westmoreland, and Melville.

The Bill was eventually passed.]

As I now understand that the Spital Fields Bill is not to be supported in the House of Lords as a Government measure, it becomes necessary before I proceed further with another Bill, now in the House of Commons, that I should know whether it is to be considered in the same light if sent up to the House of Lords.

On May 2 I requested a meeting at the Board of Trade of the following members of the Cabinet:—Lord Liverpool, Lord Bexley, Mr. Canning, Mr. Peel, Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Canning, being prevented by other business, did not attend.

I submitted to the other members, who did attend, three measures, which had been prepared for the consideration of this Board, and upon which it became necessary to obtain their decision.

Neither of these measures originated in my volunteering suggestion. The repeal of the Spital Fields Acts in particular had been recommended by a committee of the House of Lords, and it would almost certainly have been brought forward in the House of Commons by others if the Government had not taken it up. It would in that case have been equally my duty to ascertain the intention of the Government as to supporting or opposing it.

I distinctly stated to the meeting that each of the three measures, if submitted to Parliament, would meet with more or less of opposition, and that the fitness of moving in them at all must depend not so much upon their abstract merits, of which the Board of Trade might be competent to judge, as upon other considerations not to be decided upon by that Board but by the King's Government, and that I therefore called for their determination upon each of the proposed measures.

The Bill, of which a copy is enclosed, is one of these measures.

It was therefore introduced by me with the same degree of sanction and concurrence as the repeal of the Spital Fields Acts. 1823

This Bill is of the greatest importance, as affecting the commerce of this country with other States; but it is opposed, as I stated that it would be, by a part of the shipping interest, and also upon political grounds, from a supposition that it may prove injurious to our general maritime policy.

Upon the subject of this Bill I have had several communications with the Russian Minister and the commercial agents of the United Netherlands—some prior to May 2, the nature of which I reported to the meeting; and others since that period. I think it necessary to state this circumstance; because if this Bill is not to be considered a Government measure, I may, inadvertently, have misled them, as I have certainly misled the House of Commons, by representing it as decided upon by his Majesty's Government.

I now for the first time, and by inference only, collect that though decided upon by that portion of the Cabinet to whom I submitted this measure I must consider that decision as nothing more than the expression of their individual opinions.

The debate upon this Bill is fixed for the third reading on Monday next. If it be viewed in the same light as the Spital Fields Bill, I must beg to decline the moving that third reading, and to be allowed to drop the Bill, with such an explanation of my conduct, as the circumstances and a regard to my own character will in that case render necessary.

W. H.

MINUTES ENDORSED ON THE FOREGOING MEMORANDUM.

I think the measure referred to in this paper is of great importance, and absolutely necessary to enable us to carry on our trade with foreign Powers.

J. R. [Mr. Robinson]

I think this measure of great importance, in the present state of commerce, to this country.

L. [The Earl of Liverpool]

If this Bill is simply to give the powers in question to his

1823 Majesty, and the expediency of executing them in each particular instance is left with the Government, I am for giving the powers to his Majesty. But if the Bill be construed imperatively, in that case, as I have not seen the report of the communications with the foreign Powers to which Mr. Huskisson refers in his note, nor the representations against the measure which, I also collect from his note, have been made by the shipowners, I can only say that, as at present advised, I am inclined to approve it.

Bt. [The Earl Bathurst]

This measure is of very wide and extended policy—may perhaps be wise in theory, yet when attempted to be put in practice produce so much opposition as not to be worth the discontent and change of trade it may occasion. Circumstances may come out in its progress that may make it desirable a measure should be dropt: no better instance than the Spital Fields Bill was imagined by Lord Liverpool and others, as would give satisfaction; in its progress appear serious opposition and discontent, surely there is nothing unpleasant or disrespectful for Lord Liverpool himself, or others, to take subsequently a different view. Whether a Trade Bill is to be a measure of Government, Government must decide; but if I am to give an opinion of its merits I must know a great deal more, as, uninformed, my general impressions are pretty similar to Lord Bathurst's, or rather more unfavourable.

W. [The Earl of Westmoreland]

I have not seen the Bill, nor any of the communications referred to by Mr. Huskisson; but I agree with Lord Bathurst in his view of the subject.

Me. [Lord Melville]

MR. CANNING TO SIR WILLIAM A'COURT (Ambassador at Court of Spain).

[This note is inserted to show the thoughtful consideration displayed by Canning for all officers under his control. At this time the Spanish Constitutional Government had been driven from Madrid by the advance of the French army, and had taken refuge in Cadiz, carrying the King with them. The Spanish King, having refused to go to Cadiz of his own free will, had been declared by the

Cortes, on June 11, 1823, incapable of reigning. Nevertheless they determined to insist on the King going with them into Cadiz, upon which the King intimated to Sir W. A'Court that such removal was against his own will. The declaration of the Cortes, coupled with this intimation from the King, obliged Sir W. A'Court to regard the regal power as in abeyance, and it became necessary to take steps to avoid appearing to sanction the acts of those who had brought matters to such a pass. So, instead of accompanying the King and the Cortes into Cadiz, he remained apart at Seville, and treated his ambassadorial functions as for the time being in abeyance.] 1823

F. O.: June 28, 1822.

My dear Sir,—I return Mr. Ward to you; but you are at liberty to return him to me again.

If your mission continues, you shall have more help, and specifically a Secretary of Legation.

You must naturally be anxious to have the means of sending Lady A'Court to England. The frigate, therefore (now at Gibraltar), is placed at your entire disposal. Another shall be sent to the station for the purposes mentioned in your letters received this morning. All else I keep for the messenger whom I will despatch in a day or two by sea.—I am, my dear Sir,

Your sincere and faithful humble servant,

G. C.

MR. CANNING TO SIR W. A'COURT.

[This letter was written to Sir W. A'Court while he was still at Seville, and is dated only five days before the Duc d'Angoulême began to bombard Cadiz, where the Spanish king and the Constitutionalists were shut up.

It approves all Sir W. A'Court had done; the question of the appointment of a Secretary of Legation to the English Embassy in Spain is also discussed therein.]

F. O.: September 18, 1823.

My dear Sir,—You will see that you are supported in all that you have done and left undone. Be, I entreat you, as cautious in your language as in your conduct.

I am glad that you are so well satisfied with Mr.

1823 Eliot. I have not sent you any other aid, because at the present moment I think it might encumber you. Nor could I at this moment appoint a Secretary of Legation; but I will do so as soon as the occasion arrives. The end, any way, of the present crisis at Cadiz may bring about the occasion. It will not be Mr. Dawkins, as I once intended. I have offered to him, and he prefers, the place of one of the Commissioners under the Convention.—Ever, my dear Sir,

Very sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

MR. CANNING TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR.

[This letter involves a very remarkable point of law relating to the duties of a Minister of the Crown, under the present Protestant Constitution of the Monarchy, in respect of overtures of communication to the sovereign of Great Britain from the Pope of Rome.

Does a Minister incur the penalties of *Præmunire* by answering a letter from a Papal Secretary of State, and by advising his Majesty to answer one from the Pope?

Lord Eldon replied, apart from the question of the expediency of answering the particular communication, that it seemed to him the law officers[1] of the Crown were right in advising that a British Minister would incur such penalties by such action and advice.

The interest on this question and opinion survives to the present time.

The particular pope who made the overture must have been Leo XII. (Cardinal Della Genga), who had been elected on September 27, 1823.]

F. O.: November 20, 1823.

My dear Lord,—If your lordship had been at the Cabinet to-day I wished to submit the enclosed papers to your consideration.

I am not disposed to incur the Penalties of *Præmunire*. Does your lordship concur with the Attorney and Solicitor-General that I should do so by answering

[1] The law officers' opinion here referred to was quoted, and may be found, in Mr. Canning's speech on the Catholic question in the spring of 1827.

the Papal Secretary of State's letter myself and by advising his Majesty to answer that of the Pope? 1823

I have the honour to be, &c.

GEO. CANNING.

MEMORANDUM BY LORD ELDON SUBJOINED TO FOREGOING NOTE.

I have communicated to Mr. C. in private letters what occurs to me as having a tendency to establish that this letter from the Pope is not such as, independently of any question of *Præmunire*, should be offered to his Majesty.

Upon the first construction of the Acts it seems to me that the opinion of the A.G. and S.G. is right, however questionable it may be whether effect would be given to that construction.

E.

FOREIGN OFFICE MEMORANDUM.

[The French having now overrun Spain and restored an Absolute Monarchy, while the Spanish American Colonies continued in a state of active and successful revolt, the question of the recognition of their independence came more emphatically under the consideration of the British Government.

Forty years before, Great Britain had suffered a dismemberment of similar colonies; and on that occasion France and Spain had directly and indirectly succoured the rebellious colonies, and France in particular had recognised their independence at a very early period of the rebellion against the mother-country.

This memorandum accordingly furnishes such particulars as may be used to silence those powers if they offered any protests against a formal recognition of the Spanish Colonies by Great Britain.

So far as France was concerned in affording succour to the insurgent colonies of England, it appears that the assistance at first only came from private citizens. The French Government did not arrive at either a formal or informal recognition of the United States until the Treaty of Alliance between France and the new Republic, signed at Paris on February 6, 1778. War of course immediately followed on this open act of hostility against Britain.

Spain must also in some degree have recognised their independence, as she went to war with England in June 1779. She concluded no treaty with the new States until the general pacification of 1783, and no separate treaty with them until 1795.]

MEMORANDUM.

December 8, 1821.

1823 The despatches from Paris from 1774 to 1778 have been looked over for the purpose of ascertaining 'the different steps by which France and Spain advanced successively to a recognition of the independence of our American colonies and a co-operation with them.'

It does not appear from a perusal of this correspondence that either the Government of France or that of Spain took any official step in relation to the insurgents before the actual signature of treaties of amity and alliance between France and the United States, which were signed at Paris on February 6, 1778. Neither Ministers nor Consuls from either party had at that period been received, and the American plenipotentiaries who signed those treaties were described merely as Deputies from Congress. The fact of this recognition by France of the independence of the United States was formally announced to the British Government by the French ambassador in London, on March 13 following, and was justified by France on the ground of the Colonies having been independent of England from the date of the 'Declaration of Independence' by the Congress in July of the preceding year. This step was represented by the French Government as one merely of a commercial nature, and not calculated to disturb the peace subsisting between France and Great Britain. On the day of the receipt of the French Minister's communication, however, Lord Stormont was directed to quit Paris and return to England without taking leave. The French Minister in London took his departure within a week afterwards, and hostilities immediately commenced.

Lord Stormont's correspondence during the years 1776–78 abound with proofs of the countenance afforded to the insurgents, both in France and in the French and Spanish West India Colonies; but the repeated remonstrances of the British ambassador at Paris against these practices drew nothing from the French Government but an uniform disavowal of acts which were stated to be those of private individuals, and assurances of their determination to punish the offenders. This in some glaring instances was partially done. The cases of assistance of every description rendered by the French and

Spaniards to the Americans became towards the last so multiplied, and the representations consequent upon them so numerous, that almost every despatch to and from Lord Stormont has reference more or less to the subject. The most interesting and important papers are marked for a more ready reference to their contents. 1823

NOTE TO THE FOREGOING.

War between Spain and Great Britain commenced in June 1779, but no treaty was concluded between Spain and the United States prior to the general peace of 1783. The first separate treaty between Spain and the United States was in 1795.

---

EXTRACTS OF DESPATCHES FROM SIR WILLIAM A'COURT, BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT THE COURT OF MADRID, during the year 1823, while the French army under the Duc d'Angoulême was overrunning the Peninsula.

[It will be seen from these extracts that the ambassador found himself placed in very unusual circumstances: the person of the Spanish monarch had been taken possession of by the political party which had recently arrived at power through a revolution; and when the reactionists, aided by the French Power, gradually pressed the constitutional Government out of Madrid and across Spain, the overpowered Government took care to carry the King with them.

Before the French entered Spain the Continental Powers had withdrawn their representatives from Madrid, to mark disapproval of the constitutional form of government set up by the Spanish people, and to signify, on the other hand, approval of the French interference. The English ambassador alone remained with the Spanish Court, and accompanied the King as far as Seville in the course of his Majesty's involuntary retreat; but he refrained from following the flying Government any further, particularly as the King just afterwards declared himself divested of regal power.

Whichever party prevailed, Sir William A'Court was none the less duly accredited to the King of Spain; and in harmony with the wishes of his Government it was his duty to maintain perfect neutrality between the contending factions. For the time during which he continued by the King he served several desirable objects: his presence lent credit to the constitutional Government as long as it lasted; as being connected with the Sovereign in person, his dignity

1823 and office commanded the respect of the Absolutists and of the French military authorities; and in the English interests he would be found at hand whenever the inevitable collapse of the constitution took place and the King resumed his former absolute sovereignty, and the predominance of the ultra faction would require watching and checking.

The first two extracts are dated at Madrid, on the 21st and 24th days respectively of February 1823.

The third extract, dated April 26, begins the series written from Seville, when the constitutional Government had moved southwards, and the French, and a kind of provisional regency, had established themselves at Madrid. The series concludes with one dated July 12.

The series of Sir W. A'Court's communications is interrupted by an extract from an important despatch from Sir Charles Stuart, British ambassador at Paris, to Mr. Canning, of September 4, relative to the nature of the instructions given by the French Government to the army of occupation in Spain, as to the limits of their interference in the internal administration of the country.

Then come the notes that passed between Sir W. A'Court, now at Gibraltar, and the Duc d'Angoulême, beginning with one dated September 11, on the proposal of British mediation, which was of course rejected. The last document is Sir W. A'Court's report to Mr. Canning of the fall of Cadiz.]

Madrid: February 21.

It can hardly be necessary for me to state that in all these proceedings I am a mere looker-on, and only receiving the communications made to me.

Madrid: February 24.

I cannot by any means comprehend with what view he [Beltran de Lis] thought it advisable to send me the message of which I gave an account in my despatch No. 49. I am the more surprised at it, never having had the slightest communication with him either before or since, and not knowing him even by sight.

TO MR. PLANTA.

Seville: April 26.

It is hard work to avoid committing oneself when one has to deal with the opposition on your side of the water, as well as with those who wish to trick us here. You will observe that I have only communicated an extract of Sir Charles Stuart's Despatch.

M. DE SAN MIGUEL TO SIR WILLIAM A'COURT.

(Not dated, but received April 27.)

Monsieur,—J'ai reçu la note que vous m'avez passée, datée d'hier, et comme je [(note in margin) 'Copied exactly from the 'original, but it is presumed that the word *ne* has been acci-'dentally omitted'] puis y faire une réponse officielle, je me contenterai de vous dire que *l'Espectador* du 23 a fort mal rendu tout ce que je dis dans la séance des Cortés, en ayant retranché (sans doute parce que j'ai peu de voix) les mêmes exceptions, et dont je donnai un aperçu. 1823

Quoi qu'il en soit, cette omission est réparée dans le mémoire que j'ai lu dans la séance du 24, où je donne un détail de tout ce qui s'est passé entre nous deux, et le fais d'une manière à éclaircir la-dessus, MM. les députés. Peut-être j'aurai commis quelques inexactitudes; mais pour l'essentiel tout y est, comme vous serez à portée de juger lorsque le mémoire verra le jour.

Je profite, &c.

EVARISTO SAN MIGUEL.

TO MR. CANNING.

May 21.

I took the opportunity this event afforded me of assuring M. Pando, that so long as I had the honour of representing the British nation here he might depend upon my being the first to denounce to the Government the existence of any such plot, should it ever come to my knowledge that a British subject was concerned in the undertaking. That as to the charge against Colonel Campbell, it was wholly without foundation.

TO M. PANDO.

Séville: 11 Juin.

Monsieur le Ministre,—La pièce ci-jointe vient de m'être envoyée anonymement. La mention faite de la légation angloise dans un pareil papier me met dans la nécessité de l'envoyer à V.E. en la priant de croire que la légation angloise ne se mêle nullement des intrigues de cette nature, se bornant strictement à l'observance de la ligne de parfaite neutralité qui

1823 lui a été tracée par son Gouvernement, en faisant toujours des vœux pour le bonheur et pour la tranquillité du pays.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

WILLIAM A'COURT.

TO M. PANDO.

Séville: 12 Juin.

Le Roi ayant été déclaré incapable de régner, et un autre Gouvernement ayant été installé, le soussigné se trouve dans l'impossibilité de suivre les autorités dans leur marche à Cadiz.

Il ne veut pas avoir l'air de sanctionner par sa présence ni les mesures qui ont été adoptées ni celles qui se préparent. Il attendra à Seville, ou à San Lucan, les ordres de son Gouvernement.

En attendant il prie S.E. M. Pando de vouloir bien lui envoyer un passeport pour un courrier qu'il compte expédier dans la journée de demain par Badajos à Lisbonne.

Le soussigné saisit, &c.

WILLIAM A'COURT.

TO MR. CANNING.

Seville: June 12.

About midnight of the 10th a person in the confidence of the King came to my house to inform me of what had passed, and to tell me that his Majesty had resolved to make a protest against a removal, in the presence of the whole of the Corps Diplomatique, and that his Majesty would like to see me immediately, and in private, in order to consult with me upon the manner in which this ought to be done. I told the person charged with this message that I was at his Majesty's orders whenever he openly summoned me to the palace as British Minister; but in the present delicate posture of affairs I could not go secretly by night to his apartments without seriously committing his Majesty, as well as my Government, and myself. That, moreover, it was impossible for me to give an opinion upon the question it was wished to propose to me. I could not become the counsellor of the King without incurring a responsibility I was by no means authorised to assume.

Later in the evening (on the 11th) I received a summons from the King to come immediately to the palace. That there

might be no idea that I wished to make a secret of my interview, 1823
I went exactly in the same manner I usually attend the Court. I was shown into the King's cabinet, and his Majesty immediately proceeded to give me a succinct statement of all that had taken place, requesting me to communicate it without reserve to my Government. He farther told me that he understood a regency was named, and that he was to be carried off to Cadiz as a private individual and a prisoner. He asked me if I had any instructions which could bear upon so extraordinary a case.

I communicated briefly to his Majesty the nature of the instructions given to me in your despatch No. 22; and to his further question, whether I should acknowledge the regency, I replied that it was impossible I should do so without some instructions from my Government; that I was accredited personally to his Majesty, and that if he were set aside, and no longer to form a part of the Government, it would be necessary for me to be furnished with fresh credentials. That, in fact, if he were not King I was no longer Minister. His Majesty appeared to be satisfied with this answer, and added that he thought nobody could blame him, as the head of a numerous family, for refusing to consent to the removal of that family to a place where they would be exposed to every possible danger. The affair, however, was now decided, and everything that he henceforward did must be considered as forced upon him.

Seville: June 12.

The important events which have occurred here will merit all the attention of his Majesty's Government. In the very difficult position in which I have been placed I have endeavoured to conduct myself as strictly as possible according to the spirit of your instructions; and whenever these have been wanting, and I have been obliged to act from my own judgment, I shall hope for the most favourable construction of my actions.

I have, therefore, decided upon remaining here till I shall receive answers to the communications forwarded to you by this opportunity.

You will observe that I have left the door open should you instruct me to proceed to Cadiz. My functions are only, as it were, suspended till I learn the pleasure of H.M.'s Government.

June 17.

1823 On the 15th I was applied to by a gentleman, half English and half Spanish, to furnish him with a passport for Madrid, to which place he was going, charged with a complimentary mission on the part of the Ayuntamiento to the Duc d'Angoulême. With this request I positively refused to comply. I was at the same time informed that the Ayuntamiento proposed to pay me a complimentary visit. I directed the gentleman who delivered this message to return immediately to the Ayuntamiento, and inform them that such a visit would immediately be followed by my departure for Cadiz. That I was here as a private individual awaiting the instructions of my Government, and that any attempt to make use of this circumstance for political purposes would drive me away from the town. That my refusal to acknowledge the authority of the constitutional regency, without the instructions of my Government, had nothing in common with an acknowledgment of the royalist regency. That I had no concern whatever either with one party or the other. This language put an end to the meditated visit.

Seville: July 4.

As I may look for the return of Mr. Ward in ten days at latest, I shall take no steps whatever with respect to my departure from hence, till I receive the instructions of which he will be the bearer.

TO M. PANDO.

Seville: July 11.

The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, has the honour to acknowledge the recept of the note of H.E. M. Pando, his Catholic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated June 16, which note was not delivered to him till the 4th instant.

The undersigned will lose no time in bringing this note to the knowledge of his Government, and in requesting instructions how to act. Had M. Pando's communication been received in due time after its date, the undersigned would probably have been already in possession of some precise instructions for the case of his Catholic Majesty's resumption of his powers, and the

invitation given him to repair to Cadiz. From the want of such instructions he must now wait the return of another courier. 1823

In order, however, to avoid any sort of misconstruction of this delay, it is the intention of the undersigned to quit Seville immediately, to repair to San Lucar, and embark from thence for Gibraltar, there to await the orders of his Government.

From that neutral spot his communications with Cadiz will be infinitely more easy; and if in the meantime any circumstances should occur to induce the Spanish Government to wish for the intervention of the British Minister for the conveyance of any propositions, either to the French Government or army, the undersigned begs to inform M. Pando that he may freely address himself to him, and be assured of always finding him ready to become the channel for conveying such propositions if his intervention should be desired and solicited by the Spanish authorities.

The undersigned is happy, &c.

Seville: July 12.

Mr. Ward arrived late on the night of the 10th, and, though stopped and plundered on the road, was fortunate enough to save your principal despatches, which he delivered to me.

It gave me the greatest satisfaction to learn that his Majesty had been graciously pleased to approve the line I adopted, and that my conduct had met with equal approbation from his Majesty's Government.

You will already have observed, by my despatch No. 106, that the first of the two cases particularly referred to in your despatch No. 47 has already occurred, namely, that I have received, in common with my colleagues, an invitation to repair to Cadiz.

As you have left it entirely at my discretion, either to comply with such an invitation forthwith, or to declare my inability to do so without the special instructions of my Government, I have deemed it most advisable under all the circumstances of the case to adopt the latter line; and I shall immediately communicate my resolution to the Spanish Government by the note, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose. You will observe that I

1823 have worded this note altogether in a friendly tone, and that I declare my readiness to receive at Gibraltar any communications, and to afford any intervention for the conveyance of any propositions to the French Government or army, should the Spanish Government think proper to solicit it. Several reasons have contributed to make me adopt the above resolution, the first and most important of which is the conviction of the utter impossibility of my effecting any good at Cadiz at the present moment. The paper which I enclose, and upon the authenticity of which you may rely, throws a considerable light upon the intentions of France, and the means of the constitutionalists. You will observe that the French authorities are determined to exclude us from any share in any negotiation which may take place; and that the constitutionalists, even by their own avowal, have little hope of being able to hold out much longer. The presence of a British Minister under such circumstances would either be an obstacle to negotiation, or else a negotiation would be carried on under his very nose, from which he would be personally excluded. The first would be no advantage to the Spaniards, and it surely would not be thought desirable for a British Minister to shut himself up in Cadiz in order to play the part which must be his lot in the second hypothesis.

In the event, too, of the failure of a negotiation, and the bombardment and assault which would follow, the presence of a British Minister might give rise to a variety of complications, the possibility of which were better avoided if it can be done consistently, and without any direct rupture of our diplomatic relations with this country. The *mezzo-termine* of a temporary removal to Gibraltar will obviate many of these difficulties, and relieve us from some of the embarrassments of this complicated question. Another reflection which necessarily presents itself is, whether it can be permitted us any longer to assume that the King is a free agent. After his protest to the Foreign Ministers, and his declaration 'that all he henceforward does must be considered as forced upon him,' can we look upon his resumption of power in any other light than as a compliance with the orders of the party that surround him?

My arrival at Cadiz at the present moment would, I fear, be considered more as a party triumph than anything else. I

should be represented as the harbinger of more substantial aid, and my coming be construed into an approbation of all the late measures, including the deposition of the King. It would raise hopes which would never be realised, and, ending in disappointment, probably draw down upon us eventually the hatred and abuse of the very party we may now be desirous to conciliate. 1823

Seville undoubtedly is no longer a proper residence for me. I am fully aware that my continuance in a town occupied by the invading army is both inconvenient and unseemly, and I shall therefore proceed to San Lucar, and thence to Gibraltar with as little delay as possible; but, for the reasons above stated, I am unwilling to decide upon a removal to Cadiz without precise instructions from his Majesty's Government. My note to M. Pando, however, expresses nothing that can be construed into an interruption of our amicable relations with the constitutional Government. It leaves the door open for any arrangement that his Majesty's Ministers may be pleased to make. The delay afforded by this second reference home will in itself be an advantage. The course which things are likely to take will be much more clearly developed before I can receive your answer.

It is unnecessary to touch upon the second case adverted to in your despatch, as it is by no means likely to occur. I have not the slightest reason to believe that his Catholic Majesty either desires or will request my attendance.

SIR CHARLES STUART TO MR. SECRETARY CANNING.

Paris: September 4.

The anxiety of the French Government to conciliate the regency of Spain, and to remove the inconveniences which must result from the publicity of the differences between that body and the Duc d'Angoulême, has induced them to request either the King or his royal brother to address a letter to his Royal Highness expatiating upon the right of the regency to administrate the government of the country, without further interruption on the part of the French authorities than may be absolutely necessary for the subsistence of H.M. C. M.'s army; so that it would appear that, notwithstanding the King's approbation of his Royal Highness's conduct, the embarrassing circumstances of the moment have compelled this Government to

1823 give way to the regency, who have taken advantage of this state of things merely to permit the execution of the articles of the Andiyar decree which have received their sanction.

SIR WILLIAM A'COURT TO THE DUC D'ANGOULÊME.

Gibraltar: September 11.

May I request Y.R.H. to take this communication into your most serious consideration, and to inform me whether Y.R.H. feels authorised to consent to the proposition which has been made in the name of H. C. M. ?

[This was a proposal of British mediation made at the request of the besieged Government in Cadiz.]

SIR WILLIAM A'COURT TO M. LUGANDO.

Gibraltar: September 11, 1823.

The undersigned will not lose an instant in despatching Mr. Eliot to the head-quarters of H.R.H. the Duc d'Angoulême, in order to learn if H.R.H. is authorised to accede to the proposition advanced in Mr. Lugando's note. H.E. [His Excellency] must be fully sensible that it will be wholly out of the power of the U.S. [under signed] to give his consent to any attempt to force the blockade should the answer of H.R.H. be unfavourable.

THE DUC D'ANGOULÊME TO SIR WILLIAM A'COURT.

Chiolana, ce 13 sept^re 1823.

Monsieur,—J'ai reçu votre lettre du 11. J'ai entendu Monsieur Eliot et j'ai lu avec attention la note qui vous a été envoyée de Cadiz, et dont vous m'avez donné communication.

Je ne puis accepter les propositions qui y sont contenues, ni aucune médiation quelconque. C'est avec regret que je vois que ce n'est que par la force que j'obtiendrai la délivrance de sa Majesté Catholique et de sa famille.

Je vous prie, &c. &c.

LOUIS-ANTOINE.

SIR WILLIAM A'COURT TO MR. SECRETARY CANNING.

Gibraltar: September 15, 1823.

Mr. Eliot returned this evening, bringing me the enclosed answer from H.R.H. the D. d'Angoulême. I have also the

honour to enclose Mr. Eliot's report of what passed verbally with H.R.H. 1823

The duke appears to have received precise instructions from Paris upon this subject. He now unequivocally declares that he can admit of no mediation whatsoever, and expresses his conviction that the delivery of the Royal Family is only to be effected by force of arms.

It is neither my intention nor my wish (nor, indeed, do I possess the means if such were my wish) to force the blockade of Cadiz. It will, however, be satisfactory to reflect that no opportunity has been neglected which offered hope of bringing about an arrangement without the further effusion of blood, and that, whatever be the dangers to which the Royal Family may hereafter be exposed, no responsibility can attach either to Great Britain or her agents.

The D. d'Angoulême is firmly of opinion that the Royal Family is exposed to no danger whatsoever. I sincerely hope that H.R.H. may be right. Whatever happens, the sole responsibility now rests upon his head.

Seville: October 8, 1823.

Sir,—Cadiz has fallen without any conditions whatsoever. It must be considered as an unconditional submission.

For some days previous to the surrender a general discouragement had taken place. Everybody saw the folly of any further resistance, everybody began to mistrust his neighbour, and everybody became anxious to secure an amnesty for the past, without a thought of what might occur, or what might be the fate of this unfortunate country for the future.

No money, no resources were left; and, what was still worse, a general disaffection to the cause began to show itself, not only in the regular army, but even in the militia. Cries of 'Viva el Rey absoluto!' were frequently heard amongst the troops, and it became evident that upon the first attack the greater part would pass over to the enemy.

It was almost too late to treat, as the last propositions of the Duc d'Angoulême had been contumeliously rejected. Still, however, it was not impossible. But in this fatal extremity some unlucky spirit broached the unfortunate idea that it would be

1823 more consistent with the character of a great nation to throw itself upon the mercy of the King, than to treat with the enemy at the gates. The idea was too truly Spanish not to take. The engagements that the Duc d'Angoulême was still willing to accede to were entirely lost sight of, and after forcing the King's signature to a decree of amnesty (in which he was made to speak of the enemy's camp in a manner that clearly marked that he wrote under subjection) the Cortes and Government announced that he was free, and even facilitated his departure.

The consequence has been such as might have been expected. The King holds himself in no way bound by a decree which was extorted from him; and though he has not specifically annulled it, he has signed a second decree, which completely contradicts its operation.

No conditions having been made with the French, through a mistaken notion of honour, the Duc d'Angoulême has no right to interfere. The Spaniards, having chosen to trust implicitly to the King, have voluntarily deprived themselves of the support which they would undoubtedly have received from any engagement contracted with the French authorities.

By this act of folly Cadiz has been given up without even the security of an amnesty for those who defended it.

As soon as the King arrived at Port St. Mary, his first act was to order the admission of the French troops into Cadiz. This took place on the 4th inst., from which period we may date the final termination of the foreign war.

I have, &c. &c.

WILLIAM A'COURT.

---

## CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.

### THOMAS HIDEN.

[These are letters asking for pecuniary assistance or an appointment under Government as a reward for service he had rendered to the Cabinet, in warning them of the Cato Street conspiracy. His letters being badly spelt and badly written, they were at first treated as coming from an ordinary begging-letter writer, but Mr. Canning

endorses the first—'It is the name of the [man] who stopped Lord 'Harrowby to warn him of the plot in Cato Street.' 1823

On the second letter instructions are given to recommend his case to the Home Office for a small pension.]

feb 7, 1823.

Sir i hope you will parden the liberty which i ham about to take but as I feel my self in Duty Bound for the sake of my family Sir to which i have sent my Duty to ask that if you owld be so good as to see me Sir as i ham the man that has given my services to save your life & family Sir not only yours but the Cabinat & Goverment all my services was for All sir to which I hope you will think me worthy of seeing—Sir I Remain

Your most obednt. & Humbl servent

THOMAS HIDEN

Sir your servents knows me not By that name

Cromwell Rode Bromton.

feb 27, 1823.

The Right Honabe Sir George Canning Sir i have recived your letter Date feb 20 Sir i hope you will parden the Liberty which i have taken as I have but you & my frend the Earl of Harrowby to aply to Sir, as i ham afraid his Lordship will think me ungratful to ask his Lordship again as his Lordship gave me my present place & has been good to me and my family Sir as you know i have many ennemies on account of my given my Lord the Letter to save so many Lives and i have hurt my self and family and am Deprived of Dowing any thing in business to help soport my family as my present sallery will not soport them Sir you knows 85 pounds a yare is for my services i hope you will make me a messenger in your office that will suport my family—Sir i hope you will be so good as to write as my freind the Earl of Liverpool was so good as to give my—Sir i Remain

Your most obednt. servent

THOMAS HIDEN.

Cromwell Road Bromton.

1823 SIR JAMES STEPHEN (then Mr. Stephen).

[The 'text' of these communications, though not directly referred to in them, must have been a petition, described in the 'Annual 'Register' of 1823, page 121, presented to Parliament by numerous persons interested in the East India trade, praying a just classification of East Indian sugars, and an equalisation of the duties on those sugars with the duties imposed on West Indian sugars.

It appears, from statements made in Mr. Whitmore's speech in the House of Commons on May 22 following (*see* p. 124 of 'A. R.'), that the protecting duties had come into being only of recent date: previously to 1803 the duties on East Indian sugar were *ad valorem* duties, and though generally higher, became, when the price of sugar was considerably depressed, really lower than the duties on West Indian sugar.

That only since that date had the protective extra duties of 10*s.* and 15*s.* been imposed on East Indian sugars. That when the West Indian trade was excluded from the great markets of the world, it might have been proper to afford it the advantage in the British market of a protective duty; but now that, by the Acts 3 Geo. IV., caps. 44 and 45, their commerce had been opened by law for the markets of the United States, and of the Spanish American colonies, no reason existed for continuing the especial favour with which the West Indian growers had hitherto been treated.

In fact, generally the protective duties in favour of the West Indian sugar operated to the disadvantage of the consumer in Britain, and of the rival producer in the East Indies, and ought to be abolished.

After the facts and arguments set out in this petition had been launched on Parliament and the public, to the infinite terror of the West Indian planters, for whom the loss of the partial monopoly in sugar meant ruin, Mr. James Stephen conceived the idea of utilising the sugar duties and their protective operation as a means to encourage the planters in working out a gradual abolition of slavery in the West Indian colonies. He suggested that the 'scale of import duties 'on colonial produce might be made inversely proportionate to the 'advances made by the colonial Legislatures, respectively, in the miti-'gation of slavery.'

His anxiety for a concealment of his share in the suggestion arose from the fact that the promoters of equalised duties for East India sugar and the promoters of the abolition of slavery were working together, their aims being different; the one party acting in the interests of East Indian planters, the other party in the interests of an emancipation of the West Indian slaves.

But the means to these several ends were closely bound up to-

gether. The abolition of protective duties promised to reduce the profits of sugar in the West Indies to an extent which would take from slavery all its especial profitableness. On the other hand, the abolition of slavery appeared likely to destroy the sugar-producing powers of the West Indian colonies altogether, and make the question of protective duties no longer one of any importance, leaving the field of all markets open to the East Indian producer. 1823

Mr. Stephen's suggestion of continuing duties protective of West Indian produce based on a scale, graduated according to the progress each colony might make in the direction of emancipation, while favourable to the cause of emancipation, surrendered the principle of equalised duties, in behalf of which his East Indian allies were struggling.

However, it does not appear that the Government accepted the ingenious suggestion; for when the debate on Mr. Whitmore's motion on the sugar duties came off in the House of Commons, on May 22, 1823, Mr. Huskisson simply denied in general terms the remarkable benefits prophesied for the East Indies if the duties were equalised, and only conceded a reduction of duty to the extent of five shillings on a particular sugar from the East Indies, to which for mere fiscal purposes it had been found difficult to assign its proper quality.]

Kensington Gore: Feb. 18, 1823.

Dear Sir,—I wish to obtain from you what I fear it may be thought presuming in me to ask, as well as difficult for you at the present busy time to grant—a private conference with you long enough to enable a prosing old man to submit to your consideration some new and extensive views of a very important subject.

When you look at the signature below, you will scarcely need to be told that this subject is colonial slavery. It is an old one, but a subject to which the attention of the public and of Parliament will be soon and earnestly and perseveringly recalled. You will have a part to take in relation to it, your choice of which is of the highest importance, and I am anxious to put you in possession of my view if possible before any Parliamentary discussion takes place on the subject, or the closely connected one of duties on E. India sugar.—I have the honour to be, dear sir, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

JAMES STEPHEN.

Foreign Office: February 20, 1823.

1823. Dear Sir,—I shall be very glad to hear all your 'prose' when I have a little more time at my own disposal. Just now I really am so overwhelmed with un-put-off-able occupations that I must beg a short respite. You shall hear from me again.

Very sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

Kensington Gore, Sunday morning: March 16, 1823.

Dear Sir,—I heard yesterday only from Mr. Wilberforce what you said to him about my application to you, and learned at the same time that he supposes you are likely to say something on the subject of the petition of the Quakers respecting slavery, which is, it seems, to be presented to the House of Commons to-morrow.

My application to you being my own act alone, he did not know its particular object, nor my own sense of its urgency; otherwise I dare say he would sooner have communicated to me your message, for such I suppose it was meant to be.

Though I have to go into the country at Easter, I will return at any time for the sake of a conference with you, if apprised of the appointment you may make soon enough to do so; but I feel it a present duty to say that the suggestions I wish to make to you will probably be useless if you should previously have committed yourself in Parliament on the subject of slavery or that of East India sugar in the way which you are perhaps likely to do under what I believe to be your present impressions. There are most important relations between those two subjects, which perhaps have not yet presented themselves to your mind. It was my wish to direct your attention to them, not with much hope that they would lead you to act on my principles, but to prevent your throwing away what consistently I believe, with your own, might be an opportunity of effecting great and inestimable good. The views I wish to open to you are, as far as I know, exclusively my own, and for certain reasons I cannot be more explicit, except under the previous assurance of the strictest and most

honorary (*sic*) confidence. But if you think it worth while to assure me by a line in answer this morning that my suggestions shall never be mentioned to anybody as mine, without my own consent, and that my letters shall be burnt or returned to me, I will send you in the evening an explanation of my purpose sufficient to enable you to apprehend the general nature of my views, and to determine whether it is not right to keep yourself at liberty to act upon them till they have been more fully developed and considered.—I have the honour to be, dear sir, very respectfully, 1823

Your most obedient servant,

JAMES STEPHEN.

Kensington Gore: Sunday afternoon, March 16, 1823.

Dear Sir,—I am sorry to hear of your being still an invalid. Had I known it I certainly would not have troubled you with my letter of this morning. It was the erroneous information or conception that you were well enough to attend the House to-morrow that led me to suppose my object might be lost by even a day's delay. The discovery of my mistake would not, perhaps, warrant my withholding for the present such an explanatory letter as I offered on the condition you have condescendingly agreed to; but it calls on me to be as brief as my purpose will possibly allow.

My apprehension was that you might probably be led to declare your opinions on the very important subjects alluded to in my letter of this morning before I should have an opportunity of conversing with you upon them. In asking a conference with you on that subject I shall not, I hope, be suspected of having had the vanity to suppose that any arguments or persuasion of mine could alter any opinions you may have formed, except by removing, through peculiar means as I possess, any erroneous impressions you may labour under as to the facts of the case. Whether there is any room for such a service to the sacred cause I have at heart, and if so whether I am capable of performing it, it is impossible to learn in the present mode of communication; and therefore reserving that experiment for a personal conference, if ever you shall honour me with one, I will proceed directly to the suggestion which I wished confidentially to make.

1823 It seems to me very probable that you may at this time feel some embarrassment from the solicitations of the colonial party on the one hand, and the strong public claims of the East India merchants and our fellow-subjects of Hindostan on the other, backed as the latter are, and will soon more actively and perseveringly be, by all the friends of the most injured West India slaves. If it be not presumptuous in me to say so, I think your moral feelings will not easily be satisfied, even if your political influence were not to be impaired by a line of conduct that, in opposition to the voice of the soundest and best part of the community, would tend to perpetuate slavery with all its aggravations in the sugar colonies, at the expense of the purses as well as the consciences of the British people.

For my part, I hope it is needless to protest that, independently of every other consideration than the dictates of humanity and justice, I regard it as the clear and sacred duty of Parliament no longer to abandon that unfortunate class of men who, by our own opprobrious crimes against them or their ancestors, are held in slavery in the sugar colonies, but to provide for the mitigation and gradual termination of their bondage without further delay. But if unhappily the fatal error of supposing this work will ever be willingly performed by the colonial assemblies, and that it may justifiably be left to them, still prevails in our public councils, and if you are not yet convinced that this is a hopeless and most culpable devolution of the duties of that mother country by whose power alone the oppression is maintained, then I call on you not to lose the precious opportunity in your power of effectually inducing those assemblies to do part at least of the important work which you thus devolve on them. Do not add to the concessions of last session, as to trade, the further or continuing imposition of excluding duties on East India sugar, without stipulating in return on their part compliance with the repeated solicitations of the Crown, at the instance of Parliament, for the reform of their inhuman system. If you will submit to refusal where you have the right and the duty to command, at least do not give away the price by which contumacy might be bought off and compliance purchased.

They say they cannot carry on their cultivation without the benefit of a monopoly that is now stripped of nearly every pre-

tence of national advantage. I believe they are right. They cannot much longer go on without this aid, nor, unless their miserable system is reformed, can they be saved even by that expedient. They must fall, though not before they have ruined our brilliant commercial prospects in the East, plunged us into enormous further expense of treasure and life for their protection, and nearly exterminated the unhappy slaves through that progressive decline by mortality that still prevails, and which the driving system can never fail to produce. 1823

But if they are to be preserved at the expense of our Indian interests, and of a tax of five or six millions on the people of England (such, I understand from persons competent to the calculation, would be the charge of raising sugar to the monopoly price which the planters state to be the minimum they can afford to sell at), at least let us have some moral fruits of the sacrifice. Let us have reform of oppression, and deliverance from national guilt, in exchange for our Indian trade and our money.

The way in which this might be accomplished is the main point of the suggestion I have to make. The scale of import duties on colonial produce might be made inversely proportionate to the advances made by the colonial Legislatures respectively in the mitigation of slavery, *e.g.* 3*s.* per cwt. less than at present on sugars the growth of colonies that have turned their slaves into *adscripti glebæ* by attaching them permanently to the plantations they cultivate; and 3*s.* more on sugar the growth of colonies persisting in the refusal of that long since solicited reform. A further difference of 3*s.* in favour of colonies prohibiting the driving method, and raising the produce by task-work only, and against colonies persisting in the use of the drivers; a still further bounty (for such it would in effect be) on the produce of colonies that shall have limited slavery in its hereditary succession to children now living or born within a given period, &c.

These hasty sketches will show you enough of the general nature of the views I wish to open. It grows late, and I will not detain you longer except to explain my reason for stipulating that my communications should be strictly confidential. It is, to speak frankly, this. Though I mean nothing unfair to our East India coadjutors, my conduct in making such suggestions might

1823 be easily misunderstood and misrepresented. We must make common cause with them, and our common efforts must at last succeed. But we may be long disappointed. We may lose at least a session or two; meantime much good may be lost which might on these views have been obtained.

Indeed, were the planters honestly and cordially to concur with us in the mitigation of slavery, still more might be done. I should see my way to their ultimate relief. But their hitherto relentless obstinacy, and the unlimited complaisance to them of Government and Parliament, have precluded all such plans in their favour by those who are in reality their best friends, and who would have saved them from their present difficulties if permitted to do so. Reserving further explanations if desired —I remain, dear sir, very respectfully your most obedient servant,

JAS. STEPHEN.

COLONEL DE LACY EVANS (APRIL 9, 1823).

[Colonel Evans submits to Mr. Canning memoranda relative to the question of a seizure of Cuba by the British Government, in consideration of the disturbance in the balance of power and the sudden predominance of France, due to her contemplated occupation of Spain.

It is not necessary to produce them at full lengh, but a summary of Colonel Evans' arguments shows how the destiny of Cuba was involved in the larger questions at issue between Great Britain, Spain, and the United States.

The first memoir deals with the subject of the feasibility of obtaining possession of Cuba in a military point of view; his second paper discusses the moral and political aspects of the question with regard to French and Spanish claims to consideration; and his third paper touches upon the problem of a British annexation of Cuba as affected by the fact of the then recent cession of the Floridas to the United States.

(1) Entering on the military question, Colonel Evans postulates the likelihood of Cuba falling eventually into the hands of either Great Britain, France, or the United States; he only wonders that Great Britain has not bestirred herself before, seeing that once already, by only a few months' occupation of the island, she won booty to the value of 3,000,000*l.*; and the shape and extent of coast-line of the island mark it as destined for a possession for a maritime power.

He disputes the reality of its reputation for means of defence: the prolonged resistance maintained during the siege of Fort Moro, Havannah, in the year 1762 owed its efficiency to the incapacity of the assailants for enterprise. A detailed description of the two forts at Havannah, Cabana and Moro, and of the defences of the town, is given, followed by an account of the method of attack in 1762 : the siege then occupied two months and eight days. 1823

Now, a disunited enemy promises success to even a small force. If not quite that, yet a modest equipment of not more than 6,000 men and seventy guns might suffice.

The British troops should leave England so as to arrive fresh about the end of August, just when the island garrisons and militia are still suffering from the effects of the unhealthy season.

Colonel Evans then explains in detail all the military movements which should end in the capture of the forts at Havannah. He dwells upon the commercial advantages of the possession of Cuba ; and the probability that France, obtaining some kind of extorted sanction from a puppet Government of Spain, might send an expedition across the ocean and annex Cuba for herself. On the other hand, Great Britain, if she occupied the island, might regard it in the light of an indemnity for the injury her trade had suffered from the efforts of the Spanish naval force to put an end to commerce between Europe and the revolted Spanish colonies, and also utilise the commanding position it would give British authority for the suppression of piracy in West Indian seas.

(2) In his second memoir Colonel Evans surveys the question with reference to the ambition and aims of the United States ; points out that the possession of Cuba would counterpoise the acquisition of the Floridas by the States, which enlargement of dominion in itself menaced the British West Indies ; while, on the other hand, Great Britain would obtain a more influential position for dealing with the complicated problem of slavery, where her national inclinations were beginning to diverge into widely different directions from those of the United States.

(3) Colonel Evans' third memorandum sets out at full length all the arguments which morally and politically might be insisted upon to justify the annexation of Cuba by Great Britain, under the circumstances of the French invasion and occupation of Spain.

Assuming that Great Britain proceeds to seize Cuba, and that France charges Great Britain with disingenuous action in so doing, after her repudiation of interested motives, Colonel Evans submits (i.) that it may be retorted in France, that by her own sayings and doings she and her prompters, the Absolutist powers of Europe, have

1823 precluded themselves from preferring such a charge against Great Britain; (ii.) that, as regards public opinion, the invasion of Spain has biassed all men's minds favourably towards anything Great Britain might do, and unfavourably towards any proceeding of France; (iii.) that by way of a beginning, and to make a decent show of moderation while securing the ultimate object, it would only be necessary to occupy the two forts of Cabana and Moro (Havannah); (iv.) that the very shape of the island of Cuba exposes it to the designs of any maritime power; (v.) that Spain has debarred herself from any effectual protest against being deprived of any of her territory, by the fact that she had already found it convenient to surrender the Floridas to the United States; (vi.) that the allegation of injury to the British West Indian trade, from an admission of Cuba within the circle of protection, and consequent exemption from hostile tariffs, must be answered by a simple declaration of the real truth about the material prosperity of the West Indian colonies, viz., that '*nothing can arrest the progressively declining value of British* '*West Indian capital, it being a forced cultivation by non-resident* '*mortgagee proprietors of an inferior worn-out soil*;' (vii.) lastly, that the force of the great treaties having become greatly impaired, a larger freedom of action had accrued to the parties to their engagements.]

MR. JAMES STEPHEN.

[In a few modest but anxious sentences the anti-slavery leader hastens to submit proof sheets of his, as yet incomplete, pamphlet on the subject of slavery in the West Indies.]

Kensington Gore, Friday evening, May 2, 1823.

Dear Sir,—It may be very presumptuous in me to send you a fragment of a work of mine, when the most finished performance that I am capable of would, I am conscious, be unworthy of your acceptance. I mean, and very sincerely mean, in respect of its execution. But as a statesman you will rather regard what belongs to the subject than to the author; and I hope there is no presumption in thinking that on a subject which I was personally acquainted with during eleven years, and have thought and read and conversed anxiously upon during forty, I may chance to have acquired some ideas that may be useful to you, who have never been in the West Indies, and whose views

of negro slavery are very probably derived from those who know as little of its true character as yourself. At all events, I will not have to accuse myself of having omitted anything in my power that might by possibility have prevented talents and power and influence like yours from being enlisted adversely to the future destiny of those hapless fellow-creatures of whom I am a feeble advocate.—I have the honour to be, dear sir, very respectfully 1823

Your most obedient, humble servant,

JAMES STEPHEN.

P.S.—The sheets I send are all I have been able to get out of press, and more than I have fully corrected for publication.

MR. JOSEPH HOSKINS (MAY 5, 1823).

[Captain Hoskins describes himself as late of the 1st Regiment of Horse in Ireland, now 4th Regiment of Dragoon Guards. He transmits to Canning a copy of a pamphlet published by the gallant officer under the anonymous style 'by a late Captain in the Army,' as far back as the year 1793 (he calls particular attention to the date), entitled 'General Rules and Instructions for all Seconds in 'Duels.'

His note is written on a fly-leaf in the beginning of the pamphlet, dated 'Everton, May 5, 1823,' and addressed to the 'Right 'Honourable George Canning, &c. &c. &c., along with the author's 'deepest respects.' In it he says,—

'Sir, if, in the possibility of events of a like nature, this poor 'offering should prove of service to so invaluable a life as your own, 'it will abundantly repay the trouble, if such it can be called.—Joseph 'Hoskins.'

In the preface to the work Captain Hoskins refers to the subject of which it treats, as one 'too long neglected,' and he essays to mark his modesty by running his pen through the lines—

'Perhaps few men were so well qualified, none better accom-'plished, for the purpose than the writer of this little tract.' He takes credit for its 'brevity' as 'constituting one part of its merit,' and for its 'importance' as indisputable.

His idea is that 'seconds' should act as umpires in a controversy approaching a duel.

His gravity is admirable. 'Indeed, such is the effect of habit, 'that we begin to read without emotion accounts of such a com-

1823 'batant receiving the first fire! A little reflection will point to 'the dreadful impropriety of such a mode of decision,' &c.

He writes for reluctant duellists, and to mitigate the worst effects of an evil fashion; and as he means well he deprecates criticism of his style as an 'ill return of his humane intention.'

He insists on the absolute necessity of a reform in the 'mode 'of practice,' and that as 'no one else will attempt it,' he takes 'upon 'himself the office of instructor for the benefit of these unthinking 'men.'

Seconds, in a dispute leading up to a duel, are instructed to inform themselves of the minutest particulars in the quarrel, with a view to devise some reasonable pretext to avoid the deadly issue.

If it must come to fighting, the second, if his principal is in the right, has no burden on his mind; but if his principal is in the wrong, he must insist on his principal making no attempt to take the life of his adversary. How Captain Hoskins reconciles this canon with his horror at one man receiving the first fire of his adversary is not exactly clear.

He reprobates placing the men so that they may be aided in taking aim by surrounding features of the landscape, and still more condemns the short distances (specifying eight or seven yards) at which opponents were allowed to stand. He judges ten yards to be the nearest proper distance, and inquires triumphantly whether any man 'who abides his fate at such a distance does not make an 'honourable expiation for a misdemeanour.'

He ingeniously points out that the advance of the foot for firing, sometimes unintentionally, reduces the distance agreed upon; and also that in advancing the foot and inclining the body in the act of presenting, the head will be sunk some inches; and 'many,' says the captain sardonically, 'is the good or bad head that has been saved 'by it.'

But his unbounded indignation is excited by the system of seconds tossing for the first shot.

'I only beg leave to ask if this is not reducing the business to 'cool alternate firing, provided that it should even happen that 'the first shot miscarries? Now, if ever there was a more bloody 'system introduced into the world, I leave the world to judge. The 'body of a man is to stand as a mark for a cool shot without any 'interruption, like the ace of diamonds! The Lord of heaven defend 'us!'

He tells a somewhat old story of the Irishman who could snuff his candle with a pistol bullet; but going out in an affair of honour with a very bulky man, failed to hit him in two shots. When asked

to explain, he replied, 'My dear Jack, I knew the candle could not 1823
'fire at me.

Altogether our friend advocates very sound action, plenty of time to be given for reflection after a dispute, the utmost efforts of the seconds for a reconciliation, strenuous equity and fairness in conducting the hostile encounter, and lastly and mainly the entire abolition of 'first fire.'

But whether he expected the Foreign Secretary to utilise his suggestions in the character of 'second' or 'principal' must remain undetermined; but it should be remembered that Canning's duel with Lord Castlereagh was not quite forgotten, and that only eighteen days previously to Captain Hoskins sending this pamphlet Canning had given Brougham 'the lie direct' in the House of Commons, which had created a prodigious sensation, and most probably suggested to the old cavalry officer the idea of sending his production for the statesman's perusal; particularly as the nature of the quarrel made it likely that if it came to fighting, Canning's position in the affair was precisely one in which, according to many authorities in duelling, it would have been incumbent on him to receive 'first fire:' the honest soldier is anxious that his arguments against this practice should be available for use on an occasion where it was important that Canning should be spared all unnecessary danger, and the emphasis on the remote date of the pamphlet was calculated to meet any observation that the doctrine was simply invented for the occasion by pointing out how long it had been submitted to the public.

Canning's reply was grave and polite. 'He acknowledged its 'receipt with thanks, though he had happily no present occasion 'for it.'

Perhaps Canning was not unconscious how near, as far as he himself was concerned, he had been to fighting a duel in the hot blood of his maturer years !]

MR. DANIEL STUART.

[Mr. Stuart was a 'one-third' proprietor of the 'Courier' newspaper, and this memorandum is intended to exonerate him from any responsibility for certain attacks on Canning which had appeared in that paper.

He gives an amusing account of his interview with Mr. Mudford, the editor, on the subject. It incidentally appears how severely Canning watched the Foreign Office to prevent undue publication of secrets of State, and how bitterly the newspaper editor resented the

1823 difficulties placed in the way of his obtaining the information on public affairs which he sought.]

MEMORANDUM.

9 Upper Harley Street: May 6, 1823.

About the 21st ult. Mr. Stuart was told, and he believed, that Mr. Street was gone to Brighton, but a necessity occurring for an immediate communication with him Mr. Mudford disclosed that he was gone to Paris. He returned about the 30th.

An attack having been made on Mr. Canning in the 'Courier' on Thursday, the 24th, Mr. Stuart went next day to the office, but Mr. Mudford was gone, the paper being full of debates, and he having had little to do.

Next day, Saturday, the 26th, Mr. Stuart saw Mr. Mudford at the office, and complained warmly of the attack. Mr. Mudford at first seemed not to recollect that Mr. Stuart had on several occasions begged it of him as a personal favour that he would not only not attack Mr. Canning, but say a civil thing of him when an opportunity occurred. He (M.) said the paragraph was only a fair discussion of political subjects, but on Mr. Stuart's warmly rejecting such an explanation, Mr. Mudford with warmth owned that it was an attack, and was intended as such; that there was another attack which Mr. S. had complained of in Friday's paper, that they were designedly made, Mr. Canning having been an enemy of the paper all the winter, refusing any communication with it; and that in consequence of the 'Courier' having a few days before obtained exclusively a statement of the substance of the State papers in the negotiations, Mr. Canning had instituted a strict inquiry in his office, saying if he could discover who gave it, the person should be discharged. Of this Mr. Mudford warmly complained, and said he purposely made the attacks. Mr. Stuart said he would not enter into these considerations, but that Mr. Canning should not be attacked if he could prevent it, and that this would force him to try what was the utmost power he possessed in the paper, being only about one-third proprietor. After some more altercation Mr. Mudford agreed that Mr. Canning never should be attacked. He showed Mr. S. a paragraph he had written (it was in print), in reply to the other papers, denying that the 'Courier' was in the pay of any Government. Mr. S. declined

to give an opinion upon it, but said, when he went into the street, if any one asked him if he thought the 'Courier' in the pay of the French Government, he would say yes. He asked if there was anything against Mr. Canning for that day's paper, which was not then at press. Mr. Mudford said no, and he came away. 1823

Having read Mr. Canning's speech on the negotiations with much pleasure, Mr. Stuart on Friday morning last, early, hastily sent a few lines (twenty-one) in praise of it to Mudford, saying unless he had something of the same kind, or chose to re-write this in a better manner, adapting it to what else he might write, that Mr. Stuart wished it to appear in a conspicuous manner. The paragraph appeared, exactly as he sent it, near 'The Courier' head, top of the next column.

This explanation Mr. Stuart thinks necessary to his own character.

To-day Mr. Stuart called at the office in passing to speak to Mr. Street respecting a dispute about the shares of the paper. The clerk told him Mr. Street was gone to Brighton. Mr. Mudford, whom he afterwards saw, said Mr. Street was gone to Devonshire. Mr. Street was in town on Friday last, and as a very important meeting was to take place on Saturday next, which Mr. Street has postponed till Tuesday, Mr. Stuart wonders he left London at all.

DR. KEATE (Head Master of Eton).

[Understanding that Canning was going to stay at the Provost's for the ensuing Montem, he asks the distinguished old Etonian to dinner; which, however, Mr. Canning felt obliged to decline, on the score that he could not desert the Provost!]

Eton: May 18, 1823.

Dear Sir,—The information which I have received from the Provost of your intention to be present at Montem has given me the greatest pleasure, and though I am aware that you are engaged to the Lodge, yet I venture with his permission to request the honour of your company and that of your party at dinner with me on that day at Salt Hill. The nature of my dinner is such as not to interfere with any ulterior arrangements for the evening, the hour being three, and it being necessary

1823 for me to leave the table at five to collect my troops on the hill, and prepare for the march homeward. I trust, therefore, it will not be inconvenient for you to gratify me with your company.—I have the honour to be, dear sir, with the greatest respect,

Your very obedient and faithful servant,

J. KEATE.

Foreign Office: May 19, 1823.

My dear Sir,—We are very much obliged to you for your kind invitation to dinner at Salt Hill. But, as the Provost is so good as to lodge us, we hardly think it fair to avail ourselves of his permission to dine from under his hospitable roof. We shall, however, not fail to pay our respects to you at Salt Hill, at your levée before dinner.—I have the honour to be, my dear Sir,

Your obliged and obedient, humble servant,

GEO. CANNING.

MR. CANNING TO MR. ZACHARY MACAULAY.

[This letter, it appears from the correspondence, was erroneously addressed to Mr. Z. Macaulay, under the idea that he continued to be secretary to the African Institution. This Institution had for its object the abolition of slavery and the slave trade, and Canning having accepted the honorary distinction of being one of its governors, continued to hold it until he found that it proved most inconvenient in practice for a Minister of State to be held responsible by the public for the sayings and doings of a private association of philanthropists. He accordingly withdrew from the position, explaining at the same time in civil language the nature of the pressure which induced him to retire.]

Saltram: October 26, 1823.

Sir,—I take the liberty of signifying to you my desire to withdraw my name from the list of governors of the African Institution.

I expressed this wish, as you may perhaps remember, more than a twelvemonth ago, but was then prevailed upon to forego it.

I was then, however, in no public situation, other than as a member of the House of Commons; but in the situation which I have now the honour to hold I not only fear that I may experience, but I actually have experienced, very great inconvenience from being supposed to share, at the same time, in the counsels of the African Institution. 1823

It is not easy, nor very agreeable, to explain to all inquirers that the allowing one's name to stand in the list of governors of an institution neither implies any participation in their labours, nor an unqualified adoption of all their sentiments.

The world has perhaps a right to expect that no man shall sanction with his name, acts to which he is no party, or opinions of which he has not thoroughly examined the nature and tendency.

The generality of such a practice may indeed prevent it from being attended with any great mischief in ordinary cases, and in England; but it can hardly be otherwise than mischievous in the case of a member of the Government, called upon to deal with questions of the most portentous magnitude and difficulty, affecting the interests and feelings of distant colonies—questions on the principles of which all good men may be agreed, but as to the details and practical management of which the best men may blamelessly differ.—I have the honour to be, with great truth, Sir,

Your obedient and humble servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

16 Mansion House Place: October 31, 1823.

Sir,—I have this morning had the honour of receiving your letter of the 26th inst., which I presume was addressed to me under the idea that I am the secretary of the African Institution, a situation which I have ceased to fill for many years. It shall be conveyed, however, with as little delay as possible to Mr.

1823 Harrison, the secretary of this Institution.—I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

ZACHARY MACAULAY.

MR. VULLIAMY TO MR. CANNING.

[Mr. Vulliamy, the well-known watchmaker of Pall Mall, sends a memorial from his brethren in the trade, begging that, in consideration of the decline of the demand for English watches, Canning would do his best to encourage the sale of English watches, and particularly would change the custom of making presents of gold snuff-boxes on occasion of great events in the diplomatic world, and substitute gold watches instead. The superior advantages of watches over snuff-boxes as presents is skilfully pointed out.

Canning replies that the subject is entirely new to him, but he will take the memorial into consideration.]

68 Pall Mall: December 20, 1823.

Sir,—Having, I believe, the honour of being known to you since the period when the Kensington Vols. were embodied, of which corps I was adjutant, I have been requested by my brethren of the profession, who have signed the accompanying letter, to forward it to you.

I beg to subscribe myself, with great respect, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

B. L. VULLIAMY.

London: December 20, 1823.

Sir,—There probably never was a period when the manufacture of watches, particularly those of a superior class, stood more in need of encouragement than the present. This observation is not meant to apply particularly to marine chronometers, the demand for which in time of peace will be less than during a period of war. The causes of the present circumscribed state of the art are many. The great influx of foreign watches of every description with which this country has been inundated since the peace ranks among the first, and there are several others which it is unnecessary to enumerate.

The only effectual remedy is to increase the demand for the

articles; and to point out an easy and obvious means by which, with your assistance, such a demand may be created is the immediate object of this letter. 1823

English watches are much esteemed on the Continent for the excellence of their performance, but a very prevalent opinion exists among the higher classes that, in addition to this comparative high price, they are ill-shaped, clumsy machines, quite unfit to be worn. No measure that could be adopted would so much tend to relieve the trade from its present depression, and place it in a state of wholesome activity, as the introduction of the better description of English watches into comparatively general use on the Continent; and it has occurred to the undersigned watchmakers (so calling themselves in contradistinction to mere sellers of watches) that nothing would so much tend to promote such a demand as the substituting gold watches for gold snuff-boxes for the presents made by Government abroad, particularly by the office immediately under your direction. The adoption of such a measure would speedily remove the prejudices against English watches by bringing them into more general notice, and demonstrate in the most obvious manner their superiority over the watches of all other countries.

To be able to construct a vessel to sail on the water, and a machine to measure time, have by the different writers on the progressive development of science and art been ranked among the highest efforts of human skill and ingenuity. As much cannot be said of the making a gold snuff-box, however well made, which is too frequently valued solely as so much bullion, and immediately disposed of as such. This would not be the case with a valuable English gold watch, which would descend from father to son, a memorial of the talent of the country in which it was made.

The selection of snuff-boxes for presents probably had its origin from the universality of the use of snuff among foreigners, and consequent peculiar circumstance of the snuff-box, by being carried about the person, and in almost constant requisition, as likely to recall to the recollection the circumstances connected with the present. The same observations apply to a watch; it is more generally useful, and carried about the person.

In a pecuniary view of the subject the advantage would be

1823 on the side of the watches; the cost of the best gold repeater that could be required would not exceed one hundred guineas, and very excellent gold watches (not repeaters) could be procured for much less.

In cases where it is requisite to increase the value of the present, watches are equally susceptible of being decorated with precious stones as snuff-boxes, as also of being made the medium for the conveying a portrait. Indeed, for the latter purpose a watch having an inner bottom to the case is better calculated than a snuff-box. The art of clock and watch making is in a peculiar degree deserving the attention and support of Government, as affording the best schools for all the mechanical arts. Many individuals, originally brought up and intended for the profession, afterwards distinguished themselves in other branches of mechanics. It is sufficient to name Smeaton, F.R.S., who built the Eddystone lighthouse, who served an apprenticeship to a clockmaker at York. A fraudulent practice of selling watches, particularly repeaters put into English cases, for English watches has for some time past prevailed to a considerable extent among a certain class of watchmakers. The greatest care should be taken that watches of this description are not sent abroad as presents, as from this bad performance, joined to the obvious deception, which would be immediately detected, they would counteract the very object they were intended to promote.

The undersigned, being a few among the many watchmakers of this metropolis, have taken the liberty to submit the above hints to your consideration, and beg to subscribe themselves with great respect, Sir,

Your very obedient, humble servants,

JOHN R. ARNOLD, Cecil Street, Strand.
B. WEBSTER, Cornhill.
BARRAUD AND SONS, Cornhill.
EDWARD ELLIOTT, Royal Exchange.
R. GANTHORN, Cheapside.
JOHN DUTEWALL, Bond Street.
B. L. VULLIAMY, Pall Mall.

Foreign Office: December 22, 1823.

Mr. Canning will not omit to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Vulliamy's letter of the 20th inst., with its enclosure, though he can at present do no more than say, as the subject is entirely new to him, that he will take the proposal submitted to him by the writers into his consideration. 1823

MR. CANNING TO MR. GIFFARD.

[Here we find the kind-hearted Foreign Minister interceding with the editor of the 'Quarterly' for employment for a talented but poor young man named Mr. David Robinson, who had already contributed one successful article to the review.

Mr. Giffard's reply gives an interesting account of his own failing health, and of the 'Quarterly' arrangements in which Mr. Robinson's contribution was concerned.]

Gl. L.: December 13, 1823.

My dear Giffard,—How do you do? I am in bed with the gout.

What do you know of Mr. David Robinson, who wrote Cato's letters, and an article called 'The Opposition' in the 'Quarterly'?

Surely he was—and is, I suppose—a writer far above the common.

But if you think so, why did you, or do you never, employ him no more?

Have you any reason, or is it pure accident? I hear he is very poor.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

My dear Canning,—I wish that you had a pleasanter bedfellow; but here am I on the sofa with a cough, and a very disagreeable associate I find it. Old T. More, I think, died all but his voice, and my voice is nearly dead before me; in other

1823 respects I am much as I was when you saw me, and this weather is in my favour.

When I saw Cato's letters I thought them, as brother Jonathan says, somewhat lengthy and ambitious; but there was so much eloquence, so much spirit and right feeling in them, that I wrote to Stothard, the new *Times* man, to inquire if he could furnish me with his address. This he did, and I immediately sent to Mr. Robinson, who engaged to furnish an art., and, after some delay from sickness, sent me that which you have mentioned. It required curtailment, &c., but on the whole made a very admirable paper, and stung the Whigs to the quick. I should have been very happy to have more of his assistance, but he said nothing on the subject, and I scarcely know what to point out for him. Can you give me a hint?

I have had several letters from Mr. Robinson. He spoke sometimes of his illness but never of his circumstances, and I had not the slightest notion of his being poor. Not one of his letters but was calculated to raise my opinion of his character, and I [think] him to be a very worthy character.

I never mentioned his name to a single creature, but he wrote to Murray some time since about a poem he wished to publish, and announced himself as the writer of 'The Opposition' art.

I have promised Murray to try to carry on the Review to the 60th number; the 58th is now nearly finished. This seems a desperate promise, and beyond it I will not, cannot go; for at best, as the old philosopher said, I am dying at my ease, as my complaint has taken a consumptive turn. The vultures already scent the carcase, and three or four 'Quarterly Reviews' are about to start. One is to be sent up by Haygarth, whom I think I once mentioned to you as talked of to succeed me, but he is now in open hostility to Murray. Another is to be called the 'Westminster Q. Review,' and will, if I may judge from the professions of impartiality, be a decided Opposition Journal. They will all have their little day, perhaps, and then drop into the grave of their predecessors. The worst is that we cannot yet light upon a fit and promising successor.—Ever, my dear Canning,

Faithfully and affectionately yours,

WILLIAM GIFFARD.

MR. THOMAS MULOCK TO MR. CANNING.

Newcastle-under-Lyne: December 23, 1823.

My dear Sir,—It has occurred to me as being possible that you may not have seen, what I feel greatly desirous that you should see, a speech delivered by Mr. North, one of the oldest and most valued of my Irish friends on an occasion sufficiently known to you—Mr. Plunket's *ex officio* information. 1823

I have two reasons for sending you an authorised report of this speech. The first is associated with my sober and qualified nationality. I conceive that no Irish orator has approached so near to true eloquence as my friend North; in short, I know not (with the simply sincere exception of your own matchless effusions), any oratorical efforts of our day at all comparable to the fine display of bright thoughts and glowing language, which constitute the speech I now send you.

My second reason is this: North and myself have been friends from our boyhood. I know his secret predilections, and that, amidst the gain and popularity of a most successful professional career, his heart is in the senate. He will yet honourably win his way there; but I could wish, for the empire's sake, that energies so much akin to your own were employed in advocating principles which I know influence your whole life, and which, under your generous guidance, would soon as palpably influence my friend's.

We have had no direct intercourse for upwards of three years. In his last letter to me there occur the following expressions, which serve to attest the truth of my speculation concerning him:—'Notwithstanding all my success at the bar, there is more in that success to please than to satisfy. I seem to myself better fitted for another pursuit. I had rather be appended to the statesman's robe than be folded in the judge's ermine.'

Will you, my dear sir, with your wonted kindness, forgive this freedom, and suffer me to style myself,—

Your faithful, obedient, and obliged servant,

THOMAS MULOCK.

P.S.—At your own convenience you will perhaps cause the pamphlet to be returned to me.

Gloucester Lodge: December 25, 1823.

1823 My dear Sir,—Your letter and its enclosure require not my forgiveness but my acknowledgment. I am not the less obliged to you because I had seen Mr. North's speech before; nor are your suggestions the less welcome because they exactly tally with my own first thoughts on reading that beautiful piece of oratory.

It deserves all that you say of it—and you can hardly wish more than I do that the author of it should find a larger audience and a more splendid theatre for the display of talents, such as fit him for the highest exertions.

Could I in any way facilitate this object—or do you think that he would desire that I should endeavour to do so?

I have it not at command, or I would make the offer directly.

Your letter finds me in bed, at the end (I hope) of a pretty severe attack of gout, which (I hope too) will have cleared me of that infirmity for the session.

I would not defer answering it till I should be about again, lest other more pressing but not more grateful avocations should intervene; and I return the pamphlet by return of post, lest in the multitude of papers I should mislay it.—Believe me, my dear Sir,

Very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

"[Mr. Mulock sends a printed copy of an eloquent speech delivered by his friend an Irish barrister named North, and adverting to Mr. North's political ambitions, suggests that Canning might think it worth while to secure for his own side a gentleman of Mr. North's oratorical powers.

The topic on which Mr. North's oratory had expanded itself was that of the *ex-officio* informations filed in the beginning of the year by Mr. Plunket, Attorney-General in Ireland, against the

persons concerned in a riot at the Dublin Theatre against the Marquis Wellesley, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in the December preceding. The grand jury having failed to find a true bill against the rioters, Plunket in open court denounced the grand jury, and laid his informations, thereby bringing the culprits to trial, but without success, as the jury would not come to any agreement for a verdict. 1823

This led to an appeal to Parliament and some bitter debates.

It is not clear on what precise occasion Mr. North delivered his fine speech, but as he was not in Parliament at the time, apparently in the Law Courts at Dublin.

Canning acknowledged the eloquence of the speaker, and pleaded that only deficiency of all means to attract or bring forward Mr. North prevented his acting on Mr. Mulock's suggestion.]

## 1824.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

1824 [In this letter Lord Liverpool's view of the West Indian question is referred to as of the 'most awful importance.'

This may be shortly explained by the events and alarms which were taking place in the British West Indian Islands at the time; a concise account will be found in the 'Political Life,' pp. 84–103; it seems that in consequence of the debates in, and resolutions passed by, the British Parliament tending towards measures for a gradual abolition of slavery, the West Indian Colonial Legislatures, on the one hand, had adopted a most violent and intemperate line of protest and defiance, while the slaves, on the other hand, had entered on a series of dangerous conspiracies with a view to ultimate insurrection.

The imminent risk of creating a sanguinary servile war appears to have been the danger present to the mind of Canning in thinking over this difficult question.]

Gloucester Lodge: January 9, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—Your view of the W. I. question is of most awful importance. It is one which has been present to my mind for the last two months—and upon which I have thought, but not yet spoken with anyone. I suspect that our opinions tend the same way; but I will be prepared to discuss the question when we meet,

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[Sends first draft of the King's speech on opening Parliament, in which he has touched upon (1) Dutch and United States negotiations;

(2) Russo-Turkish affairs; (3) Spain and her relations to her revolted colonies. 1824

Canning wanted to mediate between Spain and the colonies upon the basis of the independence of the latter. He expected no difficulty from Russia and Austria, but much from France.]

Gloucester Lodge: January 19, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I send you a fair copy of the first draft of K. speech, as you may like to study it on your way to town.

I have put in some things which may not ultimately stand (as the paragraphs about Dutch and United States Negotiations); I almost hope that we may have a Russo-Turkish paragraph to add. You will see by C. Bagot's letter, herewith enclosed, that things are in greater forwardness at Constantinople than we apprehended. C. Bagot has done excellently.

I think I have rather improved the S. American part. I should not much object to softening our note to Spain by a direct offer of our mediation on the basis of independence. From a conversation which I have had to-day with Lieven and Neumann I am satisfied that we can satisfy them (by some such means) without a conference. Not to France. But France wants the conference for objects of her own,

Ever yours,

G. C.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[Sends a letter from Dr. Pett on the question of appointing to the next vacancy in the deanery of Christ Church.]

G. L.: January 19, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I enclose to you a letter from Pett, in answer to one in which I begged him to give me, in the strictest confidence, his real opinion as to the present fitness of the person of whom we had formerly talked for the succession of H. at Christ Church.

1824 With a little allowance for Westminster prejudice (but less in P. than in most Westminsters at his standing) I feel entire reliance on the truth and honesty of his statement and on his secrecy and discretion. As to age you see we hurried poor H. If fifty-five will not do for D. of Ch. Ch., God help you and me next year,

Ever sincerely yours,

G. C.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[Here we find Canning equipping the British representatives at Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, respectively with the arguments proper to meet the intent of the despatch given below addressed by M. de Chateaubriand, the French Foreign Minister, to M. de Polignac, Ambassador for France at the British Court, in case the reasoning of Chateaubriand's despatch should be used at the several Courts of the three Allies as a weapon against British policy.]

F. O.: Feb. 13, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I agree with you that it is better not to answer Chateaubriand's despatch to Polignac. But as that despatch has probably been communicated to the Allies, and as it may be reproduced hereafter, I think it would never do to appear to have passed it without notice. The only way in which I propose to notice it is, as in the enclosed despatch to Wellesley, Bagot, and Clanwilliam, suggesting to them heads of answers to the main arguments to be used, if those arguments are brought forward at the Courts where they reside, but not to be brought forward by them without provocation.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—This will require no Cabinet. But I send the papers to the Duke of Wellington.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[This must relate to the appointment of a Commission on Irish education, made in the beginning of the session of 1824. The expression used of the qualifications for the Commission, 'where too 'much information is nearly allied to prejudice,' is paradoxical and epigrammatic. Canning strongly insisted on sufficient strength in the body of the Commission.] 1824

Gloucester Lodge: Feb. 26, 1824.

My dear L., I hope, the fright being over, the commission will nevertheless be speedily and sincerely set to work; and I hope it will have at least some additional elements in its composition to those which Peel showed me on Tuesday night. I am quite sure that they will not do—I mean will not satisfy. There must be more vigour; and there must be some independence and impartiality—some ignorance if you will—in a case where too much information is nearly allied to prejudice, or the whole will be exclaimed against as a delusion; and we shall soon have the question over again.

I trust you are not deceived by the result of Tuesday's debate, but know what sort of a vote we should have had, if we had resisted instead of evading.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[In Vol. II., Chapter VIII., of the 'Political Life,' will be found details of the tactics adopted by the Governments of France and Spain to beguile that of Great Britain into a false position with regard to the Spanish American Colonies.

These tactics failed: for Canning had not been three months in power before he replied to the reactionary menaces from Vienna by declaring the intention of the British Government to appoint Consuls to various seaports of the disobedient Colonies for the protection of British trade. During 1823, while the French were overrunning Spain, nothing further was done; but when the Spanish Constitutional Government was extinguished, Canning opened a conference with the French Government, in October of that year, on the subject of the proposed consular appointments. In this conference

1824 Canning gave it clearly to be understood that the commercial interests of Great Britain rendered the measure indispensable, and France conceded the reasonableness of the British position.

After these preliminaries, and before the end of the year, the British Government carried out its declared intentions and despatched the Consuls to Spanish Colonies as proposed. Another twelve months elapsed before it took the final step of diplomatic recognition of this independence.

About the time when Great Britain had advanced as far as consular recognition in the path of final recognition of the independence of the separated colonies, the Spanish Cabinet circulated to the several courts of Paris, St. Petersburg, and Vienna, an invitation to a Congress at Paris to consider the state of affairs between Spain and her Colonies: the terms of the invitation referred to 'alterations which events had produced in the American Colonies,' which were to be considered with a view to conciliate 'the rights and 'just interests' of the Crown of Spain 'with those which circumstances 'might have occasioned with respect to other nations.' It will be perceived that this so far included no reference whatever to any adjustment of the differences between Spain and her Colonies; and to mark the limitation of the proposed reference to a Congress, the Council of the Indies selected this particular time as a favourable opportunity for a Decree placing everything in the Spanish Colonies on the footing it was on before the Spanish Revolution of 1820.]

LE COMTE DE CHATEAUBRIAND, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to LE PRINCE DE POLIGNAC, French Ambassador in London.

[This despatch was lithographed for diplomatic circulation. It contains an able and elaborate argument to prove that Great Britain ought to join in the Congress invoked by Spain, and to convince the other powers of Europe that her refusal would be unjustifiable and ungenerous.

The appeal to generous consideration, in view of the difficulties of the position of Spain as a sovereign dealing with rebellious subjects, and also as a Government just emerged from the confusion of a temporary revolutionary eclipse, and the impressive warning of the results of fomenting civil discord and Colonial rebellion, as illustrated by the French Revolution, bred of the United States contagion, are finely conceived, and worthy of the brilliant author who composed the despatch: the arguments failed in point of relevance to fact.

The crisis of a formal recognition of the independence of the

Spanish American States, depended upon no amount of argument or reasoning, but solely upon the actual state of the affairs of those States. British interests did not admit of indefinite postponement of such recognition: any prospect of a successful restoration of Spanish authority in the Colonies would have commanded immediate attention; but it was mere waste of time to discuss abstract rights contradicted by existing facts, and in the presence of pressing exigencies of British commerce.] 2418

Paris : le 26 Janvier, 1824.

Prince,—J'ai recu la dépêche que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 20 du courant, et je me suis empressé de la mettre sous les yeux du Roi. Sa Majesté a vu avec peine que le Cabinet de St. James ne croyait pas devoir entrer dans la médiation que l'Espagne demande aux Puissances Alliées, dans le but de pacifier les Colonies Américaines. Je vais vous expliquer les raisons que nous auraient fait désirer une détermination différente de la part de la Grande-Bretagne.

La France ne prétend pas s'immiscer dans la politique des différentes Cours de l'Europe : lorsque ses intérêts essentiels ont été compromis par une révolution voisine de ses frontières, elle a pris les armes ; l'Angleterre nous a désapprouvé publiquement ; nous avons répondu à des attaques peu méritées, par ce langage mésuré qui convient à la raison. Nous avons montré, jusque dans nos succès en Espagne, ce même caractère de modération : jamais entreprise aussi juste ne fut conduite, nous osons le dire, avec plus de générosité et de désintéressement.

Aujourd'hui les positions sont changées : c'est l'Angleterre qui croit voir ses intérêts compromis par les évènements survenus en Amérique. Si, pour défendre ses intérêts, elle pensait qu'il pourrait venir un moment où elle serait forcée de reconnaître l'indépendance des Colonies Espagnoles, il serait possible que nous ne partageassions pas cette conviction, mais en ferions-nous un sujet de récrimination et de plainte? Non, sans doute. Pourtant, le cas arrivant, combien la récrimination serait facile! Si la France ne pouvait pas se mêler l'année dernière des affaires de l'Espagne, comme l'Angleterre le prétendait, pourquoi l'Angleterre aurait-elle le droit qu'elle nous contestait? Déclarer que les colonies espagnoles sont indépendantes, contribuer ainsi à les séparer de la Métropole, ne serait-ce pas intervenir

1824 dans les affaires de la Péninsule d'une manière bien autrement grave que par une expédition passagère qui n'a servi qu'à remettre Ferdinand en possession de son autorité?

Mais la France s'interdit tout ce qui blesse; elle sait d'ailleurs, qu'il y a des nécessités politiques dont elle ne se rend pas juge. C'est ce qu'elle a reconnu au Congrès de Vérone, lorsque dans une note relative aux Colonies Espagnoles, elle disait:—

'Pour éviter de donner naissance à des rivalités et des emulations de commerce, qui pourraient entraîner des Gouvernemens, malgré leur volonté, dans des démarches précipitées, une mesure générale, prise en commun par les divers Cabinets de l'Europe, serait la chose la plus désirable.

'Il serait digne des Puissances qui composent la Grande Alliance, d'examiner s'il n'y aurait pas moyen de ménager à la fois les intérêts de l'Espagne, ceux de ses colonies, et ceux des nations Européennes, en adoptant pour base de la négociation le principe d'une réciprocité généreuse et d'une parfaite égalité.

'Peut-être trouverait-on, de concert avec sa Majesté Catholique, qu'il n'est pas tout à fait impossible pour le bien commun des Gouvernemens, de concilier les droits de la légitimité et les nécessités de la politique.'

Partant du même principe, et raisonnant dans les intérêts de l'Angleterre, le Cabinet des Tuileries pense qu'il eût été plus utile au Cabinet de St. James d'admettre la médiation proposée par l'Espagne.

Mr. Canning a jugé au contraire qu'une conférence établie pour une médiation entre l'Espagne et ses colonies était inutile ou dangereuse: inutile, si les membres de cette conférence étaient d'accord, dangereuse s'ils différaient de sentimens. Selon ce Ministre, des conseils donnés séparément au Cabinet de Madrid par les différentes Cours, seraient aussi efficaces que des conseils réunis.

Dans mon opinion, Prince, ce n'est pas là le point de vue sous lequel la médiation me semble devoir être envisagée; l'Espagne prie les Alliés de l'assister de leur influence morale et de leurs lumières, afin d'amener un arrangement entre elle et ses colonies; elle ne demande pas des conseillers, mais des arbitres. Il paraît très probable en effet, qu'une réunion de Puissances, parmi lesquelles se serait trouvée la Grande-Bretagne,

aurait pu mettre d'accord le droit et le fait, et que les deux parties 1824
n'auraient pas rejeté légèrement le jugement d'un si auguste tribunal.

Quelques passages de la Note espagnole ont paru choquer M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Britannique ; cette Note, à la vérité, est peu correcte ; il eut été facile d'en mieux mesurer les expressions, mais après tout, pourrait-on faire un crime au Cabinet de Madrid d'avoir employé les mots de *rebellion* et de *souveraineté* ? Avant que l'Espagne ait consenti à l'indépendance de ses colonies, peut-elle faire l'abandon de sa *souveraineté* ? Ferdinand peut-il ne pas appeler rebelles des sujets qui déclarèrent sa déchéance à Seville ? Pendant la Guerre de l'Indépendance des Etats-Unis, l'Angleterre se servit du même langage. Elle ne cessa de parler de *souveraineté* et de *rebellion* que le jour où elle signa le traité qui d'une colonie faisait une nation nouvelle. Pour être équitable, il faut se mettre dans la position de l'Espagne ; elle ne pouvait renoncer tout d'un coup, dans une Note, à ce qui doit faire pour elle l'objet de ses futures déterminations.

J'en dis autant du décret, très imprudent d'ailleurs, du Conseil des Indes, publié au moment même où le Ministre Espagnol sollicitait la médiation. C'est toujours la même contestation entre le droit et le fait : droit qui d'abord n'accorde rien au fait, pour céder ensuite dans le cours de la médiation ce qui doit faire la base d'un arrangement durable. Que l'Angleterre eut accepté la médiation demandée dans de pareils termes, cela n'impliquait point contradiction dans ses principes : on peut être juge dans une cause, sans partager les doctrines et les opinions des parties qui plaident.

'Mais les autorités espagnoles parlent un différent langage ;' qu'est-ce que cela fait à la demande de médiation ? Cette demande est-elle retirée ? Le Gouvernement d'un pays qui sort à peine de la confusion révolutionnaire, peut-il avoir la marche assurée d'un Gouvernement régulier ; Une conférence amicale établie entre les Alliés pour l'affaire des colonies, n'eut-elle pas même servi à établir la cohérence dans les actes, les idées, et le langage des conseils de Madrid ?

Les négociations résultant de la médiation auraient sans doute entraîné quelques longueurs ; mais en supposant que

1824 l'Angleterre, qui a si puissamment contribué à faire triompher la légitimité en Europe, eut en pensée la reconnaissance de l'indépendance des Colonies Espagnoles, serait-il dans son intérêt de précipiter le moment de cette reconnaissance? C'est ce qu'il convient maintenant d'examiner.

D'abord, rien ne me paraît presser la Grande-Bretagne, sous le rapport du commerce: elle jouit de fait de ce qu'elle pourrait avoir de droit. Ses consuls sont dans tous les ports, ses vaisseaux à tous les rivages des Colonies Espagnoles. Les fruits de son industrie encombrent tous les marchés des Amériques. Il est douteux que la reconnaissance politique de l'indépendance des colonies lui donnât plus de prospérité commerciale, et il est possible que cette reconnaissance trop soudaine ait de nombreux inconvénients.

Jusqu'à quel point il convient à la sûreté de la monarchie et de l'aristocratie anglaises de favoriser l'établissement de divers états populaires, imbus des principes de l'égalité démocratique, c'est ce qu'on ne prétend point décider. La France a payé par un sanglant esclavage de trente années l'indépendance Américaine; lorsqu' entraînés par notre générosité naturelle, par une politique qui ne reposait ni sur un droit, ni sur la nécessité, nous allâmes combattre pour la cause de la liberté dans les forêts du nouveau monde, nous ne croyions pas élever sur nos places publiques des prisons et des échafauds. Mais écartant les considérations de la politique morale, et bornant la question aux faits existants, nous demandons si un état Européen qui prétendrait aujourd'hui reconnaître l'indépendance des colonies Américaines, ne rencontrerait pas des difficultés considérables dans l'exécution de son projet.

D'abord déclarera-t-il la guerre à la mère-patrie? S'il ne fait pas, s'il entretient auprès d'elle un représentant, tandis qu'il contribue à lui faire perdre les possessions dont elle tire sa force et sa richesse, c'est une dure anomalie. Ensuite il y a des colonies qui reconnaissent la souveraineté de l'Espagne; il y en a d'autres où les Royalistes luttent encore, à main armée, contre les indépendants; d'autres enfin sont entièrement séparées de la Métropole, bien qu'en proie à des factions. Ces colonies de trois sortes doivent-elles être comprises dans la même catégorie, traitées d'après le même droit politique, le même droit des gens?

Lorsque l'Amérique Septentrionale se souleva contre l'Angle- 1824
terre, sa position était bien différente—une population homogène, partagée en divers états, était régie par des constitutions plus ou moins républicaines, avait déjà reçu une éducation favorable à la liberté ; les Etats-Unis ne changèrent, pour ainsi dire, pas d'existence ; ils ne firent que s'unir par un lien fédéral, et il se trouva par hasard un grand homme pour serrer ce lien.

En est-il ainsi des colonies espagnoles ? Les descendants de Pizarre et de Fernan-Cortez ressemblent-ils aux descendants des frères de Penn et des Puritains de Cromwell ? Est-ce une seule république qu'il faut reconnaître, comme celle des Etats-Unis, ou cinq à six républiques dont on sait à peine le nom ? L'Espagne n'a-t-elle pas porté dans ses colonies sa religion, ses mœurs, ses institutions, et jusqu'à ses préjugés ? De nombreuses familles espagnoles habitant l'Europe ne sont-elles pas propriétaires en Amérique ? Une population composée de blancs, de nègres libres ou esclaves, de mulâtres, et d'Indiens, une population disséminée dans d'immenses forêts, dans une variété infinie de climats, va-t-elle requérir tout-à-coup la science administrative et politique ? Combien faudra-t-il de tems pour que ces états nouveaux puissent exister par eux-mêmes, être assez forts pour se défendre, pour faire et tenir des traités ? N'avons-nous pas vu déjà des empereurs succéder à des tribuns du peuple, et des tribuns à des empereurs ? Les représentants des nations étrangères auront-ils des lettres de créance en blanc, qu'ils rempliront à volonté toutes les fois qu'un capitaine chassera un autre capitaine, ou qu'une tyrannie militaire prendra la place d'une république ? Ces ambassadeurs auprès de l'anarchie ne compromettraient-ils pas la dignité de leurs Gouvernements ? La France a mis trente années à revenir de la Convention à la légitimité, en passant par Robespierre, le Directoire, et Bonaparte : les colonies espagnoles iront-elles plus vite ?

Enfin, l'Espagne est sans doute bien affaiblie, mais, telle qu'elle est, si elle ne reconnaît pas l'indépendance de ses Colonies, si d'autres Puissances l'imitent en Europe, cette seule résistance passive de l'Espagne rendrait l'existence des Colonies séparées extrêmement précaire, frapperait d'un vice radical leur indépendance, entretiendrait les craintes et les espérances, réveillerait dans le cœur des colons un sentiment d'affection pour la mère-

1824 patrie, dont on oublierait les fautes, pour ne se souvenir que de sa pauvreté et de ses malheurs. De toutes ces causes sortiraient de longs troubles. Supposez que l'Angleterre sans faire la guerre aux Etats-Unis, se fut contentée de ne pas reconnaître leur indépendance, ces états seraient-ils aujourd'hui ce qu'ils sont?

Soit donc que les Colonies Espagnoles doivent rester unies à leur mère-patrie, sous un régime approprié à l'accroissement de leur population et au progrès de leurs lumières, soit qu'il plaise à la Providence de les détacher de leur Métropole, et qu'elle les destine à augmenter sur le globe le nombre des nations libres et heureuses, dans l'un et l'autre cas, la France prendra une part sincère à leur prospérité; mais que l'on désire améliorer le sort des Amériques Espagnoles, considérées comme colonies, ou que l'on souhaite l'indépendance de ces vastes pays, la médiation offerte par l'Espagne paraît favorable à ce double but.

L'Angleterre ne s'engagerait à rien en entrant dans la médiation proposée; seulement elle ne refuserait pas d'entendre les raisons de la mère-patrie, qui lui témoigne une confiance généreuse. Appelée à juger un différend, elle se serait décidée selon l'équité; et si, en dernier résultat, le Gouvernement Espagnol eût élevé des difficultés insurmontables, la Grande-Bretagne eût trouvé dans ces difficultés la sanction du parti qu'elle aurait cru devoir prendre, et une raison de plus de se renfermer dans le système de ses intérêts; si l'Angleterre au contraire prend une route isolée, et que chaque Puissance à son tour suive un plan particulier, nous craignons que l'Angleterre n'obtienne pas, par ce moyen, les avantages qu'elle espère et que le sort des Colonies Espagnoles n'en soit ni plus indépendant ni plus heureux.

La France n'est pas plus disposée que la Grande-Bretagne à soutenir des théories exclusives, et à leur sacrifier les intérêts de son commerce; mais elle pense que la médiation proposée par le Cabinet de Madrid pourrait conduire à une transaction salutaire; elle verrait donc, avec la plus vive satisfaction l'Angleterre revenir à ce sentiment, et travailler, de concert avec ses alliés, à un ouvrage digne de sa politique et de sa puissance.

Agréez, Prince, &c.

CHATEAUBRIAND.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[This submits a question as to propriety of a Court mourning on the occasion of the death of the abdicated King of Sardinia. 1824

Lord Liverpool, in his reply, advised that, laying aside the element of abdication or not, a Court mourning was desirable, as there were 'those who think the ex-King the lawful King of Great 'Britain to the day of his death.'

A sound and high-minded reason for the compliment to the deceased monarch, and marking the extinction of the former jealousy of the pretensions of the line represented by his claims.]

F. O.: Feb. 21, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—Here is a question of Court etiquette which I know not how to solve.

The ex-King of Sardinia is dead—the abdicated king. Ought the Court to go into mourning for him?

In ordinary cases the Lord Chamberlain gives the orders for mourning as a matter of course, upon receiving the notification of the death.

In this case the D. of Montrose declines doing so without special instructions, though giving it as his opinion that the Court ought to mourn. What think you?

Ever yours,

G. C.

Saturday.

My dear Canning,—As to the abstract question of King, I could not answer, but the Sardinians are all relations, and there are those who think that the ex-king was the lawful king of Great Britain to the day of his death. We must, I think, therefore mourn for him.

Ever yours,

L.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[This letter is an earnest entreaty to the Prime Minister to quicken the Lord Chancellor's movements in settling the legal side of a Convention which Canning was negotiating with the United

1824 States for a mutual concession of 'a qualified right of reciprocal 'search and seizure of those vessels belonging to either country sus- 'pected of carrying on the Slave Trade.'

'The preamble of the Convention stated that by the laws of 'both countries the slave trade had been declared piracy,—an Act of 'Parliament being passed the day on which the Convention was 'signed to that effect.'

'The American Senate, however, refused to ratify the Conven- 'tion; not from the least disposition to favour the trade, but from 'a suspicious fear of a possible collision between the armed vessels of 'the two countries.' ('Political Life,' vol. iii. pp. 85, 86.)

The excuse is not entirely without foundation, but there seems nothing unreasonable in supposing that the slaveholding Southern States of America, who then held the supremacy in the government of the United States, might wish to defeat the proposed measures for intercepting fresh supplies of the raw material of slavery from the coasts of Africa.

Rush's other propositions, rejected by Canning, possibly related to the knotty question of the trade between Great Britain, the United States, and the West India Colonies.

This is at any rate one example of old Lord Eldon's everlasting procrastination.]

G. L.: March 7, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I wish you would find an opportunity of quickening the Chancellor about the Slave Trade. Pray act. The foundation of our Treaty with the U. States.

There is no pretence of any real objection; but he keeps Huskisson in hand, and will not let the matter go forward. He says he will see the Attorney and Solicitor. He may; but when?

The Attorney and Solicitor are perfectly satisfied. The delay is very prejudicial; and may be very serious. We rely upon this agreement to soften our refusal of Rush's other propositions.

The conferences have now been suspended a month. Another week and the opportunity will be lost of getting the treaty ratified this year in America; and

then the whole subject is thrown loose again; and we have nothing but disagreement with the rest. 1824

It is really a matter of the most pressing importance.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[Discusses the question of himself and Lord L. attending the Lord Mayor's banquet on Easter Monday.

Takes the view that Lord Liverpool's presence would preserve political order on the occasion; if he was not there, the Whig chiefs, Lords Lansdowne and Holland and Sir James Mackintosh, would find themselves quite unrestrained in dealing with current topics.

It might be true that their opinions did not differ in principle from those which guided the Government; but that fact would rather give them a feeling of greater freedom from restraint than if their views had been in clear and unmistakable opposition.

Besides, the presence at the banquet of the representatives of the yet unrecognised new States would furnish an opportunity and temptation for the Whig chiefs to expand which it might not be desirable they should have.

There was truth in Canning's arguments; he had carried against much secret opposition in the Cabinet a partial recognition of the Spanish colonies in the establishment of Consular relations between them and Great Britain; he felt a keen interest in their prosperity, and in their successfully accomplishing the transition from the position of unrecognised and rebellious colonies to the state and dignity of independent sovereignty; he was anxious they should receive fair and proper treatment from Great Britain and the European Powers; he naturally, therefore, had no desire to give the Opposition leaders, by the voluntary absence of members of the Government, an opportunity of publicly reaping the credit of the fruits which he himself had been at the pains to bring to perfection.]

G. L.: March 3, 1824 (5 P.M.)

My dear Liverpool,—On my return home to feed, I find the Lord Mayor's card for Easter Monday's dinner.

What do you mean to do upon that occasion? I

1824 confess I am for going. I think you lose a great deal by throwing that sort of meeting entirely into Whig hands. Your presence keeps down a great deal which in your absence may grow to riot and excess; and this is much more important at a time when the question is one of excess or moderation in principles not very different, than when there is a decided opposition of principle which no well-meaning man can countenance and think he does no harm, as is now the case.

I think our business is to admit the extinction of party feeling, rather than to show a determination to keep it alive.

Suppose, for instance, the Mexican, the Columbian, and the Brazilian Missions here, and not yet recognised (as will be the case) by the 19th of April; will not the inconvenience be infinitely greater of having them feasted by the chief magistrate of the City of London, in the absence of all the King's ministers (with Lord Lansdowne, Lord Holland and Mackintosh to do the honours of the State), than if you and I were there to keep things in order. Pray think of this before you send an excuse.

Ever yours,

G. C.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[Lord Liverpool's interest in the Lord Mayor's dinner and the probable 'swagger' of the Opposition naturally was not, under the circumstance above told, equal to that of Canning's; so his Lordship declined to attend, and Canning was left to represent the Government.

Canning laments that the Cabinet he had summoned to consider the question of Mexico must be occupied with other questions. These, it appears, were Irish. The Marquis Wellesley, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, desired that a letter which he had written should be printed; and beside all that, Lord Newport had a Notice on Irish Education in Parliament.]

F. O.: March 24, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I rather think that the putting off of the Lord Mayor's dinner last year was in consequence of repairs at the Mansion House, and not for accommodation, and that Easter Monday is the regular Calendar day. 1824

However, out of town is a reason; but you agree with me so far as not to think that staying away as a measure would be right; I shall mention to-day at dinner my intention of accepting.

I am afraid that the Cabinet which I summoned to-day in contemplation of Mexico must be absorbed in other things. Wellesley's desire of having his letter printed, and Newport's notice on Irish education out Thursday.

Ward, besides, is ill.

I have desired Plunket to be here, and my appointment with the Duke of Wellington may serve to talk over Wellesley's letter. Shall I summon a Cabinet for Saturday?

Ever yours,

G. C.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[Describes what he understands as the extent of Lord Liverpool's promise of action in the way of promoting Lord Clanricarde, Canning's son-in-law, to an Irish representative peerage.]

F. O.: July 7, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I have just seen Lord Clanricarde, and have told him, according to your commission, that you will give him the second vacancy in the Representative Peerage of Ireland; but are under some engagements as to the first. I did not say positively that the first was out of the question; but that your engagements were such that you could not answer for it, and that you could positively promise the second.

1824 I hope I understood and have repeated you rightly. He was very pressing for the first, and seems for a younker to have a tolerably confident notion of his own pretensions.

Ever yours,

G. C.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[Reports arrival of despatches from Lord Strangford announcing the final success of his negotiation for the actual evacuation of the Principalities.]

(Fragment.) Gloucester Lodge: July 29, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—There are despatches from Lord Strangford, announcing the final success of his negotiation, by the actual evacuation of the Principalities.

It is a great matter. . .

[This had been going on for a long time. Russia had made it a condition of her restoring diplomatic intercourse with the Porte, that the Turkish troops should be withdrawn from the Principalities. The Turks alleged that the troops stationed there were only a kind of police; the Russians retorted with reports of military oppression and cruelty inflicted on the inhabitants.

But whether this was so, or not, Lord Strangford had induced the Porte to give up their demand that the evacuation of the Principalities should be postponed until the Greek troubles were settled, and had persuaded them to enter on an immediate withdrawal. The Porte thus complied with the last of the conditions stipulated by Russia as necessary before she sent a diplomatic agent to Constantinople; and Russia, having no further pretext for delay, at last proceeded to nominate M. de Ribeaupierre to be Russian Minister at Constantinople. However, unfortunately fresh complications arose, which prevented all these negotiations arriving at a successful issue; in fact, for some considerable time the appointment of M. de Ribeaupierre did not get beyond mere nomination.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[Canning proposes various arrangements to secure an informal conference between himself and Lord Liverpool and Mr. Frederick

Lamb, about to go as British Representative to Madrid on the one side, and M. Zea de Bermudez, the newly appointed Spanish Prime Minister, on the other. 1824

He regarded it as a rare chance for the heads of the British Government to be able to 'insense' a minister of Spain with the reasonableness of British policy; particularly when the French garrisoned that part of the Peninsula, and burning questions like the recognition of the Spanish American Colonies, and the pressing of claims for compensation for injuries done to British shipping, complicated every British relationship with the Court at Madrid.]

F. O.: July 30, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I have had a very long talk with M. Zea to-day, and am to have another on Monday. As he goes to be Minister in Spain, it has struck me that it might possibly be useful you should see him while he is here. His departure is fixed for Tuesday; but I have no doubt he would put it off if you were to ask him to dinner on that day or rather on Wednesday —and if you would ask Frederick Lamb to meet him, we might have some very useful conversation an hour before dinner.

I think I have quite opened his eyes about the French, and he professes now to look to England only. What he looks to may perhaps not signify much if his term of office be only the average term of six months; but as it is the first opportunity that we have had of getting at a Spanish Minister directly, we should endeavour to make the most of it.

If it suited you better to stay in town and meet them at dinner at Gloucester Lodge on Tuesday, I would ask them. But I suppose you would prefer returning to Combe.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

1824 MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[Questions the propriety of the French army of occupation being allowed to enforce Spanish municipal regulations in respect of the subjects of other Powers.]

G. L.: August 8, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—This, I confess, appears to me to be a more serious affair than A'Court thinks it. Surely it is a strong thing to allow the municipal regulations of Spain to be enforced towards other Powers by French authority.

Ever yours,

G. CANNING.

[*Note.*—After the restoration, by French military power, of the Absolute form of Monarchy in Spain, the proceedings of the Spanish King became so violent against the subdued Constitutionalists, and in other respects generally so unwise, that the French troops in occupation of Spain were often employed in protecting the defeated party from the King's rage, or rather from the rage of the Apostolical party now in enjoyment of the upper hand.

Indeed, the conduct of the latter reached such a height of senseless vindictiveness that even Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Ambassador, found it expedient to combine with the representatives of the other great Continental Powers at Madrid to resort to pecuniary bribes, and other kinds of means to induce the King to shake off his ultra advisers, and to consent to be guided by others less foolish and headstrong.

In the autumn of 1824, Sir Charles Stuart retired from the Embassy at Paris. He was replaced by Viscount Granville, an old and intimate friend of Canning. Before, however, the change was effected, Canning, who greatly desired it, met with much difficulty in clearing the path.

The first letter of the present series is dated August 17, 1824, while Lord Granville yet remained at Brussels; the second is dated September 11, the change being still in anticipation. Louis XVIII. died on September 16, and on this event all parties, Sir Charles Stuart, Lord Granville, and the British Government, proceeded to give effect to the change. It will be seen, presently, that curious complications arose as to Embassies of condolence, of congratulation, of permanence, and what not, but the main fact was that Lord

Granville moved from Brussels to Paris to enable Canning to find somebody at Paris who would faithfully reflect the liberal tone of his scheme of foreign policy. 1824

It may be of historical interest to note that Lord Granville belonged to a great family of Whig traditions, not the traditions of the houses of Cavendish, Russell and Grey, but of those of the Leveson-Gowers and Fitzmaurices. These latter great families had found themselves politically free to support the younger Pitt twice in his great career, and again, when it became clear that Pitt's mantle had descended on Canning, they came to the rescue of Canning in 1827; but before that date they had not failed to recognise in Canning's Conservatism the presence of a liberalism surpassing that of the nominal Whigs. And not one of the least of these signs may be found in the fact that so distinguished a member of a great Whig family as the first Viscount Granville, deemed it his pleasure and duty to bring his abilities to the service of the political principles advocated by Canning at the most important Court in Europe.

While on the other hand by a coincidence Sir Charles Stuart happened to be the grandson of the Earl of Bute, George III.'s first Prime Minister, and therefore might be supposed to inherit the monarchical principles of his grandsire, in opposition to the hereditary though occasional alliances of the Conservative Whig families with the political descendants of Pitt.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Foreign Office: August 17, 1824.

My dear Granville,—I was prevented from performing my promise of writing to you, on Friday, by nothing but want of time.

My hands have been and I am sorry to say are still so full, that I scarcely miss Parliament or my colleagues.

Portugal alone has given me more trouble, during the last two months, than ought fairly to be spread over half a year from all the Courts of Europe.

The question of European Portugal being settled, that of Transatlantic Portugal has taken its place.

We have been holding Conferences not of jurisdiction but of negotiation and mediation; the Plenipotentiaries of Brazil on the one part, Villa Real for Portugal

1824 on the other hand, and Esterhazy and Neumann for Austria, and I for England looking on to see fair play. The Conferences have ended in a project of Treaty of Reconciliation drawn up by me, at their joint request, as a basis for discussion, which project the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries adopt *in toto*, propose as their proposition, and are ready to sign. Villa Real pleads want of instruction—the Austrian [Plenipotentiaries] approve privately but dare not openly declare it; I therefore at the request of the Brazilians, and with the concurrence of the others, transmit the project direct to Palmella.

This has been the work of the last week—I hope it will lead to good. But Pozzo and Hyde de Neuville will counterwork us all they can.

I am obliged to recall Thornton. He has been cowed and cajoled till he forgot that he was Minister for England.

The King of Portugal had asked for an Embassy; meaning that Thornton should be the Ambassador. I give him half his vow in establishing the Embassy; but bring down A'Court to fill it, who I trust will keep Hyde de Neuville in order.

Lamb will succeed A'Court as Envoy Extra. &c., at Madrid.

The Catholic King is going to send an Ambassador here—a M. Reveilla Gigedo who has been refused at Paris; but I told M. Zea Bermudez that he must not expect me to reciprocate. An Ambassador to a kingdom occupied by a foreign force, would be an authority out of place. It is much to keep a mission there at all. My other arrangements must wait—taken all together they will amount to pretty nearly a *revirement* of the whole system; and for many reasons, that of economy among them, I must divide them between two years—

I do not mean the space of two years to come, but the expenditure of two years 1824 and 1825. 1824

I have lived in hopes during the hot months that a natural opening would come at Paris. It was very near, but the result has been a sort of revival—or at least a pause in the progress of decay.

I have, however, availed myself of an opportunity, that arose (probably) out of the temporary apprehensions, to let Sir C. S. know what he may expect. He knows that his Embassy would not survive the King, and further that I have only not apprised him of that determination long ago, because such an intimation would have seemed to imply that his removal depended on that event alone, which is not the case.

But I must still wait for an *apropos*, and as Sir C. S. retires for good and, (like Legge when shipped off for Charles Ellis' estate in the West Indies), 'had rather not go by his own consent,'—and as he cannot have honours, (which I have the certainty that he cannot), I must treat him with all gentleness and consideration. Charles Bagot is on his way home perhaps by this time; but he wants six months in England. Strangford's task is not yet quite done, and I do not think it right to name him even to himself for Petersburg, till it is so. I must make the whole change (of this series) at once; and it would be hard upon S. to throw him out of station or income before the vacancies which he occasions can be supplied.

The result is that unless the King of France cuts the knot which I am untying, you will spend the winter at Brussels. I wish I could have seen you before your change of residence. But my summer has been wasted away, and I hardly know even now how I shall get away and in what direction.

Ever yours,

G. C.

1824 —

[The conference in London referred to had been promoted by Canning with a view to an amicable separation of Portugal and Brazil. He had obtained the good will of Austria for this end by pointing out that, if monarchy existed in Brazil and it was in the power of Portugal to overset it, the monarchical principle would be more injured by the subversion of monarchy in Brazil than by the acknowledgment by Portugal of the independence of that country organised as an empire, under a member of the Portuguese royal House of Braganza; also, that such an acknowledgment would secure the position not only of Don Pedro but of Don Pedro's consort, who was a daughter of the Emperor of Austria.

He had to encounter the hostile representations of France—France had been acting on a double motive in her recent invasion of Spain; one was to sustain the principle that free institutions for nations could lawfully emanate from their legitimate sovereigns only, wherefore the French might hold themselves justified in subverting the Spanish constitution which had been forced on an unwilling sovereign by an insurgent people; and in sustaining this principle the French monarchy anticipated the need for appealing to it, if it should be found convenient to revoke the French Charter. Next, by unifying the interests of France and the restored absolute Spanish monarchy, they hoped to acquire a right of interference, 'legalised by authority of the Spanish Government' to undertake the reduction of the Spanish Colonies; and any such hostile operations, if ostensibly only in aid of the justifiable efforts of Spain to recover her lost rights, could not apparently be objected to, on principle, by the British Government, which had fought her own Colonies in a similar endeavour, and no doubt France hoped to increase the prestige of the monarchy if she could contrive a war with England isolated and deprived of the alliance of the Continental Powers, which had contributed to support her in the final contest with Napoleon, and if she could enter upon it with a reasonable prospect of suppressing the republican and rebellious independence of the Spanish Colonies, and receiving as a reward some valuable consideration in the shape of a cession of American territory, from which she might exercise a rival and subversive influence on British power and commerce in the two Americas.

Their *revanche* for Waterloo, and popular hatred of the English being gratified, the French people might be expected to adhere more decisively and conspicuously to the Bourbon Dynasty than it was apprehended they then did.

With these views in regard to her operations in Spain, France perceived it was of the first importance that the Portuguese American

State should not obtain its independence, peacefully, and on the advice of liberal England. The effect of such an example would seriously operate on public opinion in both France and Spain, to the disparagement of the legitimist governments, the strengthening of liberal opinion in favour of the independence of the Spanish Colonies, and the consequent and indefinite increase of difficulty in giving effect to the scheme. 1824

From this we see how important and far-reaching was the diplomatic warfare in which Canning was absorbed in the summer of 1824. Parliament was 'up,' his colleagues were dispersed, and he hardly missed either!

Such close attention rendered all his perceptions keenly sensitive; and he is not sparing of condemnatory language when he speaks of the conduct of the British Representative at Lisbon, who not only failed to command all the respect properly due to the weight of the power behind him, but also appeared to yield himself in unbecoming submission to whispered menaces, and to give unwary heed to the hollow promises of M. Hyde de Neuville, the French Plenipotentiary at Lisbon.

While therefore to gratify the Portuguese Court, Canning raised the British mission to the rank of an Embassy, he withheld the promotion from the British Minister, then at Lisbon, and sent Sir W. A'Court to take the place of Sir E. Thornton, and 'to keep Hyde 'de Neuville in order.'

The restored Absolutist form of monarchy in Spain, in order to enhance its credit in London, proposed to despatch an Embassy to England, but Canning, though ready to maintain amicable relations with Spain even under a government owing its resuscitation to foreign force and violence, drew the distinction that a country whose independence was compromised by occupation by a foreign army could not, so long as the occupation continued, be deemed deserving of the high Diplomatic honours of an 'Embassy,' but must remain content to receive the minor compliments of a 'Mission.'

These diplomatic changes led Canning to mention to his friend, that, added to other contemplated changes, the total result might amount to a *revirement* of the whole system: 'for many reasons, 'that of economy among them,' but the process would be gradual, not sudden, and might take two years to complete.

It must be borne in mind that a re-arrangement of the chiefs of the Diplomatic Service might well be essential when the Foreign Minister of England found it the duty of his Country to protest in the name of her own free constitution and the just rights of independent

1824 nations against the doctrines and the practice of the great Powers of the Continent.

The effect of this protest, whether uttered in full form, or only perceptible in the conduct of affairs, had already isolated Great Britain. Canning was not contending with the influence of France alone at Lisbon, but with France silently but not ineffectually supported by the sympathy of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, France herself being further invigorated by the closeness of her bonds with the restored despotism of Spain.

Every Representative of Britain to one of the great Continental Powers just so far as he truly represented the British Government found himself now considered in some degree a hostile critic of the Government to which he was accredited.

The Diplomatists accustomed under the guidance of Castlereagh to meet with sympathetic and friendly treatment, found themselves now hardly prepared to cope with the difficulty of their novel and disagreeable position ; and as the skilful touch of Canning soon discovered where, and how, and why, the British Representatives were failing him, he reasonably enough meditated such a re-assortment of the cards as would provide for a more efficient exposition of British policy at each of the Courts of the great Powers.

The removal of Sir C. Stuart from the Embassy at Paris seems, strange to say, no less due to George IV.'s dislike of him than to Canning's *revirement*, as well as to the influence of the representations of the French Ambassador in London. Canning in a letter to the Duke of Wellington dated October 12, 1824, writes to justify a visit to Paris in search of the truth.

'Polignac has told me over and over again that if I wished to be on a footing of confidence with his Government, and nommément 'with Villèle, I must change our Ambassador at Paris. Stuart has 'written the longest despatch he ever wrote in his life, to prove that 'he and Villèle were the best of friends.'

But Stuart's letters could not neutralise Polignac's representation. As for George IV.'s wishes, in a letter to Lord Liverpool of October 10, 1824, Canning cited His Majesty's declarations that he would not give Sir Charles Stuart a peerage ; besides abuse of Sir Charles 'as 'a Jacobin' and 'a good for nothing diplomatist,' and Canning claims to have resisted the King's importunities for his removal for two years past, and to have been the only person who had had any kindness or consideration for Sir Charles Stuart. Canning could not possibly deserve reproaches if when a suitable occasion, like the death of the French King, offered itself to effect a change at the Paris Embassy he took advantage of it to yield to the King's wishes,

and at the same time to place at that important post a trusted friend of his own. 1824

Lord Granville being therefore confidentially designated for the Embassy at Paris, Canning goes on to discuss the *manner* of effecting the removal of Sir Charles Stuart, and in emphasising the certainty of such removal, also dwells with the utmost consideration on the best means of sparing Sir Charles Stuart's feelings and interests on the occasion; the opportunity of the change immediately impending was to be found in the death of Louis XVIII.

It will be noticed from the foregoing analysis that this letter, dated August 17, 1824, to Viscount Granville, touched directly or indirectly upon some of the most difficult problems at that date before Canning at the Foreign Office.]

## VISIT TO IRELAND.

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

[From this communication we learn that Canning found great obstacles placed in his way in respect of a visit to Ireland.

The previous Session had been marked by strong divisions in Parliament against concession to the Roman Catholics, whether in England or Ireland.

As is well known the anti-Catholic party predominated in the Cabinet, though they had to put up with a great pro-Catholic statesman in the Foreign Office; but the King, the Prime Minister, and the Duke of Wellington alike strove to restrict Canning's activity to the field of Foreign Affairs, and they naturally viewed with anxiety, not to say jealousy, his visit to his great friend and ally the Marquis Wellesley, at this time Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; they believed Lord Wellesley to be far too tolerant of the seditious agitation of the Catholic Association. They probably apprehended, perhaps not without reason, some explosion of popular feeling in Ireland, if Canning appeared there, which might force Canning's hand on the question, and while adding fresh impetus to the agitation, might bring on a crisis of feeling too strong to admit of the anti-Catholic elements in the Cabinet continuing to co-operate with Canning; though the dissentients might have been unable to deny that his services were all but indispensable to the Ministry in the conduct of business in the House of Commons.

Canning appears to have apprcciated and acknowledged the anxieties and apprehensions of his Sovereign and colleagues, and to have given assurances of the strongest kind that he would refrain from any public appearances calculated to bring on a crisis, which

1824 he could not but feel might cost him his power at the Foreign Office, without in the then state of public feeling in Great Britain, advancing the cause of Catholic Emancipation in any appreciable degree, and at the same time inflicting incalculable injury alike on the Conservative domestic policy, with which he sympathised at home, and on the liberal foreign policy, which he so energetically promoted abroad.

The respect with which George IV. found it politic to treat his great minister is marked by the judicious and good-humoured manner used by him in pressing the necessity of caution on Canning, a moderation then, as ever in like cases, successful, as proved by the obviously sincere assurances of self-suppression Canning tendered on all sides.]

G. L.: Sept. 11, 1824.

My dear Granville,—It is very true. I am off for Dublin to-morrow. The difficulty that I have had in clearing away all obstacles to my departure is not to be described, and I am at this present moment, late in the fifth day of unintermitted labours, so tired that I can hardly guide my pen; I would not however go without saying adieu to you, and the same adieu must do for C. Ellis.

I took leave of the K. on Sunday last. I do not say that he is without some apprehensions as to my visit to Ireland, but he stated them, as you would do, in perfect good humour, and apparent confidence that I should take all due precaution.

I shall be under Wellesley's roof; shall go nowhere without him; shall stay only a week, and have his positive promise of privacy.

Adieu, for I must end.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[This letter contains the assurances just referred to :—

'Depend upon my not getting into difficulties.'

'I have inculcated privacy on Wellesley, and he has engaged 1824
'for it.'

It is curious to remark the time allotted for the journey: Canning, writing on Saturday, proposes to start on Sunday morning, and hopes to dine with the Lord Lieutenant on Wednesday evening: three days and a half between London and Dublin !]

Gloucester Lodge: Saturday, Sept. 11, 1824 (6 P.M.)

My dear Liverpool,—I am tired to death. But I think I have made a clear office and I hope to start to-morrow morning for Ireland, and to dine with Wellesley in the Phœnix Park on Wednesday.

Depend upon my not getting into difficulties. I have inculcated privacy on Wellesley, and he has engaged for it; and I am determined not to go anywhere without him. My stay will be about a week. I shall return from Dublin to Liverpool, when Mrs. C. and Harriet will meet me; and after a few days' stay with Mr. Gladstone, proceed with me to Mr. Bolton's lake, thence probably to Lowther, thence perhaps to Walter Scott's and to Sir George Warrender's near Edinburgh, and thence homewards by Ravensworth and Welbeck, where I suppose I shall leave my ladies and come up to London alone. Such is the extent of my plan if the K. of F. will be good enough not to cut it short, and the enclosed account of him seems to promise at least two months of protracted existence.

You shall hear from me from Dublin. Let me hear there that you are well.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Phœnix Park: Sept. 18, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—Your intelligence of the 15th can hardly have been true. If it were, Thursday could

1824 not have passed without a confirmation of it by telegraph, if not by courier.

That the event is at hand it is impossible to doubt. But I see no reason to believe that days, perhaps weeks, may not elapse before the actual communication.

Further, I confess I do not see what is to be done on the instant, that would require an immediate meeting.

If the account of the ceremonies observed on a K. of F.'s death be anything like correctly given in the enclosed paper, there will be abundance of time to consider of any mission of condolence.

I will, however, fix my setting out from hence on Thursday next, by which means I shall be in town by Saturday or Sunday.

If you think a meeting of the Cabinet necessary, pray let Planta know; but as at present advised, I do not see the necessity of it.

I had a good deal of talk with the King upon the steps to be taken on this event. But it did not occur to his memory any more than to me that any immediate step would be necessary. I told him that it appeared to me that for congratulation, whenever that might come, the mission of a grandee would probably be advisable; but if that is to be determined by the Coronation, it may perhaps never arrive; that for condolence, I thought I might either send Granville to Paris, preparatory to his appointment, or, that as soon as we saw to what hands the new King entrusted his ministry, I might make it a pretext to go there myself, for the purpose of coming to an understanding with Villèle, supposing him to be the person, and of communicating personally with the King, with whom I happen to have been in that sort of habits that would or might lead him to open himself to me with some degree of confidence. The King's

remark upon this suggestion was, 'I think it would be your duty to do so.' 1824

The King's mind therefore will not be in any degree of fidgetiness upon the event, take place when it will.

Think over these notions in your mind, and let us have an opportunity of talking them over before a Cabinet is summoned, if it be necessary, which I think it is not, to summon one.

I have managed to avoid all addresses and public entertainments here; and I believe without giving offence to anyone by declining them.

Fortunately the Lord Mayor, who was thefirst to offer an address, is a person of unusually civilised and intelligent understanding; and he not only accepted my reasons for declining with great good humour himself, but undertook to mediate with other bodies besides the Corporation, who had called or were preparing to call meetings. He has since attended me in my progress through the city, with an assiduity which shows that nothing has been taken amiss. Here we see men of all parties and persuasions. The Orange Blacker and the Catholic Blake sat next to each other yesterday at dinner; and so far as I can collect from persons of all sorts, with only two exceptions, of which Master Ellis was one, the general opinion is that this country has not been for years in a state so nearly approaching to tranquillity and prosperity.

Wellesley is very well in health, and in heart, and spirits.

We go to-morrow for a couple of days to Plunket's house in the country, i.e. ten miles from Dublin, and on Tuesday we dine at Goulburn's, which I should particularly wish not to miss.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

1824 [Louis XVIII. died at 4 A.M. on September 16, 1824, accordingly the report of his death communicated by Lord Liverpool, and discredited by Canning, was not true; nevertheless, the event had actually occurred two days before the date of this letter, yet the news of it had not reached him.

Canning was in no hurry to shorten his visit to Lord Wellesley, and he excused the delay in his return by observing that even if the French king were dead, there was no occasion for immediate action either on the score of expediting a mission of condolence, or on that of George IV. 'fidgeting' over the matter.

He still meditated finding some pretext to go to Paris to see Villèle in person; even so far as undertaking the mission of condolence, a separate affair from the mission of congratulation, though both followed on the same event.

Canning's Liberalism was neither destructive nor anarchical; its keynote at this time was the assertion of the perfect independence of each separate sovereign state to organise its own form of government unmolested; mere opposition to and contradiction of the doctrines of the Holy Alliance gave shape to this formula, but such Liberalism was perfectly consistent with a fully formed opinion in favour of monarchical and aristocratical institutions if developed naturally in a state, without foreign intervention; and Canning clearly cherished the idea that if he could only make the distinction intelligible to the men at the head of the French Government, he might contrive to disarm much of their jealous hostility, and render them more amenable to the right understanding and progressive development of his policy.

However, he recognised that the employment of Lord Granville, and not of himself, on the mission of condolence, would in the end be found the most expedient. Lord Granville was, at the moment, on the spot; and, moreover, was understood to be designated as successor to Sir Charles Stuart.

Passing from the French question, Canning takes credit for the precautions he adopted to avoid coming before the public in Ireland. The precautions, it appears, were not unnecessary, as efforts were made to 'draw' him, but without success.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Phœnix Park: September 24, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I received yesterday your letter of Tuesday.

There may be all the objection which you state to the project, which I had meditated; and I am not quite sure that the purpose with which I conceived it may not be answered a short time hence in another way. I confess I do attach considerable importance to the seeing both the new King and M. de Villèle (if he remains in office), but for the present let us talk of the Mission of Condolence. Of all the persons whom you or Planta have mentioned, I think the first, the Duke of Montrose—the best—because it would be quite apparent that he could have no political instructions. But his absence and his infirmities put him out of the question. The D. of D. [evonshire] is out of the question for other reasons; of Lord Winchester I know nothing; Lord Winchester might have done ten years ago, but he is quite broken. To Lord Pembroke, in himself an unexceptionable person, there is an objection which I am surprised should not have occurred to you; as to me it appears a very serious one. I mean his Russian wife. You know enough of old W.'s [query, Prince Woronzow] correspondence with Castela to be aware that they are in the highest school of Ultra Politics; and whether Lady C. went with her Lord or not, Castela's house would unquestionably be Lord P.'s ordinary house of entertainment, and he would have in appearance, if not in reality, his place among the Russian faction, which is exactly and peculiarly the place which the King's representative ought not to hold. Besides, Lord P. would not have the reputation which the D. of M., or any member of the King's household, might have of going merely to compliment Charles X. Lord P. has been employed politically; I sent him myself to Vienna, when I was last Sec. of State, upon a very delicate mission, of which (by the way) he made as little as could be made. Lastly, Lord P. has, since I

1824

1824 returned to office, applied to me very earnestly for foreign employment for Lord Malmesbury, which I was obliged to refuse, and I should therefore both feel an awkwardness in making a proposition to himself, and apprehend that he might decline my proposition and endeavour to turn it in another direction. I think you will allow all these considerations together to be conclusive against Lord P., otherwise (as I set out with saying) a person in himself unexceptionable. Further, there is in my judgment a great difficulty in the selection of any person of the class of which we are speaking, which arises from Sir C. Stuart's situation. If it was intended that Sir C. Stuart should remain, there would be nothing so simple as to send him his new credentials, and to recommend the condoling grandee to his guidance and good offices. There would be nothing extraordinary in the relation between a permanent ambassador and a grandee with a special mission—but nothing could be more awkward than the co-existence of two temporary representatives, the special one naturally leaning on that which it supposed to be permanent, but the supposed permanent one knowing its own tenure to be as short-lived as that of the one which leant on it for support. It is not to be believed that Sir C. Stuart would be very earnest in his endeavours to relieve the embarrassment of that anomalous state of things. Neither would they be relieved by a public avowal of Stuart's recall, previously to the sending the special mission. For in that case either Stuart must still remain at Paris after his recall, charged with the ordinary business of the embassy; or, if he come away, that business must fall upon the grandee who is not to be successor, or the new appointment must be made, in which case it would be difficult to account for an inter-

vening nomination with all the expense belonging to it. 1824

This last consideration is one not to be overlooked, at a time when every item of public expenditure is (through the shape in which the details of the Civil List are now exhibited to Parliament) liable to a separate discussion.

For all these reasons it did occur to me that the option lay between a Cabinet minister—and if a Cabinet minister myself (unless Harrowby could have been had—whom his relation to Granville on the one hand and his old habits with Charles X. on the other hand, seemed to me to render peculiarly proper) and Granville. The objection that Granville is not here may be cured by sending for him,—Stuart may at the same time be apprised of the intention to appoint a successor to him, and Granville may take with him, in addition to his special commission, his credentials as ambassador resident, to exhibit so soon as his special mission is executed.

This is what appears to me, under all the circumstances of the case (of which Stuart's situation constitutes the difficulty) the most unexceptionable course.

I will do nothing in the matter, however, till I have your opinion. I desire Planta to forward this letter, which will come to his hands on Monday morning, to Walmer the same day. If you send back the messenger on Tuesday he will meet me on my arrival that evening —I will then announce myself to the King.

If you wish to see me, either before I see the King or after, have no scruple in saying so, and I will come to you at Walmer.

After the receipt of your letter yesterday, I suffered myself to be persuaded to prolong my stay here two days; but I shall receive and be ready to act upon your

1824 reply to this letter, as soon as I have embarked this morning.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I send to Planta a letter to Granville, of which I enclose a copy to be forwarded if you approve.

[We find from this that Lord Liverpool had been strenuously objecting to Canning's proposed visit to Paris.

Perhaps one might infer from this, as well as from the objections raised to his visit to Ireland, that his colleagues, especially his chief, Lord Liverpool, were possessed with misgivings as to his discretion when left alone to deal with opponents who had nothing to lose and much to gain by arousing his high-spirited temper and beguiling him, if possible, to commit himself to some ill-advised expression of opinion which might be subsequently distorted and employed as a weapon against himself.

The discussion of the various 'grandees' who might be named as suitable ambassadors to execute the 'condoling mission' suggests only two remarks: the limited number of the names mentioned; and the objection taken to Lord Pembroke on the score of his Russian wife. The objection rested on grounds of Russian social influence in Paris, and its natural effect on the son-in-law of Count Woronzoff; and Canning took the objection when the antagonism between Great Britain and Russia was essentially diplomatic in form.

The question of the recall of Sir Charles Stuart now became one for immediate consideration, and the designation of Lord Granville as his successor made it an obvious solution of the difficulty as to the condoling mission, that Lord Granville should present himself at the French Court with double credentials, first for executing his special errand, and, when that was over, then those for his permanent appointment.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

G. L.: Sunday, October 10, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I have received your box with my draft of letter to Sir C. S., and should adopt all your alterations, if that draft were to be the basis of my letter.

But judge what must have been my surprise, when I received back from his Majesty yesterday the draft

which I had sent to Windsor the day before, with the following letter from his Majesty: 1824

'The King cannot approve of Mr. Canning's answer to Sir Charles Stuart's letter.

'There are two ways of doing everything; and the King is always disposed to take the kindest.'

Indeed! after having persecuted me for two years to recall Sir Charles Stuart without waiting for the *apropos* of the new reign; after having again and again declared his intention not to give Stuart the Peerage, after abusing him as a Jacobin and disparaging him as a good-for-nothing diplomatic agent, when I, to save his Majesty from importunity, take upon myself the ungracious task of discouraging all Stuart's expectations, and being the only person who has had any kindness or consideration for him, consent to bear the whole obloquy of his unbroken uncompensated removal—this is my reward!

But they are mistaken if they think I will acquiesce in such treatment or let them play their game for popularity at my expense. (I say 'they' because I know he has advisers.)

I have prepared another draft to Stuart which I send to the King to-day with a letter, of which and of the draft I enclose copies.

I am sorry for the trouble which this version will entail upon you. But I tried all I could to save you from it—and it is therefore no fault of mine.

There are other things going on of which I do not entirely approve—such as Westmoreland's mission to Paris, and conversation to Charles X. upon the Spanish American Question, which I understand he has reported to the King.

But sufficient for the day is the evil thereof.

Ever yours,

GEO. CANNING.

1824 [We here come to a characteristic trait of George IV.

He had, as has been already stated, for some time steadily set his face against the continuance of Sir Charles Stuart at Paris; but, when it came to the point, his natural good-nature and compunction at extinguishing a man who had not personally offended him, gave him qualms which found expression in criticism of Canning's language as too harsh in the letter of recall.

Possibly this criticism was instigated by Sir W. Knighton, who at that time no doubt moved quietly in opposition to Canning, and in concert with the Duke of Wellington, the Earl of Westmoreland, and the rest of the high Tory party.

Nevertheless, the remonstrance looks at this time an idea appropriate to the King's feelings, though posterity cannot now altogether discredit Canning's belief that his Majesty, on obtaining his end, designed to avoid the hostility of Sir Charles Stuart's friends in England by contriving to throw the odium of his recall on Canning.

The other noticeable point in the letter is the allusion to Lord Westmoreland's interview with King Charles X. followed by his lordship's audience of George IV. to report the French King's expression of opinion on the occasion.

In the Wellington correspondence of the period, Canning's letters will be found explaining the formal grounds of his indignation at this proceeding. It suited Wellington to pooh-pooh it as much as possible; but Canning knew what he was about in making the fuss he did on the subject.

The recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies, at some very early period, might be expected to operate beneficially to Great Britain in several ways; it would bring her trade with those countries again under regular diplomatic and consular protection; it would establish and confirm the doctrine of the independence of a separated state becoming *de jure* if such independence has been attained *de facto*; it would check the credit of the doctrine of the divine right of kings; it would put an end to the project of French aggrandisement in America; and it would counterpoise the prestige France had acquired by her occupation of Spain.

But some of these results were peculiarly distasteful to the high Tory school of statesmen in England, and though they could not absolutely stop the progress of Canning's policy, which was leading up to that end, they could throw in its way all kinds of minor impediments, not the least amongst which was the personal view of George IV. If the King could be won over and kept on the opposite side, and his family obstinacy as much as lay in him fairly aroused, there would be no saying for how long the consummation of

Canning's policy might not be delayed. Hence one may infer how much effect might be expected from influence brought to bear on the mind of George IV., already prejudiced towards ultra-monarchical views. A private message from the King of France, in point-blank opposition to Canning's aims, was by no means an unlikely method of acting on George IV.'s mind.] 1824

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

G. L.: October 12, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—The letter to the King with the remodelled draft to Sir C. S. produced the following answer:

'The King approves of the draft of Mr. Canning's present letter to Sir C. S., and the King gives Mr. Canning credit for the feeling that induces him to say that the tone of the present draft is altogether more agreeable than the former one.'

So there is an end of that matter. In the margin of the draft the K. puts opposite to the sentence about Sir C. Stuart's service, as Secretary of Embassy with Lord Granville, a query in pencil: 'Is it not more than sixteen years since Lord G. was Ambassador at St. Petersburg?' It is a little more than sixteen, but less than seventeen. But this sort of cavil seemed to imply a dislike of the passage, and therefore I altered it as you will see by the copy of my letter to that which I enclose.

I have also made an alteration in the last paragraph conformably to your suggestion, but I cannot dilute it below the original letter which the K. had previously approved..

Now as to your letter to the K., I own I have my doubts whether it would be expedient to send it just now. There is some intrigue going on of which I have not got to the bottom, and in the effects of which I think you had better not be mixed till we see how I get out of them.

1824

Westmoreland and Knighton are the two persons who have caused the reaction respecting Stuart. Both, I believe, but the latter certainly, have represented Stuart as utterly surprised and unprepared for it. This is a lie: but whose lie, whether Stuart's or his two reporters, I cannot say.

Meantime Stuart has written to Planta to disclaim any cognisance of the language of his partisans. Whereupon I have written to him the letter of which I enclose a copy, and which I think will keep him to his good behaviour.

It will be quite time enough for you to enter your protest when you see how Stuart takes the contents of this day's communication.

At present your appearance upon the scene might look as if I had called you in to my aid, and you see by the King's letter that I do not want it at present: for the K. if he had anything in his head has thought better of it. My letter (as I suspect you perceived) brought it to the test.

Ever sincerely yours,

G. C.

[Sir Charles Stuart's letter of recall is now fairly settled; Canning appears somewhat chafing under the King's criticisms, compliments, and marginal notes; which he believed to be symptomatic either of repentance of Sir Charles's recall, or of a wish to throw the onus on Canning; Canning, however, connected the change with the influence of Knighton and Lord Westmoreland; and as he had not yet discovered their motive in prompting the King to this line of conduct, he deprecated Lord Liverpool's proffered interference for the present.

One assertion of Sir Charles' friends, that he never expected his recall, Canning protested to be untrue, both in this letter and in a letter to Lord Granville of the same date; however, Sir Charles himself seems to have been behaving with tact and discretion, and in a letter to Mr. Planta to have disclaimed much that the zeal of his friends in London had been putting about on his behalf.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

G. L.: October 12, 1824.

My dear Granville,—I send Stuart his letters of recall to-night. I send him also an answer to his letter of Tuesday last which he may perhaps have shown to you, and if so, he will probably have shown you the answer; and I send him a more private letter, in consequence of one from him to Planta disclaiming all participation in the language of his partisans. 1824

I do not profess any disbelief of his disclaimer; but what think you of Lord Westmoreland being authorised to say to the King that Stuart had no expectation of his recall?

Think also of Lord Westmoreland having an audience of Charles X. upon Spanish America—and then going down to Windsor to report it to the King and to inveigh against my going to Paris!

I wish you could learn what report there is at Paris of Westmoreland's audience—and let me know it.

Ever affectionately yours,

G. C.

P.S.—If Sir C. S. does not show you my two letters to him, I will send you copies of them. But I would let him have the grace of showing them voluntarily if he pleases; and would not put you to the awkwardness of either avowing or denying that you had them in your hands.

G. C.

[Parallel to the letter to Lord Liverpool, Canning wrote on the same day one to Lord Granville, to furnish him with copies of the letters to Sir Charles Stuart relating to Sir Charles' recall. If possible Lord Granville was to manage that Sir Charles should have the grace of himself showing Canning's letters to Lord Granville.

Canning accepted Stuart's professions of ignorance of what his partisans were doing in England; but is unable in his letter to Lord

1824 Granville to refrain from an expression of incredulity of such ignorance under the circumstances.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O : October 14, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—Here is the reply to my last letter, and the amended draft.

I know not which has surprised, the beginning of the correspondence or this conclusion of it.

It is dreadful to see the extent of such an influence.

I have ascertained that the first note was dictated by that influence, and now see what a request and what a miserable tone of application he is compelled to adopt (for he knows nothing of the individual in whose favour it is made)—only three days after writing so violent and unjust a censure. He has too much the feelings of a gentleman not to be mortified at the contrast he is thus forced to exhibit. I shall of course do the job, somehow or other.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[The enclosures referred to in this letter may be guessed to be the correspondence with the King as to the draft despatch for Sir Charles Stuart's recall; and the account of the King's state of mind describes a weak man vacillating under the varying pressure of external influence; whether Canning here alludes to Sir W. Knighton or to Lady Conyngham is not quite clear; but the appeal for help to provide for some person connected with the 'influence' suggests the idea of the lady.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O.: October 14, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I send you a letter which I have received this morning from Granville.

You will see what is the state of S.'s mind; but particularly let me call your attention to what he has said to G. about India.

Could Madras be better disposed of? For you and 1824
for me, it certainly could not, for it would save you all trouble about the Peerage; and it would not only save the necessity of finding an employment for S., but preserve to me my Planta, whom I know not how to replace, especially now that the change has been suffered to run on till within prospect of the meeting of Parliament. I verily believe too that Planta himself, though if the vacancy should occur he would feel it a point of honour not to forego it, would nevertheless be not ill-satisfied that the whole of the projected change should fall to the ground. As to Lushington, you best know what he feels or how far you stand committed to him.

One thing, however, you must bear in mind, that as Stuart has mentioned his wish to Granville, he may have done so, or he may still [do so] either by letter, or when he comes over, to those who report it to the King. Knighton is loud and constant in his expressions of praise and of compassion. The King himself once mentioned S. to me for Madras. I then thought it quite out of the question, either that the directors would choose Stuart, or that he would accept the appointment.

In the latter supposition I was evidently mistaken. I am much mistaken now, if the former supposition would not also turn out to be erroneous; for I am persuaded that the directors would now gladly accept any third person, whom they thought that the Government either could not or would not refuse.

That you could not refuse him if chosen by the directors I feel quite certain. The K. was with difficulty brought to negative Sir T. Malcolm. A third negative, and upon a man of his own choice, Wynn could never get his Majesty to sanction. And consider what a question it would be on which to put the whole force

1824 of your Government—think what it would be to push Lushington (excellent as he may be) against the whole court of directors; against the King's personal opinion; against Knighton's incessant representations; and really against the fair feeling of the public, who would only compare the stations of the two candidates. A Secretary of the Treasury against a ten years' Ambassador at Paris.

Turn this over in your mind. I send a messenger to you, that I may get your answer to-morrow evening. Possibly also, if Lushington is in your neighbourhood, you might like to send over to him. And I do not know whether you have a messenger at hand.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—There is another matter alluded to in Granville's letter upon which I mean, and have been meaning, to write to you; but for the last three or four days I have been overwhelmed with worries and interviews.

To-day has brought voluminous despatches from Strangford, and not altogether satisfactory. The worst news in them, however, is that the plague had made its appearance in the Ambassadorial House at Constantinople. There had been one death—of an English servant—but S. hopes that the danger of further mischief has gone by.

G. C.

[Here we find Lord Granville's report from Paris sent to the Prime Minister.

The letter discusses the question of providing for Stuart on his return; Sir Charles himself had mentioned 'India' to Lord Granville; Canning suggests 'Madras.' Lord Liverpool had desired to appoint to Madras Lushington, Secretary to the Treasury, and to that end had negatived two such strong candidates as Sir T. Malcolm and Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone; but Canning thinks Stuart's claims superior to Lushington's, and likely to obtain the good will of the King and the approval of the public.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Gloucester Lodge: Sunday, Oct. 17, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I am very glad to hear that Walmer has agreed with you so well; and that you are encouraged to pass the next month there instead of at Bath. 1824

I see no occasion to give you the trouble of coming up to town.

The main business which is at this moment upon my hands is a discussion with Lieven upon two pretty difficult matters: 1. The Convention respecting the Northern Pacific and the North-West Coast of America; and 2. the Conferences on Greece.

The Convention has been returned from St. Petersburg unsigned, and with a *Contre Projet* which cannot be admitted—but which I am going to talk over with Lord St. Helens to-day, and see what can be made of it. The Greek Question is full of peril and plague; and the more so as the whole brunt of the business is laid on our shoulders. France and Prussia have signified their complete adhesion to the Russian plan; which, when a plan consists of many and complicated parts, is absolutely foolish, and of very little help. Austria pretends to Russia a similar acquiescence, but confides to us her perfect conviction that the whole project will come to nothing.

We who cannot take either of these courses are placed in great embarrassment. If we refuse our co-operation, France and Prussia, and Austria too, will lay the failure upon us; if we engage in the discussion, they will endeavour to make us responsible for its success.

Lieven has the most pressing instructions to urge our co-operation; and he does not appear to have an atom of discretion, nor even liberty to listen to reason.

1824 At the end of three hours' conversation, after his listening to all my arguments, he employs exactly the same words in winding up that he did in opening the subject.

The Convention (with St. Helens' aid) I think I can manage.

Upon the Greek Question I will send you the draft of my instructions to Stratford as soon as I have prepared it.

By the next packet from Lisbon, I expect to receive Palmella's observations upon the Project of Reconciliation—at one time he intended to throw the whole question overboard, and start his expedition for Brazil, but I think he has become alarmed at his own rashness, or has been talked into better temper by A'Court, and he now promises a *Contre Projet.*

Thornton's misdoings have been greater than I had even imagined.

I have seen a person, an English medical man whom I knew at Lisbon, and who is in constant professional attendance on the King of Portugal, by whose report it appears that the King's mind was so thoroughly poisoned against A'Court, that he was actually ill with fright at the prospect of seeing him. My informant was with the King immediately after the first interview, and found him quite relieved and full of A'Court's praises. Thornton had evidently lent himself to this delusion, as you will see by the enclosed letter.

If we get Subserra here, as seems not impossible, it will be still more clear that poor Thornton had ruined our cause with his own. With a little exertion, or a little right sense of his duty, he certainly would have contrived to ship Subserra off to us from the Tagus, instead of letting Hyde de Neuville carry him from the cabin of the 'Windsor Castle,' back to his office in triumph.

With Spain there is nothing to be done till the King of Spain sends us a Minister. 1824

With France nothing need be done till Granville is installed at Paris; the question of the occupation will become a serious one if an expedition against S. A. should be fitted out from Spain, but I hardly expect it.

With respect to S. A. itself, I see no step to be taken till we hear something more decisive.

Are you forward in your financial plans? and can you remit us any more taxes? If so, I am for direct ones this season.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—I propose to summon the first Cabinet for Monday, December 6, if that will suit you.

G. C.

[From this letter we learn that two puzzling and critical questions demanded Canning's immediate consideration; the manner of dealing with the Greek Insurrection; and the problem of the north-west coast of North America, where the Russian Government by a recent ukase had laid claim to an extent of territory, perfectly unreasonable, and absolutely inadmissible.

With regard to the first, at this stage little need be said, except the general statement that Russia had been trying to engage Great Britain in a conference at St. Petersburg on the Greek Question; that to avoid the appearance of concerted dictation to Turkey, Canning had stipulated that a Russian Ambassador should be appointed at Constantinople before such a conference were entered upon· while on the other hand the Russian Government treated it as an indispensable preliminary that the Turks should evacuate the Principalities.

The Russian Government held back from efficient aid to Greece, on the ground which, as a matter of principle, and not of immediate profit, commands respect, that the Greeks were insurgents and therefore international outlaws, and the Czar could not succour them, though co-religionists of his subjects, without compromising his doctrine of the legitimacy of the established governments in Europe.

1824 — It appears from Mr. Stapleton's 'Political Life of George Canning,' vol. iii. p. 122, that Sir Charles Bagot had left St. Petersburg at the beginning of September 1824.

Sir Charles' effort to give reality to the conference on Greek affairs at St. Petersburg, by assuming on insufficient information that the Turks had ordered the evacuation of the Principalities, and that the Imperial designation of M. Ribeaupierre as Russian Ambassador at Constantinople was equivalent to the actual despatch of an embassy, and consequently regarding himself as at liberty to join the conference, had ended in the disavowal of his proceedings by the British Government. His recall had been settled before this contretemps; but it was unfortunate for himself that the mistake should have occurred.

The pith of the Russian project of reconciliation consisted in the retention by the Porte of a nominal Suzeraineté over Greece with a tribute of money, and the dissipation of Greek power by breaking their country into small principalities, and in the concession at the same time to the Greeks, that they should be left in all other respects under local self-government

The effect of this project, if carried out, would have been to confer on the Greeks certain advantages; but to leave them without means of defence and security, and thereby in a condition which would tempt the Turks to ignore the stipulated concessions; the Greeks would then have had no alternative but a direct appeal to Russia for protection, and Russia would have then felt herself free to interfere to compel the Turks to observe the treaty, an interference she could *not* undertake if the aim of the Greeks continued to be unqualified rejection of the sovereignty of the Porte.

This Russian scheme, however, became public, and both belligerents received it with a burst of indignation. Canning had not treated it as altogether out of the question; but when he saw how it was received by the parties interested, he at once put it aside as impracticable.

This observation somewhat anticipates matters—the check to these negotiations, and the action taken by Canning thereon, forms the subject of the letter to Lord Liverpool on November 5, following.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

[It appears, from the 'Wellington Correspondence' and 'Lord 'Liverpool's Memoirs,' that Lord Westmoreland's interview with Charles X. of France, and report to George IV. of the French King's

opinion on the question of the recognition of the Spanish colonies, had revived in Canning the desire to visit Paris and open up personal communication with the French ministers from which, when he meditated undertaking the same expedition under cover of the Mission of Condolence, Lord Liverpool and the Duke of Wellington had dissuaded him. 1824

The letter is enigmatically expressed; but the second paragraph refers to communications between Lord Westmoreland and the King, before Lord Westmoreland made his explanations to Canning.

The third paragraph evidently refers to the wishes of the Duke of Wellington; and the high regard set by Canning on co-operation with the Duke is worthy of remark.]

Ickworth: Oct. 25, 1824.

My dear Granville,—In explanation of my last short letter, I send you the enclosed correspondence.

The only commentary which I will permit myself to make on it is that I know the letter which stands first in the series to have been written [by the Duke of Wellington] after our conference with the person [the King], at whose house it is dated, and sent after another. The presumption is that the subject was talked over at the first; and the letter shown at the second. Yet that person [the King] has never retracted the opinion originally given, nor have I afforded to him or to the writer [D. of W.] the satisfaction of knowing that I have changed my plan.

The change, as you may believe, is owing less to anything in that part of the enclosure which I send to you than to the last single one, the writer [D. of W.] of which is entitled to every consideration—even when one's opinion is not exactly the same, nothing could be so agreeable to the Ultras, or so inconvenient to me, as the divergency of our opinions on any question or action, of real or supposed importance.

The secret motive of all I believe to be that the

1824 writer [? Lord Westmoreland] of the first series was not selected to do what you have done.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

[This long letter explains Canning's personal wishes with respect to the official destinies of Sir Charles Bagot and Sir Charles Stuart: it contains a defence of the appointments he had made since he had entered on this his last term of power.]

Ickworth: October 27, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I hope you will have thought the letter to Sir Charles Stuart, of which I sent you a copy the day before yesterday, sufficient for all purposes indicated in yours of the 24th.

It shows to Sir C. Stuart that his wishes have been immediately taken into consideration, and as to any difficulties which may attend the fulfilment, it seems to me that it would be useless to anticipate them, if they should not arise, and that it will be time enough to state them if they do arise and cannot be overcome.

I think I have done my part in letting him know that I have communicated Granville's communication. What more he may have to learn on that subject he may more properly learn from other quarters; from you as head of the Government, from Wynn as President of the Department to which he would be transferred, or from Robinson as his private friend.

To keep the correspondence with him in my hands would be to imply a sort of expectation that if this suggestion of his own was found to be inexecutable, I should have something else to offer to him, an expectation better not raised even if it were likely to be realised, but most dangerous if it is not.

I do not, however, see what difficulties are to be

apprehended; supposing always (of which I know nothing) Lushington's chance to be as desperate as you and Wynn think it, and supposing Lushington therefore (what in such case would be obviously for his interest and credit) inclined to withdraw his pretensions, I cannot suppose that the Court of Directors would reject Sir C. Stuart or indeed any creditable compromise. 1824

The questions, therefore, respecting ulterior provision for Sir C. Stuart and that of Bagot's appointment to Madras, I hardly think likely to come into consideration. I hope they may not, for I will tell you how I am situated as to the Netherlands embassy.

*Imprimis*, it is the very best thing which the Secretary of State has to give; and *secundo*, it is the only thing that he can give pretty much to whom he pleases. Other embassies require various other qualifications, but the essential qualification for this (besides the indispensable one of being of ambassadorial *calibre* —'calibeer,' as the East India Directors call it) in point of rank, &c., is that he should be a friend of the Secretary of State.

From the first of these characteristics of the Netherlands embassy it results that it is the object of my general desire; from the second, that it is desired with peculiar appetency by the Secretary of State's intimate friends; and from both that it has been the subject of frequent applications to and from me since I came into office; all of which I must bear very carefully in mind whenever I come to dispose of it.

If Bagot remains all is well. He asked it of me very early on the grounds of private friendship and family distress and difficulties, which appeared to me to make a case which I could oppose to personal solicitation and expectation from other quarters. I did so: and obtained, I will not say the willing consent, but

1824 the cheerful acquiescence of those who felt themselves disappointed.

But this acquiescence was founded on the peculiar circumstances of Bagot's case, and if Bagot should now wish to give up what he earnestly solicited—for something better—and the disposal of the Hague should again fall into my hands, I cannot fight the same battle on different grounds, and expect the same acquiescence which was yielded to Bagot's necessities, and to my known regard and affection for him individually, to be given to an arrangement for the sake of bringing Sir C. S. back to employment without any interval of retreat.

You will see, therefore, that it is not any objection to Bagot's appointment to Madras that made me hesitate as to your suggestion; you know that I wished him to take that appointment long ago. But I do not like to have the Embassy at the Hague thrown into my hands with an understanding that it is to be appropriated to the purpose of bringing Stuart back into employment —not ten days after I have told him distinctly that I would not bind myself to more than to the availing myself of any favourable opportunity that 'may occur after a reasonable interval.'

As to Stuart, you know how little disposed I was to recall him, and how long I resisted assailments and importunities to that effect.

At length, however, it is done. I have incurred all the odium (if odium there be) of the measure; and now because an outcry is raised, which frightens those who first and most constantly instigated me to it, am I to retrace my steps and appear as if I was afraid of the consequences of my own act? And in doing this am I to sanction the principle against which I have been contending, that the embassies are to remain in the same hands so long as those hands choose to hold them; and

that the utmost a Secretary of State has a right to do is now and then to change them from one pair of hands to another? 1824

As to C. Bagot, I am quite sure it is unnecessary to repeat how much I wish every good to befall him, or how desirous I have always shown myself to contribute to his happiness and welfare.

But I should think it a little hard that my good nature to him in respect to the Netherlands embassy, should leave me worse than I should have been, if I had not complied with his solicitation for it.

Yet this would be the case if, upon his now relinquishing it for Madras, it were to be expected that I should hold that embassy available in some way or other for Stuart's provision.

If Lord Clancarty had resigned that embassy before C. Bagot solicited the reversion of it, I should unquestionably have appointed it to some friend of my own, leaving Granville to be sent to Paris when any proper occasion for making a change in the Paris embassy should arise.

I sent Granville to the Hague only to keep it open for Bagot.

If it becomes vacant again by Bagot's resignation of it, surely it is not unfair to consider it still at my disposal.

You will not think it unfair when you recollect that, during the two years I have been in office, I have not had an opportunity (at least I have not availed myself of one), to introduce a single friend of my own into high diplomatic office.

I exclude Granville from this statement, because he stands upon other grounds. He is an older Ambassador than any now in employment, I found him an Ambassador when I became Secretary of State in 1807. I

1824 employed him as such while embassies lasted. He has been out of office without pension for sixteen years, because I have been out of power. It was matter of obvious political faith on my return to the office of Secretary of State, if friendship were out of the question, to restore him (if willing to be employed) to his former rank of employment.

But when I speak of introducing a friend into employment, I mean such an introduction as Lord Castlereagh's of such a friend as Lord Clancarty into the embassy at the Hague.

Such as that, which with the assurance of the K. and the D. of W. that it had been Lord Castlereagh's intention, I executed for him in nominating Lord Clanwilliam to Berlin—nominations, to speak plainly of favour, with just enough of merit in the individual not to expose them to reprehension.

I had two vacancies soon after my taking the seals; one, Berlin, I have mentioned; for the other, Vienna, I had a full right to prefer Granville to Henry Wellesley, but I was told that Lord Londonderry had designed H. W. for the post, and I gave it according to this reported designation.

Since then there have been two promotions, in one of which Hill, in the other my cousin benefits, to be sure, according (but only according) to their seniority: but the vacancies produced by which are filled one by Mr. Vesey Fitzgerald, a bequest of my predecessor and a claimant of the Government; the other under circumstances which made the nomination matter of public duty or discretion.

I have, therefore, as yet given everything to my predecessor or the Government, and nothing to myself.

If after all this the Hague shall open again, I hope it will not be thought unreasonable if for the first time in

two years, and probably for the last that may occur (for, except by the act of Providence, I see no other chance of any opening at all), I consult my own feelings and the claims of my own friends. 1824

This, and not any want of feeling for C. Bagot, was the motive for my answer to the first suggestion of his name. I did not then think it necessary, nor did I like unnecessarily, to explain all my meaning. But I do not like, on the other hand, to have any disguise with you, and therefore upon your second letter I have determined to open my whole mind to you.

The results are: (1) That, as I have shown, I shall be very glad of Stuart's appointment to the Government of Madras if it takes place, as taking him off my hands, and yours, without any appearance of retractation or intimidation on my part; (2) That failing Stuart I shall be delighted to see Charles Bagot obtain the same object if he wishes it; but that the vacancy in that particular embassy whenever it again arises is one which I wish to keep at my own disposal.

Ever &c., &c.

GEO. CANNING.

[Sir Charles Stuart owed his removal, Canning distinctly says, to the persistent importunities of the King; but, when Sir Charles Stuart's removal became an accomplished fact, his friends waxed wrathful, and made such a stir that the King and Lord Liverpool, alarmed, began to urge his re-appointment to some high diplomatic post without further delay, and to suggest that the embassy at the Hague, now held by Sir Charles Bagot in succession to Lord Granville transferred to Paris, should be vacated by the appointment of Bagot to the governorship of Madras, and an opportunity be thus created for the re-employment of Stuart diplomatically.

Canning, on the other hand, insisted that, Sir Charles Stuart being removed, an interval should be allowed to elapse before his admission again to the charge of a diplomatic appointment, and that it would be better to offer him the vacant governorship of Madras.

Canning frankly pointed out to Lord Liverpool, that, considering

1824 Sir Charles Bagot's circumstances, the Madras appointment promised greater advantages to that officer than his continuance in the embassy at the Hague; but, on the other hand, he protested his desire to preserve his freedom in respect of the appointment of a successor to Bagot, if Bagot accepted Madras; and distinctly declared that he would not undertake to appoint Sir Charles Stuart to the vacancy, but meant to keep it at his own personal disposition.

Canning's claim to a free choice in this matter, founded on past forbearance, appears certainly fair and reasonable: and his statement of facts may be taken as unquestionably correct, when writing confidentially to his friend and chief, Lord Liverpool, to whom every detail was familiar.

The area of choice for such appointments is exceedingly limited, even to the most catholic minded and unprejudiced chief, and it may be safely said that a choice due to Canning's friendship, tempered by his anxiety to have his correspondent at a Continental Court intelligent and useful, would promise more security to the public service than any nomination forced on him by the King.

Of course the question remains of whom Canning was thinking when he asserted his claim to appoint his own man to the Hague.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

(Published in the 'Wellington Despatches.' Second Series.)

G. L.: November 5, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—You will see by the draft of instructions to Stratford how entirely my opinions agree with yours upon the Greek Question.

But since those instructions were drawn, I have received, most unexpectedly, the acccompanying letter from the Greek Government.

I have also received this morning from Sir Henry Wellesley the copy of a despatch from the Internuncio to P. Metternich, giving the same account of the Turkish feelings upon the Russian project as is given in the despatch from Lord Strangford, which (though you have already seen it), I send herewith to refresh your memory, the same account in substance, but in degree and in detail still more unfavourable.

Under these circumstances I have written the draft

to Count Lieven, which I send for your consideration. 1824
I will not repeat the substance of it in another form in this letter; but I must add to what I have there said.

1st. That it would be an enormous responsibility to go forward in the proposed conferences after this loud warning from Greece, without some previous explanation with the Greek Government; 2nd. That as this declaration of the Greek Government relieves us from all apprehension of a separate understanding between it and Russia, we may pause a little without risk of any mischief.

Let me know what you think.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—Pray let me have your answer to this by to-morrow's mail; as I promised to see Count Lieven again on Monday, and if I write to him as I propose, I should wish to write to him the day before.

[This letter takes up the tale of the Greek negotiations with Russia, last mentioned in this series in the letter to Lord Liverpool of October 17, 1824.

It amounts to this, that both Turks and Greeks having obtained an inkling of the project of Russia for the settlement of the question, severally and independently declared their intention to reject it. Canning attached great importance to this expression of opinion on the part of the Greeks. And in this letter he sends to Lord Liverpool the draft of a proposed note to Count Lieven intimating that under the circumstances the negotiations must now be considered at an end.

In 'Wellington Despatches,' second series, there is published a letter from Canning to the Duke, dated November 10, 1824, as to the Russian urgency on Great Britain to enter on a conference on Greek affairs, and as to the British Government holding off until the Russian Embassy should be restored at Constantinople. It refers to the 'snubbing' administered to Sir Charles Bagot for his slip on this point at St. Petersburg.]

1824. MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Gloucester Lodge: November 11, 1824. 10 o'clock.

My dear Granville,—The high notions which you had allowed yourself to form of the bulk and variety of information and instruction which you should meet on your arrival at Paris, will have led you to look with great dissatisfaction on the very little or nothing which you will have found there.

In truth, it has been absolutely, positively, physically impossible for me to find time to write to you this week.

I returned from Ickworth to town on Tuesday midnight (the 2nd), chiefly to despatch my cousin Stratford to St. Petersburg, and to present Polignac to the King. His Majesty has postponed Polignac's presentation till he can receive him in town, and an incident has occurred which postponed Stratford's departure for Petersburg. I am therefore going back to-morrow, *rebus infectis*, to Ickworth, where I left Mrs. C., and Harriet, whence however I must again return for good to-morrow se'ennight; Saturday (the 20th) being fixed for the King's coming to town.

Being here, I have been overwhelmed with an influx of matters which would have borne my continued absence exceedingly well, but which took ungenerous advantage of my arrival, and the more vigorously and venomously as it was understood that my stay was to be short. I have been also labouring all the time under a severe rheumatism, with some apprehension of its turning to gout, so that I do not know that I ever passed a less agreeable ten days, or was ever more tired than I am at this present ten o'clock, when I force myself to write this letter previously to going into a warm bath in my way to embrocation, laudanum, and bed.

As to the two points upon which you say you look

for instructions, my present instructions are silence. If the French were reinforcing their army in Spain, we might have something to say; as they are withdrawing it, what would we more? Not surely help them with our suggestion, or encourage them with our applause, or preclude ourselves, by implication even, from summing up their Spanish Expedition in our own sense in Parliament if occasion shall arise. 1824

I have told Polignac that I expect to hear from him what they are doing; but that I shall ask no questions. As to Greece and Turkey and Russia, you shall know all shortly—but not for communication to France. Not one word has France even said to us on these subjects, and I am sure Villèle is playing false upon them. If asked any questions, therefore, reply by questions in return, and so Good-night,

Ever yours, &c.
G. C.

[This letter refers to the business of providing Stratford Canning with instructions for his Embassy to Petersburg in succession to Sir C. Bagot (as already mentioned), also to the ceremonial necessary for the reception of M. de Polignac as the new Ambassador from the Court of France.

Lord Granville had evidently been expecting a great advancement of confidential information on entering on the duties of the Paris Embassy; but Canning explains he has no instructions to give. The French forces are gradually withdrawing from Spain, so nothing need be said on that head; while on the Turko-Greek Question, the French having refrained from any communication to the British Government, the latter were in turn to abstain from offering any observations thereon.

The conduct of the French Government suggests to Canning the idea that they were 'playing false,' by which expression, perhaps, it may be understood that Canning believed that France, while simulating a desire to co-operate with the other Powers to pacify matters between Greece and Turkey, really guided by a selfish policy, was playing a game for her own aggrandisement in the East in disregard of the various motives of action represented by Russia, Turkey, Greece, or Britain. What this game was, appears later on.]

1824 MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Ickworth: November 13, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—Your letter of Thursday arrived in town, probably about the time that I was setting out yesterday morning for this place, and has followed me hither.

I have returned here for the express purpose of having a few days of quiet to think and to write, which, in the hourly interruptions of Downing Street, or even of G. L., it is very difficult to find any opportunity of doing *ensuite.*

The objects of my meditations and of my intended execution are precisely those which are treated in your Minutes, for which I am infinitely obliged, and in which for the most part I entirely agree.

I send you to-day the most satisfactory report, both in matter and manner, that we have yet had of Columbia. Everything there depends on Bolivar's success, and I incline to think it may be so stated.

I propose sending a messenger to Madrid in the course of the week, as there have been several matters which have been hung up for want of an official channel of correspondence.

At length I have made Bosanquet Secretary of Legation, and through him I must now address myself to M. Zea.

The draft shall be sent to you as soon as prepared.

The most perplexing business of all is that between Portugal and Brazil; and A'Court's despatches of yesterday, which you will receive with this, if not before, do not diminish the embarrassment.

Palmella's circular to the Allies is inexcusable. I mean to stay here till Friday next, the 19th.

The King is to be in town the following day for the Recorder's report, for which alone I should not be in

a hurry to go up; but he will wish to receive in the same day certain presentations and leave-takings, which have been accumulating for the last six weeks; and therefore I must attend his Majesty that day. 1824

After that I am at your orders. I will either come to you at Walmer on Sunday, Monday, or Tuesday (the 21st, 22nd, or 23rd), or I will be at Combe on the 29th, as you propose. Decide between this time and the end of next week which you shall like best.

Bristol is well, and we are leading a very quiet and comfortable life here. Except, indeed, that Lady B. is, as usual, much of an invalid, and more so, naturally, since her return from visiting her brother. I hope the summer and seaside have set you up entirely for the winter.

Ever yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—I send you an amended copy of my letter to Count Lieven; in which you will see that I have considerably abated the expression of my hopes of the Greek acceptance.

G. C.

[Canning reports himself to have retired to Ickworth to secure time for reflection on the state of affairs.

The satisfactory report as to the rebel Spanish colony of Columbia refers to the strengthening of the independent attitude of the Colony, owing to the success of General Bolivar's military operations.

The question of the recognition of the independence of the Spanish colonies now daily occupied Canning's mind. The British Vice-Consul at Buenos-Ayres had already (in July) been authorised to negotiate a commercial treaty with the *de facto* Government of the place.

The period to which the occupation of Spain by French troops was limited by treaty was nearly expired, and the occupation still promised to continue without any defined time for its cessation.

There were, moreover, rumours that by an alteration in the

1824 distribution of the French army, in the way of concentrating the main bodies on the fortresses of Cadiz and on the north of the Ebro, the character of the occupation would be changed: instead of presenting the appearance of a police force spread over the country in aid of the legal Government, it would bring into relief a marked antagonism of French and Spanish interests, and a no-less-marked superiority of French power and prestige in relation to her weaker neighbour.

It must be borne in mind that in the May previous to the present date Don Miguel's temporary revolution had taken place in Lisbon and had been eventually foiled; that since then, beginning in July, conferences had been held in London, under Canning's immediate supervision, to negotiate terms of accommodation between Portugal and Brazil; that the former insisted on retaining 'sovereignty,' while the latter would be content with nothing short of 'indepen-' dence.' But neither party would propose terms of accommodation; so on the third meeting Canning propounded his *projet* of reconciliation, embracing the independence of Brazil, and also a scheme for retaining the separate sovereignties of Portugal and Brazil in the hands of several members of the House of Braganza. In other respects it amounted to an ordinary treaty of good friendship. This *projet* was accepted by the Brazilian Government as their own.

Canning's *projet* was rejected by the Portuguese Government under the guidance of M. de Subserra at the beginning of September 1824.

About this date, however, intelligence reached Lisbon of the holding of conferences at Paris of representatives of members of the Holy Alliance at which protocols had been agreed upon to signify the disapproval felt by the great Powers of the expressions contained in a proclamation recently issued by the King of Portugal promising to convoke the Cortes, the ancient legislature of the country, and also to recommend a continuance of hostilities between Portugal and Brazil rather than that the independence of the latter should be acknowledged. Under the guidance of Palmella, the Portuguese Government protested against the protocols in a memorandum addressed to their agents at the Courts from which the protocols emanated.

But by the advice of Subserra, the partisan of Gallican influence at Lisbon, a *contre projet* was prepared on the lines suggested by the Holy Alliance, and entirely antagonistic to Canning's *projet*, containing, among other wild articles, a proposition that the King of Portugal should become senior Emperor of Brazil—a proposal at once absurd and inadmissible.

Canning, to preserve a continuance of the mild atmosphere of

negotiation, dissuaded the Brazilian representatives from immediate rejection of the *contre projet*, and persuaded them to take it at first into consideration, and as matter for reference to their Government. 1824

It was at this point that Canning discovered that the Portuguese Government, acting, as before, under the direction of M. de Subserra, and guided by French influence, had forwarded the *contre projet* to the representatives at Lisbon of France, Spain, Russia, and Prussia, accompanied with a memorandum appealing to Europe, as it were, on the subject of Brazil, and containing a fuller exposition of Portuguese policy than had been vouchsafed to the London conferences. On this Canning instantly broke off the London conferences.

To this circular, no doubt, Canning refers in the letter of November 13, 1824, as 'inexcusable.'

The rest of the letter recalls various regal duties of the time; the King having to come up to London for the Recorder's report, when all the capital cases tried in London came before him, and having to receive certain presentations which his Foreign Minister had to make to him.

There is an allusion to the health of Lady Bristol, who, it may be mentioned, was a Miss Upton, daughter of the first Lord Templeton.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Ickworth: November 13, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I send for your perusal a letter which I received to-day from Sir W. A'Court.

You will not fail to remember that I have under the Prince de Polignac's own hand the assurance that M. de Neuville *did* summon the garrison of Badajoz into Portugal, and that he was reprimanded by his Court.

Subsequently we were informed that M. de Neuville was recalled.

The assurance respecting the garrison of Badajoz has since been denied; and it now appears that M. de Neuville is to remain at Lisbon, or at least to return there, which is the same thing.

And all this is through Russian influence; and ostentatiously avowed to be so by Pozzo at Paris.

I cannot but think that the time is fast approaching

1824 when we must take quite another tone with Russia from that which we have been holding. But of this by-and-by.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

Pray return A'Court's letter.

[Canning encloses for perusal a letter from Sir W. A'Court, British Ambassador at Lisbon.

After the revolutionary disturbance originated by Don Miguel, the Portuguese Government applied for the aid of a force of English troops to preserve order. This was refused. M. de Subserra then, through the medium of M. de Neuville, French Minister at Lisbon, summoned aid from the French garrison at Badajoz, to which summons the French military authorities paid no attention. On this Subserra again turned to England and begged for the help of an auxiliary force. This would have been again refused if it had not been for the call made on the garrison of Badajoz, which, though apparently disregarded, suggested possibilities of serious complication. To avoid, therefore, further appeals to the French military power, which, after all, might in the end be complied with, and thereby bring a French army face to face with the English naval force in the Tagus, the British Government listened to the second appeal, and, the employment of British troops at the moment being inconvenient, the Ministry devised the plan of sending a contingent of Hanoverian troops to Portugal for the service in question.

The French, however, learning how far this had gone, and in turn anxious to prevent the advent of a British force into Portugal, disclaimed any idea of pushing themselves forward, and offered positive assurance, verbal and written, that under no circumstances should French troops enter Portugal; which satisfied the British Government, and the scheme of a Hanoverian expeditionary force was abandoned.

But Canning recognised Russian influence in French policy.

Canning sums up the effect on his mind of Sir W. A'Court's despatch.

It appears the English Government held indisputable evidence that the French Minister at Lisbon, M. Hyde de Neuville, did (in behalf of the Portuguese Government) summon the French garrison of Badajoz into Portugal, for which excess of authority the French Government took credit that he was to be reprimanded and recalled.

All this was now reversed; the French Government denied the

fact of De Neuville's call on the garrison of Badajoz and suffered De Neuville to remain at Lisbon. 1824

The Russian Ambassador at Paris boasted that Russian influence had effected this change of front.

The attitude of the French and the boasting of the Russians led Canning to anticipate the necessity of taking 'another tone' with Russia before long.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Ickworth: November 16, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I send for your consideration a draft of my proposed answer to the letter from the Provisional Government of Greece.

I think there is great advantage in treating the matter in this way.

1. The letter itself is a record of our policy in the struggle.

2. The communication of it to the Porte will for ever silence all cavil there.

3. The communication of it to Russia will be at once a proof of the fairness with which we deal with her, and an indication of our determination not to be hooked into another congress at Verona—a congress, I mean, in which we should protest against the employment of force, but leave others at liberty to employ it if they like.

4. It is a rallying-point for both Greek and Turk.

5. It hangs up the question of intervention till then. Pray consider the draft with reference to all these points, and return it to me with your observations.

I shall meet it on its return and on mine on Friday evening.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Canning sends to the Prime Minister a draft despatch in answer to the Greek application for effective assistance.

1824 — In the course of the summer Russia had opened a conference at St. Petersburg on Greek affairs. Sir Charles Bagot held instructions not to join in it unless Russia first restored full diplomatic relations with Turkey, and Turkey evacuated the Principalities on somewhat inadequate grounds. Sir Charles Bagot believed the conditions fulfilled, and joined the Conference. To the Conference Russia propounded a scheme of pacification which, becoming public, elicited protests from both Turkey and Greece.

Greece appended to her protest an appeal to Great Britain for aid.

Canning's problem required for its solution a refusal to Greece not too discouraging, and yet which should define the just position of Great Britain in the matter, for the information of Russia, Austria, France, and Turkey.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Ickworth: November 16, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I received the enclosed to-day.

If the despatch which the D. of W. mentions having seen at Windsor be one addressed to me by a British public agent, I may, and I will, have a communication with Messrs. Herring upon the subject of it. But if it be secret information (as I rather think), I really do not see how I can do anything in the matter.

As to Cuba, we surely offered everything in our power when we offered the guarantee that Spain refused.

The only step that we could ever take would be to acknowledge the States of Mexico and Columbia, making an abstinence from invasion of Cuba a condition of that acknowledgment, and telling Spain that we have done so. Perhaps this might reconcile all opinions among us.

I cannot imagine that it is thought possible that, Spain continuing obstinately to refuse all accommodation, we should interfere with a strong hand to defeat the Mexican and Columbian armaments against Cuba.

We shall have a much nicer question some of these days as to the Tagus. 1824

Ever sincerely yours,

G. C.

[The first paragraph relates to a 'despatch' which the Duke of Wellington reported that he had seen at Windsor.

In the Wellington Correspondence, new series, there is published a letter from the Duke to Canning, dated November 14, 1824, dealing with the subject of Cuba menaced by the revolted colonies Columbia and Mexico.

The Duke adds:

'In a despatch which I saw at Windsor on Friday, I observe 'that Messrs. Barclay and Herring have engaged to supply the 'Mexican Government with two frigates. This is, I believe, directly 'contrary to the Foreign Enlistment Act. We might at least prevent 'this house from performing its engagement.'

The Duke recommends that the States menacing Cuba should be cautioned.

Canning evidently had not seen the despatch, but he is prepared to be extremely indignant if the document should turn out to be really a despatch actually addressed to the Foreign Office by a British public agent, and irregularly intercepted and detained at Windsor by the King. On the other hand, he rather anticipates that the document is only secret information collected by the King's private agents, with which Canning could have nothing to do.

The guarantee offered to Spain was a guarantee of Cuba to Spain by Great Britain, on the condition that Spain acknowledged the independence of her revolted colonies; this, at the instigation of Russia, she had refused (see 'Political Life,' vol. 3, p. 142).

But Spain, it appears, entertained apprehensions as to attacks being made on Cuba by the United States and by France, notwithstanding that both these Powers repudiated the idea of any such design; while she ignored the serious danger to her Cuban possession which arose from the proximity of the island to the independent but unrecognised colonies against whom Spain kept open a persistent but ineffective state of hostilities.

Canning suggests that the only way Great Britain could act to sustain the Spanish possession of Cuba would to be make abstinence from invasion of the island a condition with the revolted colonies of the acknowledgment of their independence; but he cannot see, if Spain repels every offer, how Great Britain can be expected to take the trouble of staving off by force the aggressive movements of the Spanish colonies.]

1824 MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Ickworth: November 13, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—Upon the whole I believe it will be better to give up all notion of Walmer, and look to Combe for our conferences, for which, however, we must allow ample time.

I learn from Planta that the Council is certainly to take place on Saturday, though the accounts which I hear of the King's health would lead me to doubt it.

If I get a reprieve to-morrow morning I shall prolong my stay here for a couple of days; if not, I shall be in town to-morrow evening.

You have answered St. [Stuart] as I supposed you would. The pretension was monstrous, and the bad faith of meaning Calcutta, when he knew just as well as we that the vacancy was at Madras, is of a piece with other trickeries he is practising. If the K. lends himself to any of these trickeries, and I know it, I will speak in very plain language to his Majesty, for a king should act like a gentleman.

I will talk to you about S.'s. future destination when we meet, but I will not give him the slightest encouragement to believe that I have any prospect in contemplation for him; nor have I, indeed, unless you can help me in a moderate way at home.

What Planta has heard from him about Cadiz *donne à penser*. Can this be allowed?

Ever yours,

G. C.

[The first part only relates to the movements of the Ministers. (See previous letter to Lord Liverpool of October 27.)

Next comes an expression of indignation that Sir Charles Stuart, on his removal from the British Embassy at Paris, should have feigned that he expected the Governor-Generalship of India instead of the Governorship of Madras, which, he must have known, was the only appointment really open to him.

Canning anticipated some insincerities on the part of the King in the matter, but he meant to be firm with his Majesty.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F.O.: November 20, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—From something that Wynn said to me to-day, I cannot help fearing that he is inclined to give way to a certain extent to Sir C. Stuart as to the eventual succession. 1824

He says that he has not given him hopes of being Governor-General, but only of succeeding to any unexpected vacancy in that office *ad interim*.

This, begging his pardon, is mere drivelling. If Stuart goes out with this expectation, mark my words, there will, in less than six months, be a regular set at Amherst, with a view of forcing his resignation, and as regular an attack upon the Government by all Stuart's friends and connections, to obtain a promise that he shall not be removed if he happens to succeed.

There is no safety but in obliging him to take Madras as Madras, or to leave it, without any stipulation or understanding of any kind whatever. But I am not sure if Wynn has not already gone so far as to give Stuart 'a case.' He, W., is verily the worst man of business that I ever met with. How were you led to believe otherwise of him?

I saw Stuart at Carlton House this morning, but not to have any talk with him. Indeed I have nothing to say to him. But Wynn tells me that he puts off his answer till he, S., has seen me. I have appointed him for Monday. He of course wishes to pump me. Now I will tell you exactly what I meant in my last letter about him from Ickworth. Lord Strangford, I have reason to know, would prefer returning to Constantinople to going to St. Petersburg.

I have no wish to appoint Stratford to St. Petersburg, and he does not know of Lord Strangford's predilection. But it is not likely that it will be long a

1824 secret to him, and as he will be at St. Petersburg, and as his immediate predecessor went from America thither, it will be very hard if Lord S. persists in his choice to recall Stratford and make another appointment.

But Stratford's passion (a very foolish one, in my opinion) is Home Office. He would for that give up Embassy, pension, everything.

He would be invaluable as Vice-President of the Board of Trade, but I think that in his way to that (if that were not to be vacated) I could satisfy him with a seat at the India Board. (Have you not had thoughts of moving Fremantle to the Treasury?) If you would make such an arrangement for Stratford, I could appoint Stuart to St. Petersburg six months hence. When S.'s special mission would be over would be quite time enough, and I dare say S. would like St. Petersburg at a twelvemonth hence better than Madras immediately, and I think it would be better for the Government that he should have Petersburg than Madras and Calcutta.

But I am sure you will see how impossible it would be for me to take it from Stratford to give to Stuart without compensation.

Ever sincerely yours,

G. C.

[It seems that Mr. Charles Wynn, President of the Board of Control, had been doing something or other which had all but committed the Government to Sir Charles Stuart's claim to the reversion at any rate of the Governor-Generalship of India, and this had greatly tried Canning.

Canning points out that if Sir Charles Stuart went to Madras with a latent hope of Calcutta, a dead set would at once be made against Lord Amherst, the Governor-General, with a view to drive him out and create a vacancy for Stuart.

In continuation of a *revirement* of the great diplomatic offices,

Canning propounds a scheme for sending Lord Strangford to Constantinople and Stuart to Petersburg in about a twelvemonth, if Lord Liverpool would provide Stratford Canning with some secondary office in London.] 1824

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

G. L.: November 21, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I have adopted, as you see, all your suggestions except one—that of omitting the topic of a religious war.

I confess I think it of the greatest importance (considering this is a paper which will see the light) to bring that topic to people's minds, for it is upon that the saints are running wild, and giving their aid to the political fanatics in behalf of Greece.

It is important in another point of view, as distinguishing the degree of interest which we have in the Greek cause from that of Russia, who in all her papers puts forth the character of '*co-religionnaires*,' as that which entitles the Greeks to her active interposition.

That Russia means force I have little doubt, but she has cautiously avoided saying so; and therefore we, in disclaiming motives to force, need not appear to be conscious of running against any of her doctrines or intentions. I have no objection to keep this paper for the first Cabinet.

But I fear we can never again put off our meetings so long, for the accumulation of questions, and vital ones, is tremendous.

I send you a copy of Granville's despatch of to-day, from which I augur evil. The talk of Charles X. is in the foolishest and most frantic strain of Chateaubriand. The praise of the Emperor of Russia, too, is at least in ill taste, at a moment when Charles X. must know

1824 that we know, or must suspect at least that we suspect, that Pozzo is the bitterest enemy of England, and what is said of Greece is next to an avowal of a design of armed interposition.

The change in Granville's reception is, I think, almost an affront. Surely they must have known all that belonged to the etiquette as well when they told him that he was to have his public entry, as when Mons. Lalive wrote him word that he was not.

You will see by his private letter that the ambiguous state in which he is left is not agreeable, nor without consequence.

I am strongly inclined to bring him over here on leave till the *grand deuil* is over.

It might not be amiss that he were here when we are discussing about Spain, &c.

Polignac goes to Paris next week. Let me know what you think of this, so that I may write on Tuesday.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[The draft despatch discussed in the first paragraphs of this letter is certainly the same as that referred to in the letter to Lord Liverpool of November 16, already analysed.

He defends the mention of a 'religious' war in respect of the war between Greece and Turkey; justifying his view by quoting the Russian example, who always referred to the Greeks as '*co-religionnaires*,' and also urging the expediency of recognising an aspect of the question which the 'saints' in England were co-operating with political fanatics to bring into public observation.

He then discusses the unfriendly attitude of the French Government as manifested in their treatment of Lord Granville in the matter of the ceremonial of his reception as British Ambassador at the Court of France.

He contemplated withdrawing Lord Granville from Paris for a while, on the pretext of a short leave of absence, until the occasion contrived by the French Government for this semi-affront had passed away.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Gloucester Lodge: November 23, 1824.

My dear Granville,—My rheumatism has called a little gout to its aid; and I am between both uncomfortably unwell, without, however, being under the operation of a serious fit, or, according to Dr. Holland's belief, in danger of one. 1824

I have no despatches to write to you, luckily for myself, to-day; and you need not apprehend, after such a description of my state, as unmerciful a private letter as that from Ickworth.

Nothing could be less satisfactory than your first despatch. In the first place, the treatment of you seems to have been saucy. If it be true that they could not give you a grand reception until the termination of the *grand deuil*, at least they might have ascertained that fact; or rather, they must have known it when they excited the expectation, which they afterwards disappointed.

Secondly, the conversation of Charles X. is absolute fatuity. It augurs very ill, I fear, for the possibility of any reasonable good understanding between the two countries.

I do not blame you for not having entered into a more enlarged controversy with H.M.C.M. But I regret an omission in what you report yourself to have said so much that I have ventured to supply it. You contrasted, you say, Charles X.'s doctrines, and his evident allusion to the mode in which they had been acted upon in Spain, with the resistance of England to the 'doctrines of revolutionised France.' Now, if you stopped there you gave up the argument. You admitted the principle, and differed only as to degree. But I have added to the word 'doctrines' in the above sentence 'and arms,' which I earnestly recommend to

1824 you to insert in the copy of your despatch which you consign to the archives of the Embassy. Read or recollect the debates of 1793, 1794, &c., and you will find that it was against the doctrines and principles of the French Revolution, when manifested by overt acts, that England went to war. The other admission would give *gagne de cause* to the Ultras.

There is another mistake, but I dare say only of transcription, in your despatch where the policy of the Emperor of Russia is termed 'specific,' which I have altered, *meo periculo*, to 'pacific.' It would be worth your while to make it an invariable rule to read over your despatches before you sign them. Some blunders in writing cure themselves by their obviousness; but that is not the case with the one in question; for the sense might be satisfied by the word 'specific' if applied to the Emperor of Russia's 'policy' respecting Greece. I think, however, that it is meant more generally; for if you had intended the more peculiar sense you would assuredly have gone into more explanation.

Enough, however, of criticism.

Now, as to your position at Paris. It is, as you say, awkward enough, while you are in the ambiguous state which you describe.

It has occurred to me that it might perhaps be a relief to you, and possibly that it might be of some public advantage, if you were to ask leave to come over for a short time during the continuance of your chrysalis character. Polignac is going for a fortnight to Paris. I am not sure that you might not pass the time usefully here, besides being well out of the way there. I, however, merely throw out this notion for your consideration. If at all, the time for being here would be the first fortnight of December. The *grand deuil*, I think, ends about the 18th of that month; and about

the same period, if at all, I should wish to take advantage of the breaking up of the Cabinet to go into the country. 1824

One objection to the plan is that Stuart's friends would say that he might as well have been left in possession till the end of the year.

Another is, that you have not a strong Sec. of Embassy to leave behind you. If you should come, take care to indoctrinate him well not to ask questions without being instructed to do so. 'Ask no questions and you will hear no lies' is true in Paris above all other places; but there is a peculiar inconvenience in soliciting as matter of information that which, when the knowledge of it is forced upon us, we may have to observe upon in another tone than that of mere curiosity. It is useless to send instructions to inquire until I can at the same time instruct you what to reply, if the answer should be so or so; and for the power to do that I must wait the discussions of the Cabinet.

Finally, if you think that there will be any advantage in coming over, you must ask leave to do so in such a letter as I can submit to the King. But observe, I really mean to give you the substantive voice in the decision. You will judge much better than I can of the effect of such a *démarche* at Paris. I should not be sorry if it was ascribed in some degree to *tant soit peu* of dissatisfaction at the little *empressement* shown in your reception, provided I am right in surmising, that there was *tant soit peu* of sauciness in the levity with which that matter was conducted.

Ever sincerely and affectionately yours,

G. C.

[This letter begins by an account of Canning's own state of health.

It then proceeds to comment on the incivility of the French

1824 Court, which, it appears, had at first held out to Lord Granville the expectation of a 'grand reception' being immediately granted to him in honour of his arrival in the character of British Ambassador to the King of France; and, afterwards, under pretence that such a ceremonial could not be held during the mourning for the late King Louis XVIII., had indefinitely postponed it. As Canning argues, the French Court could not have been ignorant of the proper etiquette on the occasion when they first contemplated an early ceremonial, and the pretext for delay in the 'grand mourning' must have been an afterthought, to give a colour to their desire to show a want of formal respect to the British Ambassador.

Points out an omission on the part of Lord Granville in his state ment of the British view in an argument with the King of France, on the subject of armed interference to prevent the spread of dangerous political doctrine; which omission would be corrected by the insertion of the words 'and arms' in the line 'resistance of England to the doctrines of revolutionised France'; this should run 'resistance of England to the doctrines and arms of revolutionised France.'

In historical fact, England only went to war when the revolutionary doctrines became manifest in overt acts of hostility.

This alteration Canning made in Lord Granville's despatch received at the Foreign Office, and he desired it should be made in the copy kept at the Embassy.

The distinction was vital. If England waged war against revolutionary France, without active provocation, to oppose her doctrine, monarchical France could not be blamed by England for the forcible suppression of the Spanish Constitution; but if England justified her war with revolutionary France simply on the ordinary ground of overt acts of hostility, as far as that passage in history weighed in the matter, England could sit in judgment on the recent conduct of France in attacking Spain on no other grounds but objection to Spanish private and domestic arrangements, which happened not to obtain the approval of France.

Canning proposes to correct another word in Lord Granville's despatch, substituting 'pacific' for 'specific,' as the term descriptive of Russian policy in respect of Greece.

Canning now discusses the notion of Lord Granville's taking a fortnight's leave of absence to London, pending the time during which, not having been formally received by the French Court, his ambassadorial character was in temporary abeyance. He sees one or two objections: Sir Charles Stuart's friends might ask why, if Lord Granville could come away for a fortnight at this time, Sir Charles was not allowed to finish the year at Paris. Again, the secretary of

the Embassy who would be left in charge was not a strong man; 1824
though he might be instructed, as his main duty, to abstain from asking questions.

Canning anticipated that if once the game of questions and answers was started the French might give out some information or other, which might force special notice from the British Government.

But the whole matter is left entirely in Lord Granville's hands.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

G. L.: Nov. 25, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I send you my promised memorandum on the intended occupation of the Spanish fortresses by France.

Villèle's question to Granville satisfies me that Stuart's information was correct.

Ever yours sincerely,

G. C.

[Canning, convinced of the intention of France to occupy certain Spanish fortresses, sends a memorandum on the subject.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

G. L.: Nov. 26, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I had only just sent off my little note of this morning, with its enclosure, when my Dæmon (whom, partly from my absence from town, and partly from illness, and, I believe, confinement of another sort on his, I had not seen since September), called upon me. I did not see him to-day; he left the enclosed.

Observe what is said about our situation with respect to Spain—how singularly it tallies with what I wrote half an hour ago.

Ever sincerely yours,

G. C.

[As he refers to a 'short' note and enclosure despatched the same morning, it looks as if either this or the last above-quoted

1824 letter bore the wrong date, and that they both should bear the same—either November 25 or 26.

He says his 'Dæmon' had called and left a paper, the contents of which tally with Canning's views just sent to Lord Liverpool with respect to Spain.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

G. L.: Nov. 27, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—This is the last Spanish matter with which I will trouble you. But it is material that you should see that any leniency on our part towards Spain is out of the question, for that Spain is disposed to vex us with demands altogether intolerable.

The enclosed claim for losses in 1804 (the convention being expressly limited to 1808) is preparatory, no doubt, to the Spanish frigates.

And we have already had an intimation of set-offs to be claimed in losses endured by Spanish subjects, from the encampment and waste of our army in the Peninsular war. With such a nation what can reason do?

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—Return these papers to Planta, and do not take the trouble to answer this note.

G. C.

[Canning sends papers relating to claims on Spain for compensation for past injuries done to British commerce.

He means to insist on redress.

But Spain, far from yielding the matter, protracted the controversy, and actually went so far as to put in counter-claims as a 'set-off' against the alleged damage to British interests; amongst others, claims for losses by Spanish subjects by the encampment and waste of the British army during the Peninsular war.

About this time, it appears from the Wellington Correspondence, Canning had prepared and was bringing before his colleagues (i.) a memorandum as to a recognition of Spanish American Colonies;

(ii.) a draft confidential despatch to Sir H. Wellesley, at Vienna, on the Greek question; (iii.) a memorandum of reply to be returned to the Greek appeal for British protection. 1824

The despatch to Sir H. Wellesley aimed at distinguishing between the forcible intervention, which Canning was prepared to co-operate with Russia in effecting, with a view to terminate the war between Turkey and Greece, and the species of intervention which Metternich delighted in inducing the Holy Alliance to undertake in the domestic affairs of other nations.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: Dec. 8, 1824.

My dear Granville,—I send this messenger for the purpose of putting you in possession of the enclosed despatch before Polignac's arrival in Paris.

He sets out to-morrow. I intended to have deferred the communication of the despatch, (the original of which is not yet in the hands of the person to whom it is addressed,) until I could send it officially as a copy of a complete instrument, with all its enclosures—thirty-four (they tell me) in number.

But Polignac having called upon me to-day, and put some questions to me respecting our position in the Greek affair (which, seeing that he had been imbibing incorrect notions from Lieven, I could not avoid answering,) I feel that it would be very awkward for you that he should be at Paris, knowing more on that subject than you did.

When you have read this despatch you will know a great deal more than he. I do not mean that you should seek to impart any confidence to Villèle (to Damas confidence is out of the question), but that you should be enabled to counteract any erroneous impressions of Polignac; and that if you are reserved you should appear to be so *avec connaissance de cause.*

You will understand that till you receive this de-

1824 spatch officially, you are not to acknowledge it, nor to place it in the Archives.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—Villèle will very probably ask you why Stratford did not take Paris in his way. The real reasons are, that I did not choose to have it suspected that he had any communication upon the Greek question with the French Government who, upon that question or any other, have never yet made any confidence to us. Secondly (and this you may tell Villèle, if you will), that I would not expose Stratford to the awkwardness of seeing Pozzo, with whom he has been in habits of intimacy, and telling him nothing of his errand.

G. C.

[In order to prepare Lord Granville with information in excess of what Polignac (French Ambassador in London) would take over to Paris, a copy of a despatch, not yet sent to the person to whom it is to be addressed, is communicated to Lord Granville, on the subject of the Greek question. Most probably this despatch is the one drafted, as above mentioned, to Sir H. Wellesley on that question.

Canning explains why Stratford Canning is not allowed to take Paris on his way out.

One reason is his friendship with M. Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Ambassador at Paris.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O.: Dec. 11, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I return your paper. I have not changed the order of the topics, nor added any new one. The object of my scratchings and interpolations is chiefly to make the course of argument more clear by dividing into heads—of which there is one more than Hydra had.

The K. has returned my box with Granville's despatch and private letter without a comment. 1824

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I have always forgotten to report to you Dudley's answer. He will.

G. C.

[Returns to Lord Liverpool some long argumentative paper which Canning had corrected and rearranged—probably the paper on the recognition of the Spanish Colonies referred to in the next letter.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

G. L.: Dec. 14, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—Your paper is very greatly improved by this alteration and addition.

I am recasting mine. But while the senior member of the Cabinet—I should say the senior Cabinet Minister—the Doyen de Ministres, the Sôt Privé (as the French take the liberty of calling him)—continues to agree in measures and to differ in words, and to labour to bring down the statement of measures to his own standard—that is, to the standard of his own language at Crockford's and White's—I despair of getting anything through to which I shall like to put my name.

The D. of W. is fair, open, and intelligible. The Ld. Ch. goes the way that he does go with us, manfully and clearly. But Ld. W.'s whole policy is to attempt to get back in criticism, what he has not courage to refuse giving up in principle.

The attempt to separate the question of France from that of Spanish America, after all that has taken place, is dishonest.

Ever yours,

G. C.

[This letter relates to the memoranda under consideration of the

1824 Cabinet—one by Lord Liverpool, and one by Canning—on the question of the recognition of the Spanish Colonies.

He complains of the difficulty of getting any paper settled while exposed to the peculiar criticism of the Earl of Westmoreland (Privy Seal), whom the French call 'Le Sôt Privé' ('Le Sceau Privé').

Lord Liverpool's memorandum is published in his 'Life and 'Letters'; Canning's of December 14, 1824, in Stapleton's 'George 'Canning and his Times,' p. 407.

From these memoranda—of which Lord Liverpool's is most historical, and Canning's is most explicit—on the instant political urgency of the measure of recognition of the independence of the Spanish Colonies, it will be found that a continuance of the French occupation of Spain without any fixed date for an evacuation was one of the most effectual arguments adduced in its support.

Canning's letter to Lord Granville ('Canning and his Times,' p. 411) gives an amusing summary of the struggle on his part.

The opposition offered by the King and the Duke of Wellington may be found in the 'Wellington Correspondence' of that date.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: Dec. 20, 1824.

My dear Granville,—My other letters, as you perceive, were written on Friday, with the intention of despatching a messenger to you that day or Saturday.

The King's answer to our minute arrived after those letters were written, and it became necessary to wait till after we had seen his Majesty on Saturday before I could say positively that the thing is done.

It is done, however. The King consents though he does not concur, and I am now proceeding forthwith to carry the decision into execution. I shall do this as quietly as may be; and when the instructions are actually sent off to Mexico and to Columbia, but not till then, I shall make a communication to the allied Courts, France included. Till you receive that communication say nothing, and answer no questions.

The delay has enabled me to acknowledge your despatches and private letters of Thursday.

The despatch about Spain is less satisfactory than the former. Everything is put upon 'personal wishes,' and nothing upon the intentions of the French Government. 1824

But, further, the concluding sentence of your despatch is not by any means clear in its meaning. You say that M. de V. 'intimated a hope that in two or three months the French Government might begin to withdraw a part of their army.'

Now recollect how our information stands: M. de V. and M. Damas both told you that it was intended immediately to withdraw those 16,000. If so, there is a direct change of counsel again; which, if there be, your report ought to have distinctly stated. It would be, in fact, tantamount to saying, 'We mean to keep all our army in Spain for the present.' Or did he mean, that, putting the 16,000 men out of the question, as in effect already withdrawn, he hoped in three months to begin withdrawing the remainder? Nothing can be more essentially different than these two versions; but your statement does not indicate which of the two it was intended to convey. Pray set this right in a despatch. State also in a despatch that which you added in your private political letter, as omitted in your first despatch upon the subject of the army.

The delay of course abrogates the directions in my letter of Friday to see M. V. before the opening of the Chambers. I suspect, from what you report in your despatch, that they mean very much to shirk the question of Spain in the speech. You will, of course, take care that we have a copy of it without delay.

In executing the instructions of my despatch of to-day, you will be as amicable as you describe M. de V. to be. I do not wish to push the matter to a point. Quite otherwise. Just protest enough to leave us at

1824 liberty to recur to the question when we please, and to induce the French to keep a guard over their own language as well as conduct.

Flatter M. de V. from me when you have occasion, and make out *rapports* between us, saying how I consider him as a real French Minister, as I am myself desirous of being a real English one. If you get upon sufficiently familiar terms with him to add, that Pozzo's intrigues against him are not more pertinacious than those of the Ultras of the Alliance against me, and that I desire Pozzo no better success at Paris than his *pendants* have had here, you may do so. With these *rapports*, we must have some sympathy, and make some allowances for each other, and help each other as well as we can.

But I suspect he is a rogue, after all. Adieu!

Ever sincerely yours,

G. C.

[Canning is here rejoicing in the success of his endeavours: the King has consented to the Recognition, while expressing the dissent of his own judgment; and Canning contemplates taking quiet measures to carry out the decision of the Government.

In the meanwhile he begs Lord Granville to say nothing about it to anyone.

He then discusses the statements reported by Lord Granville to have been made by the French Ministers (Villèle and Damas), on the point of the withdrawal of the French army from Spain.

He desires Lord Granville to make his report in the shape of official despatches, evidently that the King may see them and become aware of the correctness of the arguments for the Recognition by proof, which could be derived from the untrustworthy conduct of the French Government.

His private instructions to Lord Granville are amusing.

Sufficient grievance should be made of the proceedings of the French Government to warn them to keep guard over their speech and actions; but Lord Granville is to be friendly in demeanour towards them. Lord Granville is also to try and extract some symptoms of sympathy from M. de Villèle towards Canning in

respect of the removal of both being made the object of the intrigues of the Ultra or Absolutist parties; particularly of M. Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Ambassador, whose machinations in Paris resembled those of Prince Lieven in London.] 1824

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O.: Dec. 27, 1824.

My dear Liverpool,—I send you a private letter of A'Court's.

How came Subserra to know that he was so great a favourite with Lord Westmoreland? He is so; but how came he to know it?

Ever sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I add a letter from Granville just received.

What Mrs. C. tells me of De C. is as follows.

'De C. paid me a long visit yesterday and talked politics at a great rate. He is very anti-Russian, and very Greek. The not assisting the Greeks is the only point in which he does not agree with your policy. He says that he sees the Dauphin very frequently, and talks to him freely on all subjects.'

[Encloses a letter from A'Court at Lisbon.

Expresses a wish to know how Subserra, the Portuguese Minister, comes to be aware of the esteem in which Lord Westmoreland holds him. Evidently hinting at intriguing correspondence between the two.

Encloses a letter from Lord Granville.

Quotes a report from Mrs. Canning at Paris of what 'De C.' thought of Canning's policy: 'De C.' is anti-Russian, and approves of Canning's policy, except of his refusal to help the Greeks; he sees the Dauphin constantly. 'De C.' is probably 'De Chateaubriand.']

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: Dec. 31, 1824.

My dear Granville,—I confess I find in your last private letters but an inadequate return for the volumi-

1824 nous 'expedition' (to use an Austrian Chancery phrase), which I sent to you by the messenger of the 20th.

The perpetual recurrence of dinner is exceedingly distressing. But did it never enter your mind that you might evade the force of that not unexpected impediment, by beginning to write at a time of day when it does not usually present itself? Try that device.

Do not persecute the French any more about Spain. Tell them that their assurances are accepted and believed.

As to Polignac's sly revenge which he proposes to take immediately upon his return, by questioning me about Spanish America, he will find that I have anticipated him with his Government, and, still more to his disappointment, he will not find me in London.

If you can gain a day in making the Spanish-American communication to the French Ministers, without appearing to shirk them, do—in order to give so much time to the messenger who sets off for Madrid.

I shall make the communication to-morrow to Lieven, Malzah, and Esterhazy.

With Damas I suppose you must be very serious. But to Villèle you may venture to say that I know that we have done the very thing which he most wished, and that he will immediately set about abusing us to the Allies, and trying to get their consent to his following of our example.

Ever yours, G. C.

[Jokes Lord Granville about his short despatches and his excuse of dinner.

Instructs him how to treat the French Ministers; and in particular to be very serious with M. de Damas, the Foreign Affairs Minister, and to chaff M. de Villèle, the Prime Minister, about his abusing Great Britain for the Recognition Policy, and at the same time immediately setting about to get the consent of the Allies for France to do the same thing.]

## COMMUNICATIONS FROM PRIVATE PERSONS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS, RECEIVED BY MR. CANNING DURING THE YEAR 1824.

### MR. LEWIS GOLDSMITH (JAN. 9, 1824).

[Mr. Goldsmith's memorandum is too long for printing in the present work; but it is mentioned because it contains a curious suggestion for a proposed revival of a Crusading Order of Knighthood of 'Jerusalem and Malta,' for the purpose of waging war against the Turkish Empire, and of affording effectual assistance to the cause of Greek independence, which, it was hoped, might be done by warlike operations calculated to divert the attention of the Turks. 1824

The idea appears vague enough, for the 'Order' was destitute of pecuniary resources; and though it claimed property in France to the amount of one hundred and twenty millions of francs (nearly 5,000,000*l.* sterling), this property was 'under sequestration,'—in other words, practically appropriated and at the absolute disposal of the French Government; in which condition, without doubt, it was likely to remain to the end of the chapter; nor had the Knights of Malta much prospect of benefiting thereby.]

### CAPTAIN CHARLES NAPIER, R.N. (FEB. 12, 1824).

[This officer became afterwards Admiral Sir Charles Napier, and commanded the Baltic Fleet in the Russian war, thirty years later. This letter deserves mention but not reproduction *in extenso*.

It describes a scheme for direct steamboat communication between London and the Rhine, and asks for Government assistance to mitigate custom-house difficulties attending the passage through Holland of any steamboat running between London and Mayence.

Canning declined 'in any way to interfere in private specu-'lation.'

According to Sir Edward Reed, in an article in the 'Contempo-'rary Review' for November 1883, Captain Napier had been interested already in the idea of opening up steam communication from British ports to towns situated far up Continental rivers, and had had charge of the 'Aaron Manby,' an iron steamer built in 1821 by the Horsby Company, Staffordshire, for the navigation of the river Seine, when she took her first voyage across the Channel, reaching Paris on June 12, 1822.]

ANONYMOUS AT BOULOGNE.

Boulogne-sur-Mer: April 3, 1824.

1824 Sir,—I take the liberty of informing you, that the French seamen, who were publicly dismissed after the Spanish war closed, and had returned to this port, have all been remanded, and have within a few days been marched from Boulogne to resume their respective stations, and that those upon their route home to the different seaports have all been countermanded. The utmost secresy is observed by the French Government in this transaction.

I know also, as a positive fact, from private confidential information, that the most determined and inveterate hatred against England exists in the breasts of all the Ultra party now in power, and that the weak heads thereof, in their exaltation at their success in Spain, make not the smallest hesitation in admitting that it is the positive determination of Monsieur to reconquer Spanish America, even if it should cause a war with Great Britain and the United States, but that it is necessary to secure success to the enterprise to act with the greatest duplicity with regard to England, and to smuggle out as large a force as possible by degrees to the French West Indies; that the only reason their sailors were dismissed after the Spanish war was to lull the suspicion of England, but that the circular letters for their recall were prepared and ready to issue a few days after their dismissal was publicly announced.

I think it is my duty as an Englishman to give you this information, which I know to be correct (I have resided nearly seven years in this country, and am acquainted with all parties). I have only to request that through politeness you will not reply to this letter, as I might, during the short time I now mean to continue here, suffer great inconvenience if it were known I had written to you on the above subject. I trust this letter to a particular friend to be put into the post office at Dover, as no letter is sacred in the French post offices. They are frequently delivered open.—With much respect, &c.

[This is an example of many similar sources of intelligence which are constantly offering voluntary contributions to the general stock of information of a Government.

The particular item of valuable information, if true, contained in this letter is the allegation that the French naval forces, ostensibly broken up, were in truth secretly held together in readiness for active service. 1824

Assuredly the British Government knew, through its own channels, all about the bitterness which the Ultra-Government in France felt at the attitude of Great Britain in respect of the French occupation of Spain, and the measures which betrayed the longing desire of the French Government to utilise the advantages of the situation in Spain to the end of acquiring a sure footing in the Americas.

Symptoms of such a design frequently appear in the documents of the period, public and private, attributed to the French Government, of which the end was to secure colonial empire as an incidental reward of their success in Spain. There seems some probability, indeed, that, more than 'incidental' it was the 'especial' aim of the whole proceeding, though one not to be avowed until successfully carried out, on account of the jealous watchfulness of Great Britain—a road by which France hoped to arrive at anticipating and pushing Great Britain aside from any share in the broken fragments of the Spanish Empire, and to allow no Power but herself to partake in the opening up of a colonial France.]

MR. HUTCHINSON, SOLICITOR, OF LINCOLN'S INN.

Lincoln's Inn: August 5, 1824.

Sir,—Not having the honour of being known to you, I have to apologise for venturing to address you, and I therefore beg to explain the occasion of my doing so. A client of mine, Lord Bridport, has been solicited to offer himself for the borough of Callington at the next general election, and, as the party who have made the offer represent (I have reason to believe on good grounds) that they are able to bring in both members, they are anxious to find a gentleman who will allow himself to be put in nomination with Lord Bridport, because in naming only one candidate they would appear to invite the Opposite party to name the other.

The party who are in communication with me have deputed an agent to London with instructions to offer you the other seat for your son, whom they suppose you (on the authority of some report which has reached them) to intend to bring into Parliament at the next election.

1824 The agent, not having any means of introduction to you, has requested me to lay the circumstances before you, which I trust a desire to serve the interests of my client will excuse, and to request your admitting him to the honour of an interview.

Had Lord Bridport been in town, I should not have allowed myself to intrude upon you with this application; but his Lordship being at a distance, and the agents having represented that the circumstances connected with the borough do not admit of delay, I have to request your pardon for making it.—I have the honour to be, sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. HUTCHINSON.

[See another offer from another party in July 1825 (p. 372) with respect to the same Borough. This took place in the days of rotten boroughs. It explains the circumstances under which, while Lord Bridport took one seat of the Borough of Callington, the party at whose disposal the Borough lay desired to offer the second seat to Canning that he might bring his son into Parliament.

The reply was simple enough:

'Mr. Canning has received Mr. Hutchinson's letter of the 5th. 'He is much obliged to Mr. Hutchinson for the offer it contains, but 'has no occasion to avail himself of it.'

Of Canning's three sons, the eldest, George, born 1801, died 1820; the third, Charles, was born 1812. He became afterwards Earl Canning, and was only twelve years old at this date; he was known in the family as 'Carlo.' It must have been, therefore, William Pitt Canning—subsequently drowned while bathing at Madeira, in 1828—who was the second son and some years older than 'Carlo.' He was in the navy, and had become a captain, R.N., when he died.]

EXTRACT OF LETTER FROM MR. HYDE VILLIERS, CORFU (AUG. 26, 1824).

I wish the business the English have in hand here was in the Foreign Office instead of Lord B.'s [Earl Bathurst], as I think it would be better done; they have now given proper directions, and had they shown any firmness at first and never permitted an aggression to pass unpunished, matters would never have come to what they now are; and the ships which were sent to reduce Algiers to obedience should have paid a visit to the gentlemen exercising the functions of government in the Morea before they returned; at present, if that Government declines

(which I have no doubt it will) to recall the proclamation they are required to do, what can two frigates with a peace complement of men do against 98 large brigs with 150 men in each? I don t mean they will resist; but how can Lord Bathurst's directions be carried into effect against such numbers, even supposing them to be passive? Your gentlemen do things in the most extraordinary manner, and have until the last courier arrived hitherto thrown all the responsibility upon the naval commanders, who have been told always to procure redress for grievances complained of; but in doing so if a Greek had been killed I dare say whoever did it would have been drawn and quartered by the Liberals in England. The commander is there with a very inefficient force, and a very awful responsibility; though I am happy to say he has a very clever fellow and good friend to share it with him, in the person of Sir Frederick Adam, with whom he is directed to act in concert. The Smyrna station is also under his orders in case of necessity; but that only adds a corvette or two, which with a reduced complement of men are hardly fit to take care of themselves. The ships here should all be upon the war establishment, and they then should be men-of-war instead of the inefficient ships they are. 1824

[This is an extract of a private letter from Mr. Hyde Villiers to Mr. Stapleton, Canning's private secretary, which it was thought worth while to 'officialise' for official consideration.

The Greeks had been getting rather the best of it of late in their struggle with the Turks, and became, in consequence, stimulated to a somewhat high pitch of presumption. They not only formulated complaints of breach of neutrality in respect of troops, stores, and provisions freighted to the Turkish Government in neutral ships, but they took upon themselves to issue a proclamation declaring that 'all vessels' so freighted should be considered no longer belonging to any neutral nation, but as enemies, and, as such, to be attacked, burnt, or sunk, together with their crews, by ships of the Greek fleet, or any other armed Greek vessel. This high-handed proceeding required vigorous measures without delay, and called forth strong remonstrances from Sir Frederick Adam, who had succeeded Sir Thomas Maitland (deceased) in the beginning of the year as High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands. He was supported by Sir H. Neale, who commanded the British Squadron in those waters.

The letter we are now considering was written at the date of

1824 these remonstrances; it censures the Ionian Government for dilatoriness; anticipates indifference to our remonstrances on the part of the Greek Government; regrets that the squadron sent to Algiers (about June or July) to reduce the Dey to order had not first brought the Greek Provisional Government to reason; as it was he feared that the force left at the disposal of the Ionian Government would be insufficient to coerce the Greeks.

Such a communication from a person on the spot deserved attention.

However, a proclamation threatening the Greeks with immediate reprisals was published on September 6, and after much trouble and a visit of Sir F. Adam to Napoli di Romania, the Greeks were persuaded to withdraw from their untenable position.]

MR. WILLIAM GIFFARD.

James St.; Sept. 8, 1824.

My dear Canning,—I have laid aside my regalia, and King Giffard, first of the name, is now no more, as Sir Andrew Aguecheek says, 'than an ordinary mortal or a Christian.' It is necessary to tell you this, for with the exception of a dark cloud which has come over Murray's brow no prodigies in earth or air, as far as I have heard, have announced it.

It is now exactly sixteen years ago since your letter invited or encouraged me to take the throne. I did not mount it without a trembling fit; but I was promised support, and I have been nobly supported. As far as regards myself, I have borne my faculties soberly, if not meekly. I have resisted with undeviating firmness every attempt to encroach upon me, every solicitation of publisher, author, friend, or friend's friend, and turned not a jot aside for power or delight. In consequence of this integrity of purpose the 'Review' has long possessed a degree of influence, not only in this but in other countries, hitherto unknown, and I have the satisfaction at this late hour of seeing it in its most palmy state. No number has sold better than the sixtieth.

But there is a sad tale to tell. For the last three years I have perceived the mastery which disease and age were acquiring over a constitution battered and torn at the best, and have been perpetually urging Murray to look about for a successor, while I begged Copleston, Blomfield, and others to assist the

search. All has been ineffectual. Murray, indeed, has been foolishly flattering himself that I might be cajoled on from N° to N°, and has not therefore exerted himself as he ought to have done; but the rest have been in earnest. Do you know anyone? I once thought of Robert Grant; but he proved timid, and indeed his saintly propensities would render him suspected. 1824

Reginald Heber, whom I should have preferred to everyone, was snatched from me for a far higher object.

There are hundreds who dread the forced fascination of this work, and in truth I do not myself contemplate it without apprehension. Except the feeble 'British Critic,' Government has not a friend in the periodical press. Every review and magazine that is now set up is hostile either covertly or openly; and when to this we add that the selfish craft of the Saints, the envy and hatred of the Dissenters, and the indignity of the Radicals are all combined in the promotion of the same bad cause, there is really sufficient reason for fear. Several of our best writers have declared that they will submit to none but me. I have therefore promised while my strength permits to overlook their revises; but this is all I can do; to arrange their pages as before is no longer in my power. To say nothing of resigning half my income, I should have been a very simpleton to give up a prosperous and honourable situation, (as far as literature is concerned,) and which enabled me to do some service to my country, that I love so entirely, could I have retained it with safety to myself.

I have been offered a Doctor's Degree; and when I declined it on account of my inability to appear in public, my own college (Exeter) most kindly offered to confer it on me in private—that is, at the Rector's lodgings. This too I declined, and begged the Dean of Westminster, who has a living in the neighbourhood, to excuse me as handsomely as he could. It might, for aught I know, be a hard race between a shroud and a gown which shall get to me first; at any rate, was too late for honours.

And this puts me again in mind of my friend Ireland, who has stood so closely by me during the whole period of the 'Review.' I hope you will on my account remember to be kind to him, if an occasion offers. I do not wish him to remove from Westminster, but if one of the poor bishoprics should fall,

1824 — Llandaff, or Rochester, which is now so unworthily held, it would be the source of inexpressible delight to me if he were thought of. I know it is looked for (that is, his promotion to a prelacy) by his brethren; and certainly a more prudent and steady man, a more safe and sound theologian, does not exist, nor one better suited to the times.

I seem to have a thousand things yet to say, but I must stop somewhere; and the papers tell me that you are on the wing.—I am, my dear Canning, now and ever,

Most faithfully and affectionately yours,

WILLIAM GIFFARD.

P.S.—Scott gave me an article this time. We set out together, and I was hoping to fall in with him again at the end of my career.

[Mr. Giffard was the editor of the 'Quarterly Review'—a post held by him, as he says, for exactly sixteen years.

He here announces to Canning that he must resign the post on account of ill-health.

He mentions the steps he had taken to discover a fit man for his successor, but fails to get beyond naming Robert Grant, who was too much of a 'saint,' and Reginald Heber, who had gone to India as Bishop of Calcutta.

He fears the publication of the 'Review' may come to an end, and he laments such a catastrophe, as he asserts that, except the 'British Critic,' Government had not a friend in the periodical press.

Several of the best writers (on the 'Q. R.') have declared that they will submit to no one but Giffard.

Giffard justifies his retirement, as nothing but inability for work produced by ill-health could have led him to give up a prosperous and honourable situation.

Oxford had in vain offered him a Doctor's Degree; he had no strength for the ceremony, even in private.

Recommends Dr. Ireland to Canning's good favour.

The letter is rather touching, the veteran editor naturally thinking, *Après moi le déluge.*

But the remark as to the extraordinary absence of support for the Government in the periodical press strikes one as curious; particularly when contrasted with the chorus of support from the press which attended Canning's promotion to be Prime Minister, and to account for which, in sheer despair, Wellington thought fit to call it 'bought.']

MR. ZACHARY MACAULAY.

50 Great Ormond Street, October 4, 1824.

Sir,—You will not be surprised that I should be desirous to know the probable fate of the *projet* respecting the female slaves which I had the honour some time since of submitting to your consideration. It is not, however, so much to solicit information on this point that I now take the liberty of addressing you, but merely to say that a friend of mine having happened a few days ago to show a copy of my paper to Mr. Wilmot Horton, that gentleman expressed his own strong approbation of the scheme, and requested that he might have a copy given him to show to Lord Bathurst. With this request I mean to comply, making Mr. Horton at the same time aware that the paper has been communicated to you. After much deliberation on the subject, I confess that I continue to view the *projet* in question as affording the easiest solution of the complicated difficulties of the slave system; and I am happy to say that as far as respects its cost, which is one of the great obstacles to its adoption, I am assured that no objection will be felt to it on that score either by the country at large, or by some of the leading men in the Opposition, who, on the contrary, will be disposed cordially to concur in it.—I have the honour to be, Sir,

1824

Your most obedient and very faithful servant,

ZACHARY MACAULAY.

50 Great Ormond Street, October 8, 1824.

Sir,—I have had the honour of receiving your note of the 5th inst, which was delayed by an error in the address. I should otherwise have sooner acknowledged it.

I write now merely to say that in having requested you to consider my paper as private I had no intention of preventing its being freely shown to your colleagues, provided that it did not seem to yourself to involve insuperable difficulties.

I was indisposed, I confess, at least until the scheme should be deemed by his Majesty's Ministers worthy of their attention, that it should be submitted to the consideration of the West Indians. The doubts and difficulties, which it might suggest to their minds, I wished to have an opportunity of attempting to solve before the discussion should go beyond them. After that,

1824 should the scheme be still regarded as not impracticable, and one to be entertained, I can have no objection to its undergoing the examination of any of the leading West Indians, to whom you may think proper to show it. At the same time, I cannot help fearing—and I hope you will not think me uncandid in entertaining that apprehension—that the scheme would be much more obnoxious to the West Indians if it was made known to them that it came from me, than if it appeared to come before them as a suggestion from any other quarter.—I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

ZACHARY MACAULAY.

MR. CANNING TO MR. ZACHARY MACAULAY.

Foreign Office: October 5, 1824.

Sir,—I am very glad that you have submitted your plan to the consideration of Lord Bathurst.

I did not feel at liberty, under the circumstances of its communication to me, to extend that communication farther without your special permission—which I should have asked if you had not anticipated the object of my application.

I am, &c.

GEORGE CANNING.

[Notifies to Mr. Canning that a scheme relative to the improvement of the condition of female slaves in the West Indies, previously submitted to Canning, had now been communicated to Earl Bathurst, at the Colonial Office.

Canning, in reply, only says that he had not felt at liberty to divulge the scheme in question to anyone else, and he was very glad that it had now come before Lord Bathurst.

The substance of the scheme is not indicated.

During this year the Home Government were endeavouring to persuade the islands in the West Indies, having separate legislatures, to adopt a series of regulations recommended by Order in Council for ameliorating the condition of slaves, particularly of female slaves, especially forbidding them to be flogged; but these recommendations had been ill-received by the European population. The planters behaved badly, and Canning from his place in Parliament had found it to be his duty to rebuke them for their conduct.]

MR. R. T. BLEWITT.

[8 Lincoln's Inn, December 6, 1824.

Sir,—A friend of mine, who is a subject of Great Britain, but at present residing at Brussels, has requested me to obtain an answer to the following queries, on behalf of a French gentleman who has been persecuted by the present Government of France, and who wishes to obtain an asylum in Great Britain. The queries are as follow, viz.:— 1824

1. In 1793 did there exist in Great Britain an act of legislation, or a decision of Cabinet Council, which interdicted the members of the National Convention of France, judges of King Louis XVI., from entering the dominions of his Britannic Majesty?

2. In 1816 was there any act existing for that purpose against the members of the National Convention, who were banished from France by the law of January 1816?

3. If an act of the above nature existed at either of the periods, viz. 1793 or 1816, whether the English Government would now be disposed to maintain its execution, or consider it as fallen into disuse?

4. If such an interdiction never existed, or having existed is now fallen into disuse, would a banished Conventionalist of France taking refuge in Great Britain be received like the proscribed of other nations, and, like them, subject only to the Alien Bill, as all foreigners are; or would he have to fear that the Government would compel him to quit the kingdom, simply on account of his being a Conventionalist?

As I am unable to answer the above questions myself, I have taken the liberty of addressing you on the subject. I apprehend that all my friend wishes to be informed of is, definitely to know whether banished Conventionalists can take refuge in the British Dominions, and whether the actual feelings of his Majesty's Ministers are such that, considering the rank of life of the Conventionalist in question, he would be allowed to find an asylum in Great Britain, such as every other foreigner, under certain proper restrictions, has met with.—I am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

N. I. BLEWITT.

P.S.—Altho' you may possibly be offended that I should

1824 —— have added to the multiplicity of your engagements by troubling you with this letter, yet I think that feeling will be lessened by the reflection, that I may thus possibly have saved you the pain and uneasiness of being a party to the forcible exclusion of an unfortunate stranger from that asylum, which he might reasonably have expected to find in a country so generally celebrated for its free and enlightened principles.

[Begs to be informed whether there is any rule of administration, statutory or otherwise, in Great Britain, which would operate to the exclusion from the country of any member of the regicide court which tried King Louis XVI., or of any member of the Revolutionary Convention in France.

Canning's answer simply refers the inquirer to a lawyer for advice as to the statutes applicable to alien visitors to this country.]

## 1825.

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Bath: January 10, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I received your despatches of Thursday here this morning, and I hasten to reply to them by a despatch which I intend to soothe M. de Villèle's testiness. 1825

But, having done that, I have no time for more, the same messenger who brought in your despatches having brought also a voluminous mass from Sir H. Wellesley and my cousin, which I have been obliged to read, study, and return in order that they may be sent with a letter from me to the Duke of Wellington.

Upon the Greek question he and I agree; and I am glad, therefore, of an opportunity of communication and consultation.

Metternich is very angry, and threatens Russian hostilities against Turkey—threatens us, that is, but is much more alive to the danger for himself. To be sure, Sir T. M.'s proclamation was a piece of supererogatory jurisprudence that might as well have been spared. It has done infinite mischief. I think the defence of it which I improvised, for want of better knowledge, the only one of which it is susceptible; but since that is not satisfactory to my own judgment, I can hardly expect it to be so to Prince Metternich's.

Stratford's reports of his conferences with Metternich, and of his audience with the Emperor, are very inter-

1825 esting. The Emperor would have no objection to help us in Ireland, so general and purely philanthropic are his principles of occasional intervention with unruly subjects, whether of his friends or neighbours.

I have no time for more, so adieu!

Ever affectionately yours,

G. C.

[Canning having filled his mind with the contents of despatches from his cousin Stratford Canning, who had just been transferred from Constantinople to Petersburg, and also with the contents of despatches from Sir Henry Wellesley at Vienna, now passes them on to the Duke of Wellington with comments, and at the same time indites a note to his friend at Paris on the difficulties of the situation.

A proclamation of 'Sir T. M.' in connection with the Greek insurrection is described as indefensible, and sufficient to justify the wrath of Metternich. 'T. M.' are the initials of Sir Thomas Maitland, who was High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands before Sir F. Adams, and it is surmised that 'T. M.' must be a hasty error for 'Sir F. Adam,' who as High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands put forth a strong proclamation menacing reprisals if the Greeks acted on their frantic manifesto of hostility to all neutral ships carrying munitions of war. See also Mr. Hyde Villiers's letter at page 222.

Mr. Stratford Canning had, it appears, passed through Vienna, where he had 'interviewed' Metternich, and on his arrival at his destination at Petersburg had been received by the Emperor of Russia with ironical offers to the British Government to assist them in suppressing rebellious manifestations in Ireland.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F.O.: January 14, 1825.

My dear Lord,—In the conversation with M. de Villèle reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 7, that Minister appears to have declared to your Excellency that the Emperor of Russia had determined to send troops, ships, and money to the assistance of Spain, but had been dissuaded from that intention by the representations of the Allies. The whole of this intelligence is new to me. I find no trace in the corre-

spondence either of your predecessor at Paris or of his Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, of any such intention on the part of the Emperor of Russia, or of any such discussion between his Imperial Majesty and his allies. Something, indeed, was said by the Emperor to the Duke of Wellington, in the course of the conferences at Verona, of H. I. M.'s readiness at all times to hold his military means at the disposal of the Alliance for the preservation of peace in Europe. But from the context of your Excellency's despatch, it must be presumed that it cannot be to this general kind of declaration that M. de Villèle can have alluded. This remark evidently had reference to a much later period, and, as it should seem (although this is not distinctly stated), not so much to peace in Europe as to the question between Spain and her colonies. 1825

It is very desirable to ascertain the exact meaning of M. de Villèle's assertions, and I have to request that your Excellency will seek an opportunity of obtaining from him a more precise explanation of them.

. . . . . .

[Villèle having been making much to Lord Granville of certain offers of troops, ships, and money alleged to have been tendered by the Emperor of Russia to the newly resuscitated Absolutist Government of Spain, with a view to aid them in the reduction of the separated Spanish Colonies, Canning instructs Lord Granville to try and find out when and on what occasion this offer was made, pointing out that it could not have been the vague promise of the Czar to contribute military aid to preserve the peace of Europe, at the date of the Congress of Verona in 1822, though that offer was made in view of the contemplated suppression of the Spanish Constitution, but that it bears the appearance of referring to the recent state of the dispute between Spain and her insurgent colonies.

It was obviously no light matter to verify the terms of a menace of military interposition on the part of Russia in this dispute, when Great Britain, under the guidance of Canning, and to the extreme indignation of the Absolutist Powers of Europe, had taken the conclusive step of recognising the separate independence of those colonies.]

TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Ch. Ch.: January 17, 1825.

1825 My dear Granville,—Does not this date remind you of very old times? I have been passing five quiet days here on my way from Bath to town, and for two of them Liverpool has been here too. I am at Pett's canonical house, he at Bishop Legge's—All Souls Palace.

You will see in all the newspapers the account of our doings at Bristol. The Ultras will, no doubt, lay to my charge the having seduced Liverpool into popular courses. But I had no hand in it: the mayor and Common Council at Bristol would take no denial. It was Liverpool rather than me that they wanted. I am a sort of heretic in the eyes of the Bristolians: first, as the champion of their rival town; and, secondly, on account of the Catholic question. They received me very well, however; but I took great care to put Liverpool forward in everything, and to keep myself back as much as possible. Whatever the 'Times' may pretend, there was no direct allusion to South America, and upon the whole the day went off well and harmlessly *quâ* effect in the quarter where such *sympŏsia* are most held in abhorrence. It is incalculable what an impediment and perplexity our strict union (Liverpool's and mine) upon the great subjects of foreign policy is to the sighers after the continental school.

The Emperor of Russia seems to be in a passion; if he recalcitrates thus upon the Greek conference alone, what will he say and do when he receives Pozzo's account of the South American treaties? Will he publish a manifesto? For the present he contents himself with directing Count Lieven to send to me a despatch, the amount of which seems to be that 'he will be d——d 'if he ever talks Greek to us again.'

Your long despatch of Thursday, upon that subject,

is interesting, and in all respects but one particularly well written. That one defect is, that it leaves me at the conclusion entirely uninformed whether you accomplished the object stated at the beginning: that of reading our Greek papers to Villèle. So far as I can make it out, I figure you to myself with the papers in your hand ready to begin reading them, but interrupted by Villèle's endless diversions from the subject, and at length putting the papers up in your portfolio again, and coming away *re infectâ*. But you do not distinctly say this, and it is rather too much to be left to inference. Yet, on the other hand, if you had read the papers to Villèle, he would surely have made some observation upon them, which you would as surely have reported. Clear this point up to me in your next. 1825

*A propos* to finding of fault, I think it fair to tell you that I have little doubt but that the charge of *hauteur* and reserve did come from Pozzo. The person to whom it came has not the slightest suspicion that it has reached me. If she had there would be a scene with my informant's informant, which it would be both unfair and impolitic to occasion; so pray, pray, take care that not a syllable of the charge, or of what I now say about it, retranspires to this side of the Channel. I am quite satisfied that it was malicious and false. I am greatly annoyed at what you have heard from Villèle respecting Stuart's unauthorised representations about St. Domingo. I wrote to Planta to look back to Stuart's correspondence for any despatch in which he gives an account of such a conversation. That he never was instructed to utter a word upon the subject, I am positive. Whether, having taken upon himself to do so, he was directed (as he ought to have been) to do so no more, I cannot say. But if not, it was, I am sure, only from the notion that it was better to let the matter

1825 drop, than to enable him to revive the discussion with Villèle in any shape whatever. Yet how, with the perfect knowledge that he must have had of the secret article of the treaty of 1814, Stuart can have thought himself warranted in uttering the word 'Hayti,' I cannot comprehend. He had, however, a trick of meddling with matters upon which he had not any instructions. All that can now be done to cure the mischief is, to assure Villèle that instructions Stuart had none, and that we do not think ourselves authorised to express a wish, or even to give an opinion, much less to represent or remonstrate, as to any course which the French Government may think proper to take towards St. Domingo. But the pretence that they have been at all influenced in what they have done, or omitted to do, by anything that Stuart may have said to them is quite preposterous. The publication of the negotiations by the Haytians sufficiently shows the causes of their rupture. Let M. Villèle renew them with better effect when he can.

Independently of the impropriety of acting at all in such a manner without instructions, Stuart judged the matter wrong. A negotiation of Hayti by France would have been invaluable to us as an example to Spain and Portugal; and as to danger to the West Indies, what are the West Indies but one great volcano? and what is one crater the less or the more?

I was about to write to you to-day a thundering despatch upon Portugal, on learning that Villèle had sent orders to Hyde de Neuville to remain at his post at Lisbon, after having solemnly engaged to recall him. But just as I was about to put my angry pen in motion, came a despatch from A'Court informing me that Hyde de Neuville, after waiting several weeks for those orders which (it appears) he had been encouraged

to expect, and which actually left Paris for Lisbon, viâ Madrid, on Monday last, had at length embarked in the frigate sent for his conveyance, and was well on his way to Brest, before the courier that was to have detained him had begun his journey. 'The French Ambassador sailed yesterday evening,' says A'Court in a private letter, dated January 5. 'Relieved from his 'brawling opposition, I hope that everything will now go 'on smoothly, and that I shall be able to make some 'satisfactory communication by the next or by the following packet.' 1825

In this state of things, I see no advantage in letting M. de Villèle know that I know of his meditated roguery.

By the time that H. de N. reaches Brest, and the courier Lisbon, the blow will probably have been struck which is to bring back Portugal within the legitimate influence of her old ally. I say 'probably,' for we have to do with a weakness and vacillation beyond all belief. A'Court has done admirably in most difficult circumstances; and, even in case of failure, I will do him justice at all times.

My despatches of to-day (if they go to-day, as I believe they will) will have given you complete information as to Sir C. Stuart's intended mission.

With this, Villèle has no pretension to find fault; for it is a regular mediation, asked by both parties to the quarrel; and one into which we not only willingly admit Austria, but court her accession. Nothing ever was more 'European.' But he will not like it the better, I fear. Only let him have nothing to complain of in point of reserve. Go beforehand with him in all possible explanations. I do not mean that you are to read to him the despatches to Chamberlain, or to tell him their contents, but as to the fact of Stuart's going, and that

1825 he goes to finish the negotiations between Portugal and Brazil. Tell him before he has time to ask a question.

I think this is pretty nearly all that I have to say to you at present.

I go from here to Combe to-morrow for a couple of days, where we must concoct the King's speech—a matter of no small delicacy on this occasion; and thence to town. I give my full consent to Mrs. Canning's remaining with you as much longer as you desire, and as she is of use and comfort to you and Lady Granville, to whom remember me most kindly.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—Harrowby has not sent me a report of his conference with the King; but I hope to see him at Combe to-morrow or next day.

[The first paragraphs of this letter dwell upon Christ Church College topics; also upon a visit to Bristol in company with Lord Liverpool; and lastly upon the feelings of the Czar Alexander on the Greek question. They have appeared in print already, but will bear republication.

The paragraphs as to Lord Granville's reading despatches to the French Prime Minister M. de Villèle—as to the charge brought against someone of '*hauteur*' and reserve (the 'someone' being apparently Lord Granville), and as to Sir Charles Stuart's unauthorised representations to the French Government on the subject of Hayti or San Domingo, are amusing, and not previously published.

The letter marks the arrival of the Greek question at a favourable crisis in Russia.

It also refers to the secret article of the treaty about San Domingo in 1814.

It furnishes a lively illustration of Sir Charles Stuart's tendency to act without instructions, and while so doing to fail to justify the breach of discipline by making it the occasion of diplomatic success. He succeeded in repeating the performance later on in the year, and in bringing down on his head very considerable grief.

The paragraphs about Portugal have also seen the light; but they explain in graphic language the double policy of the French Government in respect of withdrawing M. Hyde de Neuville from Lisbon, and will bear repetition.] 1825

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Foreign Office: Jan. 21, 1825.

My dear Granville,—Your observations as to Villèle's confidential conferences are quite correct.

We have done what we could to remedy the past inadvertence, and Planta will tell you how we propose to preclude the repetition of it hereafter.

There will be many advantages in making V.'s private talks the subject of private letters instead of despatches.

1. I need not show them to my colleagues except when I think it expedient. If Westmoreland knows them I cannot answer for the secrecy which V. has a right to require.

2. I may show them occasionally and make a merit of showing them to the King; and I can then ensure prudence in that quarter by representing V.'s political power as dependent upon his secrets being kept.

I send you enough to-day to repay Villèle's late communications, and to prove to him that we are as ready to help him as he is to help us. I just receive notice from Lieven of a communication *de la part de sa cour.* I suppose it is to announce the Imperial determination never to talk Greek with us no more.

I am to see him to-morrow. Adieu!

Ever affectionately yours,

G. C.

Shall I appoint Mr. Cradock?

[The principal topic with which this letter deals is solicitude for the continuance of M. de Villèle's 'confidences' imparted to Lord Granville in private conversations.

It seems that, by some inadvertence, a portion of these confidences had leaked out, causing considerable annoyance to Villèle.

1825 This carelessness was to be guarded against for the future; and in particular, the confidences in question were to be communicated to Canning only in private letters of Lord Granville.

Canning anticipated several advantages from this precaution: he would be able to measure out to his colleagues exactly the amount of information that he might think expedient, especially with reference to Lord Westmoreland's inability to keep a secret; he also would retain within his own discretion what he should show to George IV., securing his Majesty's silence by representing that Villèle's retention of power depended on his secrets being kept.

Canning sends enough British Government confidences, to be imparted to Villèle in reciprocation of his talks with Lord Granville, as may encourage the French statesman to remain in the same trusting frame of mind.

What were these confidences? Those of Villèle may be taken to have included Liberal tendencies which he secretly cherished, necessarily accompanied by covert discontent with Charles X. and his bigoted policy; of course a betrayal of such a frame of mind would cost Villèle his power; but no doubt one of these 'confidences' was the knowledge of the offer of Russian aid to Spain (now Absolutist) to recover her colonies, referred to in preceding draft despatch. On the other hand, Canning's confidences may have been parallel complaints (only far less dangerous to himself) of the public and private opposition to his policy which he had met with from the King and several of his colleagues.]

MR. CANNING TO EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

G. L.: Jan. 30, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I will take care to be punctual to-morrow.

I have no objection to inserting what anyone pleases in praise of agriculture, but I have great objection to leaving out what is said of commerce.

I divine the motives of the proposal.

Ever yours,

G. C.

[This note relates to the King's speech at the opening of the ensuing session.

Canning insists that there shall be no omission of 'commerce' among the topics of the speech. He 'divines the motive of the

'proposal' to omit it. What with Huskisson's liberal policy in regard to trade and navigation, and Canning's liberal policy in protecting British interests in the separated Spanish Colonies, much might be put in the King's mouth distasteful to the high Tory party; and which they would naturally seek to avoid. But any omission of this kind Canning determined should not be allowed.] 1825

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: Feb. 15, 1825.

My dear Granville,—The debate on the introduction of the Association Bill still continues; but I presume it will end to-night. Burdett, Brougham and I remain yet unspoken. The House and the country are decidedly with us. But we shall not have the less trouble. I look upon the session till Easter as monopolised by the grievances and distractions of Ireland.

You will see by my despatch of to-day, that I know nothing of any Austrian answer.

The enclosed note from Prince Esterhazy will show you how much or how little he knows of it.

This trick of vaunting to Foreign Powers what they intend to say to us is as bad as the tricks of the Catholic Association, and must, like them, be put down.

I write to Henry Wellesley to-day, enclosing to him a copy of my despatch to you; and send it by the post, that Metternich may have the satisfaction of reading it.

I wrote in such haste last week, that I doubt whether I thanked you for your congratulations, and Lady G. for hers.

If not, I do so now. I hear every day good report of C., and his letter to me was calculated to make the most favourable impression on my mind—and did so.

I am glad that he has deferred his coming over for a week. This week I have not a moment at my own disposal.

I find among other qualifications that he is a sub-

1825 scriber to the Catholic Rent. Martin is running a race with him for Galway and popularity, and means for that purpose to vote against the Bill, though he wrote to me from Ireland that interference was absolutely necessary.

Ever affectionately yours, G. C.

P.S.—Let me have an answer to my despatch, by a despatch stating that the reports which had reached me were current in Paris. I wish you had given me an official foundation for what I have written. I cannot plead your private letters (nor Mrs. C.'s).

But Vaughan has confirmed what they contained verbally; and that may serve. Only let me have a proper echo.

G. C.

[The first paragraph of this letter refers to the great debate which took place about this time in the House of Commons on the introduction of the Government measure for the suppression of the 'Catholic Association.' The association, in fact, gave expression to the profound discontent prevailing amongst the whole, or nearly the whole, of the Roman Catholic portion of the population of Ireland.

The inborn and inherited characteristics of the Irish race include, besides many great and estimable gifts, a singular intractability and restlessness of temperament, impatient of self-restraint, but curiously enough (in its best moods) checked by secret self-distrust, leading it to loyal and even thankful submission to control exercised by others. The Roman Catholic religion, ever speaking in tones of uncompromising command, has met the requirements of this characteristic, and has accordingly established and successfully maintained a strong religious domination over the race; but politically, the discontent and restlessness of the race have generally been found to increase in exact proportion to the degree of liberty yielded; not that the Irish people are to be blamed when urging their claims to what they consider their rights, but that the more conciliatory the attitude of their rulers, the more irreconcilable and malignant are the feelings which the Irish people profess; nevertheless, their demonstrations are usually far in excess of their actual sentiments.

Catholic emancipation was a fair and open question. It commanded a majority in the House of Commons, though temporarily at a disadvantage in the Government; it was advocated by a large and powerful party in the country, and appeared to be moving by slow degrees to a favourable issue. 1825

But unfortunately the weakening of restraint upon Irish agitation, owing to this favourable condition of British opinion, far from steadying the methods of agitation, brought out indefinite aspirations in all directions, and by widening the front of battle, multiplied the enemy to be overcome along a whole line of unexpected points of conflict.

Owing to these unreasoning tendencies of the Irish race, the Catholic Association, formed on moderate principles in January 1824, had grown with startling rapidity into a highly elaborated organisation; it had attained to fulfilling for its supporters many of the functions of a true government. It ostensibly only sought redress of acknowledged grievances, but under the influence of inflammatory harangues it became an expression of unflinching objection on the part of the Irish race to forming a factor in the union of the British Isles, and it took unfortunate shape in furious hostility against the majority of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom, who still continued intent on retaining the unity of the insular empire.

The presumptuous and outrageous proceedings of the association became at length intolerable, and by the end of January 1825 the Ministry had determined to apply to Parliament for powers to suppress it. In this proceeding Canning joined, and at the time he addressed this note to Lord Granville the debate had arrived at its last night; of the three leaders who had not yet spoken, Burdett, Brougham, and himself, it happened that he followed Burdett and preceded Brougham, both the latter being opposed to coercion.

His speech justified his reputation as a debater.

He drew a clear and masterly distinction between an emancipation of the Roman Catholics, politically as fellow-subjects and citizens, which he desired, and an investment of a large religious sect with powers to wage a sectarian war on other denominations of Christianity as favoured by law in the empire, which he deprecated.

In respect of the first, he was liberal to the backbone; in respect of the second he was, what would now be called, a 'staunch Conservative.'

His decisive utterances in favour of the Established Church of England and Ireland calmed the fears of those who dreaded an attack

1825 upon its existing position of advantage, and by disarming jealousy, strengthened the cause of Catholic emancipation.

And in the same way, holding the violent conduct of the Catholic Association to be responsible for the recoil in public feeling from emancipation, he justified his support of the Government measure without derogating from his claim to be a sincere advocate of civil and religious freedom.

His distinction of the various aims of emancipation was no doubt clear and ingenious, and not wanting in support from positive assurances of distinguished Roman Catholics; none the less it proved eventually fallacious in practice, and the political emancipation of the Roman Catholics did in the end inflame sectarian discords and culminate in the overthrow of the Irish Church.

Whether such a result is to be admired or deplored signifies nothing; it suffices to observe that a wise and discerning statesman did not refuse so much as actually failed to foresee the certainty of this result; while the despised and bigoted Protestant was able from the instincts of his nature to obtain a more accurate insight into the consequences of the particular measure, and to prophesy its future destructive effect with greater accuracy than the statesman.

Of Canning's honesty there can be no doubt; but it is not every statesman who is now-a-days sincere in the contempt which he affects for the forebodings expressed in respect of great measures of change.

Passing to foreign politics, it must be borne in mind that on January 1, 1825, the official measures having been taken for a full recognition of the independence of the heretofore Spanish Colonies of Columbia and Mexico, the British Government notified the fact of such measures to all the Ambassadors and Ministers of the allied Courts.

In the letter, the text of the present observations, Canning simply remarks there had been as yet no reply from the Austrian Government, which doubtlessly refers to an anticipated reply on the subject of the step of the British Government.

A reply which came in due course (see vol. ii., pp. 79, 80, of 'Political Life,' and 'Life and Times,' p. 428). The attempt to acquire credit for 'superior rebuke,' for which Canning laughs at the Austrian diplomacy, is compared to the tricks of the Catholic Association, which in Canning's eyes, like the policy of Austria, had been working for the immediate benefit of a small coterie and narrow aims instead of for the public good and for the wide and lasting benefit of the cause it professed to advocate.

France, who still occupied Spain (though much to her own inconvenience), found herself thereby precluded from formulating any protest against the decided action of the British Government in recognising the established reality of the independence of the colonies of Spain; in fact, Villèle had already confided to Canning his secret wish to follow the example. The despatch, therefore, to Lord Granville, of which, in sending a copy to Sir Henry Wellesley at Vienna, through the medium of the Post Office, Canning desired to make Metternich cognisant, must have been a despatch drawn in a tone expressive of confidence in the indifference of France, and of disregard of the probable censures of Absolutist governments. 1825

The rest of this letter concerns the engagement of the Marquis, then Earl of Clanricarde, to Miss Canning. It is curious that Lord Clanricarde should have been a subscriber to the 'Catholic Rent,' a subscription on which the 'Catholic Association' maintained its existence; but it must be remembered, as has been said, that in the beginning of the Association many estimable persons promoted its prosperity; and it is not always easy for a public man to shake himself clear of all his political connections directly they begin to use imprudent language. And so it may have come to pass that the young Lord Clanricarde was found by his intended father-in-law in the rather awkward position of subscriber to the 'Catholic 'Rent.'

The description of Mr. Martin in pursuit of 'Galway popula-'rity,' meaning to oppose the Bill for suppressing the association, after writing to Canning that such a measure was absolutely 'necessary,' corresponds only too well with that of many a member of Parliament's conduct during the sixty years after.

The postscript contains amusing instructions for Lord Granville to return a 'proper echo' to Canning's last despatch to his Lordship.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Foreign Office: Feb. 18, 1825.

My dear Granville,—After a debate of four days and a pause of two, we begin again this evening with the Catholic Association, or a Petition from them to be heard at the Bar 'by Counsel and Witnesses' against the Bill.

The application is preposterous. But the Debate will not be the less violent; though I hope it will be terminated in one sitting.

1825 I do not know that it much signifies in what stage of the measure the debates take place. They will go on till the matter is exhausted, or rather (for that is pretty nearly done at present) till the patience of the listeners is worn down, and then the business will end quietly. I do not expect this consummation however before this day fortnight, as there are but two days in the week, Mondays and Fridays, on which orders of the day have precedency, and the second reading being fixed for Monday next, the Committee on Friday 25th, report on Monday 28th, a third reading on Friday March 4th, would be one regular course, supposing no protracted debates beyond a day on the one hand, and no such subsidence of debating fury as would enable us to quicken our pace on the other.

The sense of the House and of the country is unquestionable. Not one of those of our English or Scotch friends who have uniformly voted for the Catholic Question have been taken in by the attempt to confound that question with the merits of the Catholic Association. Three or four Irish Members have been compelled, by fear for their counties, to vote against the Bill—among them Martin of Galway; who is in alarm lest Lord C. [Clanricarde] should set up a candidate for that county; and who therefore seeks to fortify himself with the aid of the priests and of O'Connell.

You will, I hope, have been able to make Villèle comprehend the entire absorption of my whole time and existence by such a course of debates as those of the last week.

The interval of Saturday and Sunday was barely sufficient to recruit me from the fatigues of the preceding days, and to enable me to dispose of those pressing and teazing urgencies which torment and discompose one more than the most important affairs.

Monday and Tuesday quite overthrew me. Make 1825
Villèle consider a little (he who knows nothing of sittings beyond the regular and wholesome dinner hour) what it is to go into the House, as I did on Monday at five in the afternoon, remain there till two in the morning; then to have for sleep, refreshment, and such business as will not stand still, only twelve hours; then a Cabinet from two to four, then to be in the House again at five to nine, to get up to speak for two hours at eleven, and to get to bed not before five. To add to my exhaustion, Wednesday, which ought to have been a day of rest, had been fixed by the King for a Recorder's report and for the reception of Los Rios, and other Foreign Ministers. I had to spend the morning therefore at Carlton House; and when I went to bed at ten, I should have liked not to get up again for eight and forty hours. Yesterday, however. though it brought no House of Commons of any importance, was dedicated to the clearing off arrears of office which would not bear to be deferred; and to-day at five I return to my treadmill again, thanking Heaven that to-morrow is Saturday.

In the midst of this whirl and worry Villèle must not be surprised that I have not been able to turn in my mind, with all the meditation it deserves, his suggestion about crowned Bourbons for S. A. I have no objection to a monarchy in Mexico—quite the contrary. But then how is it to be set about? What is Villèle's own notion of the process? If he means avowed interference, nothing could reconcile me to it. If he means only that Spain shall propose it as the price of her recognition, I feel sure that a year ago such a proposition would have succeeded, but I fear she has outstood her market. In Columbia I take the chance of success to such a proposition to be absolutely null.

1825 Of Buenos Ayres I should say the same; if it were not that I see that the French Minister has a different notion of it; but on what that notion is founded I cannot guess—not surely on the reception which the Prince de Luca's name (their favourite one) met with in 1819.

All that it is perhaps safe to say to V. at present, and I should think all that is necessary is, that I shall be very happy to concert with him any means of extricating him from the perplexing position, in which he is placed, between the obvious interests of France and the imperious dictates of Russia.

The suggestion of monarchies in S. A. is clearly only one of those means. I cannot believe that V. attaches much importance to it in any other sense—perhaps not so much as I do. But I can only listen to the suggestion when it comes from Madrid. It is therefore there that V. must first inculcate the expediency of it.

I do not know how far Los Rios may be considered as speaking the opinions of Zea, or how far Zea may be able to govern the decisions of his Court. But supposing both these conditions true, I should not despair of seeing the Court of Madrid at length adopt a more rational view of its real situation.

Assure M. de Villèle of the interest which I take in his successful resistance to the opposition, which appears to be gathering against him; and of the anxiety with which even in the midst of my own turmoils I look for the report of the proceedings of the Chambers at Paris.

I shall send you by the next post a copy of a long note to P. Polignac, upon the much litigated question of the Oyster Fishery off Granville and Jersey—with respect to one incident of which I write to you officially to-day.

Pray prepare V. to consider this whole question calmly. It is one of immense importance; which involves all the principles of maritime law, and conse-

quently of good neighbourhood between France and England. 1825

It has cost more trouble and research than any question with which I have ever had to deal; and, unfortunately, Polignac has quite a false view of the principles upon which it is to be decided. But I must have done, for it is nearly 4, so good-bye.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

When do the Morleys come to you? Do not let us be in their way.

[The exhausted statesman begins by disburdening his mind on the subject of the situation in the House of Commons with regard to the Catholic Association suppression measure.

As Foreign Secretary the Bill was not in his department: but as leader of the House of Commons he had much to say to it; and a great part of the fighting fell to his share.

By a natural transition, he passes to the severity of the duties which beset him; and we find then, as now, our principal statesmen well nigh overwhelmed by the variety and multiplicity of the calls of duty.

Canning is anxious that M. de Villèle, the French Prime Minister, should appreciate the extent of the pre-occupation which prevented attention being given at once to the 'last idea' of the Court of France.

The Bourbons conceived that the Spanish Colonies, if separated from Spain, need not be lost to the house of Bourbon; accordingly the French Government now meditated how to establish Bourbon monarchies in the new States of Mexico, Columbia, and Buenos Ayres.

We thus arrive at the solution of the problem why the French Government had not joined the chorus of condemnation with which the Absolutists greeted the British recognition of the independence of the Spanish Colonies; and may also discern another item in Villèle's recent 'confidences' to Canning.

Canning expresses a faint hope that the Court of Madrid, under the guidance of Don Zea de Bermudez, may 'at length adopt a more 'rational view of its real situation'; the Spanish Court were at the moment raging against the acknowledgment of the independence of the Spanish Colonies.

1825 — A friendly message to Villèle conveys Canning's sympathy with the French Minister's struggles in the Chambers.

The next topic touched upon is the question of French and English rights in respect of oyster fisheries, off Granville and Jersey. Canning regards it as one of great importance, and desires that Villèle may be prepared to consider it calmly.

The apparent smallness of the scale of the question did not disguise the delicacy and difficulty of the considerations, and the importance of the principles on which it depended; and the numerous occasions which its details afforded for either nation to take offence, unless wise and temperate counsels were ever present to their mind.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: Feb. 22, 1825.

My dear Granville,—The Bill is substantially through the House of Commons. Last night, on the second reading, there was no debate; only a few flickering attempts at speaking from people to whom nobody listened; followed by a division, in about the usual proportion of 5 to 2. The three remaining stages will be gone through by Friday perhaps, certainly by Monday —with only a little discussion upon clauses in the committee or upon the Report.

I explain fully to Mrs. C. the causes of this sudden cessation of hostilities, and need not repeat the explanation.

Upon the whole the battle has done good. It was very disagreeable, and to me personally very difficult. But the result has been to the Government, strength; to the House of Commons, credit; and to me, an intelligible and assured position upon a ground hitherto doubtful and slippery; a position in which, when the demagogues have struck and the opposition have exhausted themselves, I may perhaps hereafter—but at my own time and in my own way—be enabled to do some good to Ireland, and to bring this most intractable question to a pause, if not a final settlement.

I must now begin to think of my own department. 1825
The most urgent business upon my hands are Stuart's instructions; then Lamb's; and by the time that they are done I may perhaps have something to say to you at Paris.

In the meantime, I shall send you (perhaps by messenger to-morrow) my answer to Nesselrode's saucy despatch; and soon after my answer to Polignac *de Ostreis*. Both have been ready this fortnight at least, bnt I have not been able to find a moment to read them over and put the last hand to them. Adieu,

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[The recent debates on the suppression of the Catholic Association still occupy his mind; and well they might! *Quorum pars magna fuit.*

In pages 151 *et seq.* of vol. ii. of the 'Political Life' will be found an analysis of the state of parties about this time, and of Canning's relations to them; on this question, at page 156, the second paragraph of this letter is quoted verbatim.

It appears that the general outcome of the debates was even at this date, (before the further debate of February 28 on a general motion for Catholic emancipation,) favourable to Canning's power and prestige.

It may be conjectured that the Opposition leaders contemplated, more or less openly, a return to power by a junction with Canning. They could urge some reasonable grounds for such a hope. In foreign politics Canning was undeniably Liberal, not only negatively, by abstention from the councils of the Holy Alliance, but positively, by active defiance of their wishes; as witness the recognition of the Spanish-American republic.

On commercial questions, his friend and ally Mr. Huskisson had given proof of an unprejudiced desire to remove restrictions and promote freedom of trade.

On the Irish question, Canning was the greatest champion of the enfranchisement of the Roman Catholics, and could appeal (as he did in the debate) to the greatest sacrifices for the cause.

With such a record of liberality in his favour, sustained by the well-known fact that he suffered from the jealousy and dislike of his

1825 High Tory colleagues, Brougham and others might reasonably entertain hopes that if they could only detach him from the Government, the High Tory 'rump' must collapse, and then the Opposition might come into office under the premiership of Canning; but they were anticipating the events of two years afterwards.

The division, taken a few days subsequently in the House of Commons, giving a majority in favour of Catholic claims, seemed to prove the possibility of the idea, and the favour Canning acquired amongst the rank and file of the Opposition by his policy and speeches, tended to show how easily they might accept him as Chief.

Every step that was taken appeared to bring them closer together; and the personal *prestige* now possessed by Canning exercised a powerful attraction on the rank and file of the Liberal party of the time.

But plausible as these reasonings might appear, there gaped a wide gulf between the conception and the execution of the scheme.

The men who were secretly willing to support a Liberal Canning Ministry could not bring with them *the whole* of the Opposition; personal and political jealousy and dislike would assuredly keep no small number aloof, as was found to be the case on experiment in 1827.

The Opposition included many who desired a reform of the constitution amounting to little less than revolution.

Canning had pronounced himself decisively against Parliamentary reform, and in favour of Church and King, Lords and Commons, as then constituted.

By uncompromising declarations of Conservative opinions on these points, he had won and still held an influence in the Tory party, which enabled him to act with Wellington, Eldon, and Peel, and to retain his personal predominance in Lord Liverpool's Government.

It was simply impossible for him to desert his Tory friends for the mirage of Whig support.

If his Tory friends deserted him, and a powerful Whig contingent came over to him, he could accept their services without moving from his own political point, as happened in 1827; but a departure from his own well-known political standpoint threatened loss of reputation with both sides, and consequent political ruin.

Out of office, he could make no more way for Catholic emancipation than it had made already. The House of Commons could send it up, and the Lords could throw it out. Moreover, if a reform of Parliament, or a revolutionary agitation overbearing the opposition

of the King and the House of Lords, were publicly understood to be the only means of attaining Catholic emancipation, and that Canning was prepared to lead the attack, without doubt a large section of those who had hitherto voted in the House of Commons for emancipation would have declined to support any longer a measure which, it would then unexpectedly have appeared, could not be passed without imperilling the whole framework of the Constitution. 1825

Peremptorily rejected by a large majority in the House of Commons, the measure would have been despaired of by the Irish people, with what consequences it is not difficult to imagine. Canning then justified his political rectitude in regard to treating Catholic emancipation as a question on which no possible Government could abide to stand or fall; and to limiting his protests in favour of the measure to the persuasive force of a powerful advocacy.

These debates mark an important epoch in Canning's last brilliant five years of office; and deserve the attention which the foregoing observations endeavour to draw to them.

Many people think of him only as a Foreign Minister.

The result of his present effort marks him as a consummate debater; and still more, still higher, still rarer, a persuasive debater; and an orator who, without losing his friends or his principles, could succeed by fair argument in disarming and conciliating opponents.

To return to the text—Canning passes from domestic to foreign affairs; and notes as immediate work firstly, 'Stuart's Instructions,' secondly, 'Lamb's.'

Sir Charles Stuart was at this time designated for the mission to the Emperor of Brazil ('Political Life,' vol. ii. p. 318), with a view to mediate between Portugal and Brazil.

It was accordingly arranged that he should call at Lisbon to ascertain the terms of the Portuguese Government, and then pass on to Rio de Janeiro; but all this did not take place till later in the year.

Sir Frederick Lamb's mission to Madrid held instructions to settle the mutual recriminations of the British and Spanish Governments; Great Britain complaining of the infraction of treaties with respect to facilities for commerce; Spain complaining of smuggling connived at by British officials, and of the harbouring of refugee conspirators in London.

Later on Canning promises to communicate to Lord Granville the answer returned to Count Nesselrode's (Russian) despatch on the recognition of the independence of the Spanish Colonies, and to address to his Lordship a despatch for the French Government relative to the Channel Oyster Fisheries.]

EXTRACT OF OPINION OF THE AUSTRIAN PLENIPOTENTIARY, presented at St. Petersburg on March 4, 1825, on the Greek Question.

1825 Si, contre toute vraisemblance, la Porte déclinait l'intervention des Alliés, ou si, cette intervention une fois admise, elle se refusait absolument à des concessions jugées indispensables pour amener le terme de l'insurrection, les ministres des Cours Alliées s'armeraient d'un langage plus sévère; prendraient une attitude plus imposante. Accusant alors avec justice le Divan seul de la prolongation de ces troubles funestes, dont la réaction se fait sentir en Europe et froisse les intérêts les plus chers des souverains et des peuples, ils en concluraient l'impossibilité de laisser subsister davantage un tel état des choses. Ils feraient pressentir la possibilité de se rapprocher des Grecs, de leur envoyer des agents consulaires et de recevoir les leurs; dire même qu'on pourrait reconnaître chez eux l'existence d'un Gouvernement provisoire et menacer peut-être d'admettre un jour l'indépendance de la Morée et des Iles.

[This memorandum appears to contradict the account given in the 'Political Life,' pp. 434–435. There it is stated that Austria differed from the Russian Government with regard to the principles which were to govern the conference, and with regard to the end to be aimed at; that Austria only sought to gain time and amuse Russia, until the Porte should have quelled the insurrection; that she desired the rebellion to be put down at any rate, and that she decidedly objected to the proceeding desired by Russia that the Porte should be menaced with the withdrawal of the representatives of the Allies if their intervention was refused.

In this memorandum, on the contrary, the Austrian Plenipotentiary submitted as follows:

If, contrary to all probability, the Porte should decline the intervention of the allies, or, if that intervention once admitted, she should refuse absolutely the terms pronounced indispensable for putting an end to the insurrection, the Ministers to the Allied Courts should make use of sterner language, should adopt an attitude more overawing, accusing with justice the Divan alone of being responsible for the prolongation of these melancholy troubles, of which the reaction was felt in Europe, and disturbed the dearest interests of sovereigns and peoples. They would argue the impossibility of per-

mitting the continuance any longer of such a state of things. They would bring before the Porte the possibility of their opening up communications with the Greeks—of sending to Greece Consular Agents, and accepting Greek Consular representatives in return; to remind the Divan that it was possible for the Allies to recognise the establishment amongst the Greeks of a provisional Government, and to warn them of the possibility of a recognition some day of the independence of the Morea and the Isles. 1825

The copy of this remarkable exposition of Austrian views contains a correction in Canning's own handwriting, and is endorsed with instructions in pencil to furnish copies for Lord Granville (Paris), Sir Henry Wellesley (Vienna), Mr. Stratford Canning (St. Petersburg), and Mr. Temple (Berlin).

Its great value lay in its use in the event of a controversy with Austria on liberal principles. Austria had taken upon herself to rebuke the British Government for the recognition of the separated Spanish Colonies; and now, only two months afterwards, she was propounding to her allies at a formal conference the possibility of their finding it expedient to recognise the independence of revolted Greece.

It may be observed that Great Britain was not represented at the conference in question; not improbably a reason why Austria permitted herself so outspoken a declaration of policy more consistent with that of Great Britain than with the principles usually professed by Austria.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: March 9, 1825.

My dear Granville,—My despatch of to-day is made for communication to Villèle. I have no objection to your communicating it hereafter to Metternich himself, if you take to each other. But I will not make up to him nor have him made up to, on my behalf, until I know the rights of 'J'en suis indigné.' As to Damas, you may communicate the enclosures or not, as you like best, but I see no reason for his seeing the despatch. I have just finished Stuart's instructions—oh! what a labour they have been—60 folios—mi-marge to be sure, and not very closely written—but portentous in bulk after all allowance and deduction.

1825 I have taken leave of him to-day, and he will probably sail on Saturday. Express my acknowledgments to Villèle for his promise about Hyde de Neuville, and assure him that what we are about to do, (or to try to do,) between Portugal and Brazil will be as advantageous for France as for ourselves, if we are not thwarted.

There is a M. Gestos at Brazil, a very busybody; with all Chateaubriand's restlessness and vapouring about him I cannot expect his recall; but I wish he was ordered to be quick.

The next that I shall take in hand will be Fredk. Lamb, and with his instructions I will consider well of Cuba. I agree with Villèle in thinking that there is great danger there, and that we have a common interest in preventing it if we can. Ever, my dear Granville,

Sincerely and affectionately yours,

G. C.

P.S.—I have not been out yet, but I think of going down to the H. of C. to-morrow.

[He here sends a despatch, adapted for communication to M. de Villèle, and possibly to Metternich, who was at Paris at this time, but Lord Granville is warned against any appearance of making up to Metternich, until Canning has found out the exact force of his expression 'J'en suis indigné.' ('I am insulted by it,' 'indignant at it.')

Communication to M. de Damas is, however, left to Lord Granville's direction.

What the precise topic might be to which the above-mentioned despatch referred is not clear. It possibly may be a despatch sending Lord Granville formally a copy of the instructions to Sir Charles Stuart, as it subsequently appears in a letter to Lord Granville of April 1, that the instructions were shown to Metternich.

He next congratulates himself on having cleared off the lengthy 'instructions' required for Sir Charles Stuart on his mission of mediation between Portugal and Brazil; and sends a message of acknowledgment to Villèle for the withdrawal of Hyde de Neuville from Lisbon, and for the consequent cessation of hostile intrigues at

Lisbon; he also desires a hint to be given for a partial suppression of a M. Gestos at Brazil. 1825.

We find the Foreign Secretary doing his best by acting at the French head-quarters to get the hindrances removed, which French Diplomatic Agents might otherwise deem it their duty to place in the way of Sir Charles Stuart's mission at Lisbon, and at Rio de Janeiro. In 'Life and Times,' pp. 504–506, there will be found letters from Sir W. A'Court to Mr. Canning, and from Mr. Canning to Lord Granville, of dates of December 18, 1824, and January 15, 1825, respectively, which explain the precise nature of the pressure brought to bear on the Portuguese Government to bring about a change of Ministry; it consisted simply in a threat to withdraw the British squadron in the Tagus, thereby leaving the Portuguese capital exposed to an inroad from a hostile Brazilian naval expedition.

Hyde de Neuville, French Minister at Lisbon, when the change of the Portuguese Administration was accomplished, departed for France by sea, just missing counter-orders which, if reaching him in time, might have detained him at Lisbon; but anyhow he was gone, and Canning had the satisfaction of finding the Portuguese Government formed on a basis of which he approved, and the everlasting irritation of the intriguing French Agent withdrawn.

In referring to his next business, the drafting instructions to Sir F. Lamb at Madrid—he notices the question of Cuba, and the danger which he agrees with Villèle in thinking existed in regard to that Island, whether from the United States, or from the new Spanish States, is not made clear.

It appears that Spain anticipated danger from the United States, who were apprehensive of the intentions of Great Britain with respect to Cuba, and might be expected to take active measures to secure their own interests, unless reassured by some self-denying declaration of the British Government as to that island; whereas lookers on rather expected that Cuba would become the prize of one of the New States, if Spain persisted in keeping up hostilities with them.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Foreign Office: March 11, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I have not heard of the probability of Count Capo d'Istria's recall, except from yourself.

You ask me what you should say to Metternich.

In the first place, you shall hear what I think of him;

1825 that he is the greatest rogue and liar on the Continent, perhaps in the civilised world.

In the second place, you shall learn that I have evidence, which I entirely believe, of his having been for the last twelve months at least, perhaps longer, at the bottom of an intrigue with the Court here—of which Madame de Lieven was the organ—to change the politics of this Government by changing *me*.

Recently, very recently, he is convinced that this intrigue has totally failed, and that there is no chance of renewing it to advantage. Prince Esterhazy had arrived at this conviction some time ago, but he could not so easily impress it upon his principal. Some incredibly unadvised expressions in a letter from too high a quarter to Prince Metternich himself continued the delusion, which P. E. tried to dissipate—Metternich's instructions to P. E. were to keep himself safe—to let Madame Lieven do all; to watch the impression upon the King; but not to commit himself or his Government. So E. has told a person who has reported what P. E. told him to me.

Now you shall know what I would have done, if this intrigue had gone on, and if fortunately the intemperance or miscalculation of the K. had not brought it to a premature *dénouement*, and so been obliged to give in. I would have resigned upon the S. A. question: and I would have declared openly in the H. of C.—taking care to keep safe my sources of intelligence—that I was driven from office by the Holy Alliance; and further, that the system, which I found established of personal communications between the Sovereign and the Foreign Ministers, was one under which no English Minister could do his duty. If, after such a denunciation and the debates which would have followed it, the L.'s and Esterhazy did not find London too hot for them, I know nothing of the present temper of the English nation.

Now, with this knowledge what do you say to the question of what you shall say to Metternich? 1825

I am of opinion—upon politics nothing, until he begins; and then as little as possible till you have reported to me what he has said. I have no sort of hope of any good being done with him by conciliation. But I should be glad that he should know that I know him, and am aware how much I am indebted to him for his good intentions; but that I am nevertheless disposed to be on good terms with him; and to act for the best with him on the points on which we agree. Those points are: first, Brazil, up to a certain possible division, which I will do all that I can to avoid.

The second is, as to gaining time in the Greek Question; though our ways of going about to gain time are very different.

If he talks of coming to England, do not encourage him. But as Esterhazy is going to meet him at Paris, I trust that he has given up the notion of a visit to Windsor. He would have come to triumph, I would not advise him to come to intrigue.—Ever, my dear Granville,

Yours sincerely and affectionately,

GEO. CANNING.

[Part of this letter has been published: but the name of Madame de Lieven was left out, and also the paragraphs referring to the personal communication with Metternich, which may be from the King, or from the Duke of Wellington; and to Canning's contemplated appeal to the people of England, both subjects of the highest interest; and as Madame Lieven's character for political intrigue is thoroughly well known this time; as George IV., personally and politically, has been the target for innumerable attacks; as Wellington's hostility to Canning's policy appears in his published letters, and Canning's open-handed scheme for counteracting the hostile intrigues he discovered only reflects credit on himself, no reason appears to exist for suppressing these passages any longer.

But at the time they were written, secrecy was peremptory; as is obvious from the position of the persons referred to in the letter.

1825 —— The endorsement of the copy mentions that, the copy having been begun to be made by one of the clerks of the Foreign Office, it was hastily withdrawn from him by Canning and handed to his private Secretary, Mr. Stapleton, with strict injunctions to let no one see it.

Without distrusting anyone, it is a sound principle, if you want to keep a secret, to limit the number of persons who must know it o the fewest number possible.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: March 25, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I have nothing official to send you to-day, but to-morrow or Monday I shall send (by an attaché on his road to Madrid) a copy of the answer which I return this day to M. Zea's official note of January.

I address this answer to Los Rios, by whose courier it goes to-day. I have purposely deferred answering Zea's note, first, until the issue of Bolivar's expedition should be known (a reason for delay which I avow); secondly, (a reason which I do not avow) until the Holy Alliance should have spoken their sentiments and taken their line upon the South American Question. I avail myself of the opportunity of replying to their doctrines of legitimacy, and contemplate great pleasure in reading my note to Lieven, Esterhazy, and above all to the odious and offensive Malzahn.

I have received through another channel similar expressions to those which you have heard from Vincent of a wish to be good friends again, and coming I have reason to believe directly from Metternich—with all my heart. The Brazilian instructions will help; and you may promise him the Spanish for early next week.

I am not well yet. Essentially I have shaken off the gout itself, but its effect remains still in my foot and lames me.

Ever affectionately yours,

G. C.

[Canning is still in the midst of the diplomatic conflict arising out of the British recognition of the independence of the Spanish Colonies; and the excitement of the struggle is much intensified by the proximity of Metternich.] 1825

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O: Good Friday, April 1, 1825.

My dear Granville,—It is a sin to be here at all to-day; much more heinous would it be to write despatches or even private letters of any magnitude.

I will content myself, therefore, with acknowledging yours of Monday; and, after condoling with you on your rheumatism, and informing you that my gout, or rather the debility which was the consequence of it, is beginning perceptibly to mend, (tho' I do not yet walk without my stick, on which I supported myself the night of the Catholic Question), will only add for the present that I very much wish that in giving an account of your conferences you would not (from modesty or any other cause) retrench your own part of the dialogue.

This was particularly undesirable in your conference with Metternich, whose doctrines find but too favourable a reception still with some who read your despatches, and to whom it is no satisfaction, or rather, perhaps, in one sense it is a great satisfaction, to see nothing opposed to them but the assurance that you made the obvious answers. To those of whom I am speaking the answers are not so obvious; they have heard them indeed from me more than perhaps they like; but for that very reason it is to be desired that they should read them in other versions than mine.

You say quite enough of Metternich's temper and complaints to prove to me that he is quite incorrigible; but I wish you would ask him, when next he gives you an opportunity, what he means by the identical object which the Archives of our respective offices show to

1825 have been in our common contemplation. He will answer the peace of the world, but you must not be put off with that: does he mean that it was even understood by us as an object on which England was agreed with the Alliance—to put down liberty or Jacobinism—or Revolution, call it which he will, within any other country, France alone excepted? This is a plain question. Let him answer it, aye or no. He will be the better prepared for it after reading my note to M. Los Rios.

He is quite wrong about the title of Emperor; it is essentially elective. His master was elected Emperor of Germany, and, not one of the Cæsars, whom he succeeded, became Emperor without the form of an election.

It is true that his Minister subsequently threw off voluntarily, to avoid the necessity of resigning compulsorily, the title to which he was chosen, and assumed another which the Conqueror allowed him to wear, and which the courtesy or compassion of Europe sanctioned.

It is true also that the title of Czar was tacitly allowed to be changed for that of Emperor in Russia.

There is also an Emperor in Morocco, and one in China, but the usages of Asia and Africa furnish no examples for Europe. In Europe the title of Emperor can be traced only to the Imperator of Rome, who whether he was *salutatus Imperator* in the field of battle by his soldiers, or called to the succession by adoption, and confirmed, however unwillingly or unnecessarily, by the Senate, was uniformly an elective officer.

This, however, is a very immaterial criticism of Prince Metternich's, and I am really glad that he so much approves of the instructions to Stuart, because his co-

operation has hitherto been apparently cordial, and the continuance of it is of great importance. 1825

Ever sincerely and affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This is an amusing letter, whether in regard to the writer's compunction at doing office work on Good Friday, or his remonstrances with Lord Granville on the insufficiency of the reports in his despatches, or his views of the title of 'Emperor.'

The letter explains itself, and the only points worth noticing are Canning's anxiety that the British Representatives abroad should echo the arguments, with which he furnished them, in support of his policy; so that the King and the High Tory members of the Government, when they saw the despatches, might have the benefit of the defence of Canning's policy propounded in other language by other statesmen, and also that the discussion on the title of Emperor no doubt arose from the question of the new Empire of Brazil, brought more particularly before Metternich and Villèle in consequence of their being allowed to see a copy of the instructions to Sir Charles Stuart, on the occasion of Sir Charles' errand to establish peace between Portugal and Brazil.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

G. L.: April 19, 1825.

My dear Granville,—To-day is the day of the second reading of the R. C. Bill; and of my first appearance in the H. of C. since March.

I wish I were stouter than I am; but if to-night and the Levée of to-morrow do not throw me materially back, I shall flatter myself that I am advancing towards complete recovery. My last account of myself has turned out to be rather too sanguine.

Morley sets out to-morrow for Paris. His departure is unluckily timed, and should our common enemy the gout interfere (as why may it not?) to prevent his return for the going up of the R. C. Bill to the Lords—his absence would be liable to very great misconstruction.

He has your proxy and another—Lord Sligo's—both of which I must get renewed for fear of accident.

1825 Stapleton will send one for your signature. Of course I will not put it into other hands till the last moment; but we must be prepared for the chance. Morley also must sign one for himself.

I have no means of judging what is likely to be the issue of to-day. But Morley will bring you word. I have told him he may set your mind at ease as to the effect of Esterhazy's new Mission if he had one. He was two days at the cottage, but he certainly did not see its owner alone.

Ever affectionately yours,

G. C.

[Canning again finds himself bound to reappear in House of Commons; and is regretting his deficiency in physical strength. His constitution was not otherwise than a strong one for ordinary Office life, but it unhappily proved unequal to the heavy strain of Office and House of Commons work together, aggravated by excessive responsibility, and the incessant wear of encountering and defeating attacks.

Adverting to the departure for Paris of his great friend in the House of Lords, the Earl of Morley, he dwells on the arrangements necessary to bring the proxies of his supporters in the Lords into play on the next division in the Upper House on the Catholic question. The 'very great misconstruction' to which he refers, indicates his apprehensions that, notwithstanding his own efforts in the Commons, if it happened that the Bill for the Relief of Roman Catholics was lost in the Lords by the absence of Canning's particular supporters headed by Lord Morley, the inference would be drawn that he, Canning, was playing a double game, pretending to support Catholic emancipation in the Commons, while secretly encouraging an opposition in the Lords for the sake of preserving his own personal popularity amongst the Tories.

It was the suspicion that Canning had played such a game before on the occasion of the Queen's Trial which had brought down on his head a good deal of the King's personal resentment against him, and also some public obloquy which can be traced in the language of his opponents. So it was desirable that the same *contretemps* should not again recur; and that as far as possible the votes of Canning's friends in the Lords should be duly recorded on the right side. The Relief

Bills, however, did not reach the House of Lords until May 11, and the division on the second reading did not take place till May 17. 1825

But at the date of this letter the second reading of the Relief Bill was moved in the House of Commons, the debate adjourned to April 21, and the motion carried on that day by a majority of 268 against 241.

Esterhazy, the Austrian Ambassador, on behalf of Metternich had returned and had paid a visit to the King, in order to influence the Court against Canning, but so far with little apparent success.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Gloucester Lodge: April 19, 1825.

My dear Granville,—There are three or four points in your late despatches upon which I shall write to you officially when I have time. But in the meanwhile, I think it expedient to tell you generally in what sense you should talk to Villèle upon them.

1st. Saint Domingo. Assure M. V. that I have not the least design to embarrass him, nor the least wish to deal with the matter at all, so long as I can avoid it. But it will come upon me. I have staved it off from time to time, and I will do so still if I can. But I am in the power of the Haytian Government, which may at any hour force me to some declaration, by fiscal regulations regarding British commerce. M. V. may be assured that he is totally mistaken in the belief that the British Government has agents in the island.

2nd. Cuba. I feel as strongly all the dangers that threaten Spain in this quarter as M. V. But the cure? I have some reason to believe that Polignac is instructed, or is disposed without instruction, (I would not undertake to say which), to hint at the possibility of the occupation of the Havannah by France. That will never do. If you detect any indications of a similar disposition in V. you cannot discourage them too promptly. When we proposed last year to assure Cuba to Spain, if she

1825 would acknowledge Mexico and Columbia and employ our intervention, we had reason to believe that we could have negotiated to that effect with those States. And we intended, while that negotiation was going on, to afford Naval protection to the island. But it never entered into our contemplation to land a man at the Havannah. If France wishes to secure to Spain the possession of Cuba—the Recognition of Mexico and Columbia on that condition is the only course which France can safely advise. Every other would lead to mischief. It surely cannot be supposed that we would suffer France to occupy the Colonies of Spain, as well as Spain itself; and this leads me to—

3rd. Cadiz. The rumours of fortifications seem to make great impression, and create some alarm here. Ask V. amicably (telling him that you have no official instructions to do so) what these fortifications mean? And observe to him that the time approaches when I shall have to answer questions in Parliament upon the subject of the French occupation of Spain. Cadiz, above all, will be a subject of jealousy. I will speak confidently upon his assurances through you; but the fortifications being a new matter, since we last communicated upon the subject, I want these assurances to be renewed.

4. Are they considering of our oyster discussion?—Ever, my dear Granville,

Yours sincerely and affectionately,

GEO. CANNING.

[This is a letter of the same date as the last.

It is inscribed 'private and political;' it contains instructions bearing the character of the 'markings' to guide Lord Granville in his intercourse with the French Prime Minister, M. de Villèle, on the important points in which both Powers were interested.

(1.) *Hayti.*—After a negotiation extending from the date of the Restoration in France to August 1824, the French Government, by

bribes and cajolery, induced the Haytian President, one Boyer, to accept an Ordonnance of the French King, declaring the entire independence of the French part of the Island of San Domingo, subject to special favour in respect of duties on imports from France, and to a payment of 150 millions of francs: difficulties at first appeared in inducing the Haytian Government to accept the independence thus *octroyée* to them; but under the influence of Baron Mackam, a French naval officer, in command of a ship on the West Indian Station, M. J. P. Boyer, President of the Haytian Republic, formally accepted the terms of France in a Proclamation, dated July 11, 1825. 1825

No doubt by this management the French Government saved appearances in respect of legitimate principles, and at the same time profited heavily by the fine (as it were) levied in the new Republic.

But one or two drawbacks presented themselves: the compliant Haytian Government proceeded to degrade Great Britain without delay from the commercial advantages of being fiscally the 'most 'favoured nation,' by increasing the import duty on British manufactured goods from seven to twelve per cent.: this promised presently some difficulties with the British Government; besides, there were strong symptoms of discontent ripe in the Island at the Haytian bargain with France, which while Boyer suppressed without serious trouble, no doubt remained none the less significant tokens of discernment on the part of the Haytians of the corrupt nature of the acceptance of the terms of the royal grant of independence.

Canning, in the letter before us, wishes that Villèle should know how the British Government desire to disclaim any intention of interference in the Haytian affair, unless it should be forced to '*some* declaration' by fiscal regulations 'regarding British commerce.'

From the account given above of the relations between France and Hayti, it might be safely inferred that France, in truth, prompted all the attacks on British commerce ventured by that Republic.

Canning accordingly directed a hint to be addressed to the French Government that they might do what they like in their own relations with Hayti, so long as British commerce met with fair treatment, otherwise he might be forced to take some action to protect it.

(2.) *Cuba.*—Here we find again stirring in disguise the old but concealed question of compensation sought by France in Spanish America for losses in connection with her occupation of Spain.

The difficulties of Spain in connection with her continued preser-

1825 vation of sovereignty over Cuba had been hinted by Prince Polignac, the French Foreign Minister, to constitute a satisfactory pretext for an occupation of Havannah by French troops; this idea, Canning told Lord Granville, should be at once extinguished: the guarantee offered by Great Britain to Spain in respect of Cuba, if Spain would recognise the independence of Mexico and Columbia, accompanied by a tender of naval protection for Cuba, differed entirely from the French proposal of a temporary military occupation of the Havannah.

(3.) *Cadiz.*—On this point the letter explains itself: the French Government were to be warned against giving an appearance of contemplating a permanent occupation of Spain, which any expenditure on fortifications at Cadiz would suggest; and also against any idea that the proceeding might escape notice, as questions in the British Parliament would soon attract the attention of Europe to the matter.

(4.) *The Channel Islands Oyster Fisheries.*—Have the French Government got the matter in hand?]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

G. L.: April 26, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—A thousand thanks to Lady Liverpool and to you for your kind note of yesterday, on the subject of which I will speak to Holland as soon as I am in a state to move, but at present I am bound literally hand and foot.

I send you a letter from one of our Consuls in America, which I think requires consideration.

I am not sure among all our thousand undertakings whether we have an isthmus (Panama) cutting company or not, but it will certainly be very provoking to pay tolls to the Yankees.

Ever yours, G. C.

[The first paragraph evidently refers to a friendly suggestion from Lord and Lady Liverpool for the better medical treatment of Canning's gout; as to which Canning promises to consult Dr. Holland as soon as possible.

A letter from a Consul in America is mentioned, but as to the subject there is no clue.

The last paragraph laments in familiar phrase the possibility of

a British Panama Canal Company paying toll to the Government of the United States; but why, as the United States did not then, and do not now, control the Isthmus, is again obscure; though possibly it appeared more imminent then than it does now.] 1825

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

G. L.: May 18, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I have given directions for summoning a Cabinet for Friday at two. I have chosen that day, fearing that you and perhaps others might wish to get away on Saturday for the holidays.

But if you prefer to-morrow, pray take the trouble of sending word to the F. O. to summon the Cabinet for to-morrow. It is the same to me.

My object—I think it right to let you know—is to bring before the Cabinet the state of the question which has occupied so unprofitably so large a portion of the session.

I have not communicated my intention to any one of my colleagues, nor shall I.

But if you wish to see me before we meet at the Cabinet I will call upon you when you please.

Ever sincerely yours,

G. C.

[Canning has convoked a Cabinet Council, with a view to bring the position of the 'Catholic question' before it.

He wrote this note the day after, or rather on the same day as, that on which in the early morning the Catholic Relief Bill, sent up from the Commons, had been defeated on the second reading by a majority of 48 in the House of Lords.

The 'Annual Register' records, no doubt with truth, that far from winning its way with the public, the cause of Catholic Emancipation lost heavily during this Session; notwithstanding many petitions in its favour, the numbers of those against it were largely increased 'the longer the subject occupied public attention;' and 'the failure of the proposed measure was generally acceptable both 'in England and Scotland.'

This inclination of public opinion had acquired particular force

1825 from the recent conduct of the Catholic Association, only just suppressed by special powers being entrusted to the Executive Government; and expression had been emphatically given to the anti-Catholic side of public opinion by the solemn declaration of the Duke of York, and the decided language of Lord Liverpool in the debate on the second reading in the House of Lords, both irreconcileably opposed to Emancipation.

Canning (according to the 'Political Life,' vol. ii. p. 170) was unprepared for the decisive hostility of Lord Liverpool's tone on this occasion; and from this note we find he lost no time in taking action to neutralise, as far as possible, the injury to the cause he had in hand.

The action he took left as a permanent advantage the withdrawal of the Catholic question from the position of being entirely excluded from Cabinet consideration, and its transference to the class of questions of national interest, any one of which Canning might, when he liked, propound for discussion in the Cabinet.

But the action in question also included a proposal for 'some 'sort of compromise with his colleagues, which should remove all 'ground of complaint on the part of the "Catholics" on the one hand, 'and do away with all reasonable ground of fear by their opponents 'on the other.' So says the 'Political Life,' which also asserts that several Cabinets were occupied about this time with the Catholic question.

The 'Political Life' declines to say what shape Canning's proposal took; but leaves it for certain that there was a proposal, and that he could not obtain the consent of the Cabinet thereto.

With anticipation of these struggles in Council before him, Canning wrote the letter to Lord Liverpool on the subject of the Cabinet he had convoked.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Gloucester Lodge: May 27, 1825.

My dear Granville,—The discussion in the House of Commons last night will, I hope, have cured some of the evil arising from the decision of the Lords, or rather from the tone of that decision—for nobody expected other than a defeat; but the vehemence of L.'s speech was an astounding disappointment. M. Villèle will see that I have announced the determination to which he wished me to come.

As you will be at Rheims when this letter reaches Paris, I need not make it longer. 1825

I will only add, therefore, that I get better every day.

Your Bath concerns are in Planta's hands.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[The discussion in the House of Commons, here mentioned, was probably the debate on Mr. Spring Rice's motion for production of correspondence between the Home Office and the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (the M. of Wellesley) on which Canning had proclaimed his intention to hold himself free to bring the Catholic question when he pleased before the Cabinet.

Which had the effect of somewhat soothing the Irish irritation at the decision of the Lords.

But on the occasion of the debate above mentioned, Brougham again insisted that if Canning chose to withdraw or to threaten a withdrawal, his anti-catholic colleagues would certainly yield on the question and allow him to carry emancipation.

In the 'Political Life,' vol. ii. p. 172–3, it is stated that Canning had reflected carefully on the question of a resignation on his part in respect of the Catholic question, but had decided (as has been already shown) against such a proceeding.

In fact, he was perfectly right. Public feeling out of doors in Great Britain did not, at this time, sustain the decision of the majority of the House of Commons, and, under such circumstances, Canning's retirement would not have appeared, as it should, in the light of an appeal from the House of Lords to the nation at large.

The rest of the letter relates to small matters, except a remark that Villèle would see an announcement that Canning had arrived at the determination the French Government wished, evidently to continue in office.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: June 3, 1825.

My dear Granville,—Morley tells me that he has informed you generally of the nature and effect of what I thought it right to do, after the defeat of the Catholic Bill in the House of Lords; and the report of the

1825 debate in the House of Commons on Thursday, 26th ult., will have relieved you and Villèle from any apprehension of the consequences.

If we can get a quiet summer and autumn in Ireland and a quiet session next year in Parliament upon this subject (supposing no dissolution), or a new Parliament (supposing one) in as good principles as the present, I think the cause will be gained. But the first condition, the quiet in Ireland, is indispensable, and upon it will mainly depend the possibility of either of the two alternatives which I have stated as favourable. A dissolution at present would give us a no Popery Parliament, and array England against Ireland. Ireland in a state of disturbance would have a similar effect upon dissolution at any time. To meet the question again in this Parliament would be at once useless and hazardous—hazardous because the approaching dissolution would frighten almost all who sit for populous places in England, and useless, because having already sent up a Catholic Bill to the House of Lords three times (my Bill of 1822 included) a fourth declaration of this same Parliament would be no new authority to the Lords, and it is by a new authority only that they can feel justified in changing their vote.

We hope to have Parliament up by the end of this month. The Duke of Cumberland is probably our last object of contention.

Everything abroad seems still. I may know what passed in the conferences at St. Petersburg if I choose to ask Lieven or Maltzahn. But I have very little curiosity, and since the autocrat imposed the silence, he may keep or break it as he likes best.

Ever affectionately yours,

G. C.

[The writer mentions that the critical condition of affairs had passed away. 1825

Lord Granville and Villèle had been apprehensive lest the defeat of the Catholic Bill in the Lords, coupled with Lord Liverpool's particularly strong language against it, might lead to Canning's resignation; but this had been avoided. Canning had succeeded in placing the question on a different footing in the Cabinet. It had become permissible to discuss it. This made a distinct and valuable step in advance; if Canning retired, the advantage would be thrown away without counterbalancing gain; but he was now able to reconcile continuance in a Government which included colleagues strongly opposed to emancipation, with his own principles, as thereby solid progress was made towards its eventual success.

Villèle, the Prime Minister of the French Legitimist monarchy, disliked the idea of the loss of the Liberal Foreign Secretary of England; yet their principles were ostensibly opposed. It is true French troops yet occupied Spain, still, on the other hand, French aggrandisement in the West Indies was held in check.

From what has been already pointed out on the subject of the 'confidences' between the two Ministers, it may be conjectured that dislike of the surviving impulses of the Holy Alliance was a feeling common to both, and constituted their bond of union.

The consequence of supporting Catholic emancipation to candidates for seats in a new House of Commons in case of a dissolution is considered, and thought to be very unfavourable to the success of the measure.

A quiet Ireland, and a delayed dissolution promise the best results—then the House of Lords might in the end fairly yield.

Canning exults in the contempt which circumstances enable him to retort on the Russian Emperor.

The Czar ostentatiously excluded Great Britain from the Conferences at St. Petersburg on Greek affairs.

Great Britain had the satisfaction of seeing the Conferences end in nullity, or at least in results not worth the knowing.]

MR. CANNING TO EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

G. L.: June 6, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—The enclosed hints are worth your reading.

I have been reflecting a good while on the difficulty in which we are likely to be placed by the intended Congress of American States—more especially if, as is

1825 not improbable, the U. S. of North America are invited to send a deputy to it.

Shall we send any Minister there, if invited or uninvited, or shall we take no notice of it?

Either is embarrassing: but I incline to think the last—though the easiest—the most dangerous course of conduct.

Yet if we send, to what specific purpose?

Pray turn this question in your mind, and let us talk of it at your first leisure.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Sends somebody's memorandum of valuable hints, presumably on the question of the rest of the letter, viz., a proposed Congress of American States, old and new, to be held (according to endorsement on the letter) at Panama.

The problem of choosing one out of the various kinds of action open to Great Britain in respect of such a congress, is stated in clear and succinct terms.

The topics of discussion would probably be chiefly commercial, and questions of mutual customs duties.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Foreign Office: June 7, 1825.

My dear Granville,—We got through the Duke of Cumberland's business last night much better than I expected.

It is inconceivable to what a degree the prejudice against his Royal Highness exists. But the Whigs—as they always do—pushed the hostility to such an extent, that people began to cry out 'persecution,' and so (for I can no otherwise account for it) we had two respectable and growing majorities last night, and as often happens the larger numbers upon the worse question. I suppose we shall have another division to-night and another upon the third reading on Friday, but I take the struggle to

be over. I went down yesterday prepared to be beaten, at least upon the question of amount. 1825

After this week, I trust we shall not have any contentious matter in the House, at least none to occasion late nights or anxious discussions.

I have nothing official to send you to-day. But on Friday I expect to have ready for you a reply to Polignac's answer to the Oyster Fishery letter, which reply I shall desire the Chargé d'Affaires to forward to Prince P. at Paris. It is absolutely necessary to bring that dispute to a settlement, else it may grow into something very serious.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This only reports unexpected success of Government in settling the Duke of Cumberland's affairs, and the amazing unpopularity of H.R.H. The measure in question was an Act to grant 6,000*l.* a year for the expenses of the education of Prince George of Cumberland, until H.H. should be eighteen years of age.

It also expresses determination to settle the Channel Islands Oyster Fishery dispute with the French, as possibly leading to serious trouble.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: June 21, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I am not ripe for writing to you officially on either of the two subjects on which I have lately heard from you—Cuba and St. Domingo, as they require to be settled in Cabinet, and in the last fortnight (as I hope) of the session I cannot find time to bring them under discussion, but I can tell you, generally, what is my impression on both, and you may safely talk to Villèle in the sense of that impression, though you could not properly do so with Damas.

As to St. Domingo, I think it will be allowed that we have behaved with exemplary good faith and forbearance. Twelve per cent. has been added to the

5281 duties upon our merchandise by the Government of Hayti, because we have not acknowledged their independence, and in reward for this sacrifice made to France we are taught to expect a disadvantage of fifty per cent. whenever France thinks fit to make this acknowledgment. Be it so; if the arrangement between France and St. Domingo is carried into effect, we will forgive this enormous and (as I confess I think) most ill-conceived imposition in consideration of its effect, moral, if not practical, upon the question between Spain and her colonies.

But if it fails, France can hardly expect that we should wait for ever. We must then be at liberty to consider the obligation of our secret article as exhausted.

It will be a little too much to expect that we will go on to the end of time suffering from Hayti on our side, with a knowledge of what is to be inflicted upon us by France on the other, without letting the world know why we exhibit, contrary to our temper and our policy, such patient and almost ludicrous deference to France.

When I say the obligation of our secret article, I mean as well to observe the stipulation as that to keep it still secret: but first and more particularly the latter.

As to Cuba, you cannot too soon, nor too amicably of course, represent to Villèle the impossibility of our allowing France (or France us, I presume,) to meddle in the internal affairs of that colony.

We sincerely wish it to remain with the mother country. Next to that I wish it independent, either singly or in connection with Mexico. But what cannot or must not be, is that any great maritime Power should get possession of it.

The Americans (Yankees, I mean) think of this matter just as I do.

I hope that what Villèle and Damas tell you of the convoy of Spanish troop-ships by French men-of-war is

true. I mean, that it was an unauthorised act on the part of the Government of Martinique; that it has been disavowed and blamed by the Government, and that the like is prohibited for the future. 1825

But I confess I have my doubts, whether it was not (a prescribed I will not say, but) a permitted experiment, to see how far a French force might be incidentally and imperceptibly slipped into the Havannah. Villèle ought to know that our eyes are open to the possibility of such a manœuvre. He ought to know, too, that we would not put up with it. It is precisely in colonial matters that I fear Villèle's prudence may desert him. He is essentially colonial himself, and in that part of the world the alliance would not only check his views of French aggrandisement, but would probably push him on to anything which they might hope would compromise him with England.

This is enough to keep you in the right track till I can send you regular instructions on these subjects. So adieu!

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Pending an opportunity of writing officially, Canning imparts to Lord Granville a sketch of the line to be taken in communication with the French Ministers (M. de Villèle, the Prime Minister, and M. de Damas, the Minister for Foreign Affairs) in respect of Hayti and Cuba.

This letter continues and confirms the instructions given in the letter of April 19, already quoted on the same subjects. The hostile treatment of British trade with San Domingo is accepted without active resentment or retaliation, in consideration of the example set to Spain, of a colony formally released from its allegiance, and of attempts at recovery laid aside. In return for his forbearance, France was expected to find opportunity to secure a sympathetic form of government in Hayti, and to preserve a measure of influence as a benevolent mother country. But if she failed in attaining these ends, Great Britain claimed to be free to call upon Hayti for more equitable terms for her trade with that Island.

1825 —

It seems a secret treaty article, stipulating for the abstention of Great Britain from interference in the transactions between France and San Domingo, existed between France and England. From what is said in a subsequent letter of July 12, it appears certain that the 'secret article' owed its existence to Lord Castlereagh.

With regard to Cuba, Canning only wishes to renew his warning to Villèle against any French designs, open or disguised, upon the Havannah. Taking notice of a proceeding of the French Fleet in the West Indies in conveying some Spanish troops to the Havannah, which bore a suspicious resemblance to bringing about that a French force should be 'unexpectedly' found in occupation of that port, Canning required that this proceeding should be disowned by the French Government.

He watches Villèle's colonial policy carefully, at precisely where he apprehends Villèle's prudence may desert him.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: June 28, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I hoped to have been able to have moved the adjournment of the House of Commons to-day, but we have still some awkward and disagreeable business before us; and till that is disposed of I know not how to reckon on the termination of the session.

However, we shall make an effort to get rid of these impediments to-day; and by Friday I hope we shall be clear.

Till we are so you must not expect to hear from me.

The latter end of this session has been infinitely more annoying than the beginning, not from anything affecting Government as government, but from various petty and vexatious questions which give more trouble than they are worth, and which it is as unpleasant to deal with as if they were of the most vital importance to the existence of the Government.

It is now only four o'clock, but I must go down to the House, to stay there perhaps till one or two in the morning, and nothing to show for it

The mass of public business which has been gone through in this session is beyond all example. 1825

Ever affectionately yours,

G. C.

[Grumbles at the various petty and vexatious questions which beset him in the House of Commons; more trouble than they are worth, and unpleasant as if of vital importance to the Government.

Amongst others, at this time, were discussions as to the conduct of Lord Charles Somerset in his government of the Cape Colony, which had been seriously attacked in Parliament, and, like all 'personal' questions, had a tendency to get the Government into difficulties.

There had also been a sharp debate as to colonial trade.

In the West Indies, the treatment of missionaries who were accused of prompting the slaves to insurrection had given occasion for much warm debating in the Commons.

Lastly, the indiscreet conduct, or misconduct, of Mr. Kenrick, a Surrey magistrate, was repeatedly brought before Parliament, and caused an immensity of trouble. As leader of the House of Commons, Canning had to be intelligently cognisant of all these cases.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Foreign Office: July 8, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I hope to write to you on Tuesday upon St. Domingo and upon Cuba.

Meantime there are two points relating to those subjects respectively, upon which I may as well prepare you in this manner.

1. M. de Villèle talked of the blockade of the ports of St. Domingo as the alternative consequent upon a refusal of the terms offered by France.

What does he mean by a blockade? The right of blockading a port against the access of a third Power is a belligerent right. As such we should, of course, respect it, France being at war with St. Domingo.

But we should, equally of course, respect it only according to the rights and usages of war. If M. V. means any other sort of obstruction to our intercourse with St. Domingo, he will find himself mistaken.

1825

2. The Columbian agent here, M. de Villèle's correspondent and friend (Hurtado), assures me, that the French Government have allowed their ships to be employed in carrying officers with despatches for the Spanish Government to the Colonies.

He specifies the French ship of war 'Medea,' as having taken such despatches from Cadiz.

Is M. de Villèle not aware that this, as well as the convoying of Spanish troops, is a direct violation of neutrality as between Spain and her late colonies—if the despatches related to operations of war? This is perhaps no business of ours in itself, but inasmuch as it tends to involve France in the contest it becomes matter of very serious consideration.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Continuing his above quoted letter of June 21, Canning is still only promising official letters on the subject of San Domingo and Cuba; but, in the meanwhile, prepares his correspondent for what is coming, by declaring an intention to find out precisely the force of M. de Villèle's menace of a blockade of the ports of San Domingo, as an alternative consequent upon a refusal of the terms offered by France. The right of blockade is a belligerent right. If France blockades San Domingo, it can only be on the footing of a declared hostility to the state of San Domingo. Then France must accept all the consequences, on both sides of the question, of being at war with San Domingo. No other kind of obstruction to trade with that island will be admitted by Great Britain.

With respect to Cuba, it seems that French ships of war had been allowed to carry despatches for the Spanish Government to the colonies. M. de Villèle is to be warned that if the despatches related to operations of war, this proceeding constituted as great a violation of neutrality in the conflict between Spain and her colonies, as the convoying of Spanish troops to their destination; this last infringement of equal neutrality received attention in the previous letter on the same subject.

It should be noted that M. Hurtado, the agent in Great Britain of the new state Columbia, is marked as 'the friend and corre-

'spondent' of Villèle; also that none the less Hurtado was not thereby restrained from reporting to the British Government the French breach of neutrality.] 1825

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: July 12, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I send you by this evening's courier, according to my promise, instructions: 1. Ample upon the point of precedency; 2. Sufficient, but not exhausting the subject upon St. Domingo; 3. Partial and introductory to a more full exposition upon Cuba, &c.

Upon the first his Majesty is entirely with me, the rather, perhaps, because the whole Corps Diplomatique offended him grievously, by going away in a body before supper at his Majesty's ball at St. James's. The King commissioned me to snub Lieven as *doyen* of the Corps; and I have this day administered that snubbing at the same time that I communicated the despatch upon precedency.

2. The secret article is very perplexing. Have you it? If not, here it is. Did ever British minister sign such a one before? Think of the Duke of Wellington's never having heard of it.

3. The Americans feel about Cuba just as I do. Speak seriously to Villèle about the discretion entrusted to Donzelot. How strange to put the chance of peace or war into the hands of agents over whom they have so little control.

Hyde de Neuville might have plagued them into war by bringing the garrison of Badajoz into Lisbon, and M. de V. may depend on it Count Donzelot would plague them into war, if he were to send a French regiment into the Havannah.

I go to-morrow (or the next day) to Seaford for a week's repose.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

1825 [Instructions on the questions of (1) Precedency, (2) of San Domingo, the separating French colony, and (3) of Cuba, the exposed and unprotected Spanish colony, have at length been despatched.

They have by this time run the gauntlet of the Cabinet, and the criticism of the King. On the question of 'precedency,' his Majesty, being displeased with the Corps Diplomatique in London for deserting his evening party before supper, was content to agree with Canning. In fact, he had authorised the Foreign Minister to 'snub' Prince Lieven as the 'doyen' of the Corps, for their disrespectful behaviour on the occasion in question; so he was quite prepared to support the assertion of English diplomatic dignity abroad.

With regard to the secret treaty article with France on the subject of San Domingo, Canning finds it 'very perplexing,' is amazed at its existence, and surprised that the Duke of Wellington had never heard of it. (See antecedent letter to Lord Granville of June 21, 1825.) In fact, it tied the hands of England at a very difficult conjuncture.

On the subject of Cuba, Canning obviously apprehended considerable danger from the indiscreet snatches which the French persisted in making at the islands. He presses on Lord Granville, again as before, the necessity of warning M. de Villèle of the possible results of the excessive license allowed to the French agents: recalling the dangerous conduct of M. Hyde de Neuville in summoning a French regiment from the garrison at Badajoz to occupy Lisbon; which did not take place, but, had it happened, might have led to war; and pointing out the parallel position of Count Donzelot, and the hostile proceedings which would follow on the occupation of Havannah by a French regiment.

In the letters to Lord Granville reiterating warnings to the French Premier of the instant consequences of a French occupation of the Havannah or Cuba, we may perceive in progress, and expressed in colloquial language, the actual menaces by which Canning strove, and with success, to restrain the French Government from resorting to forcible means of compensating itself in the West Indian dominions of Spain, for the unprofitable nature of their recent raid on the political institutions of the European division of their neighbour, and also for the loss of their own San Domingo.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Wortley: August 6, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—My interview with Mr. King, 1825
at Cheltenham, was entirely satisfactory, so far as the ascertainment of his personal disposition, and that of the general disposition of his Government, is concerned. But I doubt whether he has instructions to do any act, or to take any engagement for the specific object of Cuba. He requested me, however, to furnish him with a memorandum of the state of that question; with respect to which I found him less informed than I expected, and relying with a simpleness which appeared quite childish on the good sense of the Continental Powers, for the advice which they would give to Spain, and on the awakened good sense of Spain for listening to that advice when given.

I set him right upon these points; on which, if his Government blunder as sincerely as he appears to do, there is perhaps no harm done beyond the loss of time, but if—as the suspicion sometimes comes across me—this bonhomie is affected by the U. S. G. [United States Government] for the express purpose of being enabled to cry out and take a new line on the disappointment of their groundless expectations, why then the Yankees may be just the rogues that we have always hitherto taken them to be, but which I was willing to hope they might have resolved to be no longer.

I shall bring King to a point upon this matter by relating to him (what Granville's last despatches report) the French refusal of the overture of the United States Government, which seems to have been in substance the same as that to Petersburg.

I will send you a copy of my memorandum.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

1825 P.S.—I hope Planta has shown you my private letter to Lamb.

[This relates to the question of Cuba. Canning had seen Mr. King, the representative of the United States, having met him at Cheltenham.

Mr. King's demeanour seemed based on an extreme ignorance of facts, and on a fond confidence of the United States Government, and of Mr. King himself, in the good intentions and sound sense of Spain and the Continental Powers. This extreme innocence, if genuine, might lead only to delay, but it reasonably enough aroused the suspicions of Canning, who discerned that it was capable of being utilised by the United States to their own advantage, if their feigned anticipation of good conduct on every side met with disappointment.

His severe allusion to United States diplomacy about this period was not altogether without justification; a general tone of sharpness and 'smartness' in dealings with one's fellow-men will inevitably call up unpleasant retorts about 'rogues.' Occasional lapses from honesty often fail to produce such a sense of 'roguery' as a continuous display of 'smartness,' which manages to keep just within the line, but betrays the animus of overreaching in business.

However he might distrust Mr. King's apparent simplicity, he foregoes no chance of instructing that simplicity, and of rendering persistent 'innocence' valueless for the future; so the French refusal of an overture of the United States on the subject of Cuba was to be communicated to Mr. King for his enlightenment.

The overture of the United States aimed no doubt at a neutralisation of Cuba amongst possible competing Powers.

The refusal of France implied that France had not yet laid aside all hope of jockeying Great Britain, and winning the 'Pearl of the 'Antilles' for herself.

Mr. King's 'innocence' could hardly in decency survive this blow.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Storrs: Aug. 13, 1825.

My dear Granville,—The despatches which you forwarded to me by the last messenger from Sir H. Wellesley are indeed in one sense highly satisfactory. That rogue Metternich! how provoking it must be to him to find himself placed exactly in the fissure which he

had cleft for us, and forced to roar and remonstrate with his own lungs against those projects which when we anticipate them he denied, and which he reserved in his own secret mind for us the trouble and the odium (with Russia) of combating and counteracting. 'Silly 'Mr. Tomkins' (as I heard one of Littleton's girls singing the other night), if the Emperor of Russia acquiesces in the rebuff of the Porte; 'Sillier' if he threatens war and is afterwards deterred from making it by such arguments as Metternich is prepared to bring against his purpose: which are in truth only the wrong side outward of those I used interrogatively last year, when if he could either have answered or admitted them to be (as they were) unanswerable, he (Metternich) might have saved himself and the Emperor the regret of having made a very foolish figure. But, now; and from Metternich, after all the counsel they have had together, to be driven from his purpose by arguments against the interference coming from his accomplice in all sorts of interferences! I must own that I shall think more meanly of Alexander than I have ever done hitherto, if he exhibits a docility so very supple and surprising. 1825

Yet, to go to war against the protestations of Austria and France, and with England long ago protesting, and now unfettered by any pledge or participation of counsel standing by. I cannot believe that he will risk it. My reflections, therefore, come back, like Miss Littleton's song, to the refrain 'Silly Mr. Tomkins.' Metternich has to thank his own *finesse* if he (and not I) is the 'cruel Polly Hopkins,' who steps between Mr. T. and his desires.

Villèle, I suppose, can wish no other than to see his two too great allies at this deadlock. But I should like to see his answer to this Russian proposition, which

1825 Wellesley represents as even more decided than that of Austria. I rejoice that Prussia has blundered. It is the least wise Court in Europe, as Werther is the least wise of Prussian Ministers; and, therefore, likely enough to be recalled to succeed to the post of First Minister, upon Bernstorff's retirement.

I have never had occasion to take any trouble about Berlin yet; but if Werther gets there I think I may find some amusement in plaguing him a little.

Why is it that Prussia is so much the most irrational of all the allied Powers, and pronounces herself always in the most unmeasured and unsuitable terms; saved, if ever country was so, by the voluntary impulse of the people. The Government of Prussia, why is it, of all Governments, the most ostentatiously antipopular in its politics? Can Pozzo tell? You might propound it to him amicably, as a question which we are curious to have solved.

You are to thank a rainy day for this long letter—let me see if there be anything that I have to tell you which it behoves you to know! I am not sure whether I have told you about the Mexican Treaty. We must refuse the ratification of it because our Plenipotentiaries thought proper to admit an article without any instruction, and contrary to the standing policy of the country, conceding to Mexico, under certain qualifications, the principle 'Free ships, free goods.' We might, perhaps, ratify, excepting that article—that is to say if we were so to ratify, Mexico would not object, but would, perhaps, be better pleased than with the refusal to ratify at all. But it would be of evil example, to adopt a practice which we have so often blamed in the U. S.; the treaty, therefore, must go back unratified; but I apprehend no inconvenience from the disappointment. On the contrary, I think it may do the New States good, for

they are inclined to think themselves finer fellows than I have any thought of allowing them to be; and require to be taken down a peg, to bring them to the level of the Old World. 1825

The recognition they have, and they have a Chargé d'Affaires from us in proof of it. That is the essential point; the treaty will do just as well by-and-bye.

Now I believe I have nothing more to say. So adieu!

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—I wish that you would send me the book from which you quote.

G. C.

[Canning is now staying at Storrs, a pretty place on Lake Windermere, belonging to his friend Mr. Bolton.

The paragraphs relating to Greece, Metternich, and Prussia have been already printed and published.

The passage beginning, 'You are to thank a rainy day,' &c., refers to negotiations for a treaty with Mexico.

It has a certain prospective importance from marking the absolute bar Canning placed on any attempt to open up a modification of the British doctrine of the right of search; a point of policy again infringed, later on in the year, by Sir Charles Stuart in negotiating a commercial treaty with Brazil; but re-established without a moment's hesitation by Canning even to the extent of refusal to ratify the treaty.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Storrs: August 21, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I continue well, and I suppose I am every day getting stronger, though as yet that is the point most doubtful.

The weather after a few days of storm (so violent that we conceived it to be a premature equinox and bade adieu to summer) is now returned in all the glory of the month that preceded our leaving town. I do

1825 not remember so enjoyable a season, and this is exactly the place for enjoying it.

I mean to be in town on Saturday, September 17, and to prolong my stay till within about a week of that time.

Walter Scott (and his party) arrived on the banks of our lake yesterday, on his return from Ireland, and is coming here to-day.

I wish you had carried your lake projects into execution. But being where you are, why should you not take Paris in your way home?

By the way, it is whimsical enough that the D. of W. should have represented so strongly against my going to Paris last summer, and should think fit to establish himself there—without a word of warning—now. Is it only the minority of the Cabinet on litigated questions that are to have the opportunity of talking to foreign sovereigns and ministers on the points in litigation?

I shall not be so easily diverted another time.

Ever sincerely yours,

G. C.

[This letter is dated from the lakes, where Mr. Canning had retired to recruit himself after the fatigues of a heavy session. His end was still two years further on in the future; but even now one may notice in his letters occasional references to continual *malaise*, and physical disorder; and in the present letter a hint of want of elasticity and recuperative power, highly ominous of early breakdown.

He anticipates meeting Sir Walter Scott; an agreeable element in his holiday pastimes.

He refers with some irritation to the Duke of Wellington's visit at this time to Paris without consulting his colleagues; comparing it with objections raised to his own proposed visit to Paris a year before. It was good enough argument for Canning, under the circumstances; but we may observe that in Canning's case, at the time he contemplated the visit, he was not thoroughly 'in the saddle' either at home or abroad; and his known Liberal opinions, coupled

with his fiery genius, if brought into contact with the comparatively unprepared Absolutist Court of France, were capable of unexpectedly striking fire in various directions to the danger of the bystanders, while, on the other hand, Wellington, personally of a singularly 'safe' character, was possessed of opinions unpolemical in nature, and most agreeable to the reigning authorities in France.] 1825

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Storrs: September 5, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I never had to deal with a more perplexing question than that on which you ask my opinion.

I am so far from disputing your views of it, that I have myself stated the same views to three persons.

Unless the latter ones can be made to sleep during the next session, we gain nothing in point of peace on that question, by postponing the dissolution, and if it is put to sleep by the narcotic of a previous question, the very arguments by which that process is to be justified are so many signals for preparation against the dissolution of next year. Add to which that a rest so procured may be very unquiet.

All this I admit freely—nay more, all this I had written to Wellesley before I received your letter, not as delivering a made-up opinion, but as describing the elements out of which an opinion was to be formed. I have since heard from him. He is clearly and decidedly for a dissolution now.

As to the general reasons for or against it, supposing the Catholic question out of the way, I think there can be no doubt but that those for it greatly preponderate.

What, then, is my difficulty? Why this: that, right or wrong, there is a very general impression amongst friends of the R. C. question, almost a universal one, that dissolution now would be an appeal to the country on that question. The Lord Chancellor's unlucky speech,

1825 the language of the Ultra Protestants, of the publications which speak their sentiments, and the well-known declarations in high quarters, have contributed to create that impression; and as the only conclusive refutation of it would be another session, with all the inconveniences resulting from the R. C. questions being brought on, or from the attempts to keep it off; and as a dissolution now would cut short the appeal to that other session, I am greatly afraid that the impression will be as lasting as it is deep and wide, that the dissolution now was resorted to in avowed and direct hostility to the Catholic question.

This impression would be greatly increased by any partial proceedings in the course of a general election; by the admission of Lord Shaftesbury, for instance (as on the last occasion), into the committee of management, it would be confirmed beyond all possibility of denial. I know not with what face I could plead a belief, on my own individual part, of a fair intention, if a peer, the Lord Chancellor's canvasser, were called in to help in choosing the new H. of C.

On this sole ground, therefore, it certainly would be my wish to postpone the dissolution till next year. The theory of a short session I fear to be impracticable. The voluntary abeyance of the R. C. question is more than I hope for. I am aware that it cannot be secured otherwise than by a determination to put it down if brought forward by a previous question, which I must either move or at least directly countenance. But upon the whole—as at present advised—admitting as I fairly do the general expediency of immediate dissolution—acknowledging to you that Wellesley is—so far as Ireland is concerned—satisfied that it would be wise; having had little or no communication with others, and not knowing, therefore, whether I stand alone (among

our colleagues) in the importance which I assign to the impression which I have described as so prevalent, I yet, on account of that impression, cannot make up my mind to say—as I really wished to do—that agreeing in most of your reasoning, I am also ready to subscribe to your conclusions. Like you, however, I am not bent upon my view of this matter to such a degree as not to be willing to hear reason against it. 1825

I shall be in town on Saturday, the 17th; shall I come down to you the next day? You might equally summon Huskisson and Lushington. (Poor Arbuthnot, I fear, is not in a condition to attend your summons.)

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—We leave this place on Friday for Wortley, where we shall remain till Tuesday next, the 13th, and thence proceed by Welbeck (staying there a couple of days), to town. Wortley was most eager against immediate dissolution when I saw him last.

G. C.

[The 'perplexing question' related to the dissolution of Parliament; the existing House of Commons had been returned in March, 1820. Its powers did not expire until March 1827; but nevertheless it had completed its sixth session. It must have betrayed symptoms, known to anxious and curious politicians, of approaching dissolution, whether early at the hand of the Crown, or later by efflux of time. Eighteen months, or a session and a half, was the only possible extension of its existence; it might be dissolved in the autumn of 1825, or in the spring, or in the autumn of 1826.

Canning's problem is propounded in the frankest and most undisguised manner to the very man whose public utterances had emphasised its difficulties.

The existing House of Commons had by repeated votes sustained the cause of 'Catholic emancipation;' the constituencies, it was apprehended, failed to support the liberality of their representatives; it was also anticipated that they would take the Catholic question as one on which, amongst others, the result of a general election

1825 would be looked upon as the verdict of the country on a fiercely litigated point. Canning's idea was that the question was not ripe to be put to the country in its full extent, and that it might arrive at an equitable settlement after further discussions in Parliament; but that, in the present mind of the constituencies, it would be premature and unfair to call for an authoritative mandate on the subject.

He thinks it, however, at the moment almost unavoidable but that the question should take this shape to the nation; and he accounts for it by the recent emphatic utterances 'in high quarters,' referring to the Lord Chancellor, to Lord Liverpool himself, and to other Protestant leaders for this premature forcing of the question on the public mind.

The extreme popular Protestant symptoms at this time which depressed the hopes of the Liberal supporters of Catholic emancipation appear real (*vide* the 'Annual Register,' 1825, p. 69), but, in a sectarian point of view, rather puzzle the student; for hardly at any period before or since had the energies of the Papal hierarchy seemed less active or formidable, or indeed, with a serpentine wisdom which deceived Canning himself, more gentle and solicitous for compromise.

But things are not always what they seem.

The Catholic cause, though religiously torpid, was politically alive with energy. The tremendous performances of the Catholic Association had made a political impression on the English mind, that no subsequent withdrawal could efface; the sharply accentuated priestcraft which beset the throne of France had become associated in the public understanding with the conspiracy of the Holy Alliance against liberty; the intolerable interference with the liberties of Spain, and the tightening of the chains on France herself; echoes of the cries from suffering nations on the Continent reaching the ears of the English people, sustained their healthy prejudices in favour of Protestant liberty, and of hostility to Papal guidance and authority.

Canning stood forward the unflattering political foe of all that the British public thus associated with Papal policy. Hence a great part of his immense and growing popularity; his earnest strivings on behalf of Catholic emancipation could not neutralise in the public mind their appreciation of his foreign policy. Nevertheless, the mob proved wiser than the statesman; he saw the political energies of the Roman creed checked and foiled in every direction, by circumstances, by others, by himself: why, then, should he fear it? For the simple reason that the force underlying those energies might

change their direction, but would itself remain the same; and a blow aimed directly at this religious force told far more effectually than any conceivable wrestling with the mere shapes that force could so easily assume. 1825

Nevertheless, though the poor English Protestant was right, and the great statesman wrong, in their respective estimates of the internal forces of the Roman Catholic sect; though Canning did not, and perhaps could not, properly and fully apprehend the unchangeable character of the Papacy, his thoroughly settled determination as a political leader to treat the Papal Proteus purely in its political aspects, proved then, as now, the only possible solution of the problem of dealing with our fellow-subjects separating on points of conscience; and his piercing political vision enabled him to see far ahead of his able but more prejudiced colleagues.

Canning's anxiety not to 'go to the country' on the Catholic question at this precise epoch prevailed. Another session of the same Parliament took place in 1826, and by an extraordinary coincidence, the new Parliament, elected in the summer of 1826, met first in the late autumn to listen to Canning's brilliant defence of the measure of sending troops to Portugal, a measure openly defiant of the absolutism of the Continent as represented by France and Spain, and assuredly inferentially defiant of the Papal influences which unhappily guided the counsels of those Powers; and subsequently in the spring, to find Lord Liverpool disabled for good, and Canning struggling with severe bodily illness, but none the less pressing forward with indomitable energy to secure the supreme prize of the premiership for himself, after a brave but unsuccessful struggle in behalf of emancipation in the new Parliament.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Wortley Hall: September 12, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I have had this morning a long conversation with my host on the subject of the dissolution. I had last night a letter from Devonshire on the same subject; and a letter was communicated to me from Nottinghamshire, the result of all which (conversation and correspondence) is the same; and to me, I confess, surprising; viz. that there is a fury upon the Catholic question, ready to break forth, the instant that the now expected dissolution takes place.

1825 I am surprised at this, I say; because I had, like you, cherished the notion that the question had gone to sleep and was not likely to be roused even by an election.

Wortley's opinion upon the subject is perhaps the more worth weighing, because he has no personal interest in the decision. He is as sure of his return now as he would be a year hence; perhaps surer, because in the lapse of a twelvemonth who knows what may intervene to change any man's position? But he is satisfied that a general election now would raise a flame upon the Catholic question throughout the country, though he is equally satisfied that his own return, and he believes that of three Catholic colleagues, will take place without much difficulty in Yorkshire.

He is strongly of opinion, that the postponement of the dissolution to next year would afford the best chance of allaying this feverish state of the public mind; and he thinks, (contrary to the opinion which you announced, and in which perhaps without much consideration I concurred with you,) that the discussion of the Corn Laws this next session would be in itself an advisable measure, and admirable for diverting public attention and interest from the Catholic question.

As to this point, the expediency of discussing the Corn Laws this session, (supposing Parliament not dissolved,) I have not the means of deciding very confidently, but I am firm in the conviction, that, if the dissolution be deferred, the discussion of the Catholic question must be prevented, and I am ready in that case to take the task of preventing it upon myself.

This is, I think, as far as we can get towards a determination on the perplexing question which we are to settle on the 22nd at present.

My growing disposition towards a postponement arises not so much from my being convinced that the

balance of chances for a quiet election (on the one particular question) now or in 1826, turns in favour of 1826, as from my seeing that such is the prevailing belief, which be it right or wrong can never be changed if the dissolution takes place this year. 1825

In such a state of things, it seems to me that delay is the safer course. Should there be a furious religious contest now, we shall bear the blame of exciting it unprovokedly and unnecessarily.

Should the like contest (or one still more furious) be produced next year, at least it will not be our fault, but that of an inevitable necessity. This is my present view of the matter.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—I can dine with you in Downing Street on Tuesday if you will, and I will summon Huskisson to meet you.

[This letter is written from Wortley Hall, the seat of the Right Hon. James Stuart Wortley, afterwards Lord Wharncliffe, at this time a member for Yorkshire: he was grandson of the Prime Minister, Earl of Bute.

Opinions on the dissolution had come in from various quarters, and they appear to have agreed with that of Canning's host, in recommending a postponement till next year, on the ground of the strong religious excitement smouldering in the country, which a general election would fan into a flame.

Canning expresses surprise at the evidence brought to him of the real existence of such anti-Catholic public feeling; but, accepting its reality, proceeds to discuss how, if the dissolution is put off, the burning question may be kept out of sight during the next session, and public attention diverted to other topics, such as the Corn Laws, whereby the inevitable general election of 1826 might be least influenced by the dangerous Protestant ardour of the country.]

1825. MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Welbeck: September 18, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I return, according to your desire to-day, (though [you are] not at Walmer) Wellesley's letter, which shows how much he dreaded our possible recommendation, and how grateful he is for being relieved from that apprehension.

But surely it is destined that this affair is not to run smooth; for no sooner have you fixed upon a man because he is not 'a marked man,' and because his opinions are not known, than, as if for the express purpose of contradicting you, he comes forward to mark himself, and to pronounce his opinions in the single and obstreperous manner, at a moment when no other figure is on the stage. This is very unlucky; will it not be thought that this very exhibition has procured the nomination? The dates are so near that no human being can believe the coincidence to be accidental. Even if I had not read your letter of the 14th on Friday, I could hardly have believed that what I read in the 'Times' of the 16th yesterday evening had no influence upon the selection. I was absolutely astounded at this singular and ill-timed first appearance. Is there no other eligible person who at least has not shown himself to be such a goose? and so violent a goose too?

The last sentence of your letter makes me repent that I changed my plan and gave up Walmer. But I really thought, from your recurring to the illustration in your letter of the 14th, that you doubted whether it would not be, upon the whole, more convenient that we should meet in town.

However, I will indemnify myself at Walmer in the course of the autumn.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This letter relates to Lord Mount Cashell, whom the Government, as has already appeared, had made their candidate for the vacant seat amongst the Irish representative peers. The other candidate was Lord Farnham. Canning had not been allowed to start his son-in-law, Lord Clanricarde. Both candidates were 'Protestants.' On both grounds Canning permitted himself to criticise the Government candidate without reserve to his friend Lord Liverpool. This particular shot, it appears from the 'Times' of the date mentioned, had been found in the proceedings at a 'Catholic' meeting held at Fermoy a day or two before, where the Earl of Kingston took the chair, and a pro-'Catholic' resolution was carried almost unanimously; but where Lord Mount Cashell moved an anti-'Catholic' amendment in a speech of strong anti-'Catholic' feeling. It was a mere volunteer protest; as, though the meeting listened to Lord Mount Cashell, it was in no way persuaded. It was scarcely satisfactory to anybody that the Government candidate should choose this precise moment to denounce with vigour and asperity all the sins of the Papacy. Canning was provoked and not complimentary.] 1825

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Seaford: October 13, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I have missed two post days in our private correspondence, but the last week since my arrival here on Tuesday evening, the 3rd inst., has been a week of intense labour.

Thank God! it is now nearly done. Stratford and Strangford are glutted with instructions; and will take their departure, the first to-day and the second to-morrow, from London. Morier with the Mexican Treaty (in lieu of that which we refused to ratify) will be off on Saturday. The Greek offer of Protectorate will receive its answer to-day or to-morrow; I sent it up yesterday. You shall have a copy of it on Tuesday. I have paid off Stuart and A'Court since I came here, and H. Wellesley, as you know, before I left town. I have even written to Berlin—for the first time, I believe, this year—certainly for the last—so that on my arrival in town on Monday next I hope to find the F. O. pretty clear; and to find it during the few days that I shall stay there

1825 a holiday place compared with Charles's bow window here.

Here however I have, in spite of all my work, contrived to get, every day but one, a ride of two or three hours.

Now I have something to say to you—

1. Never send a bag without an ostensible despatch. There are surely subjects enough of permanent interest upon which you may prepare yourself at leisure; and may, when there is no immediate topic of the day, send off one of those prepared dissertations.

2. Take a little more pains with your private political letters. I should like to show them occasionally to the King. I have shown two of them, which contained reports of your interesting conversations with Villèle—but generally speaking there is a carelessness which I have felt that it would not do you good to show—and that as well in the handwriting as in the matter. All Kings are particular about handwriting.

3. I wish too that you would be at more pains to collect intelligence.

I mention these things now, because I am now upon that footing with H.M. that enables me to approach him with details which on a more distant and merely official footing I should not think myself justified in obtruding upon him. But I have still another reason as part and proof of that new footing: the King has of late directed Münster to communicate to me all the Hanoverian 'correspondence.' *Comprenez-vous?*

Shall I own it to you? I have been vexed to see how much better intelligence his Majesty derives from that source than from (with few occasional exceptions) his British diplomacy.

The comparison I am sure must strike him, as it does me; I wish very much that you could make yourself

an exception to the general meagreness of our official correspondence. Above all things, do not give an impression and get a reputation of being above your work. Your predecessor owed the long tolerance which he enjoyed solely to the appearance of indefatigable industry. 1825

Take an instance of the ill-luck at least of your researches after information.

The Protocol of the Conference at Paris on the American proposal respecting Cuba came back to us from a foreign Court, where it was communicated in confidence to our Minister on condition that it should not be reported at Paris in a way to lead to the detection of his channels of information. Cannot you worm anything out of Pozzo's Epicurism?—or out of Werther's ill-temper? Or out of Vincent's ill-humour at being turned out for Esterhazy? Out of Esterhazy himself I am sure you may with a little management.

Here my lecture ends.

I have forbidden Stratford to go by Paris; as it would be equally inconvenient to have him talk Greek, or to refuse to talk it, with Pozzo. Strangford, I send by sea.

Ever affectionately yours, G. C.

[Describes the heavy work he has had in preparing instructions for Lord Strangford leaving for St. Petersburg, and for Mr. Stratford Canning leaving for Constantinople.

The Principalities, and the Greek insurrection, formed the leading topics of Eastern politics.

Canning then administers a mild 'wigging' to his noble friend at the dignified carelessness of his political correspondence, public and private, and at his friend's negligence in seeking and supplying information for the British Foreign Office.

Canning appears stimulated to these remonstrances by the agreeable fact that, having won more than half the confidence of the King, he desires to preserve credit with his Majesty, and to justify the administration of the Foreign Office, and the good service of the representatives of Great Britain on the Continent, who owed their appointments to Canning's good judgment.

1825 Besides, Canning, admitted by the King to the knowledge of the Hanoverian official diplomatic correspondence, was mortified to find it better supplied with secret information than the British Foreign Office. He consequently remonstrated at once with Lord Granville on the unsatisfactory and meagre nature of his reports.

For the general effect of the instructions, dated October 12, 1825, to Mr. Stratford Canning, see pp. 456-458 of 'Political Life,' vol. ii.

The Porte were to be warned of the difficulty experienced by the Russian Government in resisting the urgency of the Russian nation for affording succour to the Greeks, and also of the diminution of its power of resistance to the popular cry, if it appeared that the Greeks were seeking an amicable solution of the question, whilst the Turkish Power failed alike in suppressing the insurrection, and in propounding any scheme of eventual pacification.

For a summary of the instructions to Lord Strangford, see pp. 446-450 of 'Political Life,' vol. ii.

The Russian Government had announced their intention of holding no further communication with the British Government on the Greek question, after the recall of Sir Charles Bagot in 1824.

Lord Strangford therefore only held instructions to repudiate any disrespectful wish to intrude on Russian counsels, but in the meanwhile to hold out assurances of confidence in return for confidence. To call attention to the Greek Protectorate offered to Great Britain, to the doubtful policy of France, and to the oppressive policy of Austria in refusing to recognise the belligerent character of the Greek warfare.

They also dealt separately with the question of the Principalities; pointing out that the means of restoring the civil *status quo* rested with the Russian Government, who therefore were responsible for the continuance of the obstacles which Russia alleged as existing in the way of restoring diplomatic relations with the Porte.]

MR. CANNING TO MR. HUSKISSON.

Seaford: October 13, 1825.

My dear Huskisson,—I do not know who drew the Order in Council, about Cannon, &c. But it is reported to me to be defective and inexecutable.

Of one thing I am quite sure, that it was thoroughly discussed in Cabinet, whether the references under it should be to the Secretary of State, or to the Admiralty or Treasury, and it was decided for the two latter.

Nevertheless that blunderheaded fool at the Council Office continues to plague me with references—which never having more than looked at the Order in Council (and found it not English) I know not how to answer. The Proclamation I took charge of—but the Order in C. I fully understood was not to be on my hands. 1825

I desire Planta to desire Buller to send you a copy of the Order for correction—and I suppose another must be passed to amend it, at the next Council.

I have been working eight hours a day ever since I got down here, to get Strangford, and Stratford, and Morier off; and to instruct Stuart in the Commercial Treaty: and Buller's plagues come upon me at my best working hour in the morning, and put me (as you perceive) out of temper. So Adieu,

Ever yours, G C.

[Complains of a badly drawn Order in Council for enforcing neutrality.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Seaford: October 14, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—My other letter has taken up more time than the subject of it was worth. Do as you like about showing it to the D. of W. Let me have the enclosures (Lord Ch.'s correspondence) back in due time.

That on the Representative Peerage I have received.

But that with the D. of B. in August, which Stapleton vows was never returned, must be still among your archives.

I received a packet of letters last night from Wellesley, two of which I enclose to you: one of them struck me with surprise, and I think with regret too.

Had it never occurred to you as probable? Not certainly with the person in question.

In another letter he sends me a list (duplicate of one

1825 which he tells me he sends to you at the same time) of votes promised to Lord Farnham and Lord Mountcashell —by which I am ashamed at seeing that Lord F. is within one of Lord MtC., there being moreover on the doubtful list one at least (my cousin), perhaps more, to be added to Lord Farnham's.

I write to-day to Clanricarde to beg him to lose no time in sending his promise to Ld. MtC. and to obtain if he can (as I hope he can) Lord Sligo's.

If Lord F. forces his way in against the Government I shall feel myself perfectly free to vote for a Committee, on the flogging, of which I have a worse opinion than I had before since I have read Lord F.'s affidavit in his own defence.

I fear Planta will hardly have been able yet to send you any of the voluminous sets of drafts prepared in the course of the last ten days for Russia, Constantinople, Mexico and Brazil. They were so long in themselves, and the enclosures in some of them so numerous, that the F. O. has nearly broken down under the work, and Planta himself is crying out with over-labour.

Meantime Howard and the others of my staff have had their full share of toil.

We have been at work daily from ten o'clock, and seldom have got out before four, often later, which for country holidays is severe relaxation.

In truth, the business of the Office is quite overwhelming at times.

Spanish America and Brazil have added at least 50 per cent. to it.

I am going up to town on Monday for a few days—among other things to exchange the Columbian Ratifications with M. Hurtado—whom I shall then endeavour to prevail with the King to receive immediately, and so get it over.

Mrs. C. goes up with me, to stimulate the workmen in our house. 1825

We hope to return here by the end of the week—for the remainder of the month at least, by about which time the Clanricardes will be over, and will perhaps join us here.

The time at which I thought of coming to you is the first week of November, previous to your going up to town. If this weather or anything like it lasts, I presume you will return again to Walmer. In that case, if Ly. L. does not go up to town, we may journey together. Let me know if this arrangement (I mean the time which I propose for my visit) suits you.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[A letter of no great interest, which discusses the voting to be expected at the next election for the Irish Representative Peerage, and also the state and nature of the press of work at the Foreign Office.]

MR. HUSKISSON TO MR. CANNING.

Paris: October 17, 1825.

My dear Canning,—I am just returned from a private audience to which the King had appointed me this morning. In the course of it he adverted to most of the subjects of great interest which now engage the attention of this Government. Upon the most material of them I shall endeavour to give you the substance of what he said.

After some expressions of personal kindness to myself and an inquiry after your health, he began by assuring me with much earnestness, and from his manner I have no doubt with equal sincerity, that the first object of his wishes was to prevent, if possible, any interruption of the general peace. France, he believed, was in a course of prosperity; England, he believed, still more so; but that the prosperity of both countries might be deeply affected should war break out in any quarter. He saw nothing near home which could at all lead him to apprehend such a calamity, but he was full of fear in respect to Greece.

1825 Unless the conflict in that quarter could be put into some train of settlement, that ere long the means of adjustment would no longer be within the reach of those who were most anxious and most interested to prevent the renewal of war. Those means, he said, still exist, and are mainly in the hands of England and Russia. France was certainly a great Power, but from many circumstances the preponderating influence in respect to the affairs of Greece belonged to the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg. It was for them to take the lead in devising some plan for putting an end to a state of things pregnant with so much danger. France would be ready to throw her weight into their scale in furtherance of any project for that purpose, and to join with the other Powers of Europe in declaring to the contending parties, that their differences must be put into a train of amicable adjustment. This declaration, he said, is the first step towards an arrangement, and without it the danger of war is imminent. Russia, he was afraid, would not, perhaps could not, temporise much longer. The country, the army, were clamorous for war, and the Emperor might find it necessary to yield.

In short, the King was very anxious to press upon me the urgency of the danger, and the extreme importance of some immediate effort being made to avert it. He would be glad, he said, of any compromise which might be thought fair and reasonable. Let such a compromise, he added, become the joint demand of all the Great Powers, and it must be entered upon. Without such a demand he should almost despair of the peace of Europe being long preserved.

I confined myself to stating generally to his Majesty my entire conviction that the English Government were as anxious as that of France to contribute to maintain peace, and that they would be very glad to adopt any measures, which appeared calculated to avert the danger which his Majesty apprehended from the continuance of the Greek contest; that it would be a fortunate thing if, without violence, the contending parties could be made sensible of the necessity of an approximation, and with that view of entering into explanations either directly or though the intervention of other Powers, but that as far as I was informed both the belligerents had hitherto decidedly and pertinaciously disclaimed any such disposition.

The King said, 'Unless they can be brought into a better temper (and of this the best chance is to be found in a joint effort of all the Great Powers) the worst consequences will ensue.' 1825

I had before heard from Granville that Damas is equally alarmed; but as the King dwelt upon this point so earnestly and returned to it again at the close of my audience, I think it not impossible that they have some information which leads them to fear that Russia will not much longer be passive, and that this joint effort is their last resource now that they find that the campaign is likely to terminate without any material progress having been made towards the subjugation of Greece, which was probably the result which both France and Austria had expected from it.

I have not time to enter upon the other topics of the King's conversation, which related to Spain, Spanish America, Cuba, and St. Domingo, upon all of which his sentiments were very much in unison with the professions of Villèle. Nothing could be more reasonable and conciliatory than the King's language upon all these points.

The most remarkable circumstance, perhaps, in this part of his conversation was his telling me that, whatever predilection he might retain for those principles and institutions of the monarchy which prevailed before the Revolution, and however much he had wished for a long time to see them restored, he felt the necessity of governing according to the circumstances in which France was now placed; that he had acted decidedly upon that feeling during the three last years of his brother's reign, and that he should continue so to act; that this was the true explanation of the step which he had taken in respect to St. Domingo and in other instances, which were disapproved of, he was well aware, by many of his most attached friends, and that he wished the King of Spain would take a lesson from France in this respect. Her true interest, he said, is in Cuba, and the internal amelioration of Spain itself making with her other possessions the best arrangement in her power. To his present Minister, he added, who was the Minister of his brother, he had continued his confidence because he appeared to him to act with system and intelligence, upon the wise principle of

1825 reconciling the circumstances, in which France was placed after the restoration, with the permanent interests of the monarchy. He appeared to me determined to stick by Villèle, and Villèle (however threatened by different parties) appears equally resolved to stick by his office.

In the course of the conversation the King repeated more than once, 'I am speaking to you from myself as to an old acquaintance,' and it was only in reference to the Greek question that upon taking my leave he said, 'When you see Mr. Canning tell him my sentiments.'

I had other topics to mention, but they will keep till we meet in town.

Ever truly yours,

W. HUSKISSON.

[Reports the general effect of a confidential conversation with Charles X. of France.

The conversation ranged over all manner of topics of foreign affairs; the Greek insurrection; the occupation of Spain; Cuba, San Domingo, &c.; but it is reported as chiefly turning on the Greek question and the Spanish question, though more particularly the former of the two.

The King of France manifested a lively anxiety to impress on Canning's friend and colleague, his Majesty's desire to preserve the peace of Europe in view of the difficulties in connection with the Greek war. He recognised the predominant influence of Russia and Great Britain in the matter, and insisted on the urgency of an end being put to the conflict.

Mr. Huskisson surmised that his Majesty and the French Government had intelligence of a threatening activity of Russia in the matter, and no doubt the facts that the Emperor Alexander, approaching the termination of his life, and stimulated by the want of success of the Turkish arms, had given symptoms of unusual impatience; and that the French Government were aware that Lord Strangford had left London for St. Petersburg, and Mr. Stratford Canning for Constantinople, only four days before, each with instructions from Canning (to what effect the French Government was ignorant) on the Greek question, aroused keen solicitude at Paris as to the eventual result of these instructions, and the position in which France might be left if the views of the great Liberal Foreign Minister of England eventually prevailed.

There is no greater tribute to Mr. Canning's power than the

French King's anxiety to persuade him of the genuineness of the declarations of Liberal policy professed by the French Government.] 1825

MR. CANNING TO THE KING.

Foreign Office: October 19, 1825.

Mr. Canning, in submitting, with his humble duty the accompanying copy of a letter for your Majesty's gracious perusal, humbly entreats your Majesty to believe, that he does not presume to entertain the slightest wish or expectation, that your Majesty should condescend to express any opinion upon the subject to which it relates. But in the very embarrassing situation in which that subject is placed, (by no fault of anyone but through its own intrinsic difficulties), Mr. Canning is, above all things, anxious that your Majesty should be informed, (if your Majesty will deign to receive such information), of any step taken by Mr. Canning individually upon a question, upon which your Majesty's confidential servants do not offer to your Majesty any collective opinion.

The letter to Mr. Plunket was shown by Mr. Canning to Lord Liverpool, before it was sent to its destination.

Mr. Canning has always intended humbly to lay it before your Majesty. But he has deferred doing so till now, partly because he has had of late to trouble your Majesty with so many voluminous official Papers; and partly because he wished to be enabled, at the time of laying the letter before your Majesty, to state to your Majesty that not only Mr. Plunket, but Lord Wellesley, concurred in its contents, and would co-operate with Mr. Canning for the attainment of its object.

Mr. Canning has now received from both the strongest assurances of such concurrence and co-operation.

For himself, Mr. Canning begs leave most humbly to assure your Majesty that, however impossible it would

1825 be for Mr. Canning at any time to pursue, consistently with his honour and with his conscientious convictions, any other course than that which he has hitherto pursued upon this most momentous and perplexing question, sentiments of affectionate duty and grateful attachment towards your Majesty will make him feel at all times no less the wish than the obligation to consult to the utmost of his power, in the discussions which may arise upon this question, your Majesty's ease and comfort, and to omit no endeavour by which the decision upon it, (whatever that decision may be), can be rendered least prejudicial to the general well-being of your Majesty's Government.

[Submits for the King's information a copy of a letter from himself to Mr. Plunket, Attorney-General in Ireland, on the Catholic question. The letter contained a declaration of Canning's future action on this question; and made it clear that, though a measure of relief had recently broken down, he had no intention of retiring from the position he had always held on the subject.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

F. O.: October 21, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I send you a letter which I have received to-day from Huskisson.

I have not been able to execute the purpose for which I came to town—that of exchanging the Columbian ratifications—Mr. Hurtado being confined to his bed with Mr. Sd. Johnstone's complaint.

But I have obtained from his My. the following gracious rescript:—

'The King will receive the Ministers of the *New States* early in November, when he comes to town for the Recorder's report.'

I hope to have a Buenos Ayrean Minister arrived by that time, and to give more law to him (the Buenos

Ayrean) and to us, I have begged Peel to contrive to fix the report for the 8th (not sooner), on which day you talk of being in town. 1825

I can then—coming up with you on the 5th—exchange the ratifications on the 7th.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Mr. Huskisson's letter no doubt was the one printed above. Canning now reports with high satisfaction the favourable tone of the King on the delicate question of receiving the Ministers of the newly recognised Spanish American States. He underlines 'New States,' to mark the alteration of his Majesty's feelings as manifested by his use of an expression, which only recently would have been offensive to him.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: October 21, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I receive your mail of Monday, with your three private letters, at the moment of setting out on my return to Seaford.

I came up for three or four days to give audiences to Foreign Ministers, and to keep the course of the office clear, by rubbing off small arrears; and Mrs. Canning came with me to look after the progress of our house —unluckily, in her part of the duties she has caught a violent cold—for we are open in parts to all the winds of heaven, which took to blowing violently the very day of our arrival.

The sun shines again to-day, however, and we hope for fine weather for the remainder of the month at Seaford.

Frere is established there with Charles.

You will not think my journey to town fruitless, when I tell you that I received the day before yesterday from the King a note, in which is the following sentence:—

1825 'The King will receive the Ministers of the New States early in November.'

Recollecting that this time twelvemonth it was a question whether there should be any 'New States' at all; and that in the discussions of that day one of the main arguments employed to deter me from my purpose, was that the King would never be brought to receive their Ministers, I think the two lines above quoted as satisfactory a 'proof of the sum' as could be desired.

I am afraid, however, that the King offers me more than I shall be able to take. For I have only one Minister, that of Columbia here; but I expect a Buenos Ayrean by the next packet.

Immediately after the presentation I shall appoint Ministers (with the double character) to both States, and to this also I have obtained his Majesty's complete acquiescence.

I have a peculiar pleasure in doing this, to show Mexico what she has lost by her selfish and silly policy, in over-reaching Morier and Ward in the negotiation of the treaty, and afterwards boasting, as her Minister M. Alamon was foolish enough to do, that he had over-reached the British Plenipotentiaries, and had made better terms for Mexico than Columbia had been able to obtain.

I delighted in raising these people into States; but I shall not let them fancy themselves too fine fellows, as they would be apt to do, if not snubbed when they deserve it.

I have taken the opportunity this comparatively quiet time, to make another communication to the King, the policy of making which you or almost any one else would perhaps have thought doubtful, and so it was; I therefore acted (as in such cases it is right to do) on

my own opinion without comparing it with any other, and I have no reason to regret having done so. 1825

I sent to his Majesty, for his private perusal, a copy of my letter to Mr. Plunket.

He has returned it with 'thanks,' describes it as 'admirable,' and though he does not (nor could I expect that he would) look beyond the next year for what must follow it, there is not one word in his letter of determination not to yield, not a syllable of his royal brother's language, and not a shadow of ill humour. This is well so far as it goes, and it is a great thing to have begun with his Majesty upon a subject, which hitherto has been considered as interdicted ground.

You remember of course that in the discussions (in Cabinet) which followed the loss of the question last session, I declared my determination to be no longer precluded from communicating with his Majesty upon the subject when I thought fit.

Now adieu!

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—You may communicate the matter of this letter to Huskisson, whose letter I have not time to acknowledge without risking a stage in the dark.

G. C.

[This letter explains what is obscure in the two previous letters.

After referring to domestic movements and troubles, he passes on to the subject of the impending audiences of the Spanish American Ministers. The absence of ill will on the part of the King again appears a source of genuine gratification to him, in thinking over the position of the question.

It is unlucky that only the Columbian Minister can be brought up for the occasion; but then the default of Mexico due to her greed in the negotiation of the commercial treaty becomes more conspicuous, and obnoxious to censure; besides, there were hopes (see letter to

1825 Lord Liverpool above) that the Buenos Ayres Minister might arrive in time to make a better show.

Canning also expounds his reasons for communicating to the King a copy of his letter to Mr. Plunket on the Catholic question. (See note to H.M. above); how, as the policy of doing so was doubtful, he did it on his own sole responsibility—how the King received it in good part, and how the step was in continuation of the notice to his colleagues of an intention to treat the Catholic question as one open to discussion in the Cabinet, with the King, and elsewhere, where it might appear to Canning fit so to treat it.

It is a pity that this letter to Mr. Plunket is not with the papers: but considering that the relief measure had just been defeated in a moribund Parliament, that the Prime Minister and Heir to the Throne had pronounced against it, that Canning had not surrendered his position of advocacy, but had declared his determination to work for it both before the Public and in the Cabinet, it may be conjectured that it sketched a line of conduct for the approval of Lord Wellesley and Mr. Plunket, which might be considered most favourable to advancing the cause in the struggle of the impending general election, and to securing victory in the new House of Commons.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Seaford: Sunday, October 23, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I will write to Wellesley, though it is a difficult job; but to set Plunket or any one else upon him would, I fear, be a heinous offence in his eyes, and more likely to drive him on than to keep him back.

However, I cannot believe that he is so absolutely crazed as to meditate the things imputed in your report from Ireland.

I return the Duke of Wellington's letter. I know no reason for an assembly of the Cabinet in November. I have nothing for them.

I presumed that your coming to town was partly for the Indian question, and partly for business of your own.

My only business there, is to exchange the Columbian ratifications, and to present the Ministers of the

New States on the day of the Recorder's report. My plan is, to leave this place on Tuesday, November 1, for Walmer, to remain there till you go up to town, whether Saturday or Sunday, to exchange on Monday the 7th the Columbian ratifications; to present on Tuesday the 8th the Columbian and (if he be arrived) the Buenos Ayrean Minister; to remain Wednesday in case you should want me in town (but not to be present at your Indian interview, of the matter of which I am quite resolved to wash my hands entirely); and on Thursday, or as soon after as I can get away, to return here for the remainder of the month. Harriet and Clanricarde will be in town about the 7th, and will return here with us. 1825

On December 1 we think of settling in Downing Street.

Do you mean to go to Bath this year? and about what time?

Ever sincerely yours,

EO. CANNING.

I write to the D. of W. himself to save time.

G. C.

[Lord Wellesley in Ireland appears from this letter to be giving, or rather continuing to give, no small anxiety to the two chiefs of the Cabinet. Canning was to make an effort to restrain his indiscretion.

The rest of the letter chiefly sketches plans of the writer's movements, private and political.

Allusion is made to the matter under discussion between the Government and the East India Company, in which Canning does not wish to concern himself.]

MEMORANDUM OF MR. CANNING.

Seaford: October 25, 1825.

Count Lieven called upon me yesterday and read to me 'in entire personal confidence,' as he said; and ithout the orders of his Court :—

1825

1. A despatch addressed to the Russian missions at the three Continental Courts on the present state of the Greek question.

2. A Résumé of the points of difference, and of the decision taken in the conferences at St. Petersburg in the beginning of the year. The despatch complains heavily of the conduct of the Allies, and of the situation in which the Emperor is left by them.

By the Résumé it appears, that the points of difference between Russia and the Allies at St. Petersburg were that:

1. Russia proposed that in case of a refusal by the Porte to listen to overtures of accommodation, recourse should be had to 'les moyens coercitifs,' which was opposed by all the Allies.

Although, says the paper, the Emperor was willing to consent that the same 'Moyens' should also be employed towards the Greeks in case of their refusal.

2. The Allies (Austria included) proposed that the Porte should be apprised of the determination of the Great Powers to acknowledge the independence of Greece, in case the Porte remained obstinate, which was opposed by Russia alone.

The result was therefore only to present simultaneously notes of advice and representation to the Porte, which notes, says the Russian Ambassador, (but not, I think, the paper,) were framed by the three missions of the Allies, as if with the express purpose of indicating to the Porte the policy of refusing, and an assurance that the refusal would not be attended with any ill consequences.

It is impossible for ill humour to be expressed more strongly than in the whole tenour of these two documents.

Among the reasons for doing something quickly is

one which was quite new to me, but which appears by the Résumé to have been communicated to the Allies in April last. 1825

The Court of Russia has positive information that before Ibrahim Pacha's army was put in motion, an agreement was entered into by the Porte with the Pacha of Egypt, that whatever part of Greece Ibrahim Pacha might conquer should be at his disposal; and that his plan of disposing of his conquest is (and was stated to the Porte to be, and has been approved by the Porte), to remove the whole Greek population, carrying them off into slavery in Egypt or elsewhere, and to re-people the country with Egyptians and others of the Mahommedan religion.

G. C.

[This is a record of what passed at an interview in which Count Lieven, the Russian Ambassador in London, communicated to the British Foreign Secretary a general view of the position of Russia with regard to the Greek question, as traced out in a despatch recently addressed to the Russian Ambassadors at the three 'Continental Courts' (Prussia, Austria, and France), and a *résumé* of the proceedings at the Conferences on the Greek question held at St. Petersburg in the beginning of the year.

Count Lieven represented that he did this 'in entire personal 'confidence,' and 'without the orders of his Court.' But none the less it was clearly an approachment to Canning on the part of the Russian Government, and, after the previous vehement repudiation of all regard for British influence on the Greek question, it marked a surrender of the antagonistical position of Russia.

The action taken by the Allied Powers towards the Porte to press a settlement of the Greek disturbances ended in nothing, the Porte simply disregarding the representations of the Allies.

But Canning learnt for the first time the atrocious design of the Turkish Government for the deportation of the entire Greek population of the Morea to Egypt, and the colonisation of the vacated territory by a new population of the Mahommedan faith; and this intelligence, it will be found, bore active fruit shortly afterwards.

It may be here noted, by anticipation, that at page 82, vol. iii., of the 'Wellington Correspondence,' will be found, in print, the official

1825 letter of instructions from the War (also at that time, Colonial) Office to the Admiralty, authorising a formal inquiry being made of Ibrahim Pacha by the British naval authorities in the Mediterranean, as to the reality of the rumoured intention of the Turkish authorities to depopulate the Morea, and to repeople the vacant territory with Mahommedan population.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Seaford: October 25, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I send you a letter which I have received this morning from Plunket.

It negatives, you see, in a manner the more satisfactory because uninvited, the existence of any such disposition as is imputed in the letter from Ireland which you mention having seen. The notion, indeed, of the proceeding mentioned in that letter is so monstrous that I cannot help believing it to be an invention, I will not say of the writer, because I know not who he is, but of some decided and inveterate enemy of Lord W.'s.

The receipt of this letter of Plunket's induces me to defer writing to Lord W., at least until I shall receive his reply to my acknowledgment of his nuptial communication.

Possibly he may give me an opening for saying what I wish to say, without adverting to the report which has been transmitted to you, and which, though it struck me at first with astonishment at W.'s supposed folly, I have upon reflection been inclined to consider rather as an indication of some design against him, than as a proof of madness (for it would be little short of madness) in him.

I add a copy of what I write to Plunket in answer to his letter.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[This refers to Irish affairs, and the Marquis of Wellesley's administration. The answer from Mr. Plunket, the Irish Attorney-

General, has been returned in reply to Canning's inquiries. Lord Wellesley had been suspected of contemplating some proceeding on the Catholic question, which Canning regards as little short of madness. Accepting Plunket's repudiation as true on Lord Wellesley's behalf, it can only follow that Lord Liverpool's informant is animated by inveterate enmity against the Lord Lieutenant. 1825

Canning's letter to Plunket will be found to be the subject of several letters above quoted.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Seaford: October 25, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—Enclosed is a memorandum of what passed with Lieven yesterday, when he came over (according to an appointment made in town) from Brighton to pay me a visit.

He was delighted with the permission to come; and has, I verily believe, opened his whole mind to me.

Certainly we have had no such confidences from any other of the Continental Powers.

The wrath against Austria, or rather Count Metternich, is great; and I must own not undeserved.

I begin to think that the time approaches when something must be done; but not till Austria as well as France has put into our hands the dealing, first with Russia, and then with the parties to the war. I am quite clear that there is no honesty in Metternich; and that we cannot enter into joint counsel with him, without the certainty of being betrayed.

It is not only his practice; but in our case it will be his pride and pleasure.

At least, however, we now know clearly enough the points of difference between us and the Alliance generally; and between the members of the Alliance among themselves; and we know our points of agreement.

Ever yours,

G. C.

[Encloses a copy of the memorandum (above given) of the inter-

1825 view with Count Lieven, and signifies his belief in the sincerity of the Russian act of confidence in him, including their distrust of Metternich, in which Canning fully concurs, as he believes Metternich would lose no possible opportunity of betraying England.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Seaford: October 31, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I have had such an influx of despatches, since I returned here ten days ago, from Rio de Janeiro, Madrid, Constantinople, and Vienna, not to mention two long conferences with Lieven, who is at Brighton, but was delighted to come over here for a 'confidential' morning, (on which he sets great store, and whereupon he sends off a courier to his Court), that I have been much more occupied in receiving intelligence than in communicating it, or commenting upon it.

And as it always happens that the more one has to write of necessity, the more one is disposed to write voluntarily, in addition I have *e converso*, let the two last mails go without a private letter to Paris.

I flatter myself that Brazil is nearly settled, so far as relates to Portugal I mean. The work that the Emperor is cutting out for himself is another question. As to Greece I have now applications from all the three Powers to take that question into our hands. The King, I hope (indeed I have reason to believe), begins to feel that I have not, as he was taught 'to apprehend,' lost to him his station among 'the Powers of the Continent,' but only changed it from the tail of Europe to the head.

What is to be done is a different thing, but nothing just yet. Things are not yet ripe for our interference, for we must not (like our good Allies) interfere in vain. If we act we must finish what is to be done.

I have been living a very wholesome life here, riding every day, warm sea-bathing every other day, and keep-

ing excellent hours, but working from eleven or ten o'clock almost every day till three or four. 1825

To-day Mrs. Canning goes to town, and I, with Charles and Frere, along the coast to Walmer, where we shall stay till Saturday. I shall then join Mrs. Canning in Downing Street, whither I am called by the necessity of interviews, (one with Esterhazy, who is at length thinking of his departure), and by a Council to be held on Tuesday, at which my Ministers from the New States, or at least one of them, the Columbian, will be received.

We shall remain in town as short a time as possible after the Council, and shall then return here for the remainder of the month, bringing Harriet and Clanricarde (whom we expect on the 7th) with us.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—Pray see that the enclosed is carefully forwarded to Mrs. Chinnery.

[One may notice in this letter signs of pardonable exultation at the success of his policy, and at the respect manifested towards Great Britain by the great continental Powers in the matter of the Greek war, confirming his credit with the hesitating King.

All the three Powers had appealed to Great Britain on the Greek question. But the time for action was not yet come ; when Britain did act, it must be decisively, and not vainly, as the other Powers had acted.

He thinks the controversy between Brazil and Portugal was nearly closed, though he apprehends trouble for Brazil on her own continent. This referred to the efforts of the Emperor Pedro to give an absolutist character to his monarchy, and also to the trouble he was taking to preserve to the Brazilian Empire the Banda Oriental province, which had in the course of the year revolted and joined the Confederation of provinces of La Plata. About this time the balance of the contest was strongly inclined in favour of the independence of the Banda Oriental, and the Brazilian Government were organising fresh efforts to recover it.

The rest of the letter refers to Canning's movements, his visit to

1825 Lord Liverpool, his business in London, and eventual return to
—— Seaford.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Walmer Castle: November 5, 1825.

My dear Granville,—Huskisson, who came here yesterday to dinner, has told me of the embarrassment which has been occasioned to you by Major Gurwood's unlicensed talk at Paris. I wish to entreat you to make a direct and formal complaint to me—in a private letter if you will—but such a one as I shall be at liberty to use.

The whole transaction is not only inconvenient to me, as well as to you, but scandalous, and I must prevent its recurrence. The inconvenience to myself alone is not sufficiently stateable, as I have of course only hearsay evidence of the Major's jabberings in London; but the remonstrances of Foreign Ministers are stateable things, and it is your duty to report them to me.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—Huskisson found Charles and Frere and me here with L. We have had a very agreeable—and I have made a very useful—three days of quiet society. To-day all go to town, indeed all are gone except me, and I shall get into my chaise as soon as I have sent off this letter.

[Major Gurwood's 'unlicensed talk' at Paris is to be suppressed. Major Gurwood's power lay in his being regarded as the mouthpiece of the Duke of Wellington.

His talk may be conjectured as a description of a state of affairs at head-quarters in Great Britain inimical to Liberal opinions, and favourable to the party of absolutism. It may also have had something to do with the diplomatic struggle at Rio de Janeiro, on the question of the independence of Brazil, to which place Gurwood once, as King's messenger, carried despatches to Sir C. Stuart, and no doubt

became cognisant of the legitimist tendencies of the Ambassadors at Rio and their conflict with the Liberal Foreign Minister.] 1825

MR. CANNING TO SIR GEORGE COCKBURN.

(Secret.) QUERIES.

1. What is the present amount of our naval force in the Mediterranean?

2. Supposing a case to occur in which it might be deemed expedient—

(1.) To prevent fresh supplies of men, &c., from reaching Egypt;

(2.) To prevent the Turkish Fleet from advancing into the Archipelago;

(3.) To prevent the Greeks from taking undue advantage of the opportunity afforded them, by this restraint put upon their enemies;

In other words, to enforce an armistice between the belligerent parties—is the present amount of force in these seas sufficient to execute this purpose in all its different details; and to do so with such effect as to deter opposition, and consequently to avoid actual hostile collision?

3. In the event of the force not being at present sufficient, could it be speedily made so by augmentation from the Tagus?

4. In the case supposed the French and Russian naval forces in these seas would co-operate with ours.

5. Is the precise force of each of these squadrons known?

6. Is the force of the Turkish naval force known?

7. What are the relative ranks of the British, French, and Russian Commanders?

[This is a memorandum of queries to the First Naval Lord of the Admiralty as to the strength of the British naval forces in the Mediterranean available for active intervention in the Greek war, with a view to enforce an armistice on both parties.

1825 This, though undated, may be fairly placed in November, 1825, just after Canning became aware, through the agency of Count Lieven, of the Turkish design for the depopulation of the Morea, and recognising the atrocity of the idea, began to consider the measures necessary to put an end to it.]

MR. CANNING TO LORD GRANVILLE.

F. O.: Sunday night, November 13, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I send off this newspaper previously to my leaving town again for Seaford, to convey to you the enclosed paper—under the conditions described in my letter of Friday. You are not to show it, nor copy it, and are to return it to me by the return of the messenger.

When you consider who and what the writer is—what are his necessary prejudices, of what sort his former connections, of what character the transactions in which he has been for so many years engaged, you will see that such an *exposé* precisely at such a moment is the most unequivocal proof that it was possible to receive of a most important conversion [the King]. You will make allowance as I do for certain expressions, especially at the beginning (with regard to language used in relation to Spain), which are probably employed in reference to former declarations of opinion at the time when the event to which they relate occurred. But with these and such like qualifications, the way in which every topic is treated is as nearly as possible what I myself would have prescribed, and certainly is not what I should have ventured to expect from this quarter this time twelve months.

The success of the Brazilian negotiation has had a great effect, I will not say in producing this change, but in encouraging the declaration of it—a declaration which is made, (and that is what I meant by 'precisely at such a moment'), just two days before the first public act of recognition of the new Government of America.

And this leads me to say that I cannot help very much regretting that you have said so little about the Brazilian treaty, either in your despatches or in your private letter. I am sure it would have been agreeable to the King to hear how that event was received at Paris—very agreeable, of course, if the general feeling was very much in its favour—but not otherwise, if the ultra-party were furious against it; because his Majesty has a due and strong sense of the duplicity with which the French Government has acted in the Brazilian transaction, and would hear without any other feeling than 'that it served them right,' of any wrath that was excited or unpopularity that was incurred by its success. 1825

At any rate, it is desirable for us to know how the treaty has been received by different parties at Paris. I think you will do well to dedicate a despatch, or a private political letter (such as I can show to the King), to that subject.

Pray, pray, my dear Granville, take a little more pains with your P. P. [private political] letters, especially. Write to me privately as to what I may keep to myself: but put it in my power to do you service with the King, and let him see that you are on the alert to provide such intelligence as may both inform and interest him on all occasions.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[The document enclosed to Lord Granville in this letter, mentioned in the first paragraph, and forming the text of the whole, is not with the papers; but it is clear it was a communication from somebody near the King, probably Sir William Knighton, if not from the King himself, implying a sense on his Majesty's part of great satisfaction with the conduct of foreign politics.

It must have constituted an agreeable confirmation of the change in the King's views with regard to Canning, first manifested in the message Sir William Knighton had brought in the previous April.

1825 The good will of the King had been greatly strengthened by the success of the negotiation conducted by Sir Charles Stuart between Brazil and Portugal, securing the recognition of the independence of the former by the mother country; notwithstanding several lapses from his instructions, due to Sir Charles Stuart's personal bias in favour of legitimism and absolute monarchy.

The conferences opened at London in July 1824, between plenipotentiaries of Portugal and Brazil, under the auspices of Canning, broke down entirely in the November following, in consequence of the Portuguese Government having thought fit to submit to the representatives of Spain, France, Russia, and Prussia, at Lisbon, a *contre projet* of reconciliation opposed to the *projet* advanced by Great Britain in London.

Austria was at this time, and in this affair, acting to a certain extent, but not without duplicity, in harmony with Great Britain.

This appeal to other Powers of Europe, not engaged in the mediation, was followed on the part of the Portuguese Government by another and stronger mark of contempt for the London conferences, viz. the despatch directly to the Court of Brazil, by the hands of an inferior agent, of the Portuguese *contre projet*.

There was not the slightest doubt that the Count de Subserra, who executed these acts of contempt for the British mediation, moved under the guidance of France, or at least of an influential French agent; and it was the aim of France to establish a breach between Portugal and England, and to replace English by French influence at the Court of Lisbon.

The French influence gained predominance in the councils of Portugal, when the Portuguese Court believed it could safely venture to yield to its natural tendencies towards ultra-monarchical pretensions, and the sense of security, which fostered French influence, arose on those rare occasions when the discontented populace of Portugal happened to feel indisposed towards another revolution; while their solitary neighbour, Spain, contemporaneously intermitted her designs of absorbing the independence of Portugal, when the rebellious and indignant colony of Brazil ceased for an instant to menace the commerce or the capital of the mother country, and whilst French troops continued all the time to occupy the strong places in Spain.

But such conjunctures seldom occurred; and British influence resumed its sway, when the Portuguese Court could not disguise from the Portuguese nation that France was unable to suppress anarchy in Portugal without compromising Portuguese independence

as against Spain, and was powerless to control the undutiful violence of Brazil, if the British squadron withdrew from the Tagus. 1825

Canning was not the man to submit with patience to these accumulated affronts, and (see 'Political Life,' vol. ii. p. 243) he caused Sir William A'Court to intimate to the King of Portugal that the choice must be made between France and England. If he chose France and M. de Subserra, the British squadron would be withdrawn from the Tagus, and the negotiations through England with Brazil would fail.

The King, overawed, only stipulated for personal protection from revolutionary violence if he broke with France; this being assured to him, he promised a change of Ministers. And here the unsleeping watchfulness of Canning came to his assistance. For by strong representations to the French Government of the dangerous audacity of M. Hyde de Neuville, referring to his summons of the French garrison at Badajoz over the frontier into Portugal, he had succeeded in obtaining his recall. The withdrawal of Hyde de Neuville divested Subserra of his energy and prestige; and the King found little difficulty in ridding himself of the French influence. (See 'Life and 'Times,' pp. 504–506.)

Nevertheless, the French influence, expelled from Lisbon, made a desperate attempt to anticipate and outbid Canning at Rio de Janeiro, by an offer of immediate recognition, if conciliated by the grant of equal commercial advantages with those of Great Britain. The Emperor Pedro refused this overture at once ('Political Life,' vol. ii. p. 340), but could not refrain from playing it off against England at a subsequent stage of the negotiations (*ibid.* p. 349), though eventually it came to nothing.

French intrigues being thus frustrated both at Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro, the field remained open for England to do what was possible to reconcile the contending parties.

Canning advised that the King, 'in the undiminished plenitude 'of his rights as King of the United Kingdom of Portugal and Brazil, 'should sign a royal charter, granting to Brazil all that remained to 'be granted, to establish an entire legislative independence; confirming to Don Pedro the unlimited exercise of the royal authority 'during the life of his father, under such titles as the representative 'assemblies of Brazil might have conferred upon him,' and permitting him to retain the title of Heir Apparent of Portugal; reserving to the King all his own titles and dignities and private property in Brazil, and agreeing for the appointment of a Commission to settle all questions of property in dispute.

The advantage of these propositions lay in the non-disturbance and implied recognition of all established facts; including even the

1825 existence of a legitimate sovereignty of the King of Portugal over Brazil, which by his charter he 'voluntarily' surrendered.

The *contre-projet* reserved a species of sovereignty over independent Brazil; the right of negotiating commercial treaties; a joint diplomacy; and a common army. These propositions were on the face of them incompatible with established facts, absurd, and impracticable.

Sir Charles Stuart, fully informed of the views of the British Foreign Office, had been sent with express intention and permission from his Government to accept diplomatic authority and instructions from Portugal, to negotiate a treaty of separation with Brazil.

Of the three shapes into which Canning's *projet* was transformed by the Portuguese Government in their instructions to Sir Charles Stuart, all turning upon various changes in the rehearsal of the titles of the King of Portugal, none would go down with the Brazilian Government. The permutations and combinations were not altogether destitute of significance, as upon them turned the question of the continuance, or otherwise, of an actual sovereignty of Portugal over Brazil. In fact (see 'Political Life,' vol. ii. p. 350), the two grand difficulties were the recognition by Brazil of the right of cession of sovereignty by the King of Portugal; and, secondly, the right of the King of Portugal to assume the title of Emperor of Brazil, and then associate his son with him in the dignity. In many of Canning's letters about this date may be found passages pointing out the elective character of the imperial dignity, and the inherent impropriety of a King assuming it for himself. And Sir Charles Stuart finally solved the difficulty by embodying in a preamble to a *Diploma Regis* an acknowledgment of the independence of Brazil, as a matter of recital precedent to the announcement by the King of Portugal of his assumption of the imperial title. He thus contrived to leave undisturbed the King of Portugal's claim to the title of 'Emperor'; the splendour of which title appears to have haunted his 'Most Faithful' Majesty's mind, and to have roused a jealousy of his son, who had succeeded in assuming it without protest from any quarter, together with an ill-founded idea that unless he secured it for himself he must sink in public estimation, notwithstanding the decision of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that the title of Emperor was not to be considered as superior in any way to that of King, and of the representations to a similar effect urged by the British Minister.

A last attempt of the Brazilian native influence to refer the Brazilian imperial authority 'to Heaven and the people,' without recognition expressed or implied of any antecedent legitimate authority in Portugal, was detected and extinguished by Sir Charles Stuart,

who insisted on and succeeded in obtaining an alteration of the style from 'Emperor by the Grace of God and the Unanimous Acclamation of the People,' into 'Emperor by the Grace of God and According to the Constitution of the State'; which of course included, without mentioning, all previous legal authority. 1825

Notwithstanding various difficulties raised by Portugal, the terms of the treaty as arranged by Sir Charles Stuart had been generally accepted; and England could claim the credit of a successful pacification between a European State and its American colony, which on the Liberal side secured the full recognition of the independence of the separating province, and, on the Monarchical side, preserved a legitimate character for the final establishment of the independence, and also a Monarchical form of government therein.

The foiling of the jealous intrigues of France and the signal success in all respects of the business undertaken, did not fail to increase the general respect for Great Britain, and to afford gratification to the English King.

Canning closes his letter by reiterated entreaties to Lord Granville to exert himself to write letters from Paris which may please and interest his Majesty; particularly as to the reception which the treaty met with at the French Court, where of course some symptoms of irritation at the predominant influence of Great Britain were inevitably expected.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: November 14, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I take advantage of this messenger to mention to you a little matter, which by possibility the folly and rascality of our newspapers (on both sides) might blow into a great one, if not timely prevented.

A translation of my note to M. Zea has somehow or other found its way into the newspapers of the Continent:—first the German, then the French, from one or other of which it has naturally been transplanted into our own. The original Continental publisher, which I take to be the German one, professed to draw his knowledge of the paper from South America and specifically from Buenos Ayres. I have no means of denying this. I have not seen the Buenos Ayres paper, indeed, nor have I the

1825 German one. Part of the paper I saw in a French newspaper, I think the *Constitutionnel.*

Be that as it may, being published and through the medium of two or three translations, one of our gazetteers —not the 'Courier,' but Dr. Stoddart of the 'New Times' —asked leave to compare the translation with the original text of the note in order to correct the one by the other. In this there seemed to be no harm, as the substance of the paper was now known to all the world, and was identical in each of the twenty newspapers which had published it, and I took for granted that the Doctor had no other intention than the innocent ambition of giving a more happy and polished version, and enjoying tacitly his superiority over his rivals. Not a bit. The rogue begins by announcing that he has an authentic copy, &c., &c., and in effect tells the world that he has got it from my office.

This is scoundrelly—if it had been harmless; but it is mischievous into the bargain. You will see in the newspapers, which of course you take—'Old Times,' and 'New,' and 'Courier,' which is an ally of the 'New,'—the use made of the passage relating to the Bourbons.

The passage is, of course, not new to anyone who can care about it—for the note, as you know, was communicated to all the Courts at the time of its being written. But the publication is annoying in a high degree, and would be grievously offensive if it were intentional.

Pray be beforehand in assuring both Damas and Villèle that it was not so; and explain to them exactly how this provoking *contretemps* has happened. I mean how the appearance of voluntary publication has been produced; for it is of that alone that I am anxious to remove the impression. As to the original transpiration, whether at Buenos Ayres, or at Frankfort, or wherever

else, I am as innocent as I am at present ignorant where it first transpired. Certainly not here. 1825

Ever affectionately yours,

G. C.

P.S.—The most mortifying thing in the whole is the destruction of my system, (hitherto persevered in and with tolerable success), of abstinence from communication with the newspaper writers. Villèle, who knows what these gentry are, can imagine what difficulty there is in at once denying them information, and expecting their allegiance. He knows perhaps better than I, that one of our newspapers (as it is called) has taken money from the French Government. This Dr. Stoddart, I believe, never has done—and as what he asked was not information, but simply as I understood him the means of correcting information of which he and all the world were already in possession, I thought the indulgence harmless and no more than his fidelity deserved. But I am cured of this sort of liberality; and have done with *hoc genus omne*, for good and all.

G. C.

[This instructs Lord Granville to proffer explanations to the French Government as to the quasi-official publication in a London newspaper of a diplomatic note addressed by Canning to M. Zea de Bermudez, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to a memorandum of reproach at the recognition by Great Britain of the independence of the Spanish Colonies. Neither the matter contained in Canning's note, nor the publication by itself, required apology, but only the quasi-official character imparted by Dr. Stoddart's, the newspaper editor, ingenious device of getting a sight of the original, and then claiming official authority for his version from memory in the *New Times*.

The substance of the note may be found in 'Political Life,' vol. iii. pp. 82–92.

The passage mortifying to the Bourbons is quoted at p. 91, and recalls the fact that in 1814, the Allies would have made peace with Bonaparte himself had his demands not been excessive, and that,

1825 even when Bonaparte was set aside, 'there was a question among 'the Allies of the possible expediency of placing some other than a 'Bourbon on the Throne of France.' This was harmless enough in an argument with Spain, but even though historical facts, their resuscitation of these delicate circumstances in a State paper officially published by the British Foreign Office, unless carefully explained on the score of some irresistible pressure, would have borne the appearance of a gratuitous and inexcusable insult to the French monarchy.

So Canning wisely sent explanations and soothing messages to the French Government.

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Seaford: November 17, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I have written to Prince Polignac to ask what he has done about the 'Gabrielle' —I fear little, as he was not the first to mention it.

It is a scandalous piece of shabbiness on the part of the French Government. But I am not sure that some scoundrels of ours—that Bierley in particular—may not have played foul and spoilt the question. Perhaps you could learn this from Sir Sydney Smith.

Do not let poor Sir Sydney starve, nor go to prison —if moderate occasional help will keep him out, and alive. But do not, on the other hand, let him know or suspect that you have any authority to help him. Poor fellow! I have received a letter from him, and were I First Lord of the Admiralty I think I should find employment for him somehow or other. But it is quite a different thing to ask employment for him, or to recommend him for it—I would perhaps run the risk, because I think I could keep him in order. But I may be mistaken in that, and I could not conscientiously say to Lord Melville that I think he could do so.

Say something good-natured from me to him; but give him no hopes—for there are none for him. I shall not otherwise (than through you) answer his letter.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Remarks that he has written to Prince Polignac to inquire what he has done about the 'Gabrielle,' and gives Lord Granville instructions how far he may go in succouring Sir Sydney Smith.] 1825

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Seaford: November 18, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I received here, last night, your several private letters of the 13th.

I must confess to you, I am much disconcerted by those of them which relate to M. G. [Major Gurwood]. From what Huskisson stated to me on his return from Paris, I conceived that you had been subjected to serious embarrassment by the talk of that man throughout Paris; and it was quite an accident and, as it turns out, a most lucky one that I did not write to his patron [the Duke of Wellington] on what I understood to be an almost formal complaint (and a perfectly just one) on your part, founded on the representations of the Portuguese Ambassador at Paris. I cannot agree with you that your 'hearsay' is 'like' mine. Mine was wholly unofficial and unconnected with office, except so far as, living chiefly in my room at the F. O., the rumour reached me there. But yours was from an official person on official grounds, and leading to official consequences. If Palmella had made the complaint to me, I should have felt perfectly well founded in representing to Sir C. S. the inconvenience to which he had exposed the King's Government by sending M. G. home at such a period of the negotiation. I should not have thought it necessary to examine into P.'s mode of getting at (or rather of getting a precise knowledge of) what was perfectly notorious to all the world—that were his affair. The representation of a foreign Minister, and of the foreign Minister most concerned, would have been quite sufficient to justify my interference.

The letter which you have sent me is of no help,

1825 and, therefore, I shall not say anything to L. about the matter.

Ever affectionately yours, G. C.

[This concerns the proceedings of Major Gurwood (see *ante*, letter to Lord Granville of November 5, 1825).

Major Gurwood had been despatched from Rio de Janeiro at the precise point in Sir Charles Stuart's negotiation between Portugal and Brazil when the question of the sovereignty of Portugal was coming to an issue, but not yet settled. He had since then been staying in Paris, and indiscreetly gossiping about amongst society in Paris; his talk had been complained of by the Portuguese Minister at the French Court, so though he professedly attached himself to the Duke of Wellington (the 'patron' mentioned by Canning), his communications equally offended the Portuguese representative and annoyed Lord Granville, the British Ambassador.

Canning, it seems, on a report from Huskisson of the inconvenience caused by Major Gurwood's proceedings, had nearly made a direct complaint on the subject to the Major's patron, and at the same time thought of sending a rebuke to Sir Charles Stuart for despatching the Major home at the precise stage in the negotiations which he did; but discovering from Lord Granville's last private letter that there was not substantial grounds enough to go upon, he decided to leave the matter alone.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

Seaford: November 18, 1825.

My dear Granville,—I have received no account of Mr. C.'s duel except yours of Monday, the 14th (if that may be called one), and a scrap which Planta has sent to me, from a Mr. Flint, in which it appears that the antagonist's name was Schonfeldt, and that the affair took place on Thursday, the 10th.

There my knowledge ends. What was the cause of the quarrel—whether Mr. C. was in the right or in the wrong—are matters which I am to gather from the newspapers; and whether the effect of it is to render his removal (in due time) from the Embassy advisable, is one upon which I have not the benefit of your opinion.

I certainly would not keep a Secretary of Embassy at a Court at which he had fought a duel; and upon the conduct of a Secretary of Embassy, in such an affair, I conceive any Ambassador would have thought it his duty to report to the Secretary of State. 1825

All that I gather from your letter, beside the fact of his having fought, is that the duel was 'foolish' (I presume on Mr. C.'s part) and that he fought without seconds—the practice of ruffians, and long ago exploded in England, and, I had supposed, in civilised Europe.

This may be all capable of explanation, but it surely required one.

It is fortunate for me that I am not in town to be exposed to the inquiries of Lord Howden's friends; and to be obliged, in proof of the incredible fact that I have no information on the subject, to produce (and how could I help it?) your letter of the 14th.

Ever affectionately yours,

G. C.

[The Mr. 'C.' who had fought the duel mentioned in this letter, was Mr. Cradock, afterwards 2nd Lord Howden, and then a Secretary to the Embassy at Paris.

Canning complains with justice of the neglect of Lord Granville to inform him properly of the exact details of the duel.]

MR. CANNING TO EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Seaford: Sunday night, November 27, 1825. 10 P.M.

My dear Liverpool,—Huskisson having returned to me the drafts of my despatches to Stuart, I send them to you together with Stuart's despatch, to which they are mostly in answer; in the hope that you may find time to read them on your way to town to-morrow. They are tough reading, but they must be gone through, and I must send them off to Rio de Janeiro without delay to take the chance (little as I fear that is) of pre-

1825 venting Stuart from signing a most foolish and mischievous treaty.

You will see in one of the drafts my apprehension that if Stuart signs his projected treaty, France will obtain just such another, and that then we shall have all the shame of grasping (in direct contradiction to our liberal professions) and at the same time be deprived of the advantage of our selfishness.

Pray observe how this apprehension is confirmed by the passage marked in the enclosed paper, which is just come to my hands.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—The drafts are *brouillons*, but I should lose twenty-four hours in keeping them to be copied.

[This sends for the perusal of the Prime Minister draft despatches to Sir Charles Stuart at Rio de Janeiro.

Sir Charles Stuart had taken upon himself, immediately after the negotiations between Portugal and Brazil had been brought to a successful issue, to proceed to negotiate treaties between Great Britain and Brazil, one commercial, the other on the Slave Trade.

The terms of the Commercial treaty appeared so unfavourable to British interests that Canning had to advise the British King to refuse to ratify it.

The substance of the arguments of the despatches here sent to Lord Liverpool is given at p. 159 (*et seq.*) of 'Political Life,' vol. iii.

It seems that, in view of the impossibility of expecting Brazil to continue on her own account the specially favourable conditions of commerce between Brazil and England conceded when, as subject to Portugal, the former shared the burden of compensating Great Britain for the trouble and cost of protection given to the mother country, Canning had thought over the question of a revision of the Commercial treaties with Brazil; but anxious to give time to the traders concerned to prepare for a change, he refrained from starting the matter at once, and from furnishing Sir Charles Stuart with any instructions thereon.

Sir Charles Stuart, however, having settled his main errand, and being left with nothing particular to do, set about negotiating

treaties between Great Britain and Brazil without instructions, and, as it were, to pass the time, but his efforts proved far from successful; a stipulation (Article 22), that Great Britain should enjoy the advantages of the 'most favoured nation,' would have operated with signal detriment to British commerce, when either the commerce of no other nation enjoyed any advantages at all, giving no test of what the 'most favoured nation' might lawfully claim; or Brazil might invert the mutual advantages, and make them so much against the 'most favoured nation,' that England, being by treaty able to claim no more, might find her trade annihilated without remedy. 1825

This mistake, conjoined with an admission (Article 17) that the right of search for enemies' goods in friendly ships was a subject for discussion in respect of the mode and manner of exercising such right; an uncalled-for and inconvenient abolition (Article 8) of the office of 'Judge Conservator,' expressly appointed to keep the affairs of British merchants out of Brazilian courts; and, lastly (Article 10), providing for a refusal of protection and even expulsion from the dominions of either Power of persons accused of high treason, forgery, and counterfeiting money or paper, proved altogether more than Canning could stand; and the treaty was disavowed, and Sir Charles Stuart was favoured with the argumentative despatches pulling his treaty to pieces.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Seaford: Sunday morning, November 27, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I send you the enclosed letter, though certainly not intended for your perusal, because from the known good sense and good temper of the writer I believe it to contain the exact truth in all respects at least but one, which is perhaps a permitted sort of falsehood, viz., that though not written by W.'s [Lord Wellesley] desire, I can hardly help doubting whether it may not be with his knowledge.

Perhaps not, however, for in more than one instance I think Shawe has written to Stapleton in a way which Lord W. certainly could not know. Be that as it may, the writer, if anyone, knows W.'s mind, and I should infer from what is here written that he [Lord W.] would not be so inexorably disinclined, as you seem

1825 to imagine, to the hereafter nomination of Lord Westmeath.

At all events, some hope of this sort (a promise it must not be) seems to afford the only chance of serving Lord Mt. C., and the honour of the Government both in Ireland and here is deeply concerned in his success.

You see by this list that we were misinformed as to Lord Lansdowne, but this list itself is wrong about Lord Darnley.

You will, I am sure, be careful not to commit Shawe.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

I shall go to town Tuesday, on Wynn's summons.

[He sends to the Premier a letter written by Colonel Shawe, Lord Wellesley's private secretary, to Mr. Stapleton, apparently relative to the next election of an Irish Representative Peer; the importance of the letter lay in its discovery of Lord Wellesley's wishes and ideas without its committing him to any definite course.

The claims of Lords Westmeath and Mount Cashell are still in conflict.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Seaford: Sunday night (half-past ten), Nov. 27, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—At the moment of preparing to send off these boxes I receive your letter announcing Ld. Westmeath's retirement.

It is a God-send.

You say nothing of Wynn's summons.

I wish I might understand from your silence that there is not to be a Cabinet this week; for I grudge going up; but I shall go, unless I hear to the contrary, on Tuesday. Wynn, however, ought to give a little more notice of his calls upon us, when we are dispersed in all corners of the Kingdom.

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—If you have fixed the Cabinet for a later day than Thursday, pray let me know by return of this messenger, for I should be loth to go up sooner than necessary. 1825

PP.S.—I this instant receive intelligence from A'Court that the King of Portugal ratifies the Treaty, and illuminates for it three nights, which shows his good sense and his love of illuminations.

I will send you the despatch to-morrow, i.e. to meet you at Combe on your arrival on Tuesday.

G. C.

[This is the third letter on the same day, and dated late (10.30 P.M.) in the evening. It notes three matters :—

1. Lord Westmeath has retired from his candidature for a representative peerage, which relieves the position.

2. Wynn, President of the Board of Control, is giving trouble by calling together a Cabinet.

3. News had just arrived from Sir W. A'Court of the joyful acceptance at Lisbon of the Treaty of Independence with Brazil.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Eastham (10 P.M.): Dec. 6, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I have not the smallest information or conjecture where Lord Wm. Bentinck is to be found. I therefore send my letters for him to you. He may probably be heard of at the Duke of Portland's—i.e. either at Harcourt House, Cavendish Square (which is the Duke's present domicile), or in St. James's Square, which is still the Duke's, and where Lord William occasionally puts up when in town.

My daughter remembers Lady William saying about three weeks ago that Lord Gosford was undecided, but that Lord Farnham was his friend and neighbour. I do not see, I confess, what is to counterbalance this consideration in favour of Lord Mount Cashell, whose politics, on the only question that constitutes politics in Ireland,

1825 are the same as Lord Farnham's. It is on this ground, I understand, that Lord Lansdowne and (as Dudley, whom I saw yesterday at Brighton, tells me) Lord Clifden wrote to somebody, but I really forget whom, to offer me his vote for Clanricarde long ago. I therefore thought that I might take the liberty of asking it for Lord Mount Cashell, through Dudley; but in vain. In truth, between two Protestants, why should the Catholics who are in opposition to Government vote for the Government candidate?

It is very awkward to canvass not for one candidate but against another: and yet that is the only way in which we can canvass on this occasion.

I enclose to you the letter from S., which enclosed that from Lord Molesworth which I sent you this morning. But I am sure you will not mention it to anyone. Can you do anything with Lord Mulgrave?

I never thought of Clanwilliam. I fear it is too late; but if not, a line (by a messenger) from Planta in your name, or in yours and mine, would be better than a letter from me.

Ever sincerely yours,

G. CANNING.

Lord Cholmondeley is an Irish peer, is he not?

Lord Templeton (Bristol's brother-in-law) has voted for Lord Farnham.

Lord Normanton? Lord Belmore? Lord Verulam?

[The election of an Irish representative peer forms the topic of this letter.

The exact whereabouts of Lord William Bentinck is not a subject of interest; but it is worth while noting that he was a man of distinguished ability, and in 1828 became Governor-General of India. His wife was a sister of the then (second) Earl of Gosford.

Canning's canvass was practically aimed at the election of his son-in-law, Lord Clanricarde; but Lord Liverpool had declined to

'run' Lord Clanricarde as a Government candidate on this occasion and the contest now lay between Lords Farnham and Mount Cashell, of whom the latter was the Government candidate. 1825

Canning's mind was influenced by this fact, and he accordingly reckoned up the Government canvass for Lord Mount Cashell in a most impartial spirit; pointing out, for instance, that Lord Farnham being of the same politics as Lord Mount Cashell, there seemed no political reason why Lord Gosford should not give his vote for his friend and neighbour Lord Farnham.

In fact, both candidates being 'Protestants,' there seemed no argument of any weight to induce 'Catholic' voting peers from opposing the Government candidate if they chose.]

MR. CANNING TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

Eastham: Dec. 8, 1825.

My dear Liverpool,—I send you Ld. W. Bentinck's answer to my letter; which is more than I expected, and on his part all that I could desire.

I should have sent you only an extract from it, but for the arrival (since I received Lord W. B.'s letter) of yours yesterday, in which you speak of Ld. H.'s in Mt. C.'s favour. I have little doubt of Ld. W. B.'s version being the true one. When power can work he may be useful; but I think you are mistaken if you fancy that his moral influence acts, in anything, any way but against what he supports.

What Lord W. says of Clanricarde has been said to me by every man, without exception, with whom I have had any communication on this subject. It was said to C. himself, by many of those now on Lord Farnham's list—specifically Clancarty, who has since been the most active of Lord F.'s canvassers—and by Lord Westmeath before he started.

In fact, C. would have walked over the course, and has been prevented from coming in (and thereby keeping out Ld. F.) only by the act of Government.

1825

It would have been more fortunate for the Government if he had not been so prevented; though, for himself, and still more for myself, I am better pleased that he is not in the H. of Lords this year.

I can answer for it that C. has worked as hard for Lord Mt. C. as if he were deeply interested in his success; though perhaps he may feel (as I do) that the successor to Lord Donoughmore, chosen by Govt., ought, on the principle of impartiality, to have been inclined to Catholic politics.

I know that you did not know Lord Mt. C.'s politics on that question; but surely others did; and it will never be believed that it was not for them that he was chosen, for in other respects I understand that there is not much personally to recommend him. Of his private character, morally, I have not heard anything; but his mental faculties have been described to me in uncomplimentary terms.

This, however, is much better than Lord Farnham.

For Lord F. in the H. of Lords—taking an active part in all Irish questions, and placed there by a list of such names as those who vote for him—the Postmaster-General in the van—will be an awkward exhibition, and it is with that view, no doubt, that the Opposition concur in helping him.

One comfort, however, there is, that if the motion which you apprehended for an inquiry into the story against him shall be made in the H. of C., it can never be right for a moment to consider the resistance to it as a duty of the Government in whose face Ld. F. has flown, and the Irish part of which he has endeavoured to pull down by means of an inquiry in 1823.

We shall, therefore, have a wholesome diversion from more perplexing topics; and I am besides really curious to know how that matter was settled. I have

got the affidavit. Lord Farnham's own, is condemnation. 1825

Ever sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

P.S.—You will, of course, return Ld. Wm.'s letter without showing it to anyone. I am afraid I shall pay for it when India opens.

[This letter continues on the subject of the Irish representative peerage election.

Lord William Bentinck, in reply to Canning's appeal, promises help, probably in respect of his brother-in-law, Lord Gosford: but Canning anticipated the call for a return of the obligation 'when 'India opens;' so Lord William Bentinck already allowed his friends to see the direction which his personal ambition took.

There is a formidable reflection on a Lord 'H.,' whose moral influence Canning estimates as a negative quantity: telling against the side he meant to support. This nobleman may be guessed to be the Marquis of Hertford, who, well known as Lord Yarmouth, had only two years before come into his honours, and whose manner of life had severely compromised his reputation, and has been a trite text for moral reflections to the present day.

Passing from the difficulties in the progress of the canvass for Lord Mount Cashell, Canning took the opportunity to point out the comparative ease with which he could have carried Lord Clanricarde; none the less because Lord Mount Cashell held 'anti-Catho-'lic' opinions; while the claims of impartiality called rather for a 'Catholic' Government candidate; particularly as the world at large, having regard to Lord Liverpool's declared opinions, would assuredly credit his choice of a candidate to anti-Catholic influences.

Besides of the two candidates Lord Mount Cashell was not thought clever enough; but on the other hand there was some story against Lord Farnham, which presented considerable difficulties to be overcome; and Lord Farnham's own excuses were not too successful.

What the story was does not signify; it suffices to know that it could be used for political purposes to disturb Lord Farnham, and therefore acquired temporary importance.]

MR. CANNING TO THE KING.

Eastham: December 9, 1825.

Mr. Canning presents his humble duty to your Majesty.

1825 In humbly submitting to your Majesty his final drafts to Sir Charles Stuart, Mr. Canning feels it necessary in justice to himself to state to your Majesty, that he has had reason to be dissatisfied throughout the whole of Sir Charles Stuart's mission with the general tone of that Minister's public correspondence, in which there has been a perpetual querulousness, and an evident attempt to make a case against the possible event of a failure, which is (in Mr. Canning's humble judgment) the very worst condition of mind in which a Minister can go to the undertaking of a difficult negotiation.

Mr. Canning ventures to hope that your Majesty will not have seen in him any disposition to throw responsibility off his own shoulders upon those of the persons whom he humbly recommends to your Majesty to employ. He was perfectly ready to bear the responsibility of a failure, if, under his instructions, the negotiation had failed. He is perfectly ready, now that it has succeeded (although placed for a time in much peril by Sir C. S.'s departure from the original instructions), to give to Sir Charles Stuart the full merit of the success, and humbly to recommend him in due time (if no positive misconduct shall intervene) for the reward with which your Majesty may be graciously pleased to mark so signal a service.

But Mr. Canning has felt it to be due to himself, in the meantime, not to allow charges absolutely groundless, preferred against him as Secretary of State by a person employed under his orders, to remain on record without recorded contradictions.

In one instance, Mr. Canning would have thought himself wanting in consideration for the office in which he has the honour, unworthily, to serve your Majesty, and for those who may hereafter succeed him in it, if

he had not at once repressed a pretension of Sir Charles Stuart's, of which Mr. Canning believes there is no example: the pretension to recommend to your Majesty, in a public despatch addressed to the Secretary of State, a gentleman (however respectable) for appointment to a particular mission. It cannot escape your Majesty's penetration, that the Secretary of State is placed by such a recommendation in a situation of most unfair embarrassment. If he adopts the recommendation thus attempted to be forced upon him, he does so without the grace of conferring a benefit on the person recommended, and without the merit, whatever that may be, of selecting a fit person for your Majesty's approbation. If he declines to adopt it, he may incur in your Majesty's eyes the blame of preferring a less worthy candidate to one in whose favour an impartial testimony appears to have been given; and he is sure to become obnoxious to the ill-will of the suggested candidate and his friends. 1825

If Sir Charles Stuart is entitled to usurp in this particular the functions of the Secretary of State, why not others of your Majesty's Ambassadors abroad, fully equal to Sir Charles Stuart in service, ability, and discernment?

What would be the Secretary of State's condition (difficult as it is for him already to satisfy conflicting claims for employment) if, bearing as he must necessarily do, all the odium of refusals, he was to be deprived, by the interference of unauthorised suggestions to your Majesty, of the compensating satisfaction of originating the recommendations of those whom he thinks fittest to be selected for your Majesty's service?

In the particular instance, Mr. Canning has no hesitation in humbly assuring your Majesty that there would, in his opinion, be great inconvenience in the selection of Mr. Chamberlain for the post of your Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Rio de

1825 Janeiro. Mr. Chamberlain has long acted there as your Majesty's Consul-General, the duties of which office he has discharged with great usefulness and ability, and he has further been employed as a sort of Chargé d'Affaires, in which employment he has also acquitted himself in a manner, which unquestionably deserves some mark of your Majesty's favour.

But to convert a Consul into a Minister is at no time and under no circumstances desirable. It would be unjust to your Majesty's diplomatic servants, over whose heads such a person would come into the profession, without having passed through the lower ranks of it; and to make a Consul a Minister at the Court at which he has been long known as Consul would be to throw away half the advantages of the new appointment. Nothing is more probable than that other Powers, France perhaps the first, will send splendid missions, filled by persons of high rank, to the Court of Rio de Janeiro.

Mr. Chamberlain, whatever be his merits, would not have a fair chance of succeeding in competition with such persons at a Court, where he has been known for years in a subaltern character, nor could he have authority with his own countrymen at a place where every captain of a merchant ship trading to Brazil has been in the habit of familiar intercourse with him on questions of fees and cockets. Mr. Canning's intention was, and is (with your Majesty's permission) humbly to recommend Mr. Chamberlain to your Majesty for a Baronetcy, as a mark of your Majesty's gracious approbation of his services in the late negotiation. Lord Liverpool concurs in this humble recommendation.

For the mission to Rio de Janeiro, Mr. Canning would submit humbly to your Majesty the name of Mr. Gordon, now, and for many years past, your Majesty's Secretary of Embassy at Vienna. Mr. Gordon's services

are, of course, far better known to your Majesty than to Mr. Canning. Mr. Gordon has repeatedly declined advancement to the smaller missions of the Continent, alleging that he conceived himself to be more usefully and creditably employed in his secondary post at Vienna than he should be at the head of any mission which had no business of importance belonging to it. Mr. Canning could not hold out to Mr. Gordon any prospect of such promotion in Europe, but having ascertained from Mr. Gordon's brother, Lord Aberdeen, that the mission to Rio de Janeiro would be peculiarly agreeable to him, on account of the connection of that Court with the Court where he has so long resided, Mr. Canning is humbly of opinion that the same consideration may render the appointment of Mr. Gordon peculiarly agreeable as well to the Court of Vienna as to that of Brazil. 1825

On these grounds, Mr. Canning most humbly submits to your Majesty the name of Mr. Gordon, your Majesty's Secretary of Embassy at Vienna, for the appointment of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from your Majesty to the Emperor of Brazil.

[Sir Charles Stuart, it appears, had not only committed the misdemeanours of departing from the Foreign Office instructions in the course of the negotiations conducted by him in behalf of Portugal for conceding the independence of Brazil, and also of negotiating without authority two Treaties between Great Britain and Brazil, of which the Commercial Treaty had been disallowed, but he must needs add the superfluous crime of officiously taking upon himself to recommend that Mr. Chamberlain, hitherto Consul at Rio de Janeiro, should be promoted to the new office of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Brazil.

This piece of presumption elicited from Canning the present letter to the King, in which the reasonable character of two important rules is clearly laid down : (1.) That subordinate officers under the Foreign Office are not to be permitted to make official recommendations as to the disposal of appointments in the Diplomatic Service ; (2.) That

1825 gentlemen who have spent long years in the Consular Service at a particular place are not eligible for promotion to the Diplomatic Service at the same place.

The effect of this reasoning disqualified Mr. Chamberlain from the step suggested by Sir Charles Stuart, but as Mr. Chamberlain possessed some real claims to recognition on the score of recent good service, Canning submitted to the King that a Baronetcy would meet the requirements of the occasion.

On some account, not known, the Baronetcy was not actually conferred until February 1828, after Canning's death, and during the Ministry of the Duke of Wellington, by Lord Dudley before the Canningites left the Duke.]

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON TO MR. CANNING.

Teddesley: December 9, 1825.

My dear Mr. Canning,—Since I saw you, I have been turning over in my mind the conversation which I had with you on Saturday last, and I must confess that I think that the apprehension which you entertain of the interference of the French Government to prevent the execution of your purpose, solely because it is the purpose of the British Government, and however beneficial the attainment of your object would be to France as well as to the Powers, does afford good ground for keeping your measure secret.

The question which I want you to consider is whether you will keep your measure secret by proceeding in the manner which you propose.

Your intention was, as I understood, to open yourself to Count Lieven. He will certainly inform Pozzo di Borgo, and Pozzo will as certainly inform the French Government.

This view of the case brings me a little further, and to request you to consider whether your best mode of proceeding would not be in the first instance to confine your communication to the Turkish Government alone. I don't think I am mistaken when I assure you that the Emperor can do nothing till towards the end of March.

You will therefore have plenty of time for communicating with him after you will have tried the Porte.

It is true that by this proposed mode of proceeding you will

lose in some degree the advantage of the menace, but certainly not the whole of that advantage. 1825

On the other hand, you will approach the Porte with more authority as a friend to advise, having had no previous communication with the Emperor; and you will have all the advantage of secrecy, inasmuch as none of the breed of Russian diplomatists will have had it in their power to betray you to other Powers. If you should fail you can always fall back upon the authoritative menace if you should think proper.

But I confess that what I like best in this mode of proceeding is that it keeps us clear as long as possible, and possibly entirely, of the Emperor of Russia and his menaces.

Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[The Duke submits his own idea of the way in which pressure was to be brought to bear on the Porte to prevent the depopulation of the Morea: he was against conjoint action with Russia in the first instance, and recommended that a single-handed remonstrance from Great Britain should be tried before having recourse to concerted menace.]

MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE.

F. O.: December 26, 1825.

My dear Granville,—'*Il est trop habile pour moi*,' was Charles Jean's answer to somebody who suggested to him to take Pozzo for his Minister.

I am very much inclined to apply the same qualification to Strangford; and if he goes on as he has begun, I may possibly follow it up with the same consequence.

Your best way of meeting what may be said to you by Damas or others of his (S$^{d}$'s) communications with Nesselrode, is to say simply that you are quite sure that there must be some inaccuracy in the report of what has passed, and some misapprehension of it on the part of Count N., for that you had seen the original instructions to Lord S., and that there was nothing in them

1825 that authorised any advance to a conference at St. Petersburg, and that I have only by this post assured you that no instructions have been sent to Strangford of a later date than those which you have seen. If Strangford will play false (whether from vanity or incapacity to stick to the truth matters not), my only defence is to show him up—defence, I mean, against the results of his false play. Defence for continuing to employ him may be more difficult.

My despatch to him (which I enclose to you with his to me) was written with Nesselrode's letter before me, though for obvious reasons I did not think fit to tell S. so; nor shall I unless he attempts to ride off upon the plea that I may have misapprehended it.

Ever affectionately yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

[In the note appended to Canning's letter to Lord Granville of October 13 will be found a summary of the instructions to Lord Strangford on his departure for St. Petersburg; they were negative in character and expectant of a 'first move' from the Russian Court, particularly on the Greek question.

Lord Strangford ('Political Life,' vol. ii. p. 451) on his arrival found the disposition of the Russian Government inclined greatly towards England; the conduct of the other allied Powers, particularly Austria, influenced by a natural wish to hold back Russia, if possible, from a great Turkish war, and to prevent the establishment of her permanent predominance on the Danube, afforded too little sympathy and encouragement to please the warlike Czar and his people, who were excited by the spectacle of their coreligionists in Greece gradually succumbing under the sword of the Moslem.

Count Nesselrode made the first advance to England, and couched it in terms exclusive of the other Powers.

'The work of restoring peace in the Levant depended on the 'establishment of a perfect understanding between Russia and 'England.'

Here appeared *the* opening of inestimable advantage to England on the Eastern question, for which Canning had watched and waited. Greece had already appealed to him, and been kindly but firmly

repulsed. Now Russia turned to England for co-operation and help. 1825

The Czar was in a state of personal excitement eminently dangerous to the interests of peace—furious with Metternich, and on the verge of military intervention in behalf of Greece.

The situation required most delicate handling; but, whatever was done, the advantage secured by the separate appeal was obviously on no account to be thrown away.

What possessed Lord Strangford to do what he did is not known; but he proposed to Count Nesselrode a plan for a joint intervention at Constantinople, to which Austria and France, in addition to Russia and England, were to be parties.

It was a false move towards Russia, a false move towards England, and unauthorised by his instructions.

It could only meet, and did only meet, with a prompt disavowal from the English Foreign Office, and Lord Strangford received orders to meddle no more in Greek affairs; except only to express approval of Count Nesselrode's idea of a separate understanding with England.

The present letter to Lord Granville contains instructions for personal and private disavowals of Lord Strangford's move to be communicated to the French Minister, to prevent all possible misapprehension.]

---

## COMMUNICATIONS FROM PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS, RECEIVED BY MR. CANNING, DURING THE YEAR 1825.

### MR. JOHN GALE JONES (FEB. 3, 1825).

[This individual, in later life, distinguished himself as a 'Chartist'; in his present application we find evidence of the bent of his mind; he asks Canning to subscribe to a one shilling issue of an 'oration' Mr. Jones, it appears, had delivered on the career of General Washington.

In his note, he appeals to 'the liberal principles avowed by the 'British Cabinet, and the amicable spirit existing between this country 'and the United States.'

Considering that the Cabinet included the Duke of Wellington, Lords Bathurst, Westmorland, and Eldon, besides Mr. Peel, this testimony, coming from one of the outside public, affords evidence of the liberal aspect of Canning's policy and the predominance which his genius secured for it in the midst of jealous and hostile colleagues,

1825 and of the general recognition of its value by the world at large. It helps to explain the symptoms of expectation on the side of the Whig opposition during the session of 1825, that Canning's principles must eventually sever him from his present colleagues, and force him to have recourse to more sympathetic allies from their own camp.

Amongst the more remarkable names in the subscription list we may mark the Duke of Bedford, Earl Fitzwilliam, Lord Holland, Lord Dacre, Mr. Coke (of Norfolk), Mr. Baxton, the philanthropist, also Mr. Alderman Wood, who was concerned in the disturbances on behalf of Queen Caroline in 1820, all being 'Whig' politicians.

Mr. Jones was allowed 'no answer.']

COBBETT.

'ADVERTISEMENT.'

'This little publication should be carefully read over by every 'one, whether Catholic or Protestant, who is about to enter upon 'the study of "Cobbett's History of the Reformation." Indeed, 'without such previous reading, this last mentioned work will be 'worse than useless.

'It consists of four parts, and is sold at the cheap rate of three-'pence each part; making, together, a nice little pocket volume, 'at the small charge of one shilling. It is published in parts, in 'order that the many important matters of which it treats may 'get into speedy circulation. By adopting this mode, while one 'branch of a family is reading the first part, another branch may 'be reading the second part; and so of the other two.

'It is printed on fine, cream-coloured paper, and with a 'clear legible type, cast on purpose by ——; as it is our most 'anxious wish, that the gay as well as the serious, the old as well 'as the young, may be drawn into the perusal of our Familiar 'Introduction.

'It should be preserved by you with as much care as you 'would the apple of your eye. You should put it by, and then 'take it up again. You should form yourselves into little parties 'and purchase it. Twelve of you should subscribe a penny each, 'and buy one "Cobbett's Book of the Catholic Church."

'Our publisher is ready to receive proposals for supplying the 'National Schools upon the most accommodating terms. Nor do 'we see any objection to the Clergy reading it, part by part, from

'their pulpits, instead of a sermon. Peers and Members of 182
'Parliament can enclose it under franks, and thereby make the
'work instantly known throughout the kingdom. Let our friends
'be but active, and we are sure of a sale commensurate with
'that of the Almanacks.

'Due notice will be given of the appearance of the French
'and Spanish translations; in which countries parts two and
'three will be read with intense delight.'

[Amongst other papers there appear proof sheets of an advertisement of 'Cobbett's Book of the Roman Catholic Church,' price three-pence. It quotes an utterance by O'Connell, which, as reported, recommends the author to all good Catholics. 'I have the honour' (so the great Irish demagogue is reported to have said) 'of being 'acquainted with this fine animal, and agree with him in all he has 'written respecting the Catholics of Ireland.'

The compliment pleased the old bucolical demagogue so much that he prints 'fine animal' in capitals, and the rest in italics!

The 'advertisement' affords an amusing specimen of Cobbett's style, and perhaps deserves reproduction.]

ANONYMOUS ('H. T.').

London: February 12, 1825.

The individual who has the honour to transmit the paper herewith enclosed, trusts that amongst the imperishable events which record Mr. Canning's administration, it is yet reserved for his high talents to give tranquillity and happiness to Ireland.

H. T.

MEMORANDUM.

The plan now humbly submitted to Mr. Canning's consideration has for its objects: first, to identify the interests of the Catholic clergy in Ireland with the views of Government; and secondly, to destroy the present influence of popular Catholic leaders.

It is proposed that an intelligent and confidential agent, whose introductions or other facilities may procure him ready access to the best society in Rome, should seek every prudent occasion to ascertain some favourite view of her Court, whether directed towards Europe or America. If directed towards South America, her views might not be incompatible with the

1825 present or prospective policy of this country. Having found an opportunity, the agent would intimate a strong opinion that the British Government might be induced to concur in and facilitate the proposed measure, and he would offer to bring it under consideration through the medium of his acquaintance with a Minister of the Cabinet. The proposed measure being entertained, Government would determine upon the conduct best calculated to animate the expectations of the Court of Rome. At a favourable juncture the state of Ireland would be particularly mentioned. If the disposition manifested by the Court of Rome on this subject were favourable, the intentions and wishes of Government might be properly explained, with an intimation that amongst other arrangements some better provision should be made for the Catholic clergy of Ireland if they would zealously aid the intended measures of Government for her tranquillisation.

A petition from the more moderate of the Catholic party in England might first introduce the policy now suggested to public notice, and be followed by bestowing from the bounty of the Crown during its pleasure a provision for improving the condition of the Catholic clergy, which would afford a consequent partial relief to the lower classes in Ireland, and by revising or remodelling the constitution of the inferior Courts there. The latter measure would enable Government to confer acceptable appointments upon Catholic barristers, or others whose conduct recommended them to notice.

It is only when the tranquillised state of Ireland shall encourage the permanent and useful residence of her landed proprietors, and the increased introduction of English capital, that a deep and solid foundation can be laid for her happiness and lasting prosperity.

[This note and memorandum are thought worth recording.

The scheme contemplates the opening of negotiations by a secret agent with the Papal Court, to obtain its sanction and aid for the acceptance by the Roman Catholic priesthood of Ireland of a system of pecuniary support from public funds, the ends being the tranquillisation of Ireland and the encouragement of an influx of British capital to promote its material prosperity.

The idea has haunted all 'liberal'-minded statesmen ever since;

it is more than suspected of having secured practical recognition from the British Government during the years 1881–3. 1825

It is an excellent idea, only it necessarily postulates a kind of policy not hitherto discoverable in the records of the Roman Catholic Church, and which would strike most people of common sense as simply suicidal. Firstly, the Papal 'Curia' must be able to find satisfaction in the prosperity of an heretical and defiant nation, and to such a degree should its disinterested pursuit of moral satisfaction extend, that, next, it must be willing to discourage its own ardent adherents, and, voluntarily, transfer the vast influence of the pecuniary sustenance and control of its agents from the spontaneous devotion of the Irish faithful to the cold and businesslike manipulation of a Protestant Government. The object and end of these vast surrenders of principle being deliberately recognised as 'tranquillity,' of itself utterly inimical to religious fervour, and an influx of 'English capital,' an incalculable power for strengthening the position and confirming the authority of the Government of the English nation; which Government must be pronounced at least indifferent to all Roman Catholic aims, and which nation must be considered as a body hostile to the Romanist position.

These propositions are self-evident; the mere postulates of the problem of the relations between a Protestant nation and the Roman Catholic Church; but, so ensnaring are the common-places of Liberalism, that statesmen of the first order in England, and unquestionably averse from the Papacy, have been found trying to defy them, and to believe that their temporary appeals to moral sense can prevail over the unchanging principles of the undying Papacy.

The foregoing remarks are not meant to imply theological bias one way or another, they strictly convey the simple truth; and the most zealous Irish Catholic will acknowledge their truth with pride, notwithstanding that a liberal-minded English thinker would be disposed to protest against the harshness and immorality of the description.]

T. HIPKINS AND ROBERT B. PITMAN.

[These gentlemen submit a memorandum embodying a sketch of an association for the purpose of making a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama. They estimate the cost of surveying the levels at 10,000*l.*, and of making the canal at 3,000,000*l.* The Mexican Minister (for the first time accredited to the Court of St. James) promises, on behalf of his Government, all manner of protection.

1825 — The advantages anticipated from the work are described as 'too 'vast to be foreseen to their full extent,' but it may be amusing to recall those thought worth specifying.

The saving of 12,000 miles voyage round Cape Horn before reaching the same latitude in the Pacific as that of the assumed point of departure in the Atlantic.

The rapid colonisation of the western shores of North America. (Railways eventually solved this problem.)

The advancement of the colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land. (Steamers and sheep-farming have effectually promoted this end.)

The shortening of the voyage to China by a hundred days, and increased facilities for trading with Japan and the Indian Archipelago.

Extension of the South Sea Fisheries by the reduction of time and expense in communicating with Europe.

Civilisation of the Pacific Islands.

Improved trade with Mexico, Peru, and Chili.

A means of relief on the recurrence of the periodical famines in Mexico.

Not a bad sketch, the scheme being undoubtedly one of genuine promise, though still extremely difficult of execution.]

MR. GEORGE ANGELO.

74 Newman Street, Oxford Street.

Mr. George J. Angelo presents his most respectful compliments to the Right Honourable George Canning, and does himself the honour of enclosing a poetical epistle, which he hopes may not prove entirely unacceptable to the person, to whom he has taken the liberty of addressing it. Mr. G. Angelo would have had much pleasure in delivering it in person, but was fearful lest it might be considered an intrusion.

[This inspired individual (whether the great fencing master or not, does not appear) forwards a poetical epistle (not with papers) addressed to Canning, who only notices the performance by a Minute :—

'Mr. Hervey will prepare a poem to be sent in return for this.'

Mr. Hervey was the third son of the Earl of Bristol, in 1826 created Marquis of Bristol, and at this time a clerk in the Foreign Office. As Lord William Hervey, he subsequently served with credit

to himself for twenty years in the Diplomatic Service ; but poetry never constituted one of his strong points.] 1825

THE LADIES OF LLANGOLLEN.

Ludbrook: April 13, 1825.

Mr. Canning has the honour to apprise the ladies at Llangollen, that his daughter looks forward to the pleasure of being presented to them next week, when Lord Clanricarde carries her to her new country.

Mr. Canning wishes that he were to be of the party, instead of resuming, as he must do about the same time, the toils of the House of Commons.

He has, however, a selfish reason for recalling himself at this moment to the ladies' recollection. They insisted with him that he should find some occasion for profiting by their kind offer of a specimen of Llangollen mutton. Now he knows no more worthy occasion likely to occur in the whole year than that of the celebration of the King's birthday, which takes place on Saturday, the 23rd, on which day Mr. Canning entertains the Foreign Ministers.

He intended, therefore, to have proved his obedience to the ladies' commands by a message through Clanricarde; but as upon calculation he doubts whether such a message would reach Llangollen in time, he has resolved upon this mode of executing his purpose.

His address is Foreign Office for mutton as well as for letters.

Plasnewydd, Llangollen: April 18, 1825.

Dear Sir,—It is beyond our power to express how highly we are gratified by your most obliging communication, or how truly sensible we are of your kindness in bestowing it upon us. Report had made us very ambitious of the honour of being known to Lady Clanricarde, before we could have any hope of the enhanced pleasure of its being accomplished under your auspices —a pleasure which receives farther addition from the confidence

1825 we indulge that your having bestowed such a gem upon our native country [Ireland] may be deemed a pledge of greater prosperity to that unhappy land than it has ever yet been blessed with.

We feel certain that if it were possible to give you an idea of half the delight we experience from your recollection of our mutton petition, you would share it with us. We have every reason to flatter ourselves that what will make its appearance at the Foreign Office on Thursday night will not be unworthy of its distinction. Our first impulse was to have despatched it the moment we perused your unspeakably welcome letter, and had his Majesty exerted his royal privilege of naming his own birthday in a colder month it would have reached you on this day; but as by leaving Llangollen by Wednesday night's mail it will reach London Thursday evening, it is likely to arrive in better condition by that arrangement than the one which first occurred to our impatience. . . . We beg to observe that a little independent neck accompanies the saddle, which neck we should be very thankful if you would have served in cotelettes or any other form for your own private luncheon, before your army of Ambassadors approach. . . . Let us hope it may induce you to afford us a repetition of the very sincere gratification we now enjoy, and ever shall in every opportunity of testifying and submitting ourselves, Dear Mr. Canning's greatly obliged and faithful humble servants,

EL. BUTLER AND SARAH PONSONBY.

Plasnewydd, Llangollen: April 24, 1825.

Dear Sir,—Two objects have long held an eminent place in our ambition; the first, that of possessing a resemblance of the person whose unequalled talents and excellence of heart (with which some circumstances that happened to come within our immediate knowledge had made us particularly acquainted) had possessed so great a share of our liveliest admiration and sincerest respect.

The second, that we might have an opportunity of judging from our own observation whether report, which had been so universal and so eloquent in dwelling on the praises of Lady Clanricarde's beauty and manners, had been more than or only just to those agreeable topics. We have now to thank the same

kind hand for bestowing on us upon the selfsame day the accomplishment of both these wishes. On Tuesday last your picture, with the unspeakable enhancement of arriving as your gift, occupied the 'craving void' in which we had for years been anxious to install it, where it shall preserve its honoured station to the final period of our continuance in this world, and where before that period arrives we now hope more confidently than ever, that we may look forward to the happiness of returning you our verbal thanks in its presence. On that same morning of Tuesday, the 19th, we had the honour and pleasure of finding that fame had not exaggerated in its praises of Lady Clanricarde; that the casket was in every respect, as far as a very short visit could enable us to judge, worthy of the mind by which it seemed to be inhabited, and manners which have left an impression and inspired a degree of affection which, the brief time considered, has seldom been equalled—never exceeded. 1825

One alloy, however, to these qualifications must still be acknowledged—namely, the utter impossibility of saying how greatly we are obliged. Yet as we should be but little grateful could we say how much, let us trust Mr. Canning will image with what sentiments we have the honour to be—

His faithful humble servants,

ELEANOR BUTLER AND S. PONSONBY.

[These ladies were Lady Eleanor Butler and Miss Sarah Ponsonby, who lived together in retired and romantic friendship.

The old-fashioned and formal style of their compliments succeeds in expressing a good deal of genuine and healthy admiration for their correspondent; who responds to it with mingled pleasure and playfulness.]

THE REV. J. S. SAWBRIDGE.

Devonshire Place, Bath: April 25.

My dear Sir,—My object in sending you the enclosed discourse is to call your attention to a very minute but a very distinguishing characteristic of the Articles of our Church; and which, without any disparagement to your character as a consummate scholar and a full fraught statesman, seems to have escaped your notice. The Articles so trend on the principles of Popery on one hand and on Calvinism on the other, without at the same time compromising the scriptural truths of absolution

1825 and predestination, that they seem (unless very closely investigated and minutely discriminated) to favour the one and the other. May I therefore request you to read what the author of the enclosed discourse has so pertinently and happily expressed on this subject at page 18. The whole discourse is worthy perusal as a composition, and almost rivals Dr. Johnson for its compression of matter and its nervous style. I add my name because you may perhaps recall me as a fellow collegian at Christchurch, and that my address to you may not be included in the numberless anonymous impertinences with which you are plagued. I witnessed the dawning of your talents, and have in my retirement noticed and admired the progress and reward of them.

You are now a main pillar of the most magnificent political structure that the wisdom of man ever raised, and if by any suggestion of mine I can assist to clear your ideas on a nice and intricate point in our Church Articles, and thereby give consistency and stability to our inseparable civil and religious establishments through so powerful an agent as you are, and may be, I shall feel that I am not an idle and an unworthy spectator of the increasing prosperity of our country, and may convince you that every corner of this kingdom furnishes characters who can think and feel deeply and write pertinently like Mr. Williams, and who can catch, and feel anxious to communicate, such clear conceptions, like the real admirer of your talents,

J. S. SAWBRIDGE.

Had Archdeacon Paley seen, as Mr. Williams does, that our Articles become bonds of union, not by compromising scriptural truth, but by going to the utmost boundary and only apparently treading on the confines of error, he would, like Mr. Williams, have added the same qualification, and thus prevented the host of adversaries he raised, and the endless controversies to which his work has given rise. A clear and complete idea is not at once the lot even of first-rate talents. This I have lived to see, and your higher and vaster range must have exhibited it more frequently. I find the whole of Mr. Williams' sermon too heavy for a frank; I therefore send only that part of the discourse which bears upon the subject, to which, with all deference, I am

anxious to call your attention. Excuse my adding that I hear the want of correctness in that part of your argument much canvassed, as deviating from long established truisms. The Reformation of our Church is, as the Bishop of Limerick styled it, a substantive religion and stands distinct from Luther's system, nor does his doctrine of consubstantiation bear upon our doctrine of the real Spiritual Presence in the Sacrament as received in our Church. The Roman Catholic doctrine of Absolution, accompanied as it always is with private confession and some outward act of penance as the atonement, cannot be brought to bear on the qualified language of the Absolution in the Visitation of the Sick, compared with the doctrine of Absolution as stated in the other formularies of our Church. 1825

F. O.: June 3, 1825.

Reverend Sir,—A letter like yours of April 25 deserved an earlier acknowledgment.

But great part of the time which has elapsed since I received it, has been passed by me in the sufferings of the gout; and my occupations since my recovery have been multiplied by that temporary secession from the business of my office.

I am really obliged to you for the pains which you are so good as to take to set me right on points on which you imagined me to be under a misapprehension. It is plain, however, that on one of those points you have been misled by reading an incorrect version of my speech. I know that in two or three newspapers (the 'Courier,' one of them, and the 'New Times' another) I was most unaccountably represented as speaking of Consubstantiation as a doctrine of the Church of England. I did no such thing. My argument (good or bad) was that the difference between Transubstantiation and Consubstantiation, whatever it might be in a religious point of view, was not such in a political point of view as to make the holders of the former necessarily traitors, while those of the latter were safely admitted

1825 to share the full franchises of the State with the members of the Church of England.

With respect to Absolution, my argument was (again setting aside the religious question) that an enemy of the Church of England might select a sentence from the Visitation of the Sick, which, separating it from what preceded and what followed it, would admit no other interpretation than one which would bring our doctrine very near to that imputed to the Church of Rome; from which I inferred not that the two doctrines are therefore the same, but that we ought to allow to others a right of explanation and qualification which we must necessarily claim for ourselves.

I repeat, that I am very sensible of your attention and good-will; and I have the honour to be, Dear Sir,

Your obedient and faithful servant,

GEO. CANNING.

[Canning having been recently reported to have confused in a public speech theological doctrines known as 'Transubstantiation' and 'Consubstantiation,' respectively, and not distinguished accurately between the doctrine of 'Absolution' from sin as taught by the Church of England, and as taught by the Church of Rome, Mr. Sawbridge sends a portion of a sermon preached by a Rev. Mr. Williams, elucidating the two points in question.

Mr. Sawbridge's letter commends itself by his earnestness, and good show of justification for troubling Canning in the matter; it consequently obtained the honour of a detailed reply, explaining precisely what Canning meant to say on the two topics referred to, which will be found not without interest for those to whom such topics are matters of real importance; though it must be pointed out that Canning's answer excluded all theological question, and limited itself entirely to political considerations.]

SIR RICHARD CLAYTON.

Montevilliers, Seine Inférieure: May 1, 1825.

Sir,—I am fully sensible of my intrusion on your valuable time, but I cannot resist the personal gratification of enclosing

you an extract from one of the French papers, as it is so perfectly in unison with my own sentiments. In the public applause which is so pre-eminently your due, and which, without the spirit of prophecy, I can venture to predict will continually increase, on every principle of gratitude I shall most fervently rejoice. 1825

Had Lord Granville's administration continued a few months longer, in all probability I should have been at this hour Minister at the Swiss Cantons, but *αὖραι φέρουσι τὰς παλαιὰς ἐλπίδας*. In the sphere in which I am now to move through your kindness, my only regret will be that I may not have those opportunities of rendering you the services a more important station might have enabled [me] to do. Be assured, however, not a single one shall escape me of showing you how truly I am, sir,

Your most devoted and grateful humble servant,

RICHARD CLAYTON.

EXTRACT FROM A FRENCH NEWSPAPER.

'Les grands principes de liberté civile et religieuse qu'a proclamés M. Canning viennent d'obtenir un nouveau triomphe, la seconde lecture du bill sur l'émancipation des catholiques d'Irlande a passé à une majorité de 27 voix. Naguères les fanatiques, échos de la sainte-alliance et des jésuites, s'écriaient: L'Angleterre reconnaît l'indépendance de l'Amérique et elle viole la liberté de croyance dans ses propres sujets! c'est par l'Inde et par l'Irlande qu'elle est vulnérable; et déjà les fils d'Ignace, chassés par la Russie, passaient de toutes parts dans la malheureuse Irlande pour y allumer les feux de la haine et des discordes religieuses. A la fois philosophe et grand homme d'état, M. Canning a jugé le danger. Le ministère anglais se rallie toute une population prête à repousser de son sein quiconque voudrait troubler la joie de son affranchissement; elle cherchera surtout à prouver qu'elle en était digne. Ainsi l'Angleterre s'enrichit au-dehors par ses alliances et par la manifestation de ses principes, et elle se fortifie au-dedans par l'union de tous les intérêts et la tolérance de toutes les opinions religieuses; elle complète l'union de l'Irlande à la Grande-Bretagne, union qui, sous un régime insupportable d'exception, était toujours provisoire; elle enlève aux nations voisines un

1825 point d'attaque facile; elle ôte d'un seul coup plusieurs millions d'auxiliaires à ses ennemis déclarés et à ses ennemis secrets, et, appelée peut-être à défendre les libertés du Nouveau-Monde, elle n'est pas réduite à craindre toujours une guerre domestique pour la conservation de ses propres royaumes.

On dirait que pour arriver au plus haut degré de gloire, de liberté et de grandeur possible, l'Angleterre prend le contre-pied de la politique de notre ministère. M. Canning fait absolument le contraire de ce que fait M de Villèle; et, en effet, pour rendre un pays riche, puissant et paisible, il n'y a rien de mieux que de regarder aujourd'hui la France, et que de suivre une marche entièrement opposée à la sienne. Nous nous enfonçons de plus en plus dans le système des prohibitions, l'Angleterre s'en dégage; nous refusons de reconnaître Haïti, nous traitons de factieux les nouveaux gouvernemens de l'Amérique du sud, nous bloquons nous-mêmes notre commerce maritime dans nos ports, et l'Angleterre proclame l'indépendance des républiques, couvre les mers de son pavillon, exploite à son profit les richesses du monde; nous embrassons le système fatal de la réduction des intérêts, achetée par l'augmentation des capitaux, elle répudie ce mode ruineux pour les finances des nations; nous sacrifions chaque jour une nouvelle garantie de nos libertés, et chaque jour elle fortifie les siennes; nous chassons arbitrairement les étrangers, même propriétaires en France, l'Angleterre s'apprête à faire disparaître l'alien bill; nous altérons insensiblement l'institution du jury, elle le purifie en assurant plus que jamais son indépendance; chaque pas que nous faisons en arrière, elle le fait en avant.

[His note simply refers to private matters; but he encloses an extract from the *Constitutionnel* French newspaper, which is worth reproduction, as testifying to the reputation for Liberal opinions and policy enjoyed by Canning amongst the Continental nations; and, without mentioning in so many words the fact of his success, the French writer by implication accredits Canning not only with sound views, but with energy and skill sufficient to meet the despotic monarchies on their own ground, to neutralise their combinations, and to frustrate their designs.]

MR. CANNING TO DR. PHILLPOTTS.

Combe Wood: May 11, 1825.

Mr. Canning has the honour to acknowledge Dr. Phillpotts' book, and the obliging letter which accompanied it. 1825

Mr. Canning has turned to the passages to which Dr. Phillpotts refers him, in none of which does Mr. C. find any ground for complaint, or any necessity for the apology which Dr. Phillpotts is so good as to offer him. Mr. C. wishes that he could truly add that the doubts which he ventured to express respecting the exclusive doctrine of the Athanasian Creed had been removed by Dr. Phillpotts' defence of the damnatory clauses of that Profession of Faith.

[Dr. Phillpotts, afterwards the celebrated Bishop of Exeter, apparently took upon himself to bring before Canning certain arguments in support of the severest interpretation of what are known as the 'damnatory clauses' of the Athanasian Creed, as set forth in a publication composed by Dr. Phillpotts for that end, in view of some public utterance of Canning's expressive of doubt of the soundness of the doctrine implied in the sanctions invoked, but not apparently in the doctrines sanctioned by such invocations in this great 'Profession of Faith.'

Canning acknowledges the communication civilly enough, but mildly adheres to his expressed opinion in the matter.

A statesman's opinions on theological questions may fairly enough command no particular weight with experts: 'ne sutor ultra crepidam;' and Canning's mind succeeded least well when such questions formed any part of the political discussions of the day. It is easy to see the healthy secularism of his views when expounded in speeches in Parliament on the 'Catholic question.' It is not that his conclusions were wrong, but that his insight into the real nature of the religious discords of mankind was too shallow.]

MR. JOHN VERNON.

Ostrohove, near Boulogne-sur-mer, France: June 2, 1825.

Sir,—As documents relating to the negro population in our West Indian colonies were last week laid by yourself and Lord Bathurst on the tables of the two Houses of Parliament, I beg

1825 leave to submit to you the accompanying papers as being connected with the subject to which those documents refer.

I venture to think that those papers (which I have very recently received from Antigua) will present to you an agreeable picture of the condition of a few W. I. negroes, improved by the total disuse of the degrading terms 'slaves,' 'gangs,' and 'drivers,' and by the substitution of the more worthy designations of 'labourers,' 'classes,' and 'foremen.' This is a change which the negro feels very sensibly, and with pride he declares himself to be advanced by it above the level of those of his own colour to whom the ancient appellations still adhere.

The accompanying papers will also present to you a body of 385 negroes, all of them (with the exception of a single African) baptized Christians, and a hundred couples or more united by the marriage rite, solemnised by missionary clergymen, and a large proportion of children growing up under the imparted benefits of religious and moral instruction, to their own future advancement and happiness, and, permit me to add, to the unfeigned satisfaction of myself, their protector and owner.

It is a singular fact that these 385 negroes are the offspring of a population which, in the year 1755, did not exceed in number 152, and that their present strength has arisen, without the addition of a single negro by purchase or otherwise, from the above-mentioned remote period to the present day.

It is chiefly to the introduction of Christianity amongst them by the Moravian and other missionaries, to the union of the sexes by the marriage rite, and to the substitution of solitary confinement for corporal punishment (not to mention a liberal allowance of clothing and of provisions served on the plantation), that I attribute the happiness and health and increased numbers of these negroes, not to be paralleled, I believe, on any estate in any of our West Indian colonies, and I think it may be fairly presumed that, were similar systems to be pursued generally, the ameliorations which you are anxious to see effected in the condition of the negro population would be powerfully promoted, and at no distant period be substantially perfected.—I have the honour to be, sir,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

JOHN VERNON.

P.S.—As the enclosed papers are originals, I beg leave to request that they may be returned to me. 1825

F. O.: June 9, 1825.

Mr. Canning presents his compliments to Mr. John Vernon, and returns the papers which he had the goodness to send for Mr. Canning's perusal.

[The writer, it seems, was owner of property, and consequently of the resident slaves in the Island of Antigua in the West Indies, and sends some papers (returned to the writer) for Canning's perusal, to illustrate a favourable development of the 'Institution.'

The subject possesses now slight interest. In the case of Mr. Vernon's estate, it appears there had been no addition by importation of negroes since 1755 (70 years before), since then the number had increased from 152 to 385; they had been christianised by Moravian and other missionaries; there were 100 couples formally and legally married; their children were educated in Christianity and in other respects; corporal punishment was abolished, and solitary confinement substituted in its stead. And to enhance their self-respect, in the place of the terms 'slaves,' 'gangs,' and 'drivers,' 'labourers,' 'classes,' and 'foremen' were successfully employed: liberal rations of food and clothing are allowed; in fact, they seem to have been treated with all the advantages of civilisation, and only wanting in freedom.

Of course, though creditable to the individual owner, his well-managed property supplied no argument against emancipation. No guarantee existed or could be contrived for the permanence of the kindly system of treatment, which, on a change of owner, might any moment be converted into one of severity and rigour, all the more crushing and dreadful for following after a reign of mercy and kindness.]

M—— J——.

[An anonymous gentleman (carefully, however, giving his address '19 Gerrard Street, Soho') sends a long letter of eight quarto pages, written in a law-writer's copying hand, explained by the fact of similar copies having been sent to various other noblemen and gentlemen, expounding a scheme for a society or institution for the suppression of vice.]

'The society to consist of all ranks and classes of persons, and of persons of all sects of religion.

1825 'Institution to be strictly a temporal one, and on no pretext whatever to embrace or interfere with any spiritual affairs.

'Efforts of the institution to commence with public lectures, setting forth on temporal grounds alone the evil consequences attending vice, and those acts of a faulty nature which lead to it; and the advantages arising from virtue and all the minor good offices comprehended in it; and by the publication of tracts on the same subject, to be distributed gratis, or sold at very cheap rates.

'Some competent person to be appointed lecturer, with a salary, who shall every Sunday evening deliver a lecture, previously composed, on some subject within the last rule; the lecture to commence at seven o'clock and to continue for one hour.

'Lecturer to be prohibited from using any but temporal arguments under pain of instant dismissal, and the tracts also to be subject to restrictions of the same kind.

'If the funds of the institution permit it, lectures also to be given on some other day in the week.

'When funds permit, relief to be given to poor persons disabled by sickness or infirmities, on production of certificates of good character from their late employers, or other respectable persons; and, further, pecuniary rewards to be given to poor persons on producing well authenticated certificates of good moral conduct for some period previous.'

[This delightful product of human folly Mr. Canning only noticed by a Minute, playfully directing it :—

'To be read aloud in my anteroom every morning by Mr. Stapleton.—G. C.'

It consisted of eight solid quarto pages!

The key-note of the scheme lies in the office of lecturer 'with a 'salary.']

'AMICUS' (ANON.).

Paris: June 20, 1825.

Sir,—I did myself the honour of addressing you by letter several months ago, offering to obtain some important information of the proceedings of the 'Russian Cabinet,' and pointing

out the mode of replying to an advertisement in the 'Times.' 1825
The blood and treasure expended in the Burmese War might —
have been saved by a present judiciously applied at that time, but the opportunity was let slip, the proposition not being thought worthy of notice; give me leave now, sir, to submit another proposal to your consideration.

That war was of Russian manufacture, and in all human probability before thirty months shall have passed away England will be engaged in a new war in Europe, a new war in India and in events of a more domestic nature, such as the nation would have avoided at any expense had the opportunity been offered; and they might be avoided! Within six weeks from this day steps may be taken that would effectually crush the plans of that Power, now nearly ready for execution; and not only the peace of Europe preserved, but the very welfare of Great Britain secured.

If the authority whence this communication proceeds were not of the first description, I would not dare venture to trespass on your time; and my only apprehension is, that you may act as Cæsar did on the 'Ides of March,' and I have reason to suppose that in point of real danger of some public description the 'Ides of March' are come. If it will add anything to your faith on the occasion, let me assure you solemnly that there is not a situation under the British Crown within the reach of any man of what is usually called the middle class of life, that would be worth my acceptance.

If you feel disposed to make any further inquiry in the quarter I have access to, a line inserted in 'Galignani's Messenger' in Paris would perhaps be found worth inserting as follows: 'An old correspondent is desired to continue.'

I am at a loss for words I assure you, sir, to impress you with what sentiments and admiration I subscribe myself,

Your sincere and devoted,

AMICUS.

[Information is proffered as to the designs of Russia, for the second time, according to the writer.

Complaint is made of the neglect the writer's previous communication met with; which if attended to, he alleges, would have saved the British Empire from the Burmese War.

1825 — The Burmese War consisted of the series of operations dating from March 5, 1824, the day of the Governor-General of India's Proclamation of War, to the end of October in the same year, during which period the Indian Government, provoked by the wanton and violent aggressions of the Burmese Government, defeated and drove the Burmese forces backwards in every direction.

The writer now forebodes for England a new war in Europe, a new war in India, and disagreeable but undefined events of a domestic nature, all to be ascribed to the intrigues of Russia.

All this time the Czar Alexander was wandering restlessly about his Empire, reviewing his armies; and the British Government entertained apprehensions of a Russo-Turkish War at any moment; but there is no trace that they in any way feared the tremendous but undefined dangers shadowed forth by 'Amicus.'

The amount of credit and attention bestowed by the English Foreign Office on this prophet of ill does not appear from the papers.

Anonymous information is not always to be despised; but Canning had no bad sources of intelligence in the Embassies at Paris and St. Petersburg; and his unremitting attention to the motives and proceedings of Russia and the Russian Emperor, must have included within its scope all that seriously menaced the peace of Europe; not excepting the diplomatic intrigue and by-play, the knowledge of which no doubt constituted the stimulus of his volunteer informant 'Amicus.']

THE MARCHIONESS OF ——.

Burlington Hotel, Old Burlington St.: June 24.

Sir,—As a stranger I feel I am intruding most excessively on your time and patience, but, flattering myself that you will, if possible, oblige me, I will at once make my request. I am deeply indebted to the medical gentleman who for nine weeks was night and day devoted in his attentions and care of a beloved son, whom I have had the misfortune to lose. Doctor Mahony, who is well known for his high professional character in the army, as well as for every other amiable quality, will not accept of any remuneration for his services. He has a brother highly educated, a most excellent young man of twenty-four years of age, for whom I know he is most anxious to provide. Having been brought up to the Law, he is capable of filling any situation either at home or abroad suitable to a gentleman. I cannot express how grateful I should feel if you could, by providing for

this young man, enable me to repay the debt of gratitude I owe to Dr. Mahony. Again requesting your indulgence, I beg to remain, 1825

Your most obliged obdt.,

A. D.

Foreign Office: June 26, 1825.

Madam,—I have received the honour of your Ladyship's letter of Friday, expressing your wish that I should 'provide for' the brother of Dr. Mahony; because the Dr. refuses to accept from your Ladyship any remuneration for his professional services.

In answer to which I can only say that it really is not in my power to meet your Ladyship's wish by 'providing for' Mr. Mahony.—I have the honour to be, Madam,

Your Ladyship's very obedient humble servant,

GEO. CANNING.

Burlington Hotel: June 27.

When Lady D. addressed herself to Mr. Canning, she was not aware the sense of her letter could have been misconstrued. Had Doctor Mahony been like the other medical gentlemen who were in attendance, his fees would have been like theirs fixed by custom; but being attached to the regiment to which her son the late Lord S. C. belonged, he when offered a compliment refused it, saying it was his duty to attend the officers of the regiment. To attend him as other medical men might do was certainly so, but to undergo the fatigue that Doctor Mahony did for nine weeks was an act of unparalleled attention. As such Lady D. felt it, and with those feelings applied to Mr. Canning. She can only now regret that such an application had been made.

F. O.: June 29, 1825.

Mr. Canning presents his respectful compliments to Lady D.

Mr. Canning is exceedingly concerned to learn from

1825 Lady D.'s note of Monday, that her Ladyship conceives him to have misconstrued her letter of the 24th inst.

In justice to himself, Mr. Canning must say that, having since the receipt of Lady D.'s note, read over with the utmost care her Ladyship's letter of the 24th, and compared it with the copy of his answer to it, he is unable to discover any 'misconstruction' of the contents of that letter.

But he is infinitely more anxious to assure her Ladyship that if any such 'misconstruction' exists, it has been on his part entirely unintentional.

[This ingenious dame, moved by gratitude to a certain physician who declined to accept pecuniary remuneration for attendance on her lately deceased son, Lord S. C., conceived the happy idea of bestowing compensation for such gratuitous attendance by obtaining a provision in the public service for the doctor's brother, and made application to the Foreign Secretary accordingly

The nature of the application seems to have somewhat irritated the Minister.

It at first sight seems hard to discern the precise offence of which Lady D. was guilty; but it should be remembered that it is open to any person whose recommendation is likely to obtain credit for a candidate for employment, to confine the intercession within the decent and customary limits of supporting an application first made by the candidate himself; the candidate applying, the testimonial testifying; the essence of a testimonial lies at least in a semblance of disinterested and unbiassed testimony on the part of the testifier.

But it is quite another thing to ask for a public appointment of which the intercessor is to obtain the sole credit, and which is unblushingly demanded as a means of discharging a private obligation of which the applicant finds difficulty in acquitting herself in any other way. It then simply amounts to a request for the perpetration of a job in favour not of the recipient but of the applicant; and though such requests are preferred, and jobs are perpetrated, in such cases it looks little less than an insult to beg an abuse of patronage, where no claim of acquaintanceship, and no tie of private or public service, connects the applicant and the Minister, and softens down the breach of public trust into the semblance of an act of private fidelity.

It is surmised that, influenced by some such reasoning, Canning thought fit to administer a very severe snub to this enterprising lady of rank.] 1825

THE REV. J. S. SAWBRIDGE.

Devonshire Place, Bath: July 11, 1825.

Dear Sir,—

Cum tot sustineas et tanta negotia . . .
. . . . . .
. . . in publica commoda peccem
Si longo sermone morer tua tempora. . . .

To be brief, I have waited for the close of the session before I acknowledged the condescending attention to my suggestions in yours of June 3, nor should I now have trespassed upon you, had not your silence upon the very pertinent passage in the discourse which accompanied my letter, made me apprehend it had been overlooked and my grand object lost. The author most happily expresses what has always been my firm persuasion, but which after thirty years' close attention to the subject I have never seen so clearly defined. The blending shades of truth and error are, by the peculiar colouring of his language, brought out in their distinct views, and present in a palpable form what has been unnoticed by our friends and misconstrued by our enemies; viz. that our reformers trend upon the religion of their adversaries without compromising the elements of their own. The Roman Catholic Bishop Baines, in Bath, has in this way taken advantage of a passage in the Church Catechism, which trends upon his doctrine of Transubstantiation, but which Archdeacon Daubeny has shown does not compromise the Scripture doctrine of the Sacrament. I have and shall take every opportunity to vindicate you from the misrepresentation of the newspapers; but I am not aware that persons holding the doctrine of Consubstantiation are admitted to the franchises of the State with the members of the Church of England. I read your speech in the *N. Times*. I was concerned to read your own account of your severe indisposition. May returning health enable you to pursue with vigour your political career. You do me justice in the motive you assign for my addressing you. I deeply feel the high importance of your opinions in matters ecclesiastical as well as civil. That you may long con-

1825 tinue to be an ornament and support of our more than ever to be admired Constitution in State and also Church, is the anxious wish and fervent prayer of

Yours with sincerity,

J. S. SAWBRIDGE.

[Canning's reply to Mr. Sawbridge's former letter of April 25 was dated June 3 of this year; and the attention it showed to Mr. Sawbridge's theological views led the Reverend gentleman to venture another attempt to 'draw' Canning, and to impress the reasoning in Mr. Williams' sermon on his mind.

Apparently no answer was returned to this second shot; and Mr. Sawbridge does not seem quite to understand that, in Canning's letter to him, there was no word or passage committing the writer to any particular view of the theological doctrines concerned.

However, there is no reason to doubt that Canning, after the fashion of a statesman, and a man of the world of the time, did really hold to the Christian Faith and to the Church of England formularies, as the question was raised and answered in the public papers just after his death.]

MR. CANNING TO THE HON. BUTLER CLARKE.

F. O.: July 12, 1825.

Dear Sir,—I hope you will not think me unfaithful to my word, in returning the petition which you sent yesterday for my signature, unsigned.

I certainly ought to have qualified my assent to your proposal, more distinctly than I am afraid I did, with the condition, 'if the contents of the petition 'should be such as I entirely approved.'

I confess that upon reading it over I find it to be, though not by any means liable to disapprobation, yet such as I think that I could not properly sign.

It gives opinions as to the state of Ireland, which although from argument and induction I may be, and am, inclined to adopt, and uphold them, I have not sufficient personal knowledge of that country to affirm as by signature of the petition I should affirm them.

I have, &c.,

GEO. CANNING.

[No letter from Mr. Butler Clarke is with this paper; and from the tenor of the note it may be surmised, that Canning had in a hasty moment promised by word of mouth to sign the petition referred to, before reading it; and that the petition came to him accordingly without accompanying note, and being itself returned, no record remains of the nature of Mr. Butler Clarke's appeal for Canning's signature. 1825 —

But it will appear to have been a petition to Parliament relative to the disturbed state of Ireland, consequent on the rejection of the Bills for Catholic Emancipation in the recent session of Parliament; and Canning avoided signing it, not because he disagreed with its prayer, but because it affirmed facts, which the actual state of Canning's knowledge prevented him from affirming with certainty.]

MR. R. KINSMAN.

Green Bank, Falmouth: July 19, 1825.

Right Honourable Sir,—I should never have presumed thus far in calling your attention to anything of a private nature, had I not felt sure that services, however humble, if sincere, would by you neither be despised nor treated with neglect.

It would be ridiculous and presumptuous in me to address you in the language of compliment, and therefore, sir, I will proceed to the object of this letter, and here let me intreat you, sir, not wholly to disregard it.

My family (I hope, neither inconsiderable nor unnoticed in this country) have for more than sixty years, often to their prejudice, both as electors for the county and its boroughs, uniformly, and from principle, supported the opinions and the party (if I may use this word) which the present Administration have always adopted. They have ever been constant in their support, and sometimes successful in their endeavours to be of service. In the elections of 1818 and 1820, my family, by their influence alone, returned both members for Callington; the then nominal patron had, in fact, neither influence nor popularity. These members were Col. Lygon, and Sir C. Robinson—to them I appeal for the truth of what I say. Yet never has any member of our family intruded himself on the attention of Government, or reaped the slightest benefit from their exertions. I am fully aware, sir, that I address you in an unusual manner, and out of the regular channel. I could, sir, have done this through what are termed powerful friends; but I know, sir, that you are above

1825 common prejudices, and will pay as much regard to me as to them.

It may be unknown to you that one of the Barings has purchased all Lord C——n's interest in Callington, and he is now by every means endeavouring to conciliate our goodwill. But his line of politics is opposed to ours. We hold the balance at present, and the scale we favour must preponderate. It is by the desire of many of my family I inform you of this, assuring you that, should Government think proper hereafter to recommend, their recommendation will be fully attended to. We have chosen our side, with it we will stand or fall.

And now, sir, I will not disguise from you that the object of this letter is to solicit most respectfully your favour and consideration. I am the eldest of the family, I have been educated at the University, have kept my terms at the Temple, and am possessed of independence. I know most of the European languages, and have made the laws and customs of the East my study. My ardent desire is to serve my country, and to labour for its good in any capacity under so great a statesman as yourself; this has ever been my sole ambition. I am now twenty-five years old, and anxious to be employed. All then, sir, I desire, all I ask for, is that if you should find me entitled and capable, you would be pleased to appoint me to some situation of responsibility and respectability abroad, either in the East Indies, Europe, or South America, but if I might be permitted to name, I should point out Ceylon as a field for every exertion; but on your high and generous character, I repose my hopes, and should I be thought worthy to labour even with a spade or a mattock in your service, depend, sir, for ever on the gratitude of my family; and for myself, I should only live to testify by my devotion to your service that which by words I never could express.

Deign, sir, to accept my humble but most sincere wishes for your happiness and glory, and permit me the honour to be, right honourable sir,

Your most humble obedient servant,

R. KINSMAN.

Foreign Office: August 13, 1825.

Mr. Canning has to acknowledge the receipt of Mr

Kinsman's letter of the 19th ulto., offering his interest to Mr. Canning in the borough of Callington. 1825

Mr. Canning makes it a rule never to meddle in elections, and must therefore decline availing himself of Mr. Kinsman's obliging offer.

[This young gentleman, aged 25, educated at Cambridge, and qualified at the Temple for the Bar, claims to be able to command the casting votes in case of a contest for the Borough of Callington (one of the numerous old rotten boroughs in Cornwall), so as practically to neutralise the influence of the gentleman ('one of the 'Barings') who supposed he had purchased the patronage of the representative of Callington in Parliament in the usual way. Confident in this position, Mr. Kinsman goes so far in behalf of the local constituency as to offer the Callington seats to Canning for the benefit of the Government; and, in virtue of this offer, of his own qualifications, and of his political admiration for the Government, he applies for employment under Government, in any quarter of the globe, but specifically in Ceylon.

The letter illustrates the manner of proposing a corrupt but not unusual offer to a Minister of the day, and the cloud of empty and complimentary verbiage in which such offers were feebly disguised.

Canning's answer speaks for itself. See also previous offer from another party in August 1824, *ante* (page 221).]

ANON: ('AN ENGLISH GENTLEMAN.')

July 22, 1825.

Sir,—Your sending all letters by the Ambassador's bag from the Continent to the G.P.O. is much to be approved; but I pray you direct your coxcombs of clerks to send them to the post when received, and not detain them in the Foreign Office for a fortnight, which they have done in an instance to cause the writing of this letter from an

ENGLISH GENTLEMAN.

[This amusing and probably not ill-founded complaint is explained by the practice, in those days, of private letters from the Continent being, by favour, brought to England in the Ambassador's bags; and then, it appears, posted in the General Post Office for delivery to the persons to whom they were addressed. The only question being how long it might be before the gentlemen of the Foreign Office would

1825 remember to send the private correspondence to the Post Office for delivery.]

MR. CANNING TO MRS. BOLTON.

Combe Wood: July 26, 1825.

My dear Madam,—I hope to be at Storrs, exactly on this day fortnight, Tuesday, August 9; unless I should hear from you in the interval, that Mr. Bolton is not sufficiently recovered to receive us. I need not say that we shall grieve for his sake at such a report of his health, but we should be still more sorry that our visit should be inconvenient to him or to you, as it must be if he were still suffering.

I am well again, and want nothing but quiet and good air, which I shall find on the banks of Windermere.

Mr. Ellis, I trust, will be able to accompany us; and I shall (with your permission) bring with me one of my private secretaries—Mr. Hervey. Lord Howard, I am sorry to say, must be at his post at the F. O. during my absence; his senior colleague, Mr. Planta, choosing the same period for his holidays at the seaside.

We propose to stay with you the whole of the month of August, during which it is not impossible that your little friend Carlo may join us, on his return from Ireland; whither he is gone to spend the bulk of his vacation with his sister.

Lord Mount Charles was so good as to take charge of him there, and I hope will bring him back. Lord Mount Charles proposes to return through Scotland, and I have ventured to say that he may take Storrs in his way to town, for the purpose of dropping Carlo.

There is one little matter of a medicinal nature, which I know you would not forgive me if I were to omit mentioning.

I drink no wine at present, but am ordered (perhaps without any very solid reason) to drink Seltzer water.

Now as this is mere fancy, nothing is more probable 1825
than that Seltzer water may not be in demand, and consequently (as political economists would infer) not in constant supply, in the North, and nothing could be easier than for me to send a cargo of it from London. But I would not surprise you with a waggon full of stone-bottles, lest you should apprehend that I intended to bottle off your lake.

I think this is the only change which late illness has wrought in me; and it is at all events a wholesome one for Mr. Bolton's delightful claret.

With Mrs. Canning's and my kindest remembrances, believe me ever, dear Madam,

Very sincerely yours,

GEO. CANNING.

[Canning writes to warn Mrs. Bolton of his intended visit to Storrs, of the members of his staff whom he proposes to bring with him, and of the necessity of providing Seltzer water for his own personal consumption. It reads pleasantly enough.]

ANONYMOUS.

The Ultra-ultra journal called *Murray's Paper* will be brought out on January 1 next, in Great George Street, Westminster.

When Lord Hertford's boast (to turn out nineteen of Mr. Canning's friends), uttered only a few days previous to the late attempt to dissolve Parliament, was defeated, the confederates then turned their attention to a morning paper, at the suggestion of Street, late of the *Courier*, and this is it!

The bantling will appear under the auspices of the Duke of York, and the Marquis.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THE PRESS.

Thomas George Street, J. Wilson Croker, Lockhart from Edinburgh, and Mr. Watts, late principal parliamentary reporter to the *Morning Chronicle*, are to be joint editors. They intend making a dead set at *The Old Times* (as far as reporting goes),

1825 and finishing the *New* one. As to the poor *Post*, and the milk and water *Herald*, they also are to be annihilated!

[Though no date is given, the letter must have been written somewhere about the summer of 1825, for it particularly refers to the question of the dissolution of Parliament in the ensuing autumn, which, advocated by the high Tories, opponents of Catholic Emancipation, as in the then state of the public mind likely to prove disastrous to the liberal element in politics, was for that very reason, at the instance of Canning, decided in the negative, and the dissolution was accordingly postponed until 1826.

From this note we learn that the disappointment of the expectation entertained by H.R.H. the Duke of York and the Marquis of Hertford of scattering Canning and his 'Catholic' friends, led to the scheme of a Tory paper to be published in January 1826, to be supported by contributions from the pens of Street, Croker, Lockhart, and Watts.

With regard to the authorship of the anonymous communication, it may be noted that, whether assumed or not, the handwriting is decidedly feminine in character; furthermore, it is sealed with a seal of a coat of arms. Crest, a monkey passant; shield, a chevron between three heads, all much effaced, which Mr. Stapleton would have compared with the seal of another anonymous friend 'Amicus,' but he had not got it: Canning tells him to ask Mr. Planta (the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office); what came of it does not appear.

The information does not appear of vital importance.]

THE REV. A. BURNABY.

Louth: September 26.

Sir,—I am just returned from the York festival, and have received your last, in which you avow your determination never to answer another letter of mine on the subject of Church preferment; but as I never was terrified at trifles, I beg leave to say that I am not in the least disheartened by the noble resolution so gallantly expressed therein, and I again declare how happy I should be if you would be graciously pleased to recommend me to the Lord Chancellor or Lord Liverpool for some ecclesiastical dignity. I can only say this, that I will never make another application either to one or the other; but I shall continue to direct my suit to you, and even if you should act

as you have declared you will, that will rather increase than diminish the number of letters you will receive from me. 1825

Suppose that, regardless of present and future punishment, I was to arm myself with desperation, and make a vacancy in one of the dignities of the Church, the Bishopric of St. David's for instance, who could blame me? But that deed be far from me!

I have taken every opportunity of making myself known to both of the Lords above mentioned; and am I to go for ten years to the Lord Chancellor's door and be insolently told by an audacious pampered livery servant, 'Go along, Lord Eldon never 'sees anyone but by appointment'? No, I will see Lord Eldon damned first, and myself suffer death.

I do not care what course you may pursue, with respect to the applications I make to you. I can only say this, that I will have some preferment, or I will die on the ground where I have taken up my position. That has always been my maxim; and it has invariably succeeded; and it will succeed now; and to save you the trouble of answering my letters (if you think it so) all future ones shall be sent unsealed.—I am, Sir,

Your most humble and faithful servant,

A. BURNABY.

[The outrageous vehemence with which Mr. Burnaby presses his suit for preferment suggests strongly the idea of some slight mental derangement; nevertheless his loud professions of inflexible obstinacy in continuing to urge his suit are rather comically expressed.]

MR. JONES.

[Mr. Jacob Jones of the Inner Temple sends with his compliments 'original poetry' composed by himself and published in the *Morning Post* a few days before. He received no notice.

The poetry commemorated the character of the deceased Sir J. C. Hippisley, Bart.

The meeting of Sir J. Hippisley with his predeceased wife in Heaven (she being descended from Stuarts) is thus described:—

'Who finds that holy wife encircled round
With kindred Stuarts everlasting crowned,
While Brunswick's Georges with their foes adore
All reigning Kings without dissension more!'

Pleasing confusion in the Courts of Heaven!

1825

Then again,

'There's joy in Heaven, but grief on earth below,
And happy Hippisley is our cause of woe!'

The author appears uncertain whether his metre shall be ten, eleven, or twelve syllables to the line, and suits the number to his exigencies.

Canning minutes the effusion in pencil:—

'Happy Hippisley! to have such a poet to sing his dirge!']

JOHN SHAW.

Framwellgate Moor, near Durham: October 22, 1825.

Sir,—I had the honour to receive your letter of August 21, 1824, acknowledging the receipt of mine of the 14th of that month, in which I endeavoured to show the expediency of making an alliance between this country and France; and I hope I will not give offence by resuming the subject.

It was the opinion of an enlightened Arab that there is no arming against contingencies in the moment they arrive, and that he who trusts all things to chance makes a lottery of his life, wherein for one happy event he shall meet with ten unlucky ones! This maxim is true as it concerns private persons, and is applicable to kings and the rulers of nations. It would surely be contrary to the rules of prudence to permit any untoward event to break the good understanding, which now exists between Great Britain and France, and not to prevent for ever the recurrence of war by a timely foresight.

'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,' is a divine precept handed from the highest authority, and if it be essential to the happiness of society that private men should love their neighbours, that high mandate must apply with tenfold force to neighbouring kings. Human laws punish private individuals for the effects of their hatred, but how dreadful is the ire of kings and the controversy of rival nations! What multitudes have fallen in the wars between England and France! Men who probably never saw each other (and therefore could [have] no personal enmity) until they were sent by their governors to destroy each other by wholesale; yet the actors in these horrid scenes were Christians, but acting contrary to the first principle of Christianity, and the dictates of humanity.

Could anything be so glorious to the present Kings of Great Britain and France, as to enter into a firmer friendship and bind the subjects of the two realms with the ties of reciprocal love; to combine the moral and physical strength of the two nations for the mutual benefit and defence of each other, and to exert their united influence to promote the general happiness of mankind. This would be a line of policy congenial to the Christian religion, and worthy of being adopted by the sovereigns of two of the most enlightened nations in the world. The peace, the happiness and prosperity, which this measure would ensure to Great Britain and France, would cause them to be considered as patterns for the imitation of the other Christian nations, and have a strong tendency to induce the Mahometan and Pagan nations to embrace the Christian faith; and our King, though past the meridian of life, may live to see the dawn of that glorious day, when universal peace will pervade the world. 1822

It may be thought presumption in me who am a ploughman, the occupier of a small farm, to communicate to my superiors my crude ideas on a matter of great importance; but the worm encounters as many gross contingencies in her humble reptile state, as does the towering eagle in all her lofty flights; and a great public evil extends its influence to men in every station of life, and its effect may be more severely felt in the cottage of the poor, than in the mansion of the wealthy.

It was the late war (the legitimate offspring of the rivalry of England and France) that raised the price of farming produce, and thereby multiplied the rent, increased taxation and poor rates, and ultimately involved this country in agricultural distress. It was this vortex that swallowed up my little savings of former years, and compels me for the support of my family daily to perform the hardest labour, though stiffened with the toil of fifty years.

My family, including five who have married my children, consists of nine sons, ten daughters, and eight grandchildren. It is the duty of a father to wish for the prosperity of his offspring, and it is natural that I, who have suffered so much from the strife of contending nations, should be anxious to leave behind me a peaceful world for my descendants to inhabit. But I seek the welfare of my family from a great public measure, a measure

1825 that will ensure the stability of the British Empire, the immortal glory of my king, and promote the general happiness of the human race.

It is perhaps too much for me to request that the thoughts of so obscure an individual may be communicated to the King, yet I hope I will be pardoned for expressing such a wish, as it is his Majesty alone who can grant my petition, which is, that he will form an alliance offensive and defensive between Great Britain, France, and America.

JOHN SHAW.

[Though perhaps with reason not judged deserving of any reply, this worthy patriarch ploughman of the North Country presses his advice for an alliance between France and England, and America, in a strain deserving of record.

He shows, with simplicity and correctness, a connection between the failure of his agricultural enterprises and past wars between the countries; his lot is reduced in consequence to that of a laborious ploughman; and he establishes the existence of a genuine right to speak his mind on the subject of the importance of friendly relations between France and England.

He betrays an ignorance natural to his modest occupation, when he tacitly assumes that the endeavours of the King's Government were less directed, than he would wish, to the attainment of the desired object, and where he supposes that his expression of opinion deserved, for its singular soundness, to be particularly submitted to the King himself, as if his Majesty's Ministers only blindly executed the Royal behests.

Far from 'singularity' being a special quality of his opinion, and far from the Royal wishes controlling the action of the Government, Mr. Shaw only faintly reflected the ceaseless anxiety of the Foreign Secretary to preserve amity with France, and entirely failed to show any knowledge (as how, indeed, should he know it?) that the Foreign Secretary had been, for some two years, in constant conflict with the Royal desires in giving effect to a wise and salutary Foreign Policy.]

MR. S. KENT.

Upton upon Severn: October 25, 1825.

There are certain seasons in human life which justify a departure from the rules of established etiquette, and this to me is one of them. When you, sir, have perused the following narrative you will forgive a stranger intruding on the duties of

your high station, and will not be displeased with the freedom. 182
of that confidence which proceeds from a high estimation of your character.

About ten years ago I was introduced at Cheltenham to the Chevalier d'Aurajo Carneiro Alvellos, Chargé d'Affaires fron the Court of Portugal. His high literary attainments, his accomplished manners and noble sentiments, concurred to engage my esteem. I was happy to win his regard, and it has ever since been my boast to number him among my most intimate friends.

The Chevalier was married in the year —— to the Lady Louisa d'Hohenozen, a relation of the House of Braganza. The fruit of this union is a daughter, whom the (then) Prince Regent of Portugal and his Royal Mother were pleased to honour by becoming sponsors by proxy, and the little Donna was baptised at the Ambassador's Chapel by the names Juanna Maria Teresa, after her royal sponsors.

I mention this incident only as a proof of the favour, in which my friend stood with his Sovereign. After a voyage which he subsequently made to the Brazils in the year 1822, the King appointed him Ambassador to the Swiss Cantons, an appointment which has never been recalled, it being the etiquette of that Court that an office once presented by the King cannot be resumed by a Minister, it can be reclaimed only by the Sovereign who signed it, and this resumption his Majesty has never deigned to make.

To the embarrassed state of the Portuguese finances may readily be ascribed the cause, that his Excellency did not at first receive the regular allowances for his mission, but there were other causes. During the absence of the Court at Rio de Janeiro, a deep conspiracy was formed at Lisbon. The Republican party had gained complete ascendency in the Cortes, and when the King arrived in the Tagus he found, by the obstacles opposed to his landing, that his power was departed from him.

The Chevalier hastened from Paris, not only to congratulate his Sovereign on his arrival in his European dominions, but also to obtain some heavy arrears due to himself. He was very graciously received, and his Majesty issued orders to the Court

1825 of Barbarena, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the immediate liquidation of the sums due to the Chevalier Carneiro. But a new scene had now opened. The King of Portugal, from being one of the most despotic monarchs in Europe, was become the most dependent. The governing faction in the Cortes, glad to mortify one who was known to be inimical to their views, disputed the authority of his Majesty over the revenue. The royal mandate was not obeyed.

While public affairs were at this painful issue, the Chevalier distinguished himself by his spirited publications in the royal cause. An article which appeared in the 'Lisbon Gazette' on the 12th of October, 1821, was known to proceed from his pen. Its boldness roused the indignation of the Cortes; he was proscribed, but having timely intelligence of the proceedings against him, he saved himself by flight on board the English packet.

Some time after this his Excellency honoured me with a visit for some weeks in Worcestershire, and from the same library, whence I now presume to address you, wrote that celebrated letter which appeared in the 'British Monitor,' December 1, 1822. This epistle first unveiled to his countrymen and to Europe the real circumstances of the Portuguese monarchy, and was the precursor of that reaction in the public mind, which ended in the restoration of the Crown to its legitimate authority.

How far this letter may have contributed to hasten this happy consummation I cannot pretend to determine. It was immediately translated with avidity into the Continental papers, and much has been ascribed to it; but surely great are the claims of one whose splendid talents have been devoted unremittingly to the service of his Sovereign under the most unpromising auspices. His claims have been felt and acknowledged by the King, yet still the Chevalier remains an unrequited creditor of the Crown, and the sums advanced from his private fortune for the King's service are still unpaid. This strange requital can be ascribed only to one cause. The Chevalier has a powerful enemy at Court in the person of the Marquis de Palmella, whose influence is thus exerted to avenge the severity, with which Carneiro, in the course of his political career, had formerly treated the administration of that Minister.

If I have succeeded in interesting your feelings in favour of

my friend, you may now naturally exclaim, 'Well, what is all this to me? What would you have from me?' Here is my great difficulty—a difficulty that in the contemplation of this letter has been continually before my eyes. Very many times have I taken up my pen to address you on this subject, and as often have my efforts been paralyzed by the strangeness of the attempt, and by the apprehension of making that appear ridiculous, which I feel to be deserving of a different consideration. 1821

In the present 'high and palmy state' of our nation's grandeur, at a time when she is courted or feared by every other State on earth, her influence is particularly great in the Court of Lisbon. The voice of our Cabinet is there listened to as to that of an oracle, and among those who form that Cabinet is one held there in considerable esteem—one whose name is identified to future times with the proudest era of our country's greatness.

Think not, sir, that I am about to assail you with the low arts of adulation; my respect for you would forbid such an artifice. I have spoken in the simplicity of my heart.

The sole object of this letter is, (if such a measure is not utterly incompatible with propriety,) to entreat your interference by recommending the claims of his Excellency the Chevalier Carneiro d'Aurajo Alvellos to the consideration of his Court. Such a recommendation from Mr. Canning, however slightly given, would immediately effect him that justice which his own merits have failed to obtain.

I know that I am guilty of a most daring presumption; I know that such an application is unbecoming from one unknown to you, perhaps unpardonable. All this I know, and yet I presume.

Weeks and months have rolled away since first this project entered my mind. Still I rejected the thought as preposterous, and still it returned with accumulated strength. The enthusiasm of friendship has at length subdued every repugnance, and though I may fail in effecting my purpose, my mind is easier since I have braved the attempt.

Perhaps it may be some extenuation of my presumption to mention that, among other political essays, the Chevalier, some time ago, published an interesting pamphlet on the politics of Mr. Canning. This circumstance can add nothing to the merits

1825 of his claim, but possibly may give him some title to your consideration.

Among the happy privileges of greatness the most enviable is the power to confer a kindness without personal sacrifice. The exercise of power, the favour of sovereigns, the administration of the wise and intelligent, and the less discerning applause of the multitude, are all acceptable to human pride; but the statesman, who from his elevation can discern and redress injured worth and can exercise the power a nation has delegated to redress the wrong or to advance the weak, has a far nobler claim to our sympathy. He addresses the best feelings of the human heart.

I shall never blush for the motive that prompted this letter, however inadequate my abilities may have proved for such a task. If you, sir, have the power to accomplish a good object without violation of propriety, I know the disposition will not be wanting; if not, the honour of a note in reply will perhaps justify me in my own eyes, but if my offence is altogether unpardonable your silence will be a sufficient rebuke.

I have only to add that I have received no communication from the Chevalier for many weeks. He is wholly ignorant of my application.

With sentiments of high esteem, I have the honour to remain, sir (very respectfully),

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

SAMUEL KENT.

I am one of a class of persons almost peculiar to this country, who fill at once the station of merchants with the rank of private gentlemen. I was intimate with the late Lord Beauchamp; I am well known to the Hon. Col. Lygon, M.P. for this county, to the Rev. Josh. Martin (brother-in-law to Mr. Sturges Bourne), the Rev. George Martin, Canon of Exeter, the Rev. H. C. Renowed, vice-master of Trinity College, Cambridge, &c., &c. To many such I would refer fearlessly should occasion need inquiry into my respectability.

Foreign Office: October 29, 1825.

Sir,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th. In answer to it, I must only refer

you to the impressions which you mention as having been long uppermost in your mind. To interfere in support of the private claims of a Foreign Minister upon his own Sovereign, would indeed be both extraordinary and unwarrantable. 1825

You may have imagined perhaps the possible existence of circumstances, at the present time, or the present case, authorising a deviation from the general principle of which you describe yourself as being fully aware.

After stating that no such circumstances exist, I need only refer you to the general rule so properly laid down by yourself, for what must necessarily be my answer to your suggestions in favour of M. A. C. Alvellos.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

GEO. CANNING.

[How to make application to a British Foreign Secretary to use his influence with a Foreign Power to obtain a settlement for the claims of a servant of that Power, cannot be learnt even from Mr. Kent's guarded and well phrased letter.

There could be only one reply, and that Canning promptly returned, 'Nothing could be done.'

The idea floating in Mr. Kent's mind was not absolutely impracticable; unfortunately for his friend the Portuguese diplomat, Mr. Kent presented it to Canning in a descriptive and theoretical shape without business-like substantiality; he thus could only meet with a refusal.]

COUNT DE B——O.

Bruxelles, le 15 Octobre 1825. Aux soins de Messieurs Dollpres Mieg & Co., Négociants à Bruxelles.

Monsieur,—Les grands hommes ont fait toujours le bonheur de leur vie de reposer dans la bienfaisance particulière des soins et des fatigues de leur carrière politique.

Cette considération peut seule me faire espérer que Votre Excellence daignera trouver le temps de lire ces lignes, au milieu

1825 des affaires de l'Europe et du globe, qu'elle dirige si glorieusement pour son nom et pour la prospérité de l'Angleterre. Je n'ose pas me flatter que sa patience aille jusqu'à lire les deux opuscules, que je viens de publier à Bruxelles, et dont je prie Votre Excellence d'agréer l'hommage dans les deux exemplaires annexés.

Elle verra dans celui sur les Cent Jours l'explication de la haine et de la persécution atroce, dont j'ai été l'objet durant huit années en France, pour prix de 29 blessures, de la perte de mes membres, et au sacrifice fait aux Français, le plus ingrat des peuples, de trois millions de fortune. Il a suffi que les puissants d'aujourd'huy ne m'ayent pas jugé étranger aux tentations de 1814 et de 1815, pour qu'ils m'ayent écrasé avec la férocité qui leur est propre.

Votre Excellence trouvera dans la brochure attribuée à un Turc, que j'ai rendu à l'Angleterre l'hommage, que lui doivent tous les êtres pensants de la civilisation actuelle. J'ai admiré, en les combattant, la valeur des Anglais, et j'ai été fier de songer que le sang Anglais coule par moitié dans mes veines, car feue ma mère était une S——d. Votre Excellence me pardonnera si, à la page 51, j'ai pris la liberté de la nommer individuellement: elle trouvera aux pages 23, 48, 61, 75 ce que j'ai dit de son illustre Patrie. Vingt années de services, la perte de mes membres, de ma fortune, de mon repos, ont été payés par huit années de tortures, de secret, de séquestration dans la forteresse de Joux, et ailleurs—enfin la France a cru me faire une grande grâce en me bannissant de son sol, et je suis venu chercher un asyle sur la terre hospitalière de la Belgique.

En 1813, j'étais venu en Angleterre dans le but d'y réclamer la succession de ma mère. Mes adversaires profitèrent des circonstances où se trouvait l'Europe, pour présenter mon voyage en Angleterre sous les couleurs odieuses de la conspiration, mais au fond pour se débarrasser de mes réclamations légitimes sur l'héritage maternel. Un journal (je crois le *Sun*, si ma mémoire est fidèle) osa même publier vers le 20 Janvier 1814, que j'étais arrêté, tandis que je vivais paisiblement à Londres même. J'y répondis le lendemain: mais les impressions restent, et je fus frappé de l'Alien Bill.

Lord Sidmouth, alors ministre de l'Intérieur, fut trompé: je ne m'en plains pas; en cas pareil un ministre doit plutôt risquer

une injustice individuelle, que de hasarder de nourrir un serpent dans son pays. 1823

Cependant il se conduisit avec tous les égards d'un gentilhomme envers moi. Dans la crainte qu'un aussi long voyage à travers l'Europe, et avec quatre personnes (car j'avais avec moi une nièce et deux domestiques), ne devînt plus dispendieux que je ne le pourrais supporter, à l'improviste, on m'offrit de la part de son Excellence cent guineas au nom du Gouvernement anglais, et une voiture de voyage. Je préférai emprunter à d'énormes intérêts, et je refusai les dons, quoique généreux, que ma délicatesse ne m'aurait pas permis d'accepter de la part même du ministre, qui m'expulsait de son pays.

Lancé aujourd'huy sur la terre, dépouillé de mes pensions, de mes retraits, de mes traitements, par la France, ruiné pour elle dans ma fortune personnelle, je ne cacherai pas à Votre Excellence que si j'avais aujourd'huy ce que je refusai, et dus, en de telles circonstances, refuser de la part d'un ministre anglais, j'en ferais la base de mon avenir, et la Grande Bretagne, qui règne dans les cinq parties du monde connu, ne s'en apercevrait assurément pas. Je ne rougis point de cette démarche ; c'est à mes assassins d'en rougir, eux qui m'y ont réduit. Lorsque celuy, qui régna sur l'Europe, je vis réduit à vendre sa vaisselle pour avoir du pain sur le rocher de son exil, comment rougirais-je de l'honorable pauvreté où m'a réduit la plus noire ingratitude, et la plus atroce oppression ? Et si je m'adresse de préférence à Votre Excellence, c'est que parmi les puissants de l'Europe je n'en connais pas de plus digne d'exercèr un bienfait, et de lui ôter ce qu'il a de pénible par l'éclat de ses vertus, et la noblesse de son caractère.

Je suis avec un respect infini de Votre Excellence

Le très humble et très obéissant serviteur

LE COMTE G. LIBREY DE B ——O,

Ancien Colonel.

ABSTRACT OF THE REPORT RECEIVED FROM THE HOME OFFICE OF COUNT B——O'S CASE.

Count Bagnano arrived in England April 22, 1813, from Heligoland, accompanied by a young lady, whom he described as his niece, but who afterwards proved not to be so. His professed object in coming to this country was to claim some pro-

1825 perty upon the death of Mr. S——d, a near relative of his mother. He appears to have been engaged in a transaction of a somewhat swindling nature during his stay at Cheltenham, where he was allowed to remain, until he received certain papers from Italy to corroborate his claims, which were received, but did not establish his right to the property.

Count B——o had served under the French in Italy, and acknowledged to have acted as a Revolutionary enthusiast, but professed to have altogether changed his principles. The report of his general conduct during his stay in England is not a favourable one, and it seems that he was more than once ordered to quit the country, but it does not appear by the memorandum that the order was ever enforced.

['Le Comte G. B——o, Ancien Colonel,' sends copies of two pamphlets written by him—one, on 'Les Cent Jours,' the other is only described as 'attribuée à un Turc,' and highly laudatory of Great Britain.

The Count's mother was a S——d, his father, one may guess, an Italian. He had taken the part of a revolutionary enthusiast in the early days of the war, and afterwards served in the French army. He claims to have received twenty-nine wounds, and lost limbs in the course of his service. He accuses France of dire ingratitude, apparently because the Revolutionary soldier of fortune did not obtain from the legitimate monarchy of France any particular regard or consideration.

He came over in 1813 to England to try and establish a right to some property in his mother's family, but failed to do so.

He travelled with a lady (who was not 'his niece,' as he alleged) and two servants, and lived some time at Cheltenham in no good odour. He asserts that the English Home Office requested him to leave the country, and offered him one hundred guineas to facilitate his departure, which he refused.

His fulsome adulation of England and Canning aimed at obtaining the hundred guineas, which he alleged had been once promised him by the British, and which, if now granted, he proposed to make the starting point of his future life; however, the old adventurer got no answer.]

MR. W. WORDSWORTH.

Rydal Mount, Ambleside: November 21.

Dear Sir,—I am about to take what I trust you will not deem an unwarrantable liberty; and knowing the value of your time, I will not trespass upon it by further apology, tho' I am going to ask a favour. My eldest son was originally designed for Cambridge, but as the time approached for his leaving school, he expressed so decidedly his preference for the Oxford course of study, that I sent him thither, though it was too late to get him admitted into any of the working colleges (as they are called), he therefore became a gentleman commoner of New College, where of course he has no prospect beyond that of his education. He is of studious habits, and my desire is that he should continue at Oxford some time after he takes his degree, to pursue, with the advantages of the place, a more extensive course of reading than an undergraduate can enter upon. A fellowship would enable him to do this under the most favourable circumstances; and Merton College has been recommended as one that elects its fellows from other societies. I have therefore been looking out among such of my friends as are likely to have influence with the Warden and Fellows, in whom the election is vested, and I hope you will not deem it an act of presumption if, with these views, I have applied to you. The friend who recommended it to my son to try for this desirable object has furnished me with a list of the electors, with some notices of their supposed connections, which I take leave to enclose, requesting that you would have the kindness to speak a word in support of his pretentions to anyone, with whom it may not be disagreeable to you to exert your influence. My son will take his degree towards the end of next year, and an election may probably take place before he becomes eligible, but it is not the less desirable for us to lose no time in procuring friends for a future occasion. 1833

Yesterday I called at Storrs, where I had the pleasure of seeing Mr. and Mrs. Bolton in health, except that Mr. B. was somewhat fearful of an attack of gout; he was to leave Storrs this morning. Mrs. B. follows him to Liverpool in a few days. With great satisfaction I learned from them that Mr. Huskisson spoke of your own health as continuing to improve. I hope

1825 you may be tempted to revisit Westmoreland next summer. Mr. Barber's horse played him a singular trick the other day; it fell with him going up hill on the King's highway.—With high respect, I have the honour to be, my dear sir,

Very sincerely yours,
WM. WORDSWORTH.

ENCLOSURE.

*Capel*, Honourable, brother to Lord Essex; Greville Howard of Stevens Park, his intimate friend.
*Griffith*, resident at Merton; his friend the Bishop of Oxford.
*Oglander*, Sir William Oglander and Lord de Dunstanville.
*Marsham*, Lord Romney, and Dr. Marsham, rector of Kirby Overblow, a connection of Lord Egremont.
*Addington*, Lord Sidmouth.
*Whish*, in the War Office; his friend, Lord Folkestone.
*Compton*, a Hampshire family.
*Herbert*, Lord Carnarvon, his brother; his friend, Lord Pembroke; his uncle Lord Egremont; intimate with Lord Holland.
*Mills-Mildmay*, friend, Lord Folkestone.
*Cockerell*, Sir John Leach; Dr. Goodenough.
*Hammond*, his connections in the Diplomatic line.
*Bouverie*, Lord Folkestone.
*Grey*,
*Rooke*, Sir Harry Burrard; Revd. G. Burrard.
*Seymour*, the Sergeant-at-Arms to the House of Commons.
*Pigou*, and *Tyndall*, both Barristers.
*Buckley*, Lord de la Warr.
*Bridges*, a Kentish family.
*Tierney*, (q).

Seaford: November 26, 1825.

Dear Sir,—I have very great pleasure in complying with your request so far as I have any power to do so.

I see two names in the list of voters which you have enclosed to me, with whom it is possible that, if not pre-engaged, the expression of my wishes in your son's behalf may have some weight—Mr. Hammond and Mr. Mildmay. I write to the father of the former; and I

procure an application to be made to the brother of the latter, in the hope, and with the very sincere desire that my intercession may be successful.—I have the honour to be, dear sir, very truly, 1825

Your faithful servant,

GEO. CANNING.

I have likewise written to Mr. Tyndall (supposing him to be the Barrister of that name) and have requested a friend to write to Mr. Addington.

Rydal Mount: November 30.

My dear Sir,—I was sitting down to express an apprehension that I had troubled you prematurely, when your letter reached me; for the prompt and very friendly manner in which you have met my wishes, I beg you to accept my sincere and cordial thanks. From the first I had feared that my son was ineligible for a fellowship at Merton on account of his birth-place; but an experienced Oxford friend was of a different opinion; he pointed out two precedents from another college; which left no doubt in my mind that my son was free to present himself as a candidate. A fact has recently come to my knowledge, which introduces so marked a distinction, that I am afraid the precedents on which we relied will not bear us out. Under this apprehension I write, that whatever opportunities may offer you may give yourself no further trouble in the affair unless I am encouraged by future inquiries to proceed, of which I shall take leave to inform you.

The regret I cannot but feel on having imposed trouble upon my friends, which may unavoidably prove fruitless, is in regard to myself, more than counterbalanced by the proofs it has afforded me of zealous exertions and good wishes, on the part of so many by whom it is an honour to be favoured, and to no one do I feel more obliged than to yourself.

An act, something between a dethronement and an abdication, has put an end to Mr. John Coleridge's short reign in the 'Quarterly Review.' His successor, Mr. Lockhart, appears too young and too unexperienced for such a trust, but independent

1825 of this, the English public, especially the literary part of it, will not much relish the prospect of the two leading reviews being both conducted by Scotchmen. We are surely a good-natured people, or very supine to let this go on without opposition. Nor is it a trifle that an instance has never yet been known (unless perhaps, we except that of Smollett) of a thorough-bred Scotchman being able to write English with idiomatic grace and purity; and of that which a N. Briton cannot write as an Englishman, how is he to judge as one? The Scotch having an idiom of their own, labour in these points under greater disadvantages than foreigners.

May I beg my compliments to Mrs. Canning, and believe me to remain, my dear sir, very faithfully,

Your obedient and much obliged servant,

WM. WORDSWORTH.

[This pleasant correspondence, which includes a letter to the poet from Mr. Canning, and two from Wordsworth himself, shows the friendly relations between the poet and the statesman, and explains one of the attractions which led Mr. Canning to pay visits to Mr. Bolton's house, Storrs, in the Lake District.

Oxford was then old Oxford, and fellowships were obtained by canvassing and election.

The gossip as to the editorship of the 'Quarterly' is amusing—particularly in reference to the consequences of the old chief's (Dr. Giffard's) withdrawal. (See his letters above quoted.)]

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE
LONDON


00024440

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 18 July, 2018